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INTRODUCTION 
The Current Climate 
In 1950, Rev. James P. Lyons, described Thomas Aquinas’s importance in the study 
of marriage as follows: 
Saint Thomas and his school have perhaps done more than any other 
theologians to clarify the structure of marriage and to indicate its place in the 
divine order of things . . . But beyond this, Thomism has a special value in a 
study of marriage, and especially in a study of the philosophical note of the 
essential structure of marriage.  For Thomism is, par excellence, [quoting 
Gilson] ‘the theology of the natural.’1 
Lyons also quotes L. Misserey who commented on the French translation of the 
Supplement to the Summa Theologiae, “Without any exaggeration one can say that Saint 
Thomas has laid out for future generations the diagram of Christian marriage.”2  In fact, it 
would not be inaccurate to say that until the 1960s, Saint Thomas’s doctrine of marriage 
was considered synonymous with official Catholic teaching. 
The Dismissal of Thomistic Marriage Theology 
However, since mid-century the prevalent social tumult has largely conduced to the 
rejection of Saint Thomas’s treatment of marriage.  The same forces that militated against 
the Church’s perennial teaching singled out Saint Thomas in particular. In his 1993 article, 
“Le remedium concupiscentiae comme fin du mariage,” Theo Belmans, O. Praem., 
catalogues numerous scholars and theologians spanning the 20th century who criticized 
Saint Thomas’s teaching on matrimony.3  Belmans’s more extensive work, Le sens objectif 
de l’agir humain: pour relire la morale conjugale de Saint Thomas, appearing as it did 
                                                 
1 J.P. Lyons, The Essential Structure of Marriage:  A Study of the Thomistic Teaching on the Natural 
Institution,  Catholic University of America Press, (Washington D.C.) 1950. 
2 L. Misserey, Le Mariage, (French translation of the Summa Theologica, Supplement), t.1., 6.  Desclee, Paris, 
1931. 
3 Belmans, “Le remedium concupiscentiae comme fin de mariage.” Revue Thomiste, XCIII (1993), pp.289-
303.  Among the authors Belmans cites as directly rejecting or contradicting Aquinas’s teaching are H. Doms, 
J. Fuchs, Bernhard Haering, J.-M. Aubert, B. Krempel, L. Janssens, Richard McCormick, John Noonan, M. 
Mueller, D. M. Pruemmer, to name only a few;  Belmans traces the roots of this movement to the 19th century 
work of F. X. Linsenmann.  
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toward the end of the period of greatest tumult and confusion, contains an even more 
exhaustive list of opponents of Saint Thomas on this subject.4 
Undoubtedly part of the reason for this antagonism was the very fact that Saint 
Thomas was identified with Church teaching.  The comprehensiveness that made him 
universally praised and consulted up until that time brought him under attack afterward.  
Certainly his very emphasis on order and law provoked much of the opposition. 
At the same time, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, a concurrent problem arose.  
Thinkers who claimed to support or agree with Aquinas often ended by misinterpreting or 
misconstruing his teaching, as we shall see in the case of Guy de Broglie in chapter 1, and 
John Milhaven in chapter 2.  Even those scholars who do not adopt a stance of dissidence 
with respect to the Church may be unaware how easily the categories of modern philosophy 
can insinuate themselves into one’s reading of Saint Thomas. 
Belmans summarizes the impact of this dismissal and confusion thus: 
Le manque de familiarité avec la doctrine de saint Augustin et saint 
Thomas, avalisée depuis bien des siècles par l’Eglise—sinon son rejet formel 
qui n’est que trop fréquent—nous a valu la situation que nous vivons 
actuellement en Occident.5 
Time for a Renewed Interest 
The last twenty years has seen a renaissance in marriage theology, inspired, fueled 
and enriched by John Paul II’s “Theology of the Body”.  One aspect of genius in John Paul 
II’s masterwork is his use of marriage as prism through which a catechesis of the entire 
faith may be given.  In a parallel trend, scholars have been returning to Thomas Aquinas in 
recent years with new vigor and an appreciation for ressourcement. 
Yet these two trends rarely converge.  Despite new interest in both the area of 
marriage studies and of Thomistic law theory, recent studies of Saint Thomas’s marriage 
theology have been relatively sparse.  In the realm of marriage studies, Aquinas’s account is 
viewed as outdated  because of its emphasis on the juridical.6  The contractual terms in 
                                                 
4 Belmans, T. G. Le sens objectif de l’agir humain: pour relire la morale conjugale de Saint Thomas; Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, Citta del Vaticano, 1980. 
5 Theo Belmans, “Le ‘remedium concupiscentiae’ comme fin du mariage,” p. 289. 
6 For example, in describing changes in the approach to marriage found in Vatican II documents, Tracey 
Rowland claims a general sense of relief in the Church’s abandonment of “the Stoic categories for analysing 
the sacrament of marriage.  Marriage manuals no longer speak of marital dues and rights and reduce the whole 
reality of marital fidelity to parental responsibilities.” (Tracey Rowland,  Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of 
Pope Benedict XVI. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 40 ). Rowland descibes the writings of the 
popes since Vatican II as tacitly in contrast with the Thomistic tradition, moving toward “an overtly scriptural 
presentation of the meaning of human sexuality with reference to a fundamentally personalist ontology, not 
narrowly focused on any particular faculty of soul but on the entire person . . .rather than with reference to the 
principles of contract law.” (Ibid., p 40-41).  Meanwhile, canon lawyer Ladislas Orsy complains that there is 
not enough theology in the new Code of Canon Law: “Inevitably, there is a lack of harmony and cohesion; at 
times the new and the old coexist in an uneasy and precarious balance.  For instance, after the initial emphasis 
on marriage as a covenant, the canons revert to the contractual terminology; no less than forty times they 
speak of the marital contract or of contracting marriage!” (Ladislas Orsy, Marriage in Canon Law: Texts and 
Comments, reflections and questions. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1986, p. 47.)  Paul Palmer’s 
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which he discusses the sacrament, the vocabulary of duty that he applies to marital 
intimacy, and the account of procreation as the couple’s duty to the human race mystify 
enthusiasts of the poetic, humanistic account drawn from the late Holy Father.  
Significantly, John Paul II did more to bring about the current richness in marriage theology 
than any other person, yet he did not dismiss Saint Thomas.  As Michael Waldstein shows, 
the Theology of the Body advances nothing contrary to Thomas’s account, though several 
of its themes represent developments and translations of Aquinas’s teaching.7 
Meanwhile, Aquinas’s theories of law and government continue to provoke lively 
interest in the fields of political philosophy and jurisprudence.  While some of this research 
addresses various aspects of marriage, these references tend to be tangential or at least 
conclusions deduced from Saint Thomas’s principles.  Scholars like John Finnis and Jean 
Porter, for example, champion a revival of Aquinas’s natural law theory; yet when they 
discuss marriage, it is to employ his teaching to advance their own positions rather than 
investigating seriously Thomas’s own teaching on marriage.8  In the case of Porter, this 
leads to a position directly opposed to Aquinas’s doctrine. Very rarely does current 
scholarship study Aquinas’s own account of marriage in order to find what contributions it 
can make to theology in light of present developments. 
Certainly in some quarters, it is assumed that since Aquinas furnished the model for 
marriage theology for nearly 700 years, his teaching has therefore been thoroughly mined 
for all that it can contribute to the current conversation.  However, this assumption not only 
neglects the new considerations that have opened up in the theology of marriage lately.  It 
also underestimates the discoveries made in the last century in every area of theology, by 
returning to the actual texts of Saint Thomas in ressourcement. 
A Methodological Obstacle 
However, the richness that has arisen from increased ressourcement brings to light 
one possible factor in the sparse attention that has been paid to Aquinas’s marriage theology 
lately.  Saint Thomas of course never finished his Summa Theologiae, so his only 
                                                                                                                                                     
arguments against the construal of marriage as a contract will be examined in Chapter 1, but Orsy’s 
astonishment that marriage should be discussed as a contract in the Code of Canon Law  itself seems nothing 
short of absurd.  One of the aims of this paper will be to show that Aquinas’s approach to marriage is very 
much “focused on the entire person” and deeply theological—not in spite of his language of “dues and rights” 
or “principles of contract law,” but precisely in and through the meaning of the juridical. 
7See Waldstein,“John Paul II and Saint Thomas on Love and the Trinity.” First part: Anthropotes, 18/1 (2002), 
pp. 113-138; and second part:  Anthropotes, 18 (2002), pp. 269-286. 
8 See Porter, Ministers of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal Authority (Grand Rapids, Mich: William 
B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2010), in which Porter argues that Aquinas’s jurisprudence would allow for 
homosexual marriages; Kevin Flannery points out the errors in this interpretation in his response: “Marriage, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Jean Porter,” (Journal of Catholic Social Thought, Vol 8(2011):2, pp. 277-289).  John 
Finnis uses Aquinas’s natural law theory to argue against homosexual marriage, but he also fails to grasp 
some essential elements of Thomas’s theory of law.  His approach will be discussed very briefly in Chapter 4. 
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substantial treatise on marriage is found in his student work, the Commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard.  Thus, in the Providence of God, Aquinas left no lengthy 
discussions of marriage after his  earliest analysis, though marriage does receive two much 
shorter considerations in the Summa Contra Gentiles.  These texts, along with a few brief 
references in the Scripture commentaries, Aquinas’s conference on the sacraments, and 
similar smaller texts, are all that we have of Saint Thomas’s marriage theology. 
One result of this fact is that for the most part we will never know what developments 
occurred in Saint Thomas’s thinking with regard to this subject from the time he was a 
student at the University of Paris until the end of his career.9  Another consideration that 
students of Thomas must keep in  mind is that in his most extensive account of marriage, 
Thomas was compelled to follow the organizational structure of themes in Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences.  This fact in itself is no insurmountable obstacle, for Thomas’s commentary is 
sufficiently indicative of his own unique vision. 
That Aquinas’s teaching on marriage changed very little over the course of the rest of 
his career is witnessed to by the fact that his students, commonly believed to be under the 
direction or inspiration of Thomas’s socius Reginald of Piperno,10 transferred his text from 
the Commentary on the Sentences directly to the Supplementum virtually without change.  
Over the last forty years, scholarship has increasingly relied on the treatise on marriage in 
the Supplementum alone, since it is commonly considered to be a faithful summary of the 
text in the Commentary on the Sentences.  Nevertheless, this is a text that Thomas did not 
compose.  While universally accepted as containing the substance of the treatise on 
marriage in the Commentary on the Sentences, the portion of the Supplementum that deals 
with marriage does omit portions of Thomas’s original treatment of marriage.  It seems 
impossible that such an abbreviation of the text could occur without its losing at the very 
least some nuances that the original text possessed.  Since one of the criticisms laid at 
Aquinas’s door is a certain heavy-handedness, a lack of delicacy in approaching the 
complex nature of marital relations, it seems especially important to attend to these very 
nuances as much as possible.  Nevertheless, recent scholarship almost unanimously relies 
on the Supplementum rather than the Commentary on the Sentences when considering Saint 
Thomas’s teaching on marriage.11 
It is therefore as a small attempt to help remedy this lack that we include our own 
translation of Saint Thomas’s treatise on marriage (In Sent. IV, Distinctiones 26-42) as 
                                                 
9 An important exception to this statement is the subtle but exciting development traced by Frère Leblanc, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 3 (Leblanc, M.  “Amour et procreation dans la théologie de saint Thomas,” 
Revue Thomiste, XCII,  (1992) 433-459).  Frère Leblanc’s discovery is a testament to us of how rewarding and 
fruitful it can prove to meditate on Aquinas’s own words in a spirit of docility without importing the 
categories of subsequent commentators.  Through his careful and humble study, Frère Leblanc uncovered a 
subtle shift over the course of Saint Thomas’s career and through the medium of his study of Scripture which 
affected Saint Thomas’s manner of viewing marriage. 
10 Recent editors of Thomas’s works, including the Leonine editors, reject with considerable indignation the 
attribution of the Supplement to Reginald (De Textu Critico Leonino Summae Theologiae, Torino: Marietti, 
1948, pp. xii).  See part II of this work for a brief discussion of the authorship of the Supplement. 
11 Two notable exceptions are the article of Kevin Flannery, OP, “Marriage, Thomas Aquinas, and Jean 
Porter,” and that  of Frere Marie Leblanc, mentioned in footnote 9. 
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Appendix A.12    It is a substantial text which was accessible only with great difficulty until 
recent technology made the Latin text of the Parma edition available online.  Nevertheless, 
the decline in its use as a source over the last forty years coincides with the decline in 
fluency in Latin reading.  This translation will make available to current researchers 
Aquinas’s most extensive and thorough treatment of marriage in English.   
The broader availability and accessibility of this lengthier text may facilitate deeper 
readings of Aquinas’s account of marriage which will reveal the inner coherency of his 
approach as well as its relation to the most important themes of theology. 
The Aims of the Present Work 
The purpose of this thesis is not primarily to defend Saint Thomas’s treatment of 
marriage against the critics of the last 40 years.  Rather, it is to discover the beauty and 
richness of his teaching by delving into his writings themselves.  Therefore, we will limit 
our consideration of the complaints against Thomas to a more general treatment.  Rather 
than trying to disprove each writer’s argument in detail, we will address a few discrete 
works that in some way exemplify current attitudes and misconceptions concerning 
Aquinas’s marriage theology.  The broader attitude of dismissal that unfortunately greets 
Saint Thomas in much of current academia can be conveyed more precisely by the 
following summaries of the charges laid against him. 
The criticisms of Saint Thomas’s approach to marriage include but are not limited to 
the following: 
 Aquinas treats marriage too much as a legal contract, and not enough as a 
sacrament or covenant. 
 He overemphasizes the physical aspect of marriage and while not giving 
enough attention to the “unitive end” of marriage or the spiritual benefits 
marriage offers to the spouses. 
 His emphasis on procreation is a base portrayal that is either too physical, too 
animal, or too juridical. 
 He views marriage as a means to the numerical increase of the human race. 
 He describes the marital act not as a mutual self-giving but as a marital “debt.” 
 He considers pleasure in the marital act sinful.  In fact, he teaches that marital 
intercourse for any other reason than proper solam procreationem would be a 
sin. 
 In general, his ubiquitous use of legal terminology strips the beauty from what 
should be the paramount relationship of love among humans. 
                                                 
12 The translation is of the Parma edition of the Commentary on the Sentences as found at 
corpusthomisticum.org, since the more recent Paris edition extends only to Book IV, Distinction 22.  
Irregularities in the text have been cross-referenced with the Piana edition, and noted. 
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One of the most pervasive complaints about Aquinas’s treatment of marriage today is 
that Thomas focuses overwhelmingly on the juridical aspects of marriage, while 
undervaluing the saving power of the sacrament.  Ironically, until the 1960s historical 
accounts of the sacrament credited Saint Thomas with defending marriage soteriologically 
in contrast to theologians before him.  Nevertheless, Thomas’s firm teaching that marriage 
does confer grace seems faint praise to modern sensibilities, since his assertion of the grace 
of marriage is hardly balanced against legal aspects of consent, the language of rights and 
duties (particularly in regard to the marital act), and the role of marriage as a remedy for 
concupiscence. 
However, a broader understanding of Aquinas’s entire work will show that he is fully 
aware of the beauty and grace-giving power of marriage.  Though his style is pithy, each 
word is weighted with meaning and draws upon numerous other topics that he discusses. 
Indeed, all of Thomas’s theology is so intimately connected that a thorough knowledge of 
his entire teaching is necessary to understanding any given part.  Therefore, a fruitful 
understanding of his writing on marriage will require an explanation of several other 
subjects he treats, such as the interaction of grace and nature, the definition of slavery, the 
nature of the common good, the meaning of concupiscence, the structure of virtue, and, 
above all, the nature of law for Saint Thomas.  By referring to these varied and rich 
subjects, it will become clear that Thomas’s juridical approach to marriage is not only 
deliberate, but it partakes in a vision of theology that spans time and the universe. 
The Plan of the Present Work 
The thesis of this dissertation is that Saint Thomas’s account of marriage has 
something to contribute to the current conversation on marriage, not in spite of his 
extremely juridical approach, but precisely because of it.  For Aquinas, marriage serves as a 
microcosm for the relationship of nature and grace.  But more particularly, the juridical in 
marriage—the legal underpinnings of the sacrament, the aspect of “debt” in the conjugal 
act, the elements of justice integral to marital love, and matrimony’s relation to the 
community—illustrates to us the centrality of the juridical to the entire economy of 
salvation.  As John Paul II uses marriage as the springboard to catechise about the entire 
faith, Aquinas sees the loving Providence of God through the lens of law.  Law is the theme 
by which Saint Thomas integrates nature and grace; it is the legal underpinning of marriage 
that elevates marriage above the biological and the animal, and links it essentially with the 
most eschatological aspects of human life.  Nor should this importance of law be 
understood according to the limited perspective of the forensic model of justification, but 
rather law for Aquinas is  the staircase that God offers to man in order to bring him into the 
highest active participation in his own salvation. 
Accordingly, we will consider a few of the many aspects of the juridical as they 
pertain to matrimony.  In chapter one a general discussion of the elements of marriage as 
Thomas describes them will reveal the dependence of the sacrament on legal categories.  
We will see that the reason for Aquinas’s constant attention to the legal requirements of 
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marriage lies not in a tendency to reduce this sacrament to a commercial contract.  On the 
contrary, according to Saint Thomas, law is the medium that allows for an astonishing level 
of human cooperation with divine grace in matrimony. 
The consideration of the essence of marriage will continue with the most important of 
the four causes, the final cause.  Aquinas’s much-derided teaching that procreation is the 
primary end of marriage is not in itself open to debate, as it is the perennial teaching of the 
Church.  Yet we will see in Guy de Broglie’s attempt to interpret this teaching for 
contemporary readers that the assumptions of modern philosophy can obscure the true 
meaning of Saint Thomas’s theology even for apologists, like deBroglie, who may be very 
familiar with him.  DeBroglie’s misconstruals will also give us an initial indication of the 
importance of understanding the common good in Aquinas, if we are to understand well his 
teaching about marriage. 
Chapter Two will undertake a consideration of the conjugal act in Aquinas.  Saint 
Thomas is accused of grudgingly admitting other ends to marital intercourse only under the 
collective title “remedium concupiscentiae,” which, for thinkers like Milhaven, translates 
into the condemnation of any pleasure the married couple might enjoy in the physical 
expressions of love.  Notwithstanding the numerous authors13  who have shown its 
groundlessness, the myth of Aquinas’s opposition to marital pleasure persists.14  In chapter 
two we will add our own explanation to the list of those debunking this enduring error; we 
will look at Aquinas’s attitude toward pleasure in the larger context of the remedium 
concupiscentiae and its indispensable role in marital love.   Secondly this chapter will 
explore Saint Thomas’s general use of the term “marital debt,” which evokes a certain spirit 
of forced labor for modern minds.  The notion of debt or duty that seems so alien to a 
contemporary idea of spontaneous love and gift of self actually corresponds to the 
quintessential act of the virtue of justice.  In chapter two we will see in an initial way how 
justice and love work in symbiosis in the contracting of this debt and its fulfillment. 
The theme of the interconnection between justice and charity continues in chapter 
three, which deals with the love between the spouses.  Both at the natural level—
friendship—and at the supernatural level—charity—love depends upon a priority of justice.  
Chapter three will consider Saint Thomas’s dramatic statement that “marriage is the greatest 
friendship,” by first exploring the definition of friendship.  This exposition will show that 
for Saint Thomas, justice furnishes the skeletal structure that allows friendship to exist.  An 
investigation into the shared good that makes marriage the greatest friendship will 
adumbrate the themes of the fourth chapter.  So too will the study of spousal charity that 
forms the second half of chapter three.  Justice is not only an integral part of natural 
                                                 
13Cf. for example, Cornelius Williams, “The Hedonism of Aquinas,” The Thomist, 38 (1974): 257-90.; John 
Finnis, "Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good".The Monist 91.3 (2008): 388; Theo Belmans, “Le remedium 
concupiscentiae comme fin du mariage” in Revue Thomiste 93:289-303 (1993). 
14 John Finnis laments in footnote 10 to the above article that the “massive, fundamental misreadings and 
misrepresentation of Aquinas in John T. Noonan, Contraception:  A History of Its Treatment by Catholic 
Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge, Mass:  Harvard University Press, 1965 and 1986) . . . have had their 
baleful influence everywhere; they wreck, for instance, the treatment of sex in marriage in the early modern 
era in Margaret R. Sommerville, Sex and Subjection:  Atittitudes to Women in Early-Modern Society (London:  
Arnold; New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1995).” 
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friendship between the spouses:  it is also essential for their supernatural charity.  Aquinas’s 
discussion of the order of charity already introduces the idea that a just ordering is 
necessary to this highest love.  His particular ranking of spousal love within that order 
reveals an even greater fusion of these two virtues at work in the spousal relationship. 
Chapter four focuses on the relation of the spouses and of marriage to the good of the 
community.  It begins with an examination of what law represents for Saint Thomas:  a  
governing authority’s formulation of reason ordering practical matters to the common good.  
As a preliminary to understanding this definition, we will briefly glance at what law is 
not—that is, a kind of bondage.  Even scholars, like John Finnis, who do not understand law 
as coercive, still fail to recognize the role of the juridical in salvation, because their reading 
of Aquinas’s legal theory neglects its divine telos.  Lastly, we will look at the essential 
relationship of law to the common good, which is ultimately God.  Just as law includes an 
order to the common good as part of its essence, so too does procreation; these two 
powerful means by which man participates in the work of the Divinity are united in 
marriage. 
Part II offers an introduction to the translation of Book IV of the Commentary on the 
Sentences, Distinctions 26-42, which follows as Appendix A.  This introduction will 
address mainly the difficulties that the text poses to modern readers of Saint Thomas at the 
level of language.  It will begin with a brief historical situating of the marital themes that 
Aquinas was dealing with.  Following will be a more detailed analysis of certain words 
whose meaning or nuance may cause trouble to today’s student of theology.  Lastly it will 
address the most fundamental historical difference in which the text is couched:  the process 
of choosing a spouse, which today often springs from the affections of the couple, but for 
thousands of years has been a matter of deliberation and the decision of others. 
The lesson that Saint Thomas has to teach us in his treatment of marriage is that law 
is something integral to love and something that develops love to its fullest character.  
Justice is necessary to charity as an incipient phase in its development; meanwhile, charity 
is the fulfillment and flowering that justice was destined for:  “for love is the fulfillment of 
the law” (Romans 13:10).  Our understanding of marriage only stands to benefit from a 
deeper understanding of the underlying juridical elements that enrich it. 
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CHAPTER I:  THE ESSENCE OF MARRIAGE 
Marriage has always posed and continues to pose delicate challenges to theology 
because of its many peculiarities as a sacrament.  Unlike other sacraments, marriage existed 
before the fall of man in the state of unfallen nature; it also existed before the coming of 
Christ in the old dispensation.  Natural marriages, those contracted between unbaptized 
persons, are still recognized as valid marriages by the Church.  Even within the realm of 
sacraments, marriage poses difficulties.  It is the only sacrament whose liturgical 
celebration is a juridical act, the exchange of consent.15  The sacramental minister is 
commonly considered to be not an ordained minister but the spouses themselves.16  The 
form and the matter of the sacrament are not self-evident, and the matter remains difficult to 
define to this day.  Moreover, and most challenging to Saint Thomas, the sacrament of 
marriage does not bring about what it signifies—the union of Christ and his Church. 
This list does not exhaust the theological problems that Saint Thomas faced in dealing 
with marriage.  Among his contemporaries, these abnormalities conduced to the conclusion 
that marriage was not a sacrament, or did not confer grace.17  Through his lapidary use of 
distinctions, Aquinas was able to defend the sacramentality and the efficacious power of 
matrimony while still recognizing the role of marriage at the level of nature.  At the time, 
Saint Thomas was battling an attitude reluctant to see marriage as an efficacious sign of 
grace because of its roots in the material, animal side of human nature.  Today, however, 
                                                 
15 C. J. Errazuriz. “Contratto e sacramento: il matrimonio, un sacramento che è un contratto. Riflessioni 
attorno ad alcuni testi dei San Tommaso d'Aquino,” in AA.VV., Matrimonio e sacramento, Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 2004, p. 4. 
16Of course, this is not the position of the Eastern Churches.  As Father Benoit-Dominique de la Soujeole 
reminds us, it is also not the teaching of the Roman Rite church, but rather it is a prevalent opinion (Benoit-
Dominique de La Soujeole, "The Minister in Marriage: Ecumenical Considerations." Theology 
Digest 49:2002; 121-127).  Saint Thomas deliberately and conspicuously refrains from ever defining a 
minister for this sacrament.  In the article addressing whether a secret marriage is valid (In IV Sent., D. 28, q. 
1, art. 3), Aquinas answers the objection that, just as “the sacrament of penance is not perfected except by 
mediating ministers of the Church, who are the ones who dispense the sacraments.  Therefore, neither can 
marriage be completed in secret without the priestly blessing” (“sacramentum poenitentiae non perficitur nisi 
mediantibus Ecclesiae ministris, qui sunt sacramentorum dispensatores. Ergo nec matrimonium potest perfici 
in occulto absque sacerdotali benedictione”).  In response to this objection, Saint Thomas distinguishes that 
“in marriage our act is the sufficient cause for bringing about the proximate effect, which is obligation:  for 
anyone of his own right may oblige himself to another:  and thus the blessing of the priest is not required for 
marriage as of the essence of the sacrament” (“in matrimonio actus nostri sunt causa sufficiens ad inducendum 
proximum effectum, qui est obligatio: quia quicumque est sui juris, potest se alteri obligare: et ideo sacerdotis 
benedictio non requiritur in matrimonio quasi de essentia sacramenti.”), which leads the reader to assume that 
the priest is not the minister of the sacrament, but the spouses are.  Nevertheless, the fact that Aquinas never 
expressly designates a minister for this sacrament, (and in omitting to do so, he departs from his pattern in 
discussing sacraments) should be the strongest argument for leaving this question open.  
17 Seamus Heaney states that “St. Albert is the first author . . . who considers the res tantum of marriage to be 
grace, taken in the strict sense of a positive and interior effect.” Heaney, “The Development of the 
Sacramentality of Marriage from Anselm of Laon to Thomas Aquinas” (Dissertatio doctoralis: Studies in 
Sacred Theology. 2d. ser., 134: Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1963) XVI, p. 183. 
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Aquinas’s thoughts are dismissed as not attributing enough spiritual power or beauty to this 
sacrament. 
In his treatment of the other sacraments, Aquinas systematically identifies the 
minister, form, matter, and effect of each sacrament, a structure that corresponds loosely to 
Aristotle’s four causes.  However, because of its many unique characteristics, marriage 
resists strict confinement to this schema.  Rather than force marriage into categories that do 
not suit it, Aquinas discusses it according to Augustine’s three goods, or by using the 
sacramental distinctions res tantum, sacramentum et res, and sacramentum tantum.  
Through these distinctions and many others, Saint Thomas was able to navigate the 
peculiarities of marriage, recognizing its potential and its limitations at both the natural and 
supernatural levels.  The concept that he used to knit the two levels together was the 
concept of law. 
Rather than approaching marriage from the point of view of matter, form, and 
minister—though he does refer to these at least obliquely—Saint Thomas approaches 
marriage according to its essence, cause, and effects.  The essence of marriage, he states, is 
a union or con-joining (coniunctio) of a man and a woman.18  The cause is the consent of 
the spouses,19 and the effect is alternately designated as children,20 or a shared life in 
domestic matters.21  Accordingly, this chapter will first consider the essence and causes of 
marriage in section 1, and the relationship between marriage’s two ends in section 2. 
                                                 
18 In IV Sent., D. 27, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1 and 2.  Cf. also Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. IV, cap. 78, paragraph 2.  
References to the Commentary on the Sentences and the Summa Theologiae will always be referring to the 
body of the article unless expressly noted otherwise.  
19 In IV Sent., D. 27, q. 1, art. 2. 
20 In IV Sent., D. 27, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2. 
21 In IV Sent., D. 27, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3. 
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1. THE CAUSES OF MARRIAGE 
Saint Thomas’s careful distinctions and attention to the technicalities of the legal 
contract are some of the qualities of his marriage theology that attracted criticism in the 
20th century.  For example, Paul Palmer, S.J. argued in his article “Christian Marriage:  
Contract or Covenant,” that the juridical approach to marriage was a scholastic imposition 
on marriage pacts that had for centuries been seen as religious covenants rather than legal 
agreements.22  According to Palmer, a covenant is an agreement that effects a relationship 
of trust, with God (“or the gods”) as guarantor.  By contrast, a contract is a product of 
human law which governs the exchange of things or services. Yet this reading of Aquinas 
ignores the transcendent ramifications that law holds for him.  On the contrary, law proves 
the medium of integrating nature and grace in the marriage compact. 
Early in his treatment of marriage, Aquinas sorts marriage according to the various 
contributions that were made to its structure by the various kinds of law that have governed 
it: 
And thus marriage, according 
as it is ordained to the procreation 
of offspring, which was necessary 
also when sin did not exist, was 
instituted before sin.  But according 
as it is a remedy provided against 
the wound of sin, it was instituted 
after sin in the time of the law of 
nature.  But according to the 
determination of persons, it had its 
institution under the law of Moses.  
Yet according as it represents the 
mystery of the union of Christ and 
the Church, it had its institution 
under the New Law; and according 
to this it is a sacrament of the New 
Law.  But as to the other benefits 
which are consequent upon 
marriage, like friendship and the 
mutual service devoted to each 
other by the spouses, it has its 
institution in civil law.  But since it 
is of the ratio of the sacrament that 
it be a sign and a remedy, thus the 
middle institutions have to do with 
it under the ratio of a sacrament; 
but as to the first institution, it has 
Et ideo matrimonium, 
secundum quod ordinatur ad 
procreationem prolis, quae erat 
necessaria etiam peccato non 
existente, institutum fuit ante 
peccatum: secundum autem quod 
remedium praebet contra vulnus 
peccati, institutum fuit post 
peccatum tempore legis naturae; 
secundum autem determinationem 
personarum, institutionem habuit in 
lege Moysi; sed secundum quod 
repraesentat mysterium 
conjunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, 
institutionem habuit in nova lege; 
et secundum hoc est sacramentum 
novae legis. Quantum autem ad 
alias utilitates quae ex matrimonio 
consequuntur, sicut est amicitia et 
mutuum obsequium sibi a 
conjugibus impensum, habet 
institutionem in lege civili. Sed 
quia de ratione sacramenti est quod 
sit signum et remedium; ideo 
quantum ad medias institutiones 
competit ei ratio sacramenti; sed 
quantum ad primam institutionem 
                                                 
22 Paul F. Palmer, S.J.  “Christian Marriage:  Contract or Covenant?”  Theological Studies 33 (1972): 617-665. 
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to do with what it is in the office of 
nature; as to the last, what it is in 
the office of civic life. 
competit ei quod sit in officium 
naturae; quantum vero ad ultimam 
quod sit in officium civilitatis.23 
This delineation of the various institutions of marriage shows how closely interwoven 
nature and grace are through law.  Marriage’s role after the Fall of Man, the stricter 
specifications that were introduced under the Mosaic Code, as well as matrimony’s 
institution in the new dispensation all pertain to its sacramentality.  Even considered as a 
sacrament strictly speaking, marriage is deeply rooted in law, since Aquinas designates the 
life of the Church as the New Law, following Saint Paul. 
At every turn, Saint Thomas emphasizes the interdependence of contract and 
sacrament, showing the interconnection of nature and grace. 
In all sacraments there is some 
spiritual operation by the mediation 
of a material operation which 
signifies it; . . . wherefore, since in 
marriage there is a certain spiritual 
union, inasmuch as marriage is a 
sacrament, and another material 
one according as it is in the office 
of nature and civil life; it is fitting 
that by the mediation of matter a 
spiritual thing is done by divine 
power; wherefore, since the unions 
of material contracts happen by 
mutual consent, it is fitting that the 
matrimonial union is also done in 
this manner. 
In omnibus sacramentis est 
aliqua spiritualis operatio mediante 
materiali operatione quae eam 
significat . . . unde, cum in 
matrimonio sit quaedam spiritualis 
conjunctio, inquantum 
matrimonium est sacramentum, et 
aliqua materialis, secundum quod 
est in officium naturae et civilis 
vitae; oportet quod mediante 
materiali fiat spiritualis virtute 
divina; unde, cum conjunctiones 
materialium contractuum fiant per 
mutuum consensum, oportet quod 
hoc modo etiam fiat matrimonialis 
conjunctio.24 
Complaints against Saint Thomas’s juridical language in the treatment of marriage 
fail to take into account the fact that marriage is unique among the sacraments in that the 
heart of the sacrament is a legal agreement.  Aquinas’s treatment of marriage must differ 
from the pattern of the other sacraments because in marriage the validity of the sacrament 
depends on the validity of the legal contract.  Accordingly every reference to the typical 
elements of sacramental theology—form, matter, minister, and effect—must take into 
consideration the juridical requirements underlying the contract. 
But the relationship goes both ways.  If the sacrament of marriage depends upon the 
legal contract in some way, marriage as a natural juridical act is always ordered toward the 
spiritual.  In defining marriage in its essence, Saint Thomas not only views it as a union or 
“con-joining” (conjunctio), but he states that in the genus of conjunctio, marriage is the 
greatest union, “for the union of man and woman is the greatest since it is a union of both 
                                                 
23 In IV Sent., Distinctio 26, question 2, article 2.  Where quotations are taken from the Commentary on the 
Sentences, they will be shown beside their English translation.  Where citations are taken from a text that 
already exists in English, I have used that translation. 
24 In IV Sent., Distinctio 27, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 1. 
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souls and bodies.”25  Even a natural marriage is a spiritual union, involving the soul of each 
party.  The reason for this is rooted in the nature of the human being as rational animal. In 
his reflections on the relationship between contract and sacrament, Carlos Errazuriz argues 
that the contract cannot be separated from the sacrament precisely because human nature is, 
in itself, ordered to the spiritual: 
Se invece il contratto decade a mero interscambio di prestazioni, 
modellato dalla volontà dei contraenti, e chiuso in un rapporto egoistico 
puramente orizzontale, bisogna constatare che purtroppo non c’è più un vero 
contratto matrimoniale secondo l’essere naturale della persona umana nella 
dualità uomo-donna, e manca pertanto il presupposto essenziale perché esso 
possa essere sacramento. Per superare la resistenza a legare contratto e 
sacramento, la via maestra passa attraverso la riscoperta del valore 
trascendente delle nozze e del vincolo coniugale, che non sono realtà 
profane, estranee alla trascendenza.26 
Though he does not use the language of the Theology of the Body, Saint Thomas 
identifies this intrinsic relation of human nature to transcendence in his attention to man as a 
rational animal. One manifestation of this emphasis on man’s rational nature, and thus his 
spiritual nature, is evident in Aquinas’s treatment of marital consent.  Consent is the cause 
not only of the marriage contract but also of the sacrament, for it brings about “the perfect 
signification of marriage, which consists in the union of minds that happens through the 
consent.”27 
A.  The Centrality of Consent to Sacrament and Contract 
Aquinas’s account of the conditions for consent emphasizes again the interpenetration 
of the legal and the sacramental in marriage.  In the article on whether consent must be 
expressed in words, Saint Thomas gives parallel reasons: first from the necessity of a 
sensible sign for the sacrament, second from the need for “an expression of words, by which 
men oblige themselves to each other” in any legal contract.28 
The consent is called the efficient cause of matrimony because it is the cause of the 
contract.29  But it is, in a certain way, the efficient cause of the sacrament as well, by the 
fact that “the words by which matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this 
                                                 
25 In IV Sent, Distinction 27, Question 1, Article 1, qc. 2, ad 3: “conjunctio viri ad mulierem per matrimonium 
est maxima, cum sit et animarum et corporum.” 
26 C. J. Errazuriz. “Contratto e sacramento: il matrimonio, un sacramento che è un contratto. Riflessioni 
attorno ad alcuni testi dei San Tommaso d'Aquino,” in AA.VV., Matrimonio e sacramento, Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 2004, p. 49. 
27 In IV Sent, Distinctio 27, Question 3, Article 1, qc. 1, ad 3, “perfectam significationem matrimonii, quae 
quidem consistit in conjunctione animorum, quae fit per consensum, et in conjunctionem corporum …” 
28 In IV Sent, Distinction 27, Question 1, Article 2, qc. 2, sed contras « in quolibet contractu oportet esse 
expressionem verborum, quibus se mutuo homines obligent.. » 
29 In IV Sent, Distinction 27, Question 1, Article 2, qc. 2. 
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sacrament.”30  However, the words of consent not only account for the form of the 
sacrament; they also figure into the matter of the sacrament for Saint Thomas. 
The matter of the sacrament of marriage is only obliquely referred to in Aquinas’s 
treatise on matrimony, and it remains elusive to define to this day.  In one of only three 
articles where Saint Thomas explicitly refers to the matter of the sacrament, he argues that 
“in a secret marriage, the due matter is preserved, for there are persons legally capable of 
contracting.”31  He reinforces this later in the same article where he says, “Clandestine 
marriages are not prohibited as being against the essential components of marriage, as 
marriages are prohibited between persons legally ineligible, who are improper matter for 
this sacrament ...”32 
Elsewhere he seems to specify that the matter is not actually the persons of the 
contractants themselves, but rather the matter consists in the “act of the one who avails 
himself (utitur) of this sacrament.”33  While the verb utitur would suggest that the act 
Aquinas alludes to is the usus matrimonii—the conjugal act—Aquinas explicitly rejects this 
notion, which was prevalent among many of his contemporaries.34  Saint Thomas argues in 
addressing “Whether carnal commingling is of the integrity of the sacrament” that the “use 
of marriage” is not essential to the sign because only the signification of a res contenta is 
essential to a sacramental sign.35  By the conjugal act, on the other hand, is symbolized 
Christ’s “union with the Church by his assumption of human nature in the unity of his 
person.”36  This is obviously not something that can be effected by the sacrament or 
contained in it. Therefore, the conjugal act cannot be the sacramental matter, which would 
be a constituent part of its sign. 
However, elsewhere Aquinas states that “the expression of words is related to 
matrimony as the exterior washing is related to baptism,”37 a comparison that connects the 
expression of consent with the matter of the sacrament.  Fr. Seamus Heaney interprets the 
statement thus: 
But if the words expressing consent are identical in extent with the 
sacramentum tantum, they are also identical with the acts which constitute 
the matter of the sacrament.  Therefore the external acts which constitute the 
matter are in some way contained in the words expressing consent, for there 
                                                 
30 In IV Sent., Distinction 26, Question 2, art. 1, ad 1 “verba quibus consensus matrimonialis exprimitur, sunt 
forma hujus sacramenti.” 
31 In IV Sent, Distinction 28, question 1, article 3, sed contra. “in occulto matrimonio servatur debita materia, 
quia sunt personae legitimae ad contrahendum.” 
32 In IV Sent, Distinction 28, question 1, article 3, ad 4.  “non sunt prohibita clandestina matrimonia quasi 
contra essentialia matrimonii existentia secut sunt prohibita matrimonia illegitimarum personarum, quae sunt 
materia indebita huic sacramento.” 
33 In IV Sent., Distinction 26, Question 2, art. 1, ad 2 “sacramentum matrimonii perficitur per actum ejus qui 
sacramento illo utitur, sicut poenitentia; et ideo, sicut poenitentia non habet aliam materiam nisi ipsos actus 
sensui subjectos, qui sunt loco materialis elementi, ita est de matrimonio.” 
34 Edward Schillebeeckx, Marriage: Human Reality and Saving Mystery (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), 
p. 319. 
35 In IV Sent., Distinction 26, Question 2, art. 4, ad 2. 
36 In IV Sent., Distinction 27, Question 1, art. 3, qc. 2, ad 1 “sed per carnalem copulam significat 
conjunctionem ad Ecclesiam quantum ad assumptionem humanae naturae in unitatem personae.” 
37 In IV Sent., Distinction 27, Question 1, art. 2, qc. 2 “expressio verborum se habeat ad matrimonium sicut 
ablutio exterior ad Baptismum.” 
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are no other external acts which enter the essence of marriage.  Saint Thomas 
does not explain how the verba contain the matter and the form of marriage, 
but it seems to us that as in the case of Saint Albert there is some suggestion 
that the verba constitute a mutual datio and a mutual acceptio which are the 
matter and form respectively of the sacrament of marriage.38 
Nevertheless, Saint Thomas does not explicitly construe the matter and form this way, 
though he was undoubtedly aware of Saint Albert’s explanation.  Aquinas’s general 
definition of the matter of the sacrament as the “act of the one who avails himself of 
marriage” opens the possibility of understanding the matter of the sacrament in a broader 
way as many or all acts of the spouses living out their married life. 
Yet this brings us to an important distinction that Saint Thomas never lost sight of.  
The expression “form” can be used many ways, even within the context of the seven 
sacraments. When we speak of the form of the sacrament, we are speaking of the formal 
principle of the efficient cause of marriage.  The form of the sacrament and its matter come 
together in the sign to cause the sacrament to come into being.  The form of the sacrament is 
not the same as the formal cause of matrimony—that which makes it to be what it is.  If the 
marital consent were the formal cause of marriage, then the marriage would cease when 
consent was revoked.  Rather, the formal cause of marriage is the marital bond (vinculum).39 
The bond is what is caused by the consent, and what acts dispositively as the cause of grace. 
Though we might interpret the matter of the sacrament in a loose way as the actions 
of the spouses throughout their life together, this is not the action that contributes to the sign 
that brings marriage into being.  This distinction between bringing about the sacrament and 
living out the sacrament came later to be referred to as marriage in fieri and marriage 
factum esse.  When Saint Thomas elucidates these complicated relationships, he uses the 
terms sacramentum tantum, res et sacramentum, and res tantum.  The sign, composed of 
the form and matter of the sacrament, is the sacramentum tantum, which causes the res et 
sacramentum.  The res et sacramentum is the bond, which is caused by the sign, and which 
is itself dispositively the cause of grace (res tantum). 
In this respect the bond resembles the character (quasi character) in those sacraments 
that bestow a character.  Like the character in baptism, the bond that is caused by consent 
acts as a dispositive cause of grace in the spouses: 
Just as neither the water of 
baptism nor the form of words bring 
about grace immediately, but rather 
a character; so the external acts and 
the words expressing consent 
directly effect a certain bond of 
obligation, which is the sacrament 
of marriage.  And a bond like this 
operates dispositively for grace by 
sicut aqua Baptismi vel forma 
verborum non operatur ad gratiam 
immediate, sed ad characterem; ita 
actus exteriores et verba 
exprimentia consensum directe 
faciunt nexum quemdam, qui est 
sacramentum matrimonii; et 
hujusmodi nexus ex virtute divinae 
institutionis dispositive operatur ad 
                                                 
38 Heaney, The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage from Anselm of Laon to Thomas Aquinas, 
(Washington, D.C.:  Catholic University of America Press), p. 68. 
39 In IV Sent., Distinction 27, Question 1, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 1. 
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the power of divine institution. gratiam.40 
Incidentally, Saint Thomas refers to the res et sacramentum of marriage in two 
different ways.  He states that the coniunctio itself is the res et sacramentum when 
discussing how the bond is caused by sensible signs.41 But when comparing marriage to 
those sacraments that imprint a character, he states that the res et sacramentum is the 
“obligation which a man has toward a woman by such acts.”42  Clearly coniunctio and 
obligatio represent here two aspects of the same effective reality; one looks back to the 
consent that caused it, while the other looks forward to the effects of marriage, which we 
will discuss in section 2 of this chapter.  Conjunctio focuses on the being of the bond, while 
obligatio focuses on the operation that arises from it, for operation follows from essence.  In 
this sense obligatio is related to conjunctio as natural law is related to nature. 
Monsignor Peter Eliot comments on the connection: 
Saint Thomas, as an acute observer of human experience, was already 
moving beyond the third good, the “sacrament,” as the “bond” or as Saint 
Augustine’s “indissolubility” to the “res tantum,” the graced life of the 
spouses, the elevation and redemption of sexual love. 
His broader view, from the bond to the graced life of the spouses, is evident when he 
explains that, as a good of Marriage, the “sacrament” is not only indissolubility, but all 
those things which come from the Christ-Church signification.  Going further, he gently 
corrects Peter Lombard’s Augustinian definition of “sacrament” as the good of 
indissolubility.  Marriage, in its own right, is a “natural undertaking” before it is a 
sacrament, and the sacramental aspect is a condition added to it from which it derives its 
goodness.  This broader meaning he even describes as “sacramentality”:  “Therefore, its 
sacramentality (sacramentalitas), if I may use the word, is reckoned among the goods 
which justify Marriage; accordingly, this third good of Marriage, the sacrament, denotes not 
only its indissolubility, but also all the things which pertain to its signification.”43 
Monsignor Elliot’s description of sacramentality as “a condition added” to marriage 
should not be misunderstood.  One of the most remarkable aspects of marriage as a 
sacrament, which will be discussed further in the next section, is that nothing is added to the 
natural undertaking to transform it into a sacrament; as Errazuriz points out,  the intentions 
of the contractants are no different in causing the sacrament than in causing the contract.44    
The only difference lies in the baptismal character imprinted on each of their souls. 
This fact brings up the importance of the individual contractants to the constitution of 
the sacrament.  In discussing clandestine marriages, Saint Thomas states that such 
marriages are “not prohibited as being against the essential components of marriage, as 
marriages are prohibited between persons legally ineligible, who are improper matter for 
                                                 
40 In IV Sent., Distinctio 26, q. 2, art. 3, ad 2. 
41 In IV Sent., Distinctio27, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 2. 
42 In IV Sent., Distinctio 26, q. 2, art.1, ad 5. 
43 Peter J. Elliott, What God Has Joined:  The Sacramentality of Marriage  (New York: Alba House, 1990), 
pp. 97-98. 
44 Errazuriz, p. 50. 
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this sacrament.”45  Here the very persons contracting are referred to as the matter of the 
sacrament.  Their role in effecting the sacrament is another reason for the extensive study of 
legal impediments to marriage. 
The many factors contributing to consent form a critical intersection-point of law and 
sacrament in marriage; Aquinas, like any scholar of his age, had to consider extensively 
what could vitiate consent from a legal standpoint because the legal consent is also the sign 
in the sacrament.  Nor would Saint Thomas consider it degrading to the spirituality of 
marriage that it depends upon a juridical entity.  A careful reading of his explanations of the 
legal aspects of the marital compact shows that it is marriage’s juridical character itself that 
makes it the perfect microcosm of the interaction of grace and nature. 
B. Marriage has its cause in us 
The uniqueness in marriage that Saint Thomas refers to repeatedly is the degree to 
which God has left it in our hands.  Not only at the level of nature, but also as a sacrament, 
the spouses cause the contract.  They produce or are themselves the matter and the form. 
The nearest similarity to this kind of human causality among the sacraments, as 
Aquinas points out, is in the sacrament of penance, where the acts of the penitent constitute 
the matter of the sacrament.  But even then, whereas in penance our act is essential but 
insufficient for the sacrament, “in marriage our acts are the cause sufficient to bring about 
the proximate effect.”46 
Marriage is remarkable in the level of human agency that it depends upon.  In 
explaining why so many impediments must be listed for this sacrament, Saint Thomas gives 
the remarkable explanation that “Matrimonium habet in nobis causam, sed alia quaedam 
sacramenta solum in Deo.”47  The shocking power of this statement led the English 
Dominicans to soften its effect in their translation of the Supplementum: “Marriage has its 
cause in us and in God, while some of the other sacraments have their cause in God 
alone.”48  Even without employing such a conservative translation, we can be certain that 
Saint Thomas recognized human and divine agency as necessary to each of the 
sacraments.49  But marriage is set apart in requiring human contribution to an exceptional 
degree.  This uniqueness derives from the sacrament’s resting on a legal contract. 
                                                 
45 In Sent. IV, Dist 28, Q. 1, art. 3, ad 4:  “quasi contra essentialia matrimonii existentia, sicut sunt prohibita 
matrimonia illegitimarum personarum, quae sunt materia indebita huic sacramento.” 
46 In Sent. IV, D. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2 “actus noster in poenitentia quamvis sit de essentia sacramenti, non est 
tamen sufficiens ad inducendum proximum effectum sacramenti, scilicet absolutionem a peccatis; et ideo 
oportet quod ad perfectionem sacramenti interveniat actus sacerdotis. Sed in matrimonio actus nostri sunt 
causa sufficiens ad inducendum proximum effectum.” 
47 In Sent. IV, D. 34, q.1, a. 1, ad 1. “ unde et poenitentiae, quae habet causam in nobis aliquo modo, Magister 
supra, dist. 16, quaedam impedimenta assignavit, ut hypocrisim, ludos, et hujusmodi.” 
48 St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica, IIIa QQ. 74-90, Supplement QQ. 1-99. (Allen, Texas: Christian 
Classics, 1981);  Supplement, Question 50, art. 1, ad 1. 
49 See In Sent. IV, D. 38, Q.1, art. 2, qc 2, ad 4, on the necessity of solemnity in taking religious vows: 
“Marriage and the other sacraments have their full effect even when those things that pertain to the solemnity 
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The centrality of the contract in this sacrament reveals the value and dignity given to 
human nature by God; this truth underpins all of Saint Thomas’s account of marriage.  The 
fact that God established marriage first as an office of nature before he elevated it to the 
level of a sacrament is an indication of what Errazuriz calls the “openness to transcendence” 
that is written into the nature of the human being.  By allowing marriage to be established 
under natural law and civil law, God handed over marriage to human direction.  But even as 
a sacrament, matrimony depends to an exceptional degree on the wills of the two spouses. 
The fact that consent must be expressed publicly both for the sake of sacrament and 
for the sake of law illuminates another aspect of the inter-relatedness of the two.  The form 
of a sacrament must be openly spoken because it specifies the sign.50  But Saint Thomas 
points out by comparing the marital consent to a religious vow, that while religious vows 
may be secret, because religious life is a spiritual obligation, a marriage must be public, 
because it is a sacramental obligation.51  A sacramental sign is by nature related to the 
community, and thus must be perceptible by the community.  This is also the reason that 
juridical consent must be publicly expressed.  Law is ordered to the good of the community; 
even the personal virtue of justice is a moral virtue that orders a man’s will toward others.  
The expression of marital consent establishes the interior intention of the spouses in an 
external way that can be ratified by the community.  This is important because of 
marriage’s political and ecclesial role, which will be discussed further in chapters 3 and 4. 
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas sums up the integration of nature and grace 
in his statement that the indissolubility of marriage “is of utmost importance to [the 
spouses] so that by earthly and fleshly means they may manage not to be disunited from 
Christ and the Church.”52  Monsignor Elliot highlights the communal import of this 
comment: 
as the dispositive means of Grace, the bond works as the strengthening 
gift of indissolubility, forming the secure basis whereby married Christians 
“may determine not to be disunited from Christ and the Church.”  The 
ecclesial nuance is important.  The bond disposes for a special, close, 
married participation in the unity of the Mystical Body, thus fulfilling Saint 
Paul’s vision of Marriage in Ephesians, spouses as “members of his body.53 
The contract showcases the aptitude of human nature for willing something that is 
ordered beyond the two contractants.  In arguing that marriage is more religious covenant 
than legal contract, Palmer failed to realize that the marital contract involves the relation of 
the spouses to the community and to the divinity, by its very nature and the nature of man.  
Meanwhile the sacrament of marriage is dependent upon the contract as that earthly reality 
                                                                                                                                                     
of the sacrament are omitted, because they have efficacy from divine power, not human institution” 
(matrimonium et alia sacramenta habent plenum effectum suum praetermissis his quae ad solemnitatem 
sacramenti pertinent, propter hoc quod habent efficaciam ex virtute divina, et non ex institutione humana). 
50 Summa Theologiae, III, Q. 60, art. 6. 
51 In Sent. IV, Dist. 27, Q. 1, art. 2, qc. 2, ad 1. 
52 Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Three:  Providence, Part II.  Translated by Vernon J. Bourke.  Notre Dame:  
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Lib III, cap 78, 4122. 
53 Peter J. Elliott, What God Has Joined:  The Sacramentality of Marriage, p.97. 
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that is taken up and transformed into something spiritually effective.  As Monsignor Peter 
Eliot writes, 
If Our Lord can use bread, wine, oil, water, words, why can he not 
incorporate the human contract into a sacrament?  It is obvious that Marriage 
is a unique contract, but it is like other contracts because it establishes the 
mutual obligations of commutative justice.  While we would want to widen 
these mutual obligations beyond “rendering the Marriage debt,” including a 
community of life and especially procreation, the contract keeps before us 
the binding force of sacramental consent.  By playing down or denying the 
contract, we not only eliminate the objective standard required by canonists 
in their work, but we also damage sacramentality, by weakening the 
solemnly binding obligations entailed in procreation, fidelity, and 
indissolubility.”54 
                                                 
54 Peter J. Elliott, What God Has Joined:  The Sacramentality of Marriage.  New York: Alba House, 1990, 
p.130. 
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2. THE ENDS OF MARRIAGE 
If the effect of consent is the marital bond or vinculum, the bond is still only a middle 
term between the consent and the ends of marriage.  On various occasions, Saint Thomas 
designates the effect of marriage as either proles55 or shared domestic life.56  The 
relationship between these two effects or ends to which marriage is ordered has become the 
single most debated aspect of marriage theology in our day, and the most frequently 
misunderstood. 
Nor is the misunderstanding limited to those unschooled in Aquinas’s writings.  The 
subtlety with which he treats the relationship between what we now call “the procreative 
and the unitive ends” of marriage can easily be lost even on those who are very familiar 
with his work.  Some of the problem arises from the ways that our thinking has been shaped 
by the modern era.  Another factor lies in the radical interconnection of all of Saint 
Thomas’s thought, so that understanding this aspect of marriage theology requires 
knowledge of seemingly distant subjects. 
In the first place, Aquinas would never have spoken of a “unitive end” of marriage, 
because as we saw in section 1, union pertains to the essence of marriage.  It is what 
marriage is for the sake of its ends. With regard to the two explicit ends of marriage, 
Aquinas looked for order in all things, an order placed there by an infinitely reasonable and 
loving God.  According to this worldview, wherever a single reality is ordered to two 
things, one will be for the sake of the other. 
Nevertheless, this simple principle can easily be misconstrued.  In a 1974 article 
appearing in Doctor Communis and entitled, “La Conception Thomiste des Deux Finalités 
du Mariage,” Guy de Broglie explained the relation between the unitive and procreative 
ends of marriage in a well-intentioned but misguided way.  Taking as his point of departure 
the immense impact of Herbert Doms’ 1935 book Du sens et de la fin du mariage57on 
twentieth century considerations of marriage, DeBroglie attempts to show the compatibility 
of the second Vatican council’s approach to marriage with the foregoing tradition: 
La seul moyen, semble-t-il, d’opposer autre chose que des protestations 
impuissantes à cet effondrement de toute une importante section de 
l’ancienne morale, c’est de compléter (sans y contredire aucunement) les 
quelques allusions sommaires que le Concile a faites aux finalités du 
mariage.  Il suffira pour cela de montrer que si ces finalités sont 
effectivement, “diverses,” et toutes pleinement dignes de notre estime, il 
reste néanmoins à la finalité de procréation une certaine primauté 
                                                 
55 In IV Sent., D. 27, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2. 
56 In IV Sent., D. 27, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3. 
57 In English, The Meaning of Marriage.Translated by George Sayer.  New York:  Sheed and Ward, 1939. 
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indiscutable,--au sens précis ou l’entendait Saint Thomas et toute la 
théologie traditionelle.58 
DeBroglie begins by surveying the vastly diverse aims that motivate people to marry, 
emphasizing the likely difference between the aim of the marriage contract and the aims of 
the individuals getting married: 
lorsque saint Thomas nous parle d’une “finalité primordiale du 
mariage,” il doit s’agir de tout autre chose que d’une fin destinée à jouer un 
rôle constant et privilégié dans les intentions subjectives de tous ceux qui se 
marient, ou de tous ceux qui veulent user de leurs droits conjugaux.59 
In order to make sense of “la finalité propre” of the marriage contract, “trop 
couramment méconnue par un certain « personnalisme » contemporain,”  DeBroglie 
introduces the distinction between a contract for mutual service and a contract between two 
people for shared service to the common good.60  The marriage contract would be the latter:  
it is ordered to the “grande cause” of the healthy and assured renewal of the human race.  
Nevertheless, few people, if any, enter upon marriage for the sake of this great cause.  
Rather, most people get married for selfish reasons. But DeBroglie compares this scenario 
to the mechanism governing employment in the police force or the postal service: 
Quand un jeune homme choisit de s’engager dans tel ou tel service 
public, après avoir peut- être hésité quelque temps entre les postes, les 
chemins de fer ou la police, sa décision final ne lui sera que rarement dictée 
par un enthousiasme désintéressé pour tel ou tel genre particulier de 
fonctions à remplir.  Elle se fondera presque toujours sur des motifs plus 
personnels et plus prosaiques.  Il choisira la carrière qui semblera le mieux 
correspondre à ses aptitudes, à ses goûts, à ses chances d’avancement.  Et à 
cela personne ne trouvera rien à redire, pourvu seulement que le sujet dont 
nous parlons sache se souvenir que de pareils engagements ont pour 
première et fondamentale raison d’être le service du bien public et non celui 
de son bien individuel.  D’où il suit que, dans toute la zône d’action sur 
laquelle ces engagements porte expressément . . . le contractant devra faire 
passer les exigences du dit « service » avant tout sousi de s’assurer quelque 
avantage personnel. 
Ainsi en va-t-il dans le cas qu nous occupe.  Personne ne demande aux 
gens de se marier pour des motifs purement désintéressés, --pas plus qu’on 
ne demande aux postiers d’avoir choisi leur profession par un désir pur et 
magnanime de coopérer efficacement a l’acheminement du courrier postal. . . 
. Mais tout comme on demande aus postiers de rendre hommage à la grande 
finalité communautaire de leur contrat en s’y montrant strictement fidèles 
dans la zône d’activité dont ils sont convenus, le contrat conjugal exige que 
les époux en observent rigoureusement les clauses dans tout le domaine sur 
                                                 
58 Guy DeBroglie, “La Conception Thomiste des Deux Finalités du Mariage,” Doctor Communis 30 (1974, 4), 
page 6. 
59 DeBroglie, p.10. 
60 DeBroglie, p. 12. 
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lequel ce contrat portait directement, c'est-à-dire dans le domaine limité de 
leurs activités génitales.61 
According to this comparison, no one joins the postal service out of an altruistic 
interest in the common good for which the institution was established.  Instead, people 
become postal workers out of interest in their own good—the desire for the benefits that 
this career will bring to them personally.  Yet while they pursue their own benefits, their 
actions within the institution benefit the community.  DeBroglie draws a comparison with 
marriage: spouses marry out of self-seeking desires, but as long as they follow the rules of 
the Church (remaining within the institution), they will be unconsciously working for the 
healthy and certain perpetuation of the human race. 
It is easy to see how DeBroglie arrived at this understanding of Saint Thomas on the 
two ends.  In the very first article that treats marriage in the Commentary on the Sentences, 
Aquinas states that the principal end of marriage is the good of offspring, while the 
secondary end is the mutual service the spouses devote to each other.  Then, in Distinction 
33, Thomas seems to make explicit the ordination of the primary end to the common 
welfare, while the secondary end reflects the good of the couple: 
marriage is principally ordained 
to the common good under the ratio 
of the principal end, which is the 
good of offspring; although under 
the ratio of the secondary end it is 
ordained to the good of those 
contracting marriage, as it is per se 
a remedy for concupiscence. 
matrimonium principaliter 
ordinatur ad bonum commune 
ratione principalis finis, qui est 
bonum prolis; quamvis etiam 
ratione finis secundarii ordinetur ad 
bonum matrimonium contrahentis, 
prout per se est in remedium 
concupiscentiae.62  
Yet it would be a mistake to conclude from this text that the primary end is for the 
good of the majority, to which the good of the individual must be subordinated.  To engage 
in such a reading would be to subject Saint Thomas’s understanding of the common good to 
a utilitarian interpretation, conditioned by Malthusian views of the human race.  DeBroglie 
is right to look beyond the couple for the end of the marriage contract.  The end of this 
contract indeed exceeds the happiness of the two parties engaged in it—a fact that makes it 
almost unique among contracts.  This fact also accounts in part for the perpetuity of the 
marriage contract:  because this contract is ordered beyond the contractants, it cannot be 
dissolved if one or both parties fail its terms, or are dissatisfied, since it is not a contract for 
the mutual benefit of the spouses solely, but for the good of the community.  Yet DeBroglie 
fails to see that the common good includes the good of the contractants more deeply than 
the private goods they may pursue for themselves. 
DeBroglie’s explanation of the relation of these two ends to each other is something 
of an “invisible hand” theory of marriage.  While not wholly incorrect, it reflects a modern 
attitude that actually obscures the truth that Aquinas sought to convey. 
                                                 
61DeBroglie, pp. 22-23. 
62 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q. 2, art. 1, ad 4. 
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To begin with, DeBroglie’s admission that most couples embark upon marriage 
without intending marriage’s ends reflects a modern misunderstanding of the nature of 
human acts.  A comparable claim might hold that a person can walk without intending to 
move from the place he is standing:  his intention would contradict the nature of the act 
itself.  This dissolution of a physical act from the intention of the agent has its roots in a 
Cartesian dualism.  As Saint Thomas points out, an intention that totally excludes the ends 
of marriage itself, is an intention not to marry, and would invalidate the marriage.63  In a 
related question, Aquinas says that entering into marriage for reasons that are less than 
noble (causae inhonestae), does not affect the goodness of marriage itself, but the person 
with shameful aims sins by marrying for these motives: 
the cause of marriage per se is 
that to which marriage is of itself 
ordained and this is always good; 
namely the procreation of children 
and the avoidance of fornication.  
But its final cause per accidens is 
that which the contracting parties 
intend from this marriage.  And 
since what is intended from a 
marriage follows upon a marriage; 
and prior things are not changed by 
what comes later but rather the 
reverse; therefore the marriage does 
not receive goodness or badness 
from that cause. But the 
contractants themselves do since it 
is their end per se.  And since per 
accidens causes are infinite such 
causes of marriage can be infinite 
some of them being honorable and 
others dishonorable. 
causa finalis matrimonii potest 
accipi dupliciter; scilicet per se, et 
per accidens. Per se quidem causa 
matrimonii est ad quam 
matrimonium est de se ordinatum; 
et haec semper bona est; scilicet 
procreatio prolis, et fornicationis 
vitatio. Sed per accidens causa 
finalis ipsius est hoc quod 
contrahentes intendunt ex 
matrimonio. Et quia hoc quod ex 
matrimonio intenditur, consequitur 
ad matrimonium; et priora non 
variantur ex posterioribus, sed e 
converso; ideo ex illa causa non 
recipit matrimonium bonitatem vel 
malitiam, sed ipsi contrahentes, 
quorum est finis per se. Et quia 
causae per accidens sunt infinitae; 
ideo infinitae tales causae possunt 
esse matrimonii, quarum sunt 
quaedam honestae, et quaedam 
inhonestae.64 
DeBroglie’s argument concerns couples who marry for the sake of the secondary end 
of marriage without intending matrimony’s primary end.  If the spouses simply remain 
within the limits set by the Church, they will attain their own personal ends—mutual love—
as well as providing an unintended service to the human race. 
DeBroglie himself laments the fact that the pervasive influence of modern philosophy 
makes an argument such as his a necessary compromise.  Yet his compromise fails in the 
very thing he hoped to accomplish:  to make Saint Thomas and the Church’s traditional 
teaching on marriage palatable to modern sensibilities, “des esprits si mal préparés à les 
                                                 
63 Cf. In IV Sent, Distinction 29, questio uniqua, articulus 3, questiuncula 3, on conditional consent; conditions 
placed on marital consent are upheld if they do not exclude the goods of marriage itself; if they do exclude the 
bona conjugii (for example, upon condition of sterilisation), the marriage itself is invalid. 
64 In IV Sent, Distinctio 30, Questio 1, articulus 3. 
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entendre en leur vrai sens.”65  He himself falls prey to the confusion that issues from 
modern philosophy, for his account of the common good is of a good alien to the spouses 
serving it. 
A.  The Two Ends of Marriage and the Common Good 
First of all, it is difficult to see how DeBroglie’s “great cause” of the perpetuation of 
the human race can really constitute a common good as Saint Thomas understands it.  A 
common good is the kind of good from which every member of the community benefits.  A 
truly common good is not diminished by more members partaking in it—rather it is 
increased.  Accordingly, true common goods are limited to a very particular category of 
things like peace, fellowship, and truth. 
In his article, “The Common Good in St. Thomas and John Paul II,” Michael 
Waldstein adds: 
The peace of a state or a family is also a common good in the strict 
sense, provided that it is a genuine peace of the whole, from which no one is 
excluded. When I share in this peace, I do not lessen your share in it. In fact, 
without my share, your share in it would decrease, since peace can exist in 
the full sense only if each and every person shares in it.66 
It is evident that the kinds of things that are usually called common goods, like shared 
food, public property, or money in a common fund cannot be common properly speaking.  
These are technically private goods:  the food that one person eats can in no way be 
possessed by the rest of the community; public property may be enjoyed by various 
members of the community in turn, but not held truly in common.  Generally speaking no 
countable goods can be common:  they can be divided but not shared. 
The importance of this distinction can be applied to Fr. DeBroglie’s assertion that the 
assured perpetuation of the species is the common good that marriage is ordered to.  If it is a 
true common good, every person in the species should benefit from its continuation, for the 
more there is of a common good, the more each member has to enjoy. 
It would be mistaken to understand the good of proles as the sociopolitical benefits of 
an increased birth rate for the sake of social programs.  Though this may be a real good, it 
does not reflect accurately what Saint Thomas understood as the common good; it is rather a 
collection of private goods.  Nor is it sufficient to consider the metaphysical or ontological 
good of existence, in which every human in some way participates by the continued 
existence of the human race.  This argument would also contain some truth, but Saint 
Thomas had more specific and elevated common goods in mind. 
                                                 
65 DeBroglie, “La Conception Thomiste des Deux Finalités du Mariage,” p. 32. 
66 Michael Waldstein, “The Common Good in St. Thomas and John Paul II,”  Nova et Vetera, Eng. Ed. Vol. 3 
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What Aquinas meant by equating the bonum prolis with the bonum commune appears 
in his initial treatment of marriage in Distinction 26 of Book IV of the Commentary on the 
Sentences.  Marriage is natural, he says,  “First, as concerns its principal end, which is the 
good of offspring:  for nature does not intend only their generation, but their upbringing, 
and their advancement to the perfect state of man as man, which is the state of virtue.”67   
For Saint Thomas, then, the bonum prolis could never be simply limited to the perpetuation 
of the human species.  At every reference, Thomas emphasizes that the real heart of the 
good of offspring is not generating children, but educating them.  This emphasis on 
bringing up children to virtue forms the backbone for his argument for monogamy and 
indissolubility at the natural level, because among all the animals, the young of the human 
animal requires the guidance of parents until he reaches adulthood, and “a child cannot be 
educated and instructed by a parent unless he has certain, definite parents:  which would not 
be unless there were some obligation of a man to a particular woman.”68  Thus it becomes 
necessary for the male and the female of this animal to remain together all their lives, to 
help each other in the shared task of raising the children. 
But the education of children regards more than the biological dimension of marriage.  
It is the fundamental reason Aquinas gives that Mary and Joseph’s association was truly a 
marriage, despite the absence of conjugal relations:   
A child is not called the good 
of marriage only because he is 
generated through marriage, but 
also inasmuch as he is accepted and 
educated in marriage; and thus the 
good of this marriage was a child, 
but not in the first way. 
Ad quartum dicendum, quod 
proles non dicitur bonum 
matrimonii solum inquantum per 
matrimonium generatur, sed 
inquantum in matrimonio suscipitur 
et educatur; et sic bonum illius 
matrimonii fuit proles illa et non 
primo modo.69 
 
Though the relationship was never consummated, Mary and Joseph were united for 
life for the sake of raising to adulthood the child they had received from God. 
In fact, nearly every time the bonum prolis is discussed, Thomas emphasizes that in 
considering the generation and the education of children, the former is always for the sake 
of the latter: 
marriage was chiefly instituted 
for the good of offspring, not only 
their generation, since this can 
happen without marriage, but also 
their upbringing to the perfect state:  
matrimonium principaliter 
institutum est ad bonum prolis, non 
tantum generandae, quia hoc sine 
matrimonio fieri posset, sed etiam 
promovendae ad perfectum statum: 
                                                 
67 In IV Sent., D. 26, Q. 1, Art. 1, c: “Primo quantum ad principalem ejus finem, qui est bonum prolis: non 
enim intendit natura solum generationem ejus, sed traductionem, et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum 
hominis, inquantum homo est, qui est virtutis status.” 
68In IV Sent., D. 26, Q. 1, Art. 1. “Filius autem a parente educari et instrui non posset, nisi determinatos et 
certos parentes haberet: quod non esset, nisi esset aliqua obligatio viri ad mulierem determinatam.” 
69In IV Sent., D. 30, Q. 2, art. 2, ad 4. 
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since everything naturally intends 
its effect to arrive at its perfect 
state.  But in children a two-fold 
perfection must be considered:  
first, the perfection of nature not 
only as to the body, but also the 
soul, through those things which 
are of natural law; second, the 
perfection of grace. 
quia quaelibet res intendit effectum 
suum naturaliter perducere ad 
perfectum statum. Est autem in 
prole duplex perfectio 
consideranda; scilicet perfectio 
naturae non solum quantum ad 
corpus, sed etiam quantum ad 
animam, per ea quae sunt de lege 
naturae; et perfectio gratiae.70 
The importance of education to the good of offspring shows us marriage’s connection 
to the common good.  For Saint Thomas, marriage is not for the sake of producing children, 
marriage is for the sake of producing adults.  The aim of the bonum prolis is not more 
people to continue the human race but rather more just citizens for the polis and more 
charitable members for the Body of Christ.  The more that citizens in the polis have the 
virtue of justice, the more just the community can become.  The community of the Church, 
because it is the mystical Body of Christ, is even better constituted to enjoy the charity of its 
members as a common good.  Justice and charity are true common goods, and it is these 
common goods that marriage is ordered to in the good of offspring. 
In fact it is precisely the centrality of raising the children that is the reason for the 
secondary end of marriage, which Saint Thomas defines as “the mutual service that the 
spouses devote to each other in domestic matters.”71  Aquinas makes this relationship 
explicit in his discussion of the goods of marriage in the Commentary on the Sentences: 
In the good of offspring is not 
only to be understood procreation 
of children but also their education, 
to which all sharing of labor 
between a man and a woman joined 
in marriage is ordered as to an end, 
for fathers naturally lay up treasure 
for their children, as is evident 
from 2 Cor 12.  And thus in the 
procreation of children another end 
is included, as a secondary end in a 
principal end. 
in prole non solum intelligitur 
procreatio prolis, sed etiam 
educatio ipsius, ad quam sicut ad 
finem ordinatur tota communicatio 
operum quae est inter virum et 
uxorem, inquantum sunt 
matrimonio juncti, quia patres 
naturaliter thesaurizant filiis, ut 
patet 2 Corinth., 12, et sic in prole, 
quasi in principali fine, alius quasi 
secundarius includitur.72 
This is what it means to call the mutual devotion ‘secondary.’  It does not mean that it 
is of less importance to marriage or can be dispensed with.  Saint Thomas states that both 
ends belong to marriage per se or essentially.73  It does not mean that the good of the 
individual is to be sacrificed to the good of the many.  Nor is the secondary end the 
incentive that is attached to the procreative end in order to induce spouses to undertake this 
                                                 
70 In IV Sent., D. 39, Q. 1, art. 2, corpus. 
71 In IV Sent, D. 26, Q.1, Art. 1, corpus:  “mutuum obsequium sibi a conjugibus in rebus domesticis 
impensum.” 
72 In IV Sent, D. 31, Q.1, Art. 2, ad 1. 
73 In IV Sent, D. 30, Q.1, Art.3, corpus. 
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rather onerous duty to mankind.  Rather, mutual service is called a secondary end because it 
is included in the primary end, as a means is included in the end. 
B.  Parents naturally lay up treasure for their children 
This passage on the relation of the two ends also includes an important hint of the 
breadth and depth of Aquinas’s vision for the two ends.  In what almost seems like a non-
sequitur, Saint Thomas says that all sharing of labor between a man and a woman is ordered 
to the education of children, “because fathers naturally lay up treasure for their children.” 
The passage is a response to the objection that sharing of labors should be included among 
the goods of marriage, “since marriage does not only occur among men for the procreation 
and nurturing of children, but also for the consortium of a shared life for the sake of sharing 
the labors.”74 
The word consortium illuminates further the mind of Saint Thomas as to the common 
good.  Aquinas received the expression consortium communis vitae as a definition of 
marriage from his predecessors,75 and it has persisted in the definition of marriage in canon 
law to this day.  Canon lawyer Ladislas Orsy comments 
consortium is virtually impossible to translate correctly; it has no 
equivalent in English.  Literally, it means a close association of persons 
sharing the same fortune, fate and destiny.  It is less than communio, which 
is the closest of intimate relationships.  Yet it is more than societas, which 
can be a loose partnership for business purposes.76 
Quite literally, a consortium means not just shared life, but joint destiny, combined 
fortunes.  It is under the aspect of “shared life” that Saint Thomas uses this word to explain 
why polygamy was tolerated among the patriarchs.77  It is under the aspect of “combined 
fortunes” that consortium can be translated as “inheritance” in the articles treating 
adoption.78  But in the definition of marriage, “consortium communis vitae et communicatio 
divini et humani juris,” consortium adds something beyond the shared life (communis 
vitae).  While its origins as a shared sors or fate derived from pagan ideas of the afterlife, 
Saint Thomas anchors it firmly in Christian theology by answering it with his allusion to II 
Corinthians 12:14, “parents naturally store up treasure for their children.”  Yet even in its 
original context, this Scriptural reference can seem like a non-sequitur.  Paul tells the 
Corinthians that he will not be a burden to them, for he seeks not their possessions but the 
                                                 
74 In IV Sent. D. 31, Q. 1, Art. 2, obj 1: “Quia matrimonium non solum fit in hominibus ad prolem 
procreandam et nutriendam; sed ad consortium communis vitae propter operum communicationem, ut dicitur 
in 8 Ethic.” 
75 Cf. In IV Sent. D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 1, qc. 3. 
76 Ladislas Orsy, Marriage in Canon Law:  Texts and Comments, Reflections and Questions, Wilmington, DE: 
Michael Glazier, 1986. 
77 Cf. D. 33, Q.1, Art. 1, sed contra and ad 9.   
78 Cf. In IV Sent. D. 41, Q. 1, Art. 2, qc. 2, obj. 2. 
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Corinthians themselves, “for neither ought children to lay up for the parents, but the parents 
for the children.  But most gladly will I spend and be spent for your souls.”79  Paul employs 
this economic language of saving up for one’s children to convey soteriological and 
eschatological realities. 
With this Pauline appeal as subtext, Aquinas explains the nature of shared labor 
between husband and wife.  The consortium inquired about in the objection is the shared 
fate and fortune that is combined for the sake of the children; the parents’ joint efforts in 
educating the young are the inheritance that they bestow on their children. 
Aquinas makes an allusion to this statement from II Corinthians 12:14 once more in 
the treatise on marriage, in a text that sheds even more light on the question at hand: 
marriage by the intention of 
nature is ordered to the education 
of children, not only for a certain 
time, but for the entire life of the 
children.  For which reason it is 
from natural law that parents store 
up treasure for their children, and 
children are the heirs of their 
parents.  Therefore, since children 
are a common good of the husband 
and wife, it is necessary for their 
association to remain undivided 
forever according to the dicates of 
the law of nature. 
matrimonium ex intentione 
naturae ordinatur ad educationem 
prolis non solum per aliquod 
tempus, sed per totam vitam prolis. 
Unde de lege naturae est quod 
parentes filiis thesaurizent, et filii 
parentum heredes sint; et ideo, cum 
proles sit commune bonum viri et 
uxoris, oportet eorum societatem 
perpetuo permanere indivisam 
secundum legis naturae dictamen.80 
Here the same comment—parents naturally store up treasure for their children—is 
summed up a moment later thus:  “children are a common good of the husband and wife.”  
Not only does the consortium, the common good of the couple, exist for the sake of the 
children, but the children themselves are a common good for the couple. 
This is a radically new way for Saint Thomas to use the expression bonum commune.  
Michael Waldstein contextualizes it thus: 
An important distinction St. Thomas makes is that between intrinsic and 
extrinsic common good. The example he usually uses to illustrate this 
distinction, following Aristotle, Metaphysics Lambda, is an army. The 
intrinsic common good of an army, which is its internal order and unity, is 
ordered to victory, which is the army’s extrinsic common good. A universal 
principle can be seen here. “Whenever we see a multitude ordered to each 
other, it must be ordered to some external principle” (De Veritate, 5.3.c). 
This principle applies also to marriage. The intrinsic common good of 
marriage, which is the unity of love between husband and wife on the basis 
                                                 
79 II Corinthians 12:14, Douay-Reims translation. 
80 In IV Sent. D. 33, Q. 2, Art. 1. 
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of the marriage vow, is ordered to the child, which is the extrinsic common 
good of marriage.81 
Obviously a child is in many ways a private good—neither of the spouses can wholly 
possess him the way they might fully and completely possess peace or truth.  But by his 
allusions to II Corinthians, Saint Thomas highlights the very real way that children can be a 
common good of their parents.  Aquinas uses the word once to describe the cooperation of 
husband and wife in raising the children, and once to describe that cooperation enduring for 
the entire lifetime of the spouses.  As the common good of his parents, the child is equally 
the good of both:  he comes from both equally and grows under their shared attention.  If 
the parents’ shared life is one of virtue, the child’s inheritance will be his education in 
virtue.  This working together to bestow on the child the legacy of a life lived well, shows 
us how the unitive and procreative ends of marriage are more deeply interwoven than 
distinct. 
Thomas’ vision, “Whenever we see a multitude ordered to each other, it must be 
ordered to some external principle” reveals to us even more about marriage.  A multitude 
ordered to each other must be for the sake of something greater than themselves.  The love 
between spouses goes beyond willing the good of the other to willing even more others to 
be brought into that love, and to be willed that good. 
Moreover, Saint Thomas’s references to II Corinthians as an explanation of the 
consortium adumbrate the higher ordination of the bonum prolis.  At the natural level, 
children are a common good of the parents as the mode in which the parents’ life will 
continue after after their physical death.  Their consortium, their shared efforts and 
earnings, will pass to the child when they die; if they are virtuous, these shared efforts will 
endow their children with an education in virtue.  Yet just as the pagan sors conveyed a 
sense of fate or destiny, the consortium of Christian marriage is ordered to the afterlife.  The 
II Corinthians allusion reinforces this, for Paul is not discussing material savings, but rather 
the “spending” of himself in saving the souls of his spiritual children.  Similarly, the bonum 
prolis in a Christian marriage extends beyond the education of children to civic virtue; it 
aims to rear children to a heavenly inheritance.  Saint Thomas addresses this further 
meaning of the bonum prolis: 
The procreation of children, as 
a good of the sacrament, adds 
something beyond procreation of 
children as intended by nature.  For 
nature intends offspring according 
as the good of the species is 
preserved in them.  But beyond 
this, in offspring as a good of the 
sacrament of matrimony, is 
understood that children received 
are ultimately ordained to God.  
Therefore it is necessary that 
proles prout est bonum 
sacramenti, addit supra prolem 
prout est intentum a natura. Natura 
enim intendit prolem prout in ipsa 
salvatur bonum speciei; sed in 
prole secundum quod est bonum 
sacramenti matrimonii, ultra hoc 
intelligitur ut proles suscepta 
ulterius ordinetur in Deum; et ideo 
oportet quod intentio naturae qua 
prolem intendit, referatur actu vel 
habitu ad intentionem prolis prout 
                                                 
81 Waldstein, “The Common Good in St. Thomas and John Paul II,” p. 677. 
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nature's intention by which she 
intends children, is referred 
actually or habitually to the 
intention of children as a good of 
the sacrament; otherwise it would 
be stuck at the level of creation; 
which cannot happen without sin. 
est bonum sacramenti; alias staretur 
in creatura; quod sine peccato esse 
non potest.82 
If children are a common good of marriage, they must finally be ordered to the 
ultimate common good of the universe, which is God.  Saint Thomas even goes so far as to 
say that 
Offspring, as a good of 
matrimony, includes remaining 
faithful to God.  For children are 
only considered a good of marriage 
according as they are hoped for in 
order to be raised to the worship of 
God. 
proles, secundum quod est 
bonum matrimonii, includit fidem 
ad Deum servandam; quia 
secundum quod proles expectatur 
ad cultum Dei educanda, ponitur 
matrimonii bonum83. 
The problem with DeBroglie’s account of the “grande cause” is that it does not paint 
things grandly enough.  To bind marriage only to the rather uninspiring end of producing 
more people is not so very different from the mentality that looks at population as a series 
of digits and declaims that there are too many.  When we begin to view humans 
quantitatively we leave the realm of the common good and place ourselves squarely among 
private goods.  Modern readers’ understandings of population seem to be irretrievably 
tainted by Malthusian views, which, resting as they do on the calculation of private goods, 
terminate in frightening prognoses of finite material resources.  Thinking more deeply about 
the meaning of the common good offers us a way out of this culture of death. 
To DeBroglie’s credit, his purpose was to defend magisterial teaching  by 
harmonizing traditional Thomistic doctrine on marriage with that enunciated in Humanae 
Vitae—a commendable aim during what must have been a time of great confusion after 
Vatican II but before the Theology of the Body.  Nevertheless a hazy grasp of the Thomistic 
idea of the common good—a topic so important to Aquinas that Waldstein calls it 
“architechtonic”84—results in an analysis of marriage that is riddled with problems.  If a 
lifelong student of Saint Thomas and one-time professor at the Institut Catholique could fail 
the mark on a theme so central to Thomas, it should be a sign of how easily anyone might 
stumble into the same misreading.  DeBroglie’s errors are a testament to the pervasiveness 
of modern philosophy; even among those of us who do not subscribe to modern ideas 
expressly, our minds are all informed to some degree by the materialistic and utilitarian 
outlook of this modern era.  One result of the influence of modern science on our thinking is 
that when we try to weigh the two ends of marriage against each other, we will always end 
by bringing them into competition with each other.  Even well-intentioned attempts to 
                                                 
82In IV Sent., D. 31, Q. 2, A. 2, ad 1. 
83 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q. 1, A. 2, ad 5. 
84 Waldstein, p. 569. 
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defend Saint Thomas will merely end in gluing the two ends together in some mechanistic 
way.  By looking through the lens of Saint Thomas’s notion of universal order, it becomes 
clear that the two ends’ relationship is much more organic:  they are indissolubly connected 
by nature like a flower and its fruit. 
Palmer and DeBroglie may have had different attitudes toward Saint Thomas, and 
differing approaches to his marriage theology.  When looked at together, they represent well 
the problems that have sidelined Aquinas in marriage studies in recent years.  Many, like 
Palmer, consider Saint Thomas outdated because his attention to law seems to diminish 
marriage’s spiritual beauty and power.  Meanwhile a supporter of Aquinas like DeBroglie, 
who argues that his subordination of love to duty will not ultimately detract from the 
personal fulfillment of the spouses, consequently misrepresents Aquinas badly.  Although 
modern readings of Saint Thomas focus on different aspects of his marriage theology, many 
share in a common misperception:  a desire to diminish or separate man’s biological, animal 
nature from his spiritual nature.  By contrast, Aquinas views human nature as an integrated 
whole.  Moreover, he recognizes that the economy of salvation in general, rooted as it is in 
the Incarnation, and the sacraments in particular, depend upon this integration of material 
and spiritual.  Law does not contaminate sacramentality, but rather ensures its penetration to 
every level of the human being.  By the same token, duty need not be in competition with 
love, but rather should strengthen and deepen it, as we will see in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER II:  THE MARITAL ACT 
The difference between current attitudes toward sexuality and Saint Thomas’s 
understanding can hardly be over-stated.  Even among sympathetic 20th century readers of 
Thomas, his characterization of marital intimacy can seem unfeelingly analytical.  He is 
commonly reproached with condemning marital intercourse unless it is “propter solam 
procreationem.” His understanding of the marital act as a “remedy for concupiscence” 
strikes some as being mired in the biological and the animal, others as springing from an 
Augustinian obsession with sin that borders on jansenism.85  His description of conjugal 
intimacy as “the marital debt” smacks of a cold legalism. Meanwhile, Aquinas has drawn 
criticism from other authors (Milhaven and Palmer, for example), for describing as a venial 
sin conjugal relations that are motivated by the desire for sexual pleasure.86  Modern 
theologians wish to focus on sexual love as the ultimate expression of spousal affection, and 
find it difficult to reconcile Aquinas’s language with the current language of “unitive 
significance.”87  Thomas’s understanding of marital love will be examined more closely in 
the following chapter.  Here we will consider his assessment of conjugal intimacy. 
                                                 
85 See Theo Belmans, Le sens objectif de l’agir humain:  pour relire la morale conjugale de Saint Thomas; 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Citta del Vaticano, 1980, pages 328, 336.  See also, Belmans, “Le remedium 
concupiscentiae comme fin de mariage,” Revue Thomiste, XCIII (1993), p. 297. 
86 John Giles Milhaven, “Aquinas on Sexual Pleasure,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 5/2 (1977), p. 157-181. 
Palmer, Paul F., S.J.  “Christian Marriage:  Contract or Covenant?”  Theological Studies 33 (1972): 617-665. 
87 Humanae Vitae, 12.  
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1. THE MARITAL ACT AS REMEDY FOR CONCUPISCENCE 
In his book, Le sens objectif de l’agir humain, Theo Belmans catalogues the modern 
critics of Aquinas who find fault with his designation of the secondary end of marriage as 
remedium concupiscentiae.88  They prefer to focus on his description of it elsewhere as 
communicatio operum,89  domestica conversatio90 or vita communis in rebus domesticis or 
 mutuum obsequium,91 since these more general Aristotelian terms seem to open the 
possibility of marital intimacy only out of purely affective reasons.  Aquinas’s 
interchangeable use of the term vitatio fornicationis92  as the per se secondary end of 
marriage makes his meaning in speaking of a remedy for concupiscence more explicit. 
Belmans sums up the criticism of Aquinas on this topic in a quote from Bernhard 
Haering, who accuses Saint Thomas of a 
sacralism aliéné et faux concentrant toute l’attention sur la validité du 
contrat et ses aspects cérémoniels, tout en déclarant l’amour conjugale 
accessoire . . . Le commerce marital se trouve ainsi simplement excusé en 
tant qu’il constitue pour les conjoints un moyen pour la procréation d’enfants 
ou que, en raison du peu de maîtrise de soi, il signifie, en tant que remedium 
concupiscentiae, ou remède contre une convoitise debridée, un moindre mal 
que la fornication.93 
In a related misreading, numerous current scholars lambaste Saint Thomas for his 
supposed censure of pleasure in conjugal intimacy.  Usually this charge forms part of a 
larger erroneous belief that Aquinas forbade marital relations for any reason other than 
propter solam procreationem.  This widespread myth about Aquinas’s teaching  
overwhelmingly owes its origin to John Noonan’s influential work Contraception: a 
History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists.94 
To understand Thomas’s characterization of marital intimacy, we must first begin by 
considering the several meanings of the word concupiscentia in Aquinas, meanings which 
                                                 
88 Belmans lists, among others, Doms, Fuchs, Aubert, Haering, Linsenmann, Pruemmer.  
89 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 164, 2; In Sent. IV, D. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; also D. 33, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 3. 
90 ST, Supplementum, 44.3.; In Isaiam, 4:1. 
91 In Sent. IV, D. 26, q. 1, a. 1. 
92 In Sent. IV, D. 30, q. 1, a. 3. 
93Belmans, “Le remedium concupiscentiae comme fin de mariage,” p. 301.  
94 John Noonan, Contraception:  a History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists  
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965). In “The Good of Marriage:  Some Historical 
and Philosophical Observations” (American Journal of Jurisprudence 42 [1998]), John Finnis traces the 
misreading of two other scholars disseminating Noonan’s errors:  John Boswell, Christianity, Social 
Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the 
Fourteenth Century (University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1980), p. 165 and 322; and Andrew 
Koppelman, “Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?” (American Journal of Jurisprudence 42 [1997]). We 
might add to the list James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (University of 
Chicago Press:  Chicago and London, 1987), page 421-422,429. See also Finnis, “Law, Morality and ‘Sexual 
Orientation’” in Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and Culture of Homosexuality (John Corvino, ed.; 
Lanham-New York-London:  Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). 
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are related to each other in an order descending from the general to the particular:  
concupiscence as the desire for a good; concupiscence as the desire for pleasure; and 
concupiscence as an inordinate desire for corruptible goods.  Many of the problems in those 
texts that have seriously examined Aquinas on this topic derive from conflating these 
various uses of the word “concupiscence.”   Saint Thomas distinguishes the use of 
concupiscentia himself in Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 30, Article 1. 
A.  Three definitions of concupiscence 
Desire for goods. Thomas gives as an example the text of Wisdom 6:21, “the 
concupiscence of wisdom.”95  This general sense of concupiscence as desire for a good is 
the source of Aquinas’s distinction between the love of concupiscence and the love of 
friendship.  The love of concupiscence is directed at goods which are desired for oneself or 
for others.  The love of friendship, on the other hand, is concerned with the person for 
whom goods are desired.   James McEvoy cautions however that the love of concupiscence 
“has wrongly suggested to many a form of selfish love that is the opposite of altruism and 
that verges upon narcissism.”96  Rather: 
Amor concupiscentiae is attached to things, in the first place—things 
wanted for people.  Hence the distinction between the two loves reposes 
essentially upon the difference between means (things) and ends (persons).  
Desiring love is of course self-referring.  However, it is not selfish of its very 
nature, for the thing wanted may be wanted for myself or for someone else 
(vel sibi vel alii), as a means to be used well.97 
It is also in this sense that the lower, sensitive powers of the soul are 
divided into irascible and concupiscible appetites:  the concupiscible 
appetite seeks goods; by contrast the irascible appetite deals with obstacles 
to those goods.98 
Desire for pleasure. This use of concupiscence with regard to the sensual appetite 
leads to its meaning as a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty, which Aquinas 
defines as “a craving for what is pleasant,”99 or the desire for sensible good (qua absent).100  
This desire for pleasure can be natural, i.e. suited to one’s nature, or rational, perceived by 
reason to be suited to one’s nature (as wealth, for example). 
                                                 
95 ST, I-II. 30.1, objection 1. 
96 James McEvoy, “The other as oneself :  friendship and love in the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas” in 
Thomas Aquinas:  Approaches to Truth, ed. James McEvoy and Michael Dunne. (Four Courts Press, Dublin, 
2002), page 24.  See also, McEvoy, “Amitie, attirance et amour chez S. Thomas d’Aquin” in Revue 
philosophique de Louvain, 91 (1993), p. 391. 
97 McEvoy, “The other as oneself,” page 25. 
98 ST, I, Q. 81, A2. 
99 ST, I-II. 30.1 and 3. 
100 ST, I-II. 30.2, ad 1. 
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“The immoderate turning to mutable goods.”101  According to both of the previous 
two meanings of concupiscence, concupiscence can be considered a natural and good part 
of created nature.  However, the disintegration of the natural order of things that occurred as 
a result of the Fall of Man means that neither the concupiscible appetite nor its desires are 
subject to man’s reason.  This overthrow of the natural order gives us the most familiar use 
of the term concupiscence: the material effect of original sin by which we tend to 
corruptible goods for their own sake. 
While concupiscence in this last sense tends to a much broader range of sins than 
sexuality (indeed, any sin), common speech tends to equate this “immoderate turning to 
mutable goods” with the immoderate desire for sexual pleasure.  Aquinas explains this 
association by pointing out that lust is the most obvious manifestation of concupiscence 
because sexual pleasures are among the most vehement of sensual pleasures, and therefore 
cloud the reason more than other mutable goods.102 
Some of the misreadings of Thomas on the relation of concupiscence to marriage are 
clearly traceable to an equivocation of these many varying, though closely-related, 
meanings of the word concupiscence.  John Milhaven’s article, “Thomas Aquinas on Sexual 
Pleasure”103 provides several examples, while condensing representatively several of the 
current complaints about Aquinas’s attitude toward marital intimacy. 
B. Concupiscence as sensual pleasure 
While ostensibly undertaking to defend Saint Thomas against claims that his position 
toward sexual pleasure is inconsistent, Milhaven argues that Thomas should have better 
appreciated the positive benefits of sexual pleasure.  Universally translating concupiscentia 
as “the appetite for sexual pleasure,” Milhaven contrasts Aquinas’s condemnation of marital 
intercourse ex concupiscentia, which Thomas considers at least a venial sin,104 with 
Thomas’s innovative stance in affirming the “goodness and naturalness” of concupiscentia: 
He rejects the widespread medieval position that this appetite 
(concupiscentia) is essentially sinful.  He also denies—and is the first 
medieval theologian to do so—that this appetite constitutes a flaw or 
perversion of human nature.  Original sin has “corrupted” the appetite only 
in reducing it to its natural state.  In its natural state, concupiscentia is no 
longer completely subject to reason.105 
Clearly, there are several different meanings of concupiscence at work here.  The 
passage quoted refers to Thomas’s use of concupiscence according to its first and second 
                                                 
101 ST I-II, Q 82, A3. 
102 Cf. ST, II-II.151.3; II-II.153.1. 
103 John Milhaven, “Thomas Aquinas on Sexual Pleasure,” in The Journal of Religious Ethics, 5:2 (1977) pp. 
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104 In Sent. IV, D. 26, Q. 1, a. 4; In Corinth. 7.1; ST, II-II, 154, 2, ad 6.  
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meanings, as a natural appetite for pleasures.  But by deeming marital intimacy “propter 
solam delectationem” a venial sin, Thomas is considering an example of the immoderate 
seeking of mutable goods that is the vestige of original sin.  The relationship between the 
two meanings has its roots in something Milhaven does recognize:  the insubordination of 
the lower faculties to reason since the Fall of Man.  Yet Milhaven still fails to distinguish 
between the faculty that is part of man’s nature, the passion that it is subject to, and the 
disorder that goes by the same name.  To state that original sin has corrupted the 
concupiscible appetite “only” by reducing it to its “natural state” of rebellion against reason 
is, if not false, at least very misleading; it gives the impression that the theologian who so 
valued man’s created nature approved the disorder that damaged that nature so severely. 
Nor does the relationship of concupiscence (whether as appetite or passion) to reason 
explain fully Thomas’s teaching on it.   To understand why seeking the pleasure of sex—or 
indeed any pleasure—for its own sake would always amount to at least a venial sin for Saint 
Thomas, it is important to understand the place of pleasure in his anthropology. 
For Aquinas, pleasure is the repose of an appetite in having attained the good that it 
was made for.  It is a passion limited to sentient creatures, because it requires not only the 
attainment of a sensible good but the recognition or perception of its suitability to a given 
faculty.  (Thomas distinguishes that pleasure, properly speaking, is limited to sensible 
goods; its spiritual or intellectual counterpart should really be called joy.106)  The objects of 
pleasure vary according as the appetites do, but what makes an object pleasant is its 
suitability to the faculty that it pleases.  Animals and children, “have from God their natural 
appetite, which is moved to what is naturally suitable to them.”107  Adult humans have the 
possibility of desiring more complex objects based on the goodness that they perceive 
themselves as good; their desires may vary according as their needs vary, or they may err in 
perceiving something as a suitable good.108  It is in this way that Aquinas speaks of the 
morality of pleasure:  “there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests 
in that which is in accord with reason.”109 
Milhaven recognizes the critical moderating role of reason in the morality of pleasure 
for Aquinas.  But he considers Aquinas’s claim that the Blessed will not enjoy sexual 
pleasures after the resurrection of the body,110 a sign of inconsistency: 
Thomas’ negative judgment on sexual pleasure is, therefore, not based 
exclusively on the power this pleasure has, as a result of Original Sin, to 
move man out of the control of his reason and thus to disturb his higher life.  
A more fundamental negativity of sexual pleasure is seen by Thomas even 
when the pleasure is totally subordinated to man’s reason . . . and man’s 
intellectual contemplation goes on undisturbed.111 
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Yet this apparent inconsistency only arises if one ignores the most basic nature of 
pleasure as the experience of fulfillment of a faculty.  While Saint Thomas confirms that 
other sensible pleasures will enrich the joy of the beatific vision (for example, the pleasures 
of sight and sound), there will be no need for human generation after the resurrection.  
Therefore, the sexual appetite will no longer be seeking its fulfillment, the attainment of 
which causes sexual pleasure.  Thomas excludes the pleasures of food for the same reason:  
the objects of the animal body will no longer be necessary to the spiritual body. 
Milhaven, drawing heavily on Noonan and Fuchs,112 finds confusing Thomas’s praise 
for the goodness of pleasure, especially sexual pleasure, when viewed alongside his 
condemnation of acting for the sake of it in conjugal intimacy.  But Aquinas did not 
consider pleasure an end to be sought, but a fruit accompanying the attainment of an end.  
To seek the enjoyment of attaining an end while trying to avoid attaining the end involves a 
certain metaphysical and moral absurdity. 
Cornelius Williams expounds on this in his lecture on “The Hedonism of Aquinas.”113  
While too early to speak to Milhaven’s article, Williams’s lecture addresses directly the 
errors in Noonan, on whom Milhaven relies so heavily. 
The implication is that Saint Thomas taught that married people may 
never seek the pleasure attaching to sexual intercourse, that they may never 
desire bodily union because it pleases them, because they delight in it.  Now 
it must be clearly stated that such a teaching is to be found nowhere in his 
writings, neither in the early nor in the later and more mature works. . . On 
the contrary, he constantly insisted on the important place and value of 
pleasure, of sexual pleasure, in married life, and, anticipating the moderns, 
even pointed to the close connection between the seeking of that pleasure 
and the indulgence in it and the expression and fostering of married love.  
Sexual pleasure of the married is for him something holy and meritorious of 
eternal life and is increased in intensity by the love of those who seek it and 
indulge in it. . . But he also insisted just as strongly that the pleasure  and the 
seeking for it must be in order, ordered by right reason according to the 
needs of life and of one’s station in life.  In other words, in line with the 
whole tradition of human thought from Aristippus to Frankl, he ever 
adamantly rejected the pleasure-principle; he always refused to admit that 
the summum bonum is pleasure—whether spiritual or sensual—or the 
seeking after it.  And in that precise sense he also consistently taught that it 
can never be in order for the married to indulge in coital activity for the sake 
of pleasure alone—propter solam delectationem, realizing certainly the 
intrinsic disorder of such a manner of acting and conscious perhaps as well 
of the imminent danger of addiction, which can exclude all human value.  He 
also always kept in mind the important distinction between the finis operis 
and the finis operantis, and he always refused to admit that it is in order for 
the operans to rob the opus of its intrinsic finality in order to achieve its own 
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subjective end.  As to the use of contraceptive methods, the exercise of coital 
activity together with the hindering of conception, he saw with absolute 
lucidity that in such a case there is no question of true marital or conjugal 
intercourse… 114 
Aquinas never states that married couples may not desire pleasure in their conjugal 
union, but rather that they may not approach each other for the sake of pleasure alone.  In 
fact,  in the Sentences Commentary Thomas explicitly rejects the position commonly 
attributed to him, giving a schema that he would repeat often throughout his career115: 
Certain people say that 
whenever sexual desire (libido) 
principally moves someone to the 
conjugal act, it is a mortal sin.  But 
when it is a side-motive (movet ex 
latere), then it is a venial sin.  
However when someone refuses 
pleasure altogether, and it 
displeases him, then it is without 
any venial sin at all.  Thus, to seek 
pleasure in this act would be mortal 
sin, to accept the pleasure offered 
would be venial sin, but to hate it 
would be a thing of perfection. 
…quidam dicunt quod 
quandocumque ad actum 
conjugalem libido principaliter 
movet, est peccatum mortale; sed 
quando movet ex latere, tunc est 
peccatum veniale; quando autem 
delectationem omnino respuit, et 
displicet ei; tunc est omnino absque 
veniali peccato: ut sic 
delectationem in actu illo quaerere, 
sit peccatum mortale; 
delectationem oblatam acceptare, 
sit peccatum veniale; sed eam 
odire, sit perfectionis. 
But this cannot be:  for 
according to the Philosopher in 
Book 10 of the Ethics, the 
judgment of a pleasure and an 
operation is the same:  for the 
pleasure of a good operation is 
good, and a bad operation carries 
bad pleasure.  Whence since the 
marital act is not evil per se, neither 
will seeking its pleasure be always 
a mortal sin.  And therefore it 
should be said that if pleasure 
should be sought outside the 
dignity of marriage, such that, for 
example, someone should not turn 
to his wife because she is his wife, 
but only because she is a woman, 
prepared to do the same with her as 
if she were not his wife, it is a 
mortal sin.  And such a man is 
called ‘too ardent a lover’ of his 
Sed hoc non potest esse: quia, 
secundum philosophum in 10 
Ethic., idem est judicium de 
delectatione et operatione: quia 
operationis bonae est delectatio 
bona, et malae mala. Unde cum 
actus matrimonialis non sit per se 
malus; nec quaerere delectationem 
erit peccatum mortale semper. Et 
ideo dicendum, quod si delectatio 
quaeratur ultra honestatem 
matrimonii, ut scilicet quia aliquis 
in conjuge non attendat quod 
conjux est, sed solum quod mulier 
est, idem paratus facere cum ea etsi 
non esset conjux, est peccatum 
mortale; et talis dicitur ardentior 
amator uxoris, quia scilicet ardor 
ille extra bona matrimonii effertur. 
Si autem quaeratur delectatio infra 
limites matrimonii, ut scilicet talis 
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115 See, for example, Ad Corinthios, 7.1.329. 
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wife, for in fact that ardor tends 
outside the goods of marriage.  If, 
on the other hand, pleasure were 
sought within the limits of 
marriage, so that namely such 
pleasure were not sought in any 
woman but one’s wife, thus it 
would be a venial sin.116 
delectatio in alia non quaereretur 
quam in conjuge, sic est veniale 
peccatum. 
Thomas adds that this kind of sin is considered a ‘daily sin,’ for which saying one 
Pater Noster suffices. 
Approaching one’s spouse solely as an object of pleasure would be the love of 
concupiscence (according to the first meaning of concupiscence above), which, while an 
appropriate love for things, remains an insufficient response to a human being.117  In fact, 
John Paul II more dramatically condemned this kind of attitude as using one’s spouse.118 
Saint Thomas has a larger goal in mind for spouses uniting in conjugal intimacy, an 
intention which orders the act to God, to the couple’s final end, and to bringing new souls 
into the grace of Christ. 
Much of Milhaven’s misunderstanding arises from his failure to recognize the 
fundamental organic relationship between an appetite and its end.  He describes the 
relationship thus: 
The real end of the sex appetite is different from the end it seeks, 
pleasure. The real end of the sex appetite is what God and nature have in 
view in affixing pleasure to the appetite as an inducement for the appetite to 
move.  The end God and nature have in view is the conservation of the 
human species through procreation. . . .The conservation of the species, in 
turn, has as its ultimate end the ultimate end of the members of the species, 
i.e., the spiritual activity by which they have their beatitude with God.  The 
senses can know nothing of ends like these.119 
Again, Milhaven’s phrasing obscures Aquinas’s meaning, while revealing a 
worldview that is completely incompatible with Saint Thomas’s.  By stating that “God and 
nature” have “affixed” pleasure to the appetite in order to “induce” it to move, Milhaven 
(like DeBroglie in the previous chapter) evokes a vision of nature’s Author as outside the 
things He has created, artificially and mechanistically eliciting the activities He desires in 
                                                 
116 Commentary on the Sentences, Book IV, Distinction 31, q.2, a3. 
117 Cf. Galeotti, F. “Amore ed amicizia coniugali secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino.” Doctor Communis 25 
(1972),  pp. 41-44. 
118 Cf. “The concupiscence that arises as an interior act on this foundation . . . changes the very intentionality 
of the woman’s existence ‘for’ the man by reducing the wealth of the perennial call to the communion of 
persons, the wealth of the deep attraction of masculinity and femininity, to the mere satisfaction of the body’s 
sexual ‘urge’…Such a reduction has the effect that the person (in this case the woman) becomes for the other 
person (the man) above all an object for the possible satisfaction of his own sexual ‘urge’… A man can 
commit such adultery ‘in the heart’ even with his own wife, if he treats her only as an object for the 
satisfaction of instinct.”  John Paul II, and Michael Waldstein. Man and Woman He Created Them: A 
Theology of the Body. Boston, MA: Pauline Books & Media, 2006, 43:3, pages 298-299. 
119 Milhaven, page 162. 
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contrast to the ends the creatures seek themselves.  This dislocation of the pleasure and end 
of the appetite—indeed, the dislocation of the Creator and creation—replaces a true 
understanding of nature as that which unfolds from its own internal principles, principles 
that God placed within it to bring it to its good.  The dis-integration of Milhaven’s 
cosmology does not end there:  he sees the goal of procreation, and of human life, as 
ultimately each individual’s private possession of God.  Again the enjoyment of the good is 
valued above the good to be enjoyed; such a schema amounts to desiring God by a love of 
concupiscence, rather than the love of friendship. 
The inherent failures in Milhaven’s vision become apparent in the conclusion that he 
draws subsequently: 
But Thomas’s treatment of sexual pleasure, as seen thus far, seems to 
suggest an underlying dualism whereby man’s sense life would have no 
value except in serving his spiritual life… Does not reason know that the 
rich sense life of man is worth seeking for itself and not solely to make 
possible his spiritual activities?120 
Milhaven’s lamentation that sense knowlege would exist only to further man’s 
spiritual good reveals his fundamental lack of understanding of Saint Thomas’s 
anthropology and ultimately his whole cosmology.  Far from evidencing a “dualism” in 
Thomas’s thought, it is only this subordination of all man’s gifts and abilitites to the pursuit 
of his final end that most deeply unites body and soul.  To complain that the joys of the 
senses should be sought for their own sake is to advocate the deliberate “turning toward 
corruptible goods”—the very practice of concupiscence according to its third, most 
dangerous and potentially sinful meaning. 
Repeatedly, Milhaven errs by looking for private ends where he should be seeing 
common goods.  Even his discussions of man’s ultimate end fall prey to this tendency: he 
describes beatitude as a private activity of individuals rather than the shared good of all 
creation, God.121  Ironically this tendency to choose personal goods rather than common 
goods lies at the root of the failing called concupiscence that afflicts all mankind. 
Yet if Thomas does not share Milhaven’s view of the ordering and end of the 
universe, how does he see it?  What does concupiscence mean to him and how is marriage a 
remedy for it, if does not simply designate the sexual drive or the desire for sexual pleasure? 
C.  Concupiscence as disordering 
For Aquinas, the love of concupiscence is a good and necessary part of human nature.  
It follows upon the love of friendship (in that one always desires a good for someone, 
whether another or oneself).  At its best it can be the altruistic desiring of noble goods for 
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121 The difference between private goods and common goods will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 
four. 
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another or a virtuous desiring of honorable things for oneself.  However, one effect of 
original sin is that the love of concupiscence may be directed at improper objects. 
Likewise, the concupiscence that is a desire for pleasure is an integral part of nature:  
every creature naturally tends toward the end for which it was created and pleasure is the 
enjoyment of  the attainment of the end.  The passion of concupiscence is disordered if it 
becomes extreme, or, as in the case of marriage, if the experience of pleasure is desired to 
the exclusion of the fulfillment that it signals. 
Thomas never fails to take into account the derailing of the natural order that afflicts 
the faculty and the passion of concupiscence in his discussion of the marital act.  
Nevertheless, he maintains the goodness of that act, rooted in the demonstrable goodness of 
created nature.122  In fact, he reserves his strongest condemnation for those who denigrate 
the material aspects of marital intimacy, contending, 
it is impossible to say that the 
act by which children are procreated 
is universally illicit so that the mean 
of virtue could not be found in it:  
unless it is argued according to the 
insanity of certain people, that 
corporeal things were caused by an 
evil god; from which perhaps that 
opinion is derived. And that is the 
worst heresy. 
impossibile est dicere, quod 
actus quo procreatur proles, sit 
universaliter illicitus, ut in eo 
medium virtutis inveniri non possit; 
nisi ponatur secundum quorumdam 
insaniam, quod res corporales 
causatae sunt a Deo malo; ex quo 
forte ista opinio derivatur quae in 
littera tangitur; et ideo est pessima 
haeresis.123 
Thus to desire the goods of marriage is what God intended for man, at the natural 
level.  To desire the pleasure that accompanies any faculty’s accomplishment of what it was 
made to do, is entirely natural.  It is when the pleasure of that fulfillment is sought to the 
exclusion of the fulfillment itself that the order of nature is inverted. 
When the spouse is viewed as an object for the source or pleasure of the other spouse, 
the love of concupiscence has overstepped its bounds.  It is the inversion, derailing, or 
misdirection of these aspects of human nature that marriage, and specifically the marital act, 
offers a remedy for. 
Aquinas points out that the marital act has been providing a remedy to the disordering 
that is concupiscence ever since this disorder came about. 
And thus marriage, according 
as it is ordained to the procreation 
of offspring, which was necessary 
also when sin did not exist, was 
instituted before sin.  But according 
as it is a remedy provided against 
the wound of sin, it was instituted 
after sin in the time of the law of 
nature.  But according to the 
Et ideo matrimonium, 
secundum quod ordinatur ad 
procreationem prolis, quae erat 
necessaria etiam peccato non 
existente, institutum fuit ante 
peccatum: secundum autem quod 
remedium praebet contra vulnus 
peccati, institutum fuit post 
peccatum tempore legis naturae; 
                                                 
122 In IV Sent, D. 26, q.1, a. 3. 
123 In IV Sent, D. 26, q.1, a. 3. 
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determination of persons, it had its 
institution under the law of Moses.  
Yet, according as it represents the 
mystery of the union of Christ and 
the Church, it had its institution 
under the New Law; and according 
to this it is a sacrament of the New 
Law.  But as to the other benefits 
which are consequent upon 
marriage, like friendship and the 
mutual service devoted to each 
other by the spouses, it has its 
institution in civil law.  But since it 
is of the ratio of the sacrament that 
it be a sign and a remedy, thus the 
middle institutions have to do with 
it under the ratio of a sacrament; 
but as to the first institution, it has 
to do with what it is in the office of 
nature; as to the last, what it is in 
the office of civic life. 
secundum autem determinationem 
personarum, institutionem habuit in 
lege Moysi; sed secundum quod 
repraesentat mysterium 
conjunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, 
institutionem habuit in nova lege; 
et secundum hoc est sacramentum 
novae legis. Quantum autem ad 
alias utilitates quae ex matrimonio 
consequuntur, sicut est amicitia et 
mutuum obsequium sibi a 
conjugibus impensum, habet 
institutionem in lege civili. Sed 
quia de ratione sacramenti est quod 
sit signum et remedium; ideo 
quantum ad medias institutiones 
competit ei ratio sacramenti; sed 
quantum ad primam institutionem 
competit ei quod sit in officium 
naturae; quantum vero ad ultimam 
quod sit in officium civilitatis.124 
Thus, even before the coming of Christ, God was refining marriage to provide a 
remedy for sin.  That “determination of persons” that was introduced under the law of 
Moses was also ordered toward the repression of concupiscence.  For example, Aquinas 
states that Mosaic restrictions against marrying close relatives had as their reason that, 
The secondary end of marriage 
per se is as much the repression of 
concupiscence; which is lost if any 
consanguineous woman can be 
taken in marriage; for a great 
opportunity is presented to 
concupiscence unless carnal 
intimacy is forbidden between 
those persons who must keep 
company in the same house. 
finis matrimonii secundarius 
per se tantum est concupiscentiae 
repressio; qui deperiret, si quaelibet 
consanguinea posset in 
matrimonium duci; quia magnus 
concupiscentiae aditus praeberetur, 
nisi inter illas personas quas oportet 
in eadem domo conversari, esset 
carnalis copula interdicta.125 
In the Old Testament, the kind of remedy that marriage provided against sin does 
indeed resemble the restraint of animal instincts that Thomas’s 20th century opponents 
criticize.  Aquinas states that 
The remedy that [marriage] 
offers for the satisfying of 
concupiscence lest it should drive 
someone over the edge from being 
remedium praebeat 
satisfaciendo concupiscentiae, ne in 
praeceps ruat, dum nimis arctatur, 
habuit etiam in veteri lege ex ipsa 
                                                 
124 In IV Sent., Distinctio 26, question 2, article 2. 
125 In IV Sent., D. 40, a.3. 
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too strictly restrained, it possessed 
also in the Old Law by the very 
nature of its act. 
natura actus.126 
The effect was that 
. . . an act having baseness is 
impeded; which happens by the 
very nature of the act; since while 
concupiscence is satisfied in the 
conjugal act, it is not so incited to 
other corrupting influences;  
because of which the Apostle says, 
1 Corinthian 7:9,  it is better to 
marry than to burn. 
actus turpitudinem habens 
impediatur; quod fit ex ipsa natura 
actus: quia dum concupiscentiae 
satisfit in actu conjugali, ad alias 
corruptelas non ita incitat; propter 
quod dicit apostolus, 1 Corinth. 7, 
9: melius est nubere quam uri.127 
Yet even under the law of nature, the goodness of the marital act was not limited to a 
stifling or channeling of animalistic urges.  As mentioned above, Aquinas believed that 
even in a natural marriage, the marital act could be an act of virtue.  To defend the virtue of 
the marital act, Aquinas must meet many objections that resemble the criticisms of modern 
readers:  why must the marital act be “excused” by the goods of marriage, if it is not a sin?  
Hasn’t it always got concupiscence attached to it?  Doesn’t the extreme pleasure of the act 
eclipse reason to such a degree that man is incapable of a human act of virtue?  (Of course, 
when these objections arose among Thomas’s contemporaries, they sprang from a belief in 
the baseness of marriage; current criticisms are leveled at Thomas for even entertaining 
such negative views of marriage and the conjugal act.) 
Aquinas answers these objections with equanimity: we speak of the goods of marriage 
as “excusing” marital intimacy not because of any sinfulness in the act itself:  
Something is properly said to 
be excused which has a 
resemblance to evil, and yet is not 
evil . . . and since the marital act 
has a likeness to an inordinate act 
because of the corruption of 
concupiscence, therefore, for the 
goods of marriage it is excused 
entirely, so that it is not a sin.   
illud proprie dicitur excusari 
quod aliquam similitudinem mali 
habet, et tamen non est malum, vel 
non tantum quantum apparet: 
quorum quaedam excusantur a toto, 
quaedam a tanto; et quia actus 
matrimonialis propter corruptionem 
concupiscentiae habet 
similitudinem actus inordinati, ideo 
pro bono matrimonii excusatur a 
toto, ut non sit peccatum.128 
Moreover, the corruption of concupiscence that gives the marital act a resemblance to 
a disordered act is “not the baseness of fault, but of punishment, coming from our first sin; 
                                                 
126In IV Sent.,  D. 26, q. 2, a. 3. 
127 In IV Sent., D. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4. 
128 In IV Sen.t, D. 26, q.1, a. 3, ad  4. 
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so that namely the lower powers and members of the body do not obey reason.”129  
Nevertheless, the corruption of concupiscence that accompanies marital union does not 
prevent reason from appointing a mean of virtue: 
Any human act is called good 
in two ways.  In one way, by the 
goodness of virtue, and thus an act 
is made good by those things which 
place it in the mean:  and fidelity 
and the procreation of children do 
this in the marital act . . . 
Dicitur autem aliquis humanus 
actus bonus dupliciter. Uno modo 
bonitate virtutis; et sic actus habet 
quod sit bonus ex his quae ipsum in 
medio ponunt; et hoc faciunt in 
actu matrimonii fides et proles…130 
Fidelity and procreation act like “due circumstances,” making the act good and 
reasonable.  In this way, “through the goods of marriage, which dignify carnal 
concupiscence, the act to which concupiscence inclines loses its external baseness.”131  And 
even if, due to the insubordination of the passions because of concupiscence, reason is 
unable to operate during the conjugal act, the act remains a virtuous human act because it is 
“pre-ordered by reason:”132 
The overflow of passion which 
causes vice is not found according 
to its quantitative intensity, but 
according to its relation to reason. . 
.  However, the pleasure 
experienced in the marital act, no 
matter how intense it may be 
according to quantity, nonetheless 
does not exceed the limits fixed for 
it by reason before its beginning, 
regardless of how incapable reason 
may be to establish them during the 
pleasure itself. 
superabundantia passionis quae 
vitium facit, non attenditur 
secundum intensionem 
quantitativam ipsius, sed secundum 
proportionem ad rationem…. 
Delectatio autem quae fit in actu 
matrimoniali, quamvis sit 
intensissima secundum 
quantitatem, tamen non excedit 
limites sibi a ratione praefixos ante 
principium suum, quamvis in ipsa 
delectatione ratio eos ordinare non 
possit.133 
Thus the marital act provides a remedy for the disordering that is concupiscence, even 
at the natural level.  For by intending the goods of fidelity and procreation, a couple can 
actually build virtue through their conjugal intimacy: 
For although the works 
corresponding to concupiscence 
secundum se are bound to increase 
concupiscence, yet according as 
Quamvis enim opera 
concupiscentiae congrua secundum 
se nata sint concupiscentiam augere; 
tamen secundum quod ratione 
                                                 
129 In IV Sent, D. 26, q.1, a. 3, ad  3:  “turpitudo illa concupiscentiae quae actum matrimonii semper 
concomitatur, non est turpitudo culpae, sed poenae, ex peccato primo proveniens; ut scilicet inferiores vires et 
membra corporis rationi non obedient.” 
130 In IV Sent, D. 31, q. 2, a. 1. 
131 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4:  “ut actus ad quem inclinat concupiscentia, exterius turpitudine careat; et 
hoc fit per bona matrimonii, quae honestant carnalem concupiscentiam.” 
132 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6:  “est a ratione praeordinatus.” 
133In IV Sent,  D. 31, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3. 
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they are ordered by reason they 
repress it:  for by repeated acts are 
left behind similar habits and 
dispositions. 
ordinantur, ipsam reprimunt: quia 
ex similibus actibus similes 
relinquuntur dispositiones et 
habitus.134 
Nevertheless, even virtue at the natural level is insufficient for Saint Thomas to 
consider the marital act a true remedy for concupiscence.  He reviews the inadequacy of this 
stance in Distinction 26, Question 2, Article 3, “Whether marriage confers grace,” 
For certain people have said 
that marriage is a cause of grace in 
no way, but only a sign.  But this 
cannot stand, for according to this it 
would not differ at all from the 
sacraments of the Old Law . . . for 
the remedy that it offers for the 
satisfying of concupiscence lest it 
should drive someone over the edge 
from being too strictly restrained, it 
possessed also in the Old Law by 
the very nature of its act. 
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod 
matrimonium nullo modo est causa 
gratiae, sed est tantum signum. Sed 
hoc non potest stare: quia secundum 
hoc in nullo differret a sacramentis 
veteris legis… Quod enim 
remedium praebeat satisfaciendo 
concupiscentiae, ne in praeceps 
ruat, dum nimis arctatur, habuit 
etiam in veteri lege ex ipsa natura 
actus. 
And thus others have said that 
grace is conferred there in order to 
withdraw one from evil, for the act 
is excused from sin, which would 
have been a sin without marriage.  
But this would be scarcely anything, 
for this was also the case under the 
Old Law.  So they say that it 
withdraws one from evil inasmuch 
as it lessens concupiscence lest it be 
borne outside the goods of 
marriage; but by that grace there is 
no help for acting well.  But this 
cannot stand, for it is the same grace 
which impedes sin and which 
inclines to good . . . 
Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod 
confertur ibi gratia in ordine ad 
recessum a malo: quia excusatur 
actus a peccato, qui sine matrimonio 
peccatum esset. Sed hoc esset nimis 
parum: quia hoc etiam in veteri lege 
habuit; et ideo dicunt, quod facit 
recedere a malo, inquantum mitigat 
concupiscentiam ne extra bona 
matrimonii feratur; non autem per 
gratiam illam sit aliquod auxilium 
ad bene operandum. Sed hoc non 
potest stare: quia eadem gratia est 
quae impedit peccatum, et quae ad 
bonum inclinat… 
Wherefore, others say that 
marriage, inasmuch as it is 
contracted in the faith of Christ, is 
able to confer a grace helping those 
things to be done which are required 
in marriage; and this is more 
probable:  for wherever a certain 
divine faculty is given, help is also 
given by which man can fittingly 
make use of that faculty. . . 
Wherefore, since in marriage is 
Unde alii dicunt quod 
matrimonium, inquantum in fide 
Christi contrahitur, habet ut conferat 
gratiam adjuvantem ad illa operanda 
quae in matrimonio requiruntur; et 
hoc probabilius est: quia ubicumque 
datur divinitus aliqua facultas, 
dantur etiam auxilia quibus homo 
convenienter uti possit facultate 
illa…Unde, cum in matrimonio 
detur homini ex divina institutione 
                                                 
134 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4. 
47 
 
given to a man by divine institution 
the faculty of enjoying his wife for 
the procreation of children, grace is 
also given without which he could 
not do this fittingly… and thus that 
grace is now given in this sacrament 
like a res contenta. 
facultas utendi sua uxore ad 
procreationem prolis, datur etiam 
gratia sine qua id convenienter 
facere non posset; sicut etiam de 
potestate ordinis supra dictum est, et 
sic ista gratia data est ut jam res 
contenta in hoc sacramento.135 
Ultimately, in his characterisation of marriage as a remedy for concupiscence, 
Aquinas never loses sight of the fact that the only true remedy for concupiscence is 
supernatural grace.  While in regard to its act, concupiscence can be mitigated and even 
redirected to something good through the goods of marriage, “on the part of concupiscence 
itself, as it is repressed in its root…marriage offers a remedy by the grace which is given in 
it.”136 
D. The Remedy for Concupiscence is Grace 
Let us first consider Thomas’s description of marriage as a source of grace before we 
examine the question of grace given in the conjugal act. 
In contrast to his contemporaries, Aquinas insisted that marriage was a sacrament of 
the New Law, and therefore must be a source of grace by that very fact:  “a sacrament 
carries a certain remedy of holiness for man against sin,…wherefore, since this is found in 
marriage it is counted among the sacraments.”137  Or again: 
in the definition of sacrament 
is included causality of grace… 
Therefore since marriage is a 
sacrament, it will be a cause of 
grace… 
it is not a remedy except to the 
extent that it has some effect.  
Therefore it has something of 
efficacy for repressing 
concupiscence.  But concupiscence 
is not repressed except by grace.  
Therefore grace is conferred in 
in definitione sacramenti 
ponitur causalitas gratiae… Ergo 
cum matrimonium sit 
sacramentum, erit causa gratiae… 
non est in remedium nisi 
inquantum aliquam efficaciam 
habet. Ergo habet aliquid efficaciae 
ad reprimendum concupiscentiam. 
Sed concupiscentia non reprimitur 
nisi per gratiam. Ergo confertur in 
ipso gratia. 
                                                 
135 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 2, a. 3, corpus. 
136 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4:  “ex parte ipsius concupiscentiae, ut reprimatur in sua radice; et sic 
remedium praestat matrimonium per gratiam quae in eo datur.” 
137 In IV Sent, D. 26, q.2, a. 1:  “sacramentum importat aliquod remedium sanctitatis homini contra peccatum, 
exhibitum per sensibilia signa, ut in 1 dist, quaest 1, art. 2, quaestiunc. 1, dictum est; unde, cum hoc inveniatur 
in matrimonio, inter sacramenta computatur.” 
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it.138 
Ironically, one of the strongest arguments against the sacramentality of marriage that 
Thomas had to address among his contemporaries, was the very pleasure that accompanies 
marriage.  His objectors argued that the efficacy of the sacraments comes from the Passion 
of Christ, but no one can be conformed to the Cross by something that carries as many 
pleasures as matrimony.  Thomas’s answer shows his characteristic breadth of vision:  
“Although marriage does not conform to the Passion of Christ in suffering, yet it does 
conform to it in the love, by which he suffered for the Church in order that she might be 
joined to him as bride.”139 
It is clear that the remedy for concupiscence that Aquinas sees in marriage 
corresponds to the love, and more specifically, the charity, that the grace of the sacrament 
endows the spouses with.  While the relationship of charity between the spouses will be 
considered more extensively in the next chapter, here we should examine how charity 
combats the disordering that is concupiscence. 
Elsewhere in his works, Thomas delineates the relationship between sacramental 
charity and the diminishment of concupiscence; for example, in his treatment of the 
Eucharist in the Summa Theologiae.  Thomas argues that the Eucharist acts as armor, 
strengthening man against the fomes of sin, by the fact that it is “a sign of the Passion of 
Christ, by which the demons were defeated.”140  The fact that marriage also represents the 
Passion accounts for its sacramental efficacy:  “Just as the water of baptism is able to touch 
the body and cleanse the heart by its contact with the flesh of Christ, so marriage has this 
from the fact that Christ represented it in his Passion.”141 
Marriage is a source of grace from the moment of consent, for those in whom no 
obstacle against grace remains:  “Before fleshly commingling happens, marriage is a 
remedy by the grace that is given in it, although not by the act, which belongs to its second 
integrity.”142  Yet the good of the sacrament, the fact that the union represents the love of 
Christ and his Church has the effect of making conjugal intimacy not only virtuous, but 
even holy: 
Any human act is called good 
in two ways.  In one way, by the 
goodness of virtue…In another 
way, by the goodness of sacrament, 
according to which an act is not 
only called good but also holy; and 
the marital act has this goodness 
Dicitur autem aliquis humanus 
actus bonus dupliciter. Uno modo 
bonitate virtutis…alio modo 
bonitate sacramenti, secundum 
quod actus non solum bonus sed 
etiam sanctus dicitur; et hanc 
bonitatem habet actus matrimonii 
                                                 
138 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 2, a. 3, sed contra. 
139 In IV Sent, D. 26. q. 2, a. 1, ad 3: quamvis matrimonium non conformet passioni Christi quantum ad 
poenam, conformat tamen ei quantum ad caritatem per quam pro Ecclesia sibi in sponsam conjungenda passus 
est 
140Summa Theologiae, III. 79. 6. 
141 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1:  “sicut aqua Baptismi habet quod corpus tangat et cor abluat ex tactu 
carnis Christi; ita matrimonium hoc habet ex hoc quod Christus sua passione illud repraesentavit.” 
142 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4:  “ante commixtionem carnalem est matrimonium in remedium ex gratia 
quae in eo datur, quamvis non ex actu, quod pertinet ad integritatem secundam.” 
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from the indissolubility of the 
union, according to which it 
represents the union of Christ and 
his Church.143 
ex indivisibilitate conjunctionis, 
secundum quam signat 
conjunctionem Christi ad 
Ecclesiam. 
The consummation of the marriage confers upon it a new level of indissolubility, by 
which it represents more completely the union of Christ and the Church.  Thus the marital 
act possesses not only the goodness of virtue, but the goodness of sanctity. 
Moreover, this sanctity does not only characterize the marital act in the abstract; it is a 
real possibility for the two spouses as well.  One consequence of matrimony’s sacramental 
grace is that it gives the spouses the possibility of meriting eternal life by the marital act, 
for every act in which a 
precept is fulfilled is meritorious, if 
it is done out of charity…since no 
act proceeding from a deliberate 
will is indifferent… the marital act 
is always either a sin or it is 
meritorious in someone who has 
grace. 
omnis actus in quo impletur 
praeceptum, est meritorius, si ex 
caritate fiat… cum nullus actus ex 
deliberata voluntate procedens sit 
indifferens, … actus matrimonialis 
semper est peccatum, vel 
meritorius in eo qui gratiam 
habet.144 
Against objectors who balk at attributing such effects to something as common and 
enjoyable as conjugal intimacy, Thomas maintains the all-decisive character of Christian 
love:  “The root of meriting as to the substantial prize is charity itself.”145 
The specific aim of charity is to direct a person’s actions toward God as ultimate end, 
and toward the good of neighbor, which is God.  Thomas gives various references to how 
charity informing the conjugal act could change the intentionality of the spouses.  For 
example, thinkers like DeBroglie, whom we saw in Chapter 1, draw a tension between the 
service to the common good and the personal aims and desires of the spouses in marital 
intimacy.  Their arguments rest on statements of Aquinas like the following: 
Marriage is principally 
ordained to the common good 
under the ratio of the principal end, 
which is the good of offspring; 
although under the ratio of the 
secondary end it is ordained to the 
good of those contracting marriage, 
as it is per se a remedy for 
concupiscence. 
matrimonium principaliter 
ordinatur ad bonum commune 
ratione principalis finis, qui est 
bonum prolis; quamvis etiam 
ratione finis secundarii ordinetur ad 
bonum matrimonium contrahentis, 
prout per se est in remedium 
concupiscentiae.146 
But in the light of charity, it becomes clear that the common good referred to is not 
some fascist notion of increasing the population, but rather a concrete action ordered to the 
                                                 
143In IV Sent,  D. 31, q. 2, a. 1. 
144In IV Sent,  D. 26, q. 1, a. 4.  
145 In IV Sent, D. 26, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1:  “radix merendi quantum ad praemium substantiale est ipsa caritas.” 
146In IV Sent,  D. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4. 
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love of neighbor.  In contrast to that interpretation of Aquinas, it is evident that he includes 
in the good of proles the education of the children toward a shared life with God: 
The procreation of children, as 
a good of the sacrament, adds 
something beyond the procreation 
of children as intended by nature.  
For nature intends offspring 
according as the good of the 
species is preserved in them.  But 
beyond this, in offspring as a good 
of the sacrament of matrimony, is 
understood that children received 
are ultimately ordained to God.  
Therefore it is necessary that 
nature’s intention by which she 
intends children, is referred 
actually or habitually to the 
intention of children as a good of 
the sacrament; otherwise it would 
remain stuck at the level of 
creation, which cannot happen 
without sin. 
proles prout est bonum 
sacramenti, addit supra prolem 
prout est intentum a natura. Natura 
enim intendit prolem prout in ipsa 
salvatur bonum speciei; sed in prole 
secundum quod est bonum 
sacramenti matrimonii, ultra hoc 
intelligitur ut proles suscepta 
ulterius ordinetur in Deum; et ideo 
oportet quod intentio naturae qua 
prolem intendit, referatur actu vel 
habitu ad intentionem prolis prout 
est bonum sacramenti; alias staretur 
in creatura; quod sine peccato esse 
non potest147 
Nor is Thomas’s emphasis on marriage as a remedy for concupiscence mired in the 
biological or a Freudian idea of libido.  An insight to the charity that he expects to be at 
work can be seen in his distinction that 
If someone intended by the 
marital act to avoid fornication in 
his spouse, this is not a sin; for this 
is a kind of rendering of the debt 
which belongs to the good of 
fidelity.  But if he intended to avoid 
fornication in himself, then a 
certain excess exists here; and 
according to this it is a venial sin:  
nor was marriage instituted for this, 
unless according to the 
forebearance which exists about 
venial sins. 
si aliquis per actum matrimonii 
intendat vitare fornicationem in 
conjuge, non est aliquod peccatum; 
quia hoc est quaedam redditio 
debiti, quod ad bonum fidei 
pertinet. Sed si intendat vitare 
fornicationem in se, sic est ibi 
aliqua superfluitas; et secundum 
hoc est peccatum veniale: nec ad 
hoc est matrimonium institutum, 
nisi secundum indulgentiam, quae 
est de peccatis venialibus.148 
By referring to the secondary end of intercourse as a “remedy for concupiscence” or 
“the avoidance of fornication,” Thomas does not understand it as an outlet for unbridled 
animal urges, but as the most important part of the mutual aid and service that the spouses 
owe each other in charity.  The spouse can more surely avoid fornication in himself by the 
                                                 
147 In IV Sent, D.. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1. 
148 In IV Sent, D. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2. 
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grace of the sacrament; Thomas will not call it virtue to seek one’s spouse for this reason, 
though neither will he allow it to be called mortal sin.  Yet to engage in the marital act out 
of concern for the highest good of one’s spouse—his union with God which is threatened 
by temptation—is truly a work of charity. 
Indeed, Thomas’s unwavering focus on charity as the effect of sacramental grace also 
lays to rest the problem of pleasure in the marital act, because “no virtue has such a strong 
inclination to its act as charity, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great a 
pleasure.”149  It is the nature of charity to increase the pleasure of any act it performs.  Thus 
in their conjugal intimacy, spouses endowed with the charity that accompanies sacramental 
grace not only offer a remedy to each other’s concupiscence, but they merit eternal life for 
themselves while rendering the act even more pleasurable. 
Ultimately, the charity that accompanies the grace of the sacrament provides the true 
remedy for the turning inward or selfish grasping at private goods that original sin makes all 
men prone to.  As Belmans states, Aquinas’s teaching means that the marital pact and the 
actions that follow are “de nature à porter remède à l’egoisme qui guette tout mortel ici-bas 
depuis le péché originel et ne peut être surmonté que par notre incorporation au Christ 
glorifiée.”150 
                                                 
149 Summa Theologiae, II-II, 23.2. 
150 Theo Belmans, “Le remedium concupiscentiae comme fin de mariage,” Revue Thomiste, XCIII (1993), p. 
289. 
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2. THE MARITAL ACT AS DEBT 
In recent years John Paul II’s “Theology of the Body” has given us a hopeful new 
way of considering marital love, in language that resonates with modern individuals who 
see sexuality only denigrated and cheapened in our society.  John Paul II describes the 
marital act as “the sign and fruit of total personal self-giving,”151 which springs from the 
total gift that every human being is called to make of himself.152  Donald Asci sums up the 
new vision thus: 
The conjugal act is a singular and irreplaceable act of love between 
husband and wife.  In and through the conjugal act man and woman give 
themselves to one another, express and perfect their love for each other, 
paricipate in the goods of marriage and consummate their marriage.153 
Beside this luminous understanding of marital love, which we have scarcely begun to 
plumb, Saint Thomas’s treatment of the marital act may seem overwhelmingly legalistic, 
and therefore inadequate.  There seems to be a most jarring division between Thomas’s 
treatment of marriage and the current understanding of marriage as a path to holiness and a 
union of hearts.   John Paul II characterizes conjugal intimacy as a “total gift of self” by 
both spouses; Thomas Aquinas refers to it as the debitum,  which is usually translated 
“marital debt” or “duty”154 a phrase that evokes at best a dry legalism, and at worst a kind of 
servitude.  While the ‘gift’ exalts the joyful freedom of a Christian, the ‘debt’ rings of 
compulsion; the former seems the quintessential act of love while the latter is simply a 
submission to law. 
Can these notions be reconciled?  How can something be both gift and debt? 
A careful look at Aquinas’s exposition of marriage within the context of his entire 
vision of theology reveals that the marriage debt for him held the potential to be as beautiful 
and sanctifying as the gift of self seems to us.  The fact that Saint Thomas wrote 
comparatively little about the sacrament of marriage does not make it insignificant in his 
thought.  In fact, the relationship that he delineates between the juridical aspects of 
matrimony and its sacramental nature stems from one of Saint Thomas’ greatest 
contributions to the theological tradition, his exposition of the relation between nature and 
grace. 
The marital act provides a focal point and microcosm for this discussion. 
                                                 
151 Familiaris Consortio, 11. 
152 Cf. Gaudium et Spes, 49 and 51. 
153 Donald P. Asci, The Conjugal Act as Personal Act, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2002; page 274. 
154Saint Thomas Aquinas,  In IV Sententiarum, Distinctio 32. 
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A. The Origins of the Debt 
Initially, Saint Thomas’s language does seem to describe an almost commercial 
exchange with respect to marital duties: 
As a slave is in the power of 
his master, so also is one spouse in 
the power of the other, as is clear 
from I Corinthians 7.  But a slave is 
bound by the necessity of a precept 
to render his debt of servitude to 
his master, as is clear from Romans 
13:7: Render your debts to all: 
tribute to whom tribute is owed, 
etc.  Therefore one spouse is bound 
by the necessity of precept to 
render the debt to the other.  
sed contra sicut servus est in 
potestate domini sui, ita et unus 
conjugum in potestate alterius, ut 
patet 1 corinth. 7. Sed servus 
tenetur ex necessitate praecepti 
domino suo debitum servitutis 
reddere, ut patet Rom. 13, 7: 
reddite omnibus debita: cui 
tributum etc… Ergo et unus 
conjugum ex necessitate praecepti 
tenetur alteri reddere debitum.155 
Yet closer consideration reveals that the spouses, in this matter, are not equivalent to 
slaves.  Saint Thomas distinguishes between legal debt, which has the force of a precept, 
and moral debt, which is necessary for maintaining or growing in virtue.156  The marital 
debt is indeed a legal debt (or “duty”), arising from a juridical contract.  In the consent, 
which is the efficient cause of the marriage bond, it is “the power of carnalis copulae, to 
which one consents.”157  The spouses consent to exchange power over their own bodies 
with regard to the faculty of generation. 
It is important for Saint Thomas to defend the teaching that conjugal consent is 
consent to the power of sexual union rather than to sex itself.  On the one hand, the two 
purposes of marriage (procreation and as a remedy for concupiscence) make consenting to 
this power essential for the contract.  On the other hand, the fact that what is exchanged in 
the contract is the power over one’s body rather than the bodies themselves opens the 
contract to the possibility of a valid Josephite marriage or entry into religious life by mutual 
agreement.  Consenting to exchange power over one’s body also distinguishes the marriage 
contract and its consequent debt from simple slavery. 
The conditions of the consent itself form another important difference.  Thomas 
spends an entire Distinction of the Commentary on the Sentences showing that the consent 
must be completely sua sponte, and can be invalidated by grave fear, family pressure, 
mistaken understanding158 or any compulsion159 in either party.  Moreover, even laying 
down a condition that goes against one of the goods of marriage will invalidate the 
consent.160  If this debt arises from a kind of submission or servitude, it is a servitude that 
                                                 
155 In IV Sent., Distinction 32, Article 1.  
156 ST, II-II, Q. 80, Article 1, Corpus. 
157 In IV Sent., Distinction 28, Article 4, corpus: « potestas carnalis copulae, in quam consentitur . . . » 
158 Cf. In IV Sent., Distinction 30, Question 1, Articles 1-2. 
159 Cf. In IV Sent., Distinction 29, Articles 2, 4, and 3. 
160 Cf. In IV Sent., Distinction 29, Article 3.3, and Distinction 30, Question 1, Article 3. 
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must be entered into with full knowledge and free will, and without any trace of 
compulsion. 
While full disclosure and freedom from compulsion are standard legal conditions 
required for the validity of any contract, Saint Thomas remains aware that this contract is 
also a sacrament, for he adds as a reason for this freedom that “marriage represents the 
union of Christ and the Church, which happens according to the freedom of love.  Therefore 
it cannot happen by a forced consent.”161 
If the efficient cause of the marriage debt lies in the contract, the final cause is one of 
the ends of marriage: providing a remedy for concupiscence.  As such, the debt pertains to 
the good of  fides,which has to do with the unity of marriage: 
Just as it is contained in the 
promise of marriage that neither 
party may approach the bed of 
someone else, so also that both 
must render the debt to each other, 
and this latter is more important, 
since it follows from the mutual 
power given each to the other; and 
therefore, both matters belong to 
faith; but in the text is stated what 
is less manifest. 
Sicut in promissione 
matrimonii continetur ut neuter ad 
alterum torum accedat; ita etiam 
quod sibi invicem debitum reddant: 
et hoc etiam est principalius, cum 
consequatur ex ipsa mutua potestate 
invicem data; et ideo utrumque ad 
fidem pertinet; sed in littera ponitur 
illud quod est minus manifestum.162 
The good of fides adds another aspect of justice to the rendering of the marital debt.  
Faith (or fidelity), one of the three goods that dignify or honestant marriage, is the part of 
justice that concerns keeping one’s promises: 
faith is not taken here as a 
theological virtue, but as a part of 
justice, according to which 
faithfulness is named from those 
things mentioned which are done in 
the observation of promises.  For in 
marriage, since it is a certain 
contract, is a certain promise, by 
which a certain man is determined 
to a certain woman. 
Fides non accipitur hic prout 
est virtus theologica, sed prout est 
pars justitiae, secundum quod fides 
dicitur ex hoc quod fiunt dicta in 
observatione promissorum: quia in 
matrimonio, cum sit quidam 
contractus, est quaedam promissio, 
per quam talis vir tali mulieri 
determinatur.163 
The good of fides arises from keeping one’s promise to offer one’s spouse a virtuous 
alternative to the impulses of concupiscence.  As such, it provides for the good of the other 
in a crucial way, for, in pursuing fides, one spouse lays himself down to prevent the other 
from falling into mortal sin. 
                                                 
161 In IV Sententiarum, Distinction 29, Question 1, Article 3, questiunculus 1, sed contra. “matrimonium 
significat conjunctionem christi ad ecclesiam, quae fit secundum libertatem amoris. Ergo non potest fieri per 
coactum consensum.” 
162 In IV Sent., Distinction 31, Question 1, Article 2, responsum ad 3.  
163 In IV Sententiarum, Distinction 31, Question 1, Article 2, responsum ad 2.  
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It is important too, to remember that it is easier to fall into mortal sin in this area than 
it may seem.  Modern readers of Aquinas may be shocked at the picture he paints of a 
married person who must render the spouse’s conjugal rights with urgency in order avoid 
the spouse’s fornication.164  It gives the impression that Saint Thomas imagines married 
people to suffer from an almost pathological lack of self-control.  But on the contrary, he is 
accutely aware of how delicate interior purity is.  As he remarks in his discussion of kissing 
in the Summa Theologiae, 
A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to 
Matt. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already 
committed adultery with her in his heart."165 
The “fornication” that is to be averted need not be a full-fledged  adulterous affair.  
Thomas is all too aware that the struggle for holiness is both urgent and constant; thus the 
aid that the spouses have pledged to each other must be correspondingly available and 
continuous. 
Aquinas also harbors a certain sympathy for the needs of the spouses, which he shows 
in surprising places.  He advises that a husband should be sensitive to the desires that a wife 
may be too bashful to express.166  Even a married man who has taken a vow of continence 
must be sensitive in responding to his wife’s unspoken wishes for intimacy, “lest the 
marriage be made exceedingly burdensome for the wife who is always having to demand 
the debt.”167  In addressing the situation of the leper’s wife, which had been a matter of 
some discussion among theologians since it had appeared in one of the Decretals,168 
Aquinas allows that a wife need not cohabit with her leprous husband, so as to avoid 
contracting the disease.  But where the conjugal rights are concerned, he does not offer any 
escape clause to the wife propter horrorem, as some of his contemporaries did.169 He states 
that her likelihood of being infected by such brief contact is slim, and apparently the act of 
fidelity that intercourse would represent is of such necessity to the souls of both spouses, as 
to outweigh the physical risk. 
Saint Thomas first mentions the marital debt (or “duty”) in proving that the marital 
act is not only devoid of sin, but actually meritorious in someone possessing grace,170 for 
“when spouses come together for the sake of the procreation of children, or so that they 
might render the debt to one another, which belongs to fidelity, they are totally excused 
from sin.”171  It is not sinful because it was commanded by God for the sake of procreation; 
its merit derives from the fact that that rendering a debt is the quintessential act of the virtue 
                                                 
164 See for example, In IV Sent., D. 32, Q. 1, Art. 2; D. 31, Q. 1, Art. 3; D. 31, Q. 2, art. 2. 
165 Summa Theologiae, II-II,  Q. 154, Art. 4. 
166 In IV Sententiarum, D. 32, Q. 1, Art. 2, qc. 1, corpus. 
167 In IV Sententiarum, D. 38, Q. 1, Art. 3, qc. 2, ad 4. “ne nimis onerosum reddatur matrimonium uxori 
semper exigenti.” 
168 Decretals IV.8.2 
169 Elizabeth Makowski, “The Conjugal Debt and Medieval Canon Law,” Journal of Medieval History. 3, 
(1977), no. 2, p. 112. 
170 In IV Sententiarum, Distinctio 26, Question 1, Articles 3 and 4. 
171 In IV Sent., Distinction 31, Question 2, Article 2, Corpus. 
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of justice.172  But the ways that this act fulfills the virtue of justice are manifold.  Engaging 
in marital intimacy for the sake of procreation is an act of obedience to divine command or 
an act of religion, in bringing forth children for the worship of God; Saint Thomas counts 
both of these virtues as “annexed” to justice for their resemblance to justice. To engage in 
the conjugal act for the sake of fidelity protects the unity of the marriage and exercises the 
virtue of justice in keeping one’s promise. 
Some scholars, like John Finnis, object to the very translation of debitum as debt, 
arguing that it necessarily leads to a misinterpretation of Saint Thomas.  Within the context 
of his larger study of Aquinas’s natural law theory (which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4), Finnis explains the good of fides in the following way: 
…it is necessary first to be clear about Aquinas’ view of marital 
intercourse—a view often misunderstood.  A virtuous choice to engage in an 
act of marital intercourse need not be motivated by the hope of having 
children.  Another distinct, sufficient, and entirely acceptable reason is: ‘to 
give one’s spouse the bodily co-operation, in marital [sexual] intercourse, to 
which he or she is entitled’ {ut debitum reddat}.  Does this mean acting out 
of a sense of duty?  Or only in response to one’s spouse’s claim of right or 
other initiating request?  Not at all.  There is nothing unreasonable about 
either party taking the initiative and asking for or tacitly seeking intercourse.  
Appropriately making and acting on and/or in response to such a request, the 
spouse will indeed ‘each be giving the other what he or she is entitled to {ut 
sibi invicem reddant}’—one’s bodily co-operation in marital sexual 
intercourse.  But doing so has a point; it need not be at all a matter of 
choosing ‘to do one’s duty’ or even ‘to give him what he’s entitled to’ or 
‘give her her rights’.  Rather the point will be, says Aquinas, the good of 
marital fides {bonum fidei}. 
What, then, is fides—literally ‘fidelity’ or ‘faithfulness’—in this 
context?  It is the disposition and commitment of each of the spouses to 
‘cleave to’ {accedere}—precisely, to be maritally united with—the other and 
no other person.  So, besides the negative commitment not to be maritally or 
in any other way sexually united to anyone else (‘fidelity’), fides even more 
basically includes a positive commitment and willingness, a reason for 
action.  This is the key to understanding Aquinas’ understanding of sexual 
morality.  Fides is, indeed, the characteristic proximate object(ive) or 
‘appropriate matter about which {debita materia [circa quam]}’ we are 
engaged when we choose and engage in marital intercourse, even on those 
occasions when we also have explicitly or implicitly the hope of procreating.  
This positive fides is the willingness and commitment to belong to, and be 
united in mind and body with, one’s spouse in the form of societas and 
friendship which we call marriage… 
…So fides is a motive, a reason for many co-operative acts intrinsic or 
incidental to a sharing in the ‘whole life’ of the marital household…Each of 
us is entitled to the other’s co-operation in such acts, provided there is no 
reason for abstaining.  So, truly marital intercourse is literally an act of 
                                                 
172 In the same place he adds that conjugal intimacy for the sake of procreating children for the worship of 
God, or out of respect for God’s precept is an act of religion, itself a sub-virtue of justice (Cf. Summa 
Theologiae, II-II, Q. 81).  
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justice.  But that does not prevent it from being an act of love.  It is an act 
that we can enter into with joy {laetantes}173; the fact that it can give the 
greatest of all bodily pleasures {delectatio intensissima} in no way makes it 
unreasonable; there is nothing wrong at all with our welcoming assent to 
such pleasure in the marital act; nor in our being motivated towards such an 
act by the prospect of giving and sharing in that delight as token of our 
marital commitment.174 
Yet, despite Finnis’s exegesis, praising the marital act as a virtuous act of justice still 
leaves us some distance from the spontaneous loving self-abandonment that is currently 
touted.  Saint Thomas bridges this gap by showing us how much is included in the notion of 
justice and what character it confers on the conjugal act. 
B. Justice and the Conjugal Act 
We in the modern era may be tempted to narrow our understanding of justice to 
commutative justice, but for Saint Thomas justice was a much broader, richer concept.  
Where post-Enlightenment man thinks in terms of rights, a notion that invariably arises in 
contentious, self-seeking contexts, Saint Thomas speaks not of rights, but rather of right, as 
the object of justice.  Justice is not only the noblest of moral virtues, but all virtues share in 
the general notion of justice, from the fact that justice directs all other virtues to its own 
end, the common good.175  Already it is a vision of justice that is more communal, more 
universal, less individualistic, less grasping. 
To gain a glimpse of everything subsumed under the notion of justice, one need only 
glance at the themes Saint Thomas includes in his treatise on justice in the Summa 
Theologiae:  not only restitution and equity, but religion, devotion, prayer, adoration, 
sacrifice, oblations and first-fruits, tithes, vows, oaths, praising the name of God, piety, 
observance, obedience, thankfulness, truth, affability, and liberality.  These virtues are 
considered to be “annexed” to justice because justice goes beyond legal debt to include 
moral debt as well. 
Justice is a fundamentally social virtue, for 
It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man 
in his relations with others; because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very 
name implies . . .on the other hand, the other virtues perfect man in those 
matters only which befit him in relation to himself. . .Because a man’s work 
                                                 
173 Finnis refers to In I Cor. 7, I ad v. 5 [325], and points out that the idea that couples who have been 
abstaining will experience their retrouvaille with joy is Aquinas’s own contribution, “not suggested by the text 
on which he is there commenting.” 
174 John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, (Oxford [England]; New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 143-147. 
175 Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 58, Articles 12, 5, and 6. 
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is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of 
equality.176 
Saint Thomas upholds Peter Lombard in teaching that in regard to the marital act 
husband and wife are equals—not with the equality of measure, but with the equality of 
proportion, as two things are said to be equal that have equal relationships to something 
else.177 In fact, Saint Thomas goes beyond the Lombard’s assessment to state that spouses 
are proportionately equals in the marital debt and in the management of the home: “But 
according to the second kind of equality, they are equals in both matters,”178 because, 
although their responsibilities differ, they have the same relationship to the domestic 
community. 
For this reason they enjoy a special kind of justice that is based on their particular 
relationship and directed to the good of the community that they form together: 
A wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, since he 
stands related to her as to his own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. V.28), 
is nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his father, or 
a slave from his master:  for she is received into a kind of social life, that of 
matrimony, wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. V.6) there is 
more scope for justice between husband and wife than between father and 
son, or master and slave, because, as husband and wife have an immediate 
relation to the community of the household, as stated in Polit. i.2.5, it 
follows that between them there is domestic justice rather than civic.179 
Far from being restricted to commercial exchange, justice is the virtue that reinforces 
and protects community—in this case the community of marriage.  It treats the spouses as 
equal parties in a shared life that is furthered and built up by the payment of the marital 
debt. 
C. The Marital Debt as a Path of Sanctification 
By speaking in terms of debt, then, it is clear that Saint Thomas envisioned something 
wholly voluntary.  Moreover, the act of paying a debt fulfills the virtue of justice and 
ennobles the marital act, making it virtuous despite the damage done to it by concupiscence. 
The nature of justice means that the spouses are endowed with an equality that we are 
unlikely to find under secular laws until very recently. But can the payment of this debt 
actually be a means of sanctification for the spouses? 
Saint Thomas says yes: 
                                                 
176 ST, II-II, Q. 57, Article 1, Corpus. 
177 In IV Sent., Distinction 32, Article 3. 
178 In IV Sent., Distinction 32, Article 3, Corpus. “Sed quantum ad secundam aequalitatem sunt aequales in 
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Every act in which a precept is 
fulfilled is meritorious, if it is done 
out of charity.  But the marital act 
is this kind of act. 
Omnis actus in quo impletur 
praeceptum est meritiorius, si ex 
caritate fiat.   Sed actus 
matrimonialis est hujusmodi . . . 180 
Since no act proceeding from 
deliberate will is indifferent . . . the 
marital act is always either a sin or 
it is meritorious in someone who 
has grace. 
Cum nullus actus ex deliberate 
voluntate procedens sit indifferens . 
. . actus matrimonialis semper est 
peccatum, vel meritorious in eo qui 
gratiam habet.181 
The fulfillment of the divine precept, or rendering what is due, merits an eternal 
reward for those who have grace.  Yet the economics of merit—which also suggest 
commercial exchange to modern sensibilities—have themselves something to teach us 
about Saint Thomas’s view of debt.  Merit is in a certain relative way something that God 
“owes” the individual.  Yet this debt only arises from God’s preceding gift of grace.182 
The payment of a human debt resembles God’s justice only in a analogous way, for, 
among other reasons, we are not our own justice or our own charity.  Yet in marital 
intimacy, the debt does arise from a preceding, voluntary gift.  Saint Thomas draws a 
comparison with the religious life, in which the duty of a certain kind of servitude is also 
undertaken willingly: 
Both states, namely religious 
life and marriage, contain 
something similar, namely a 
perpetual obligation; and therefore 
either state is something like 
servitude.  But the obligation in 
marriage is not to the work of 
perfection, but to rendering the 
bodily debt. 
Uterque enim status, scilicet 
religionis et matrimonii, aliquid 
simile habet, scilicet perpetuam 
obligationem; et ideo uterque status 
est quasi alicuius servitutis. Sed 
obligatio matrimonii non est ad 
opus perfectionis, sed ad 
reddendum carnale debitum.183 
In both marriage and religious life, a person voluntarily submits himself to a perpetual 
duty.  But a perpetual obligation undertaken of one’s own free will is a gift, for as Saint 
Thomas defines elsewhere, “a gift is properly an unreturnable giving . . . a thing which is 
not given with the intention of a return.”184  Indeed, the gift made in entering religious life 
may bear more resemblance to a “total gift of self,” since the three vows of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience involve giving up one’s belongings, power over one’s own body, 
and power over one’s own will.  Yet Saint Thomas emphasizes that since the will is man’s 
most precious good, the vow of obedience, in a way, comprises the total gift of one’s self in 
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its entirety, “because by the vow of obedience man offers something greater, namely his 
own will.”185  And this kind of gift is a possibility for married Christians in paying the 
conjugal debt.  For, as Saint Thomas explains when considering the virtue of obedience, the 
fulfillment of a duty or a command is no less meritorious by the fact that it is required: 
A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways.  In one way, on the part 
of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, 
on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will.  Now a deed 
is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it 
proceeds from the will.  Wherefore, although obedience be a duty [debitum], 
if one obey with a prompt will, one’s merit is not for that reason diminished, 
especially before God, who sees not only the outward deed, but also the 
inward will.186 
This is a reiteration of his earlier articulation of the same position: 
A debt (or duty) does not 
diminish the ratio of merit except 
inasmuch as it diminishes the ratio 
of the voluntary, since it does carry 
a certain aspect of necessity.  But if 
the debt is rendered voluntarily, 
there will be nonetheless as much 
merit as there is the ratio of 
willingness. 
Debitum non diminuit 
rationem meriti nisi quatenus 
diminuit rationem voluntarii, 
secundum quod quamdam 
necessitatem importat. Sed si 
voluntarie debitum reddatur, 
nihilominus ibi erit tantum meriti 
quantum est ibi de ratione 
voluntarii. 187 
Not only is the perpetual duty of rendering the debt something that must be 
undertaken in total freedom, but the actual rendering of the debt can be sanctifying to the 
spouse who gives with a ready will. 
Love is the impulse behind any gift, since it moves the will to give:  “love has the 
nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given.”188 If this love is charity, then 
the gift is made out of a love for God and the desire for the sanctification of one’s 
neighbor—in this case, one’s spouse.  The marital debt is founded on a precedent gift and 
springs from love whenever spouses engage in it for the sake of marital goods. 
The chief difference ultimately in our reaction to Saint Thomas’s characterization of 
marital intimacy as debt while modern theologians characterize it as a gift, is a sense of 
compulsion in the first and generous love in the second.  Yet it is clear upon closer 
consideration that compulsion in the beginning is one thing that would prevent this debt 
from even forming, since any coercion at the time of consent invalidates the marriage 
contract. 
It is true that the notion of debt or duty carries a certain aspect of necessity.  Yet Saint 
Thomas reminds us that if we consider carefully the notion of gift, it contains a similar 
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quality of permanence.  Nor is the sense of permanence or necessity out of place in the 
marital pact, which is indeed a perpetual commitment or a “total gift of self.” 
Conjugal relations for the sake of any of the goods of marriage are meritorious of 
eternal life in those who have grace—that is, they are sanctifying.  While Saint Thomas 
largely limits his discussion of the marital debt to the language of justice, his theology 
reveals that justice can form a continuum with charity, for, like charity, justice looks to the 
good of one’s neighbor as directed to the common good.  The marital debt arises from a 
previous gift of self, as God’s gift of merit presupposes His mercy.  The correspondence 
between law and love continues throughout the married couple’s life together, for as Saint 
Thomas explains in his Commentary on Romans, love itself is a debt that can never be paid:  
“the debt of fraternal love is paid in such a way that it is always owing . . . because the debt 
of love is paid once in such a way that it always remains under the debt of a precept.”189 
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3. THE MARITAL ACT AND ORIGINAL SIN 
In Aquinas’s theology, the conjugal act is inextricably linked with original sin.  The 
effects of original sin on marital intimacy are among the main disadvantages to married life, 
for it is the due to original sin that the body does not obey reason.  It is due to original sin 
that the appetite and passion of concupiscence are corrupted and liable to turn inordinately 
to corruptible goods.  The resulting lack of order and harmony within the human being 
acquires a certain importance in the marital act,  also because it is this act that  is the means 
of transmission of original sin to each new generation. 
Aquinas clarifies this in the Summa Theologiae, where the objector posits that since 
lust is no worse than other sins, it has no need of a sacrament of its own.  Aquinas answers 
that “there was a need for a special sacrament as remedy against venereal concupiscence 
because by this concupiscence, not only the person but also the nature is defiled:  secondly 
by reason of its vehemence whereby it clouds the reason.”190  Thus the sexual act is both 
infected by original sin, and the means of spreading the infection.  This also accounts for 
the overwhelmingly large number and frequency of sexual sins. 
Yet even these considerations do not result in a negative view of sexuality for Saint 
Thomas.  Rather, he sees in the marriage act the remedy to original sin and its effects at 
both the natural and sacramental levels. 
The conjugal act has a soteriological function aimed at combatting the effects of 
original sin in several ways.  Under the law of nature, the object of bringing children into 
the world within a permanent relationship dignifies the marriage act and furnishes a 
legitimate outlet to the passions that have been unsettled by original sin. 
At the level of virtue, marital intimacy is essentially related to justice, because 
original sin is formally the loss of original justice.  Engaging in conjugal intimacy out of the 
intention of fidelity or submission to each other is an act of justice, which directly counters 
the privation of justice that original sin caused in human relations.  Where marital intimacy 
is an act of mutuum obsequium,  it becomes a reversal of the disordering that resulted from 
the Fall.  It is in these varied and subtle senses that Saint Thomas speaks of marriage, under 
the aspect of remedy for concupiscence, as working to the good of the spouses and their 
salvation.191 
Yet, while it remains the most private and intimate of activities, the marital act has a 
relationship to the community that must not be underemphasized.  At the biological level, 
the sexual faculty connects man to the species as a whole, for reproduction remedies the 
“defect of the entire human race”—death, original sin’s most fundamental consequence.192  
Aquinas never forgets the biological needs of the human animal, but he never allows those 
to define him exhaustively either. 
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Although Saint Thomas is criticized for overemphasizing the relationship of marital 
intimacy to the Fall, it is important for us to recognize that marriage will never be served by 
denying the reality of original sin.  Moreover, resistance to this fundamental aspect of 
human history and psychology will prevent us from seeing the conjugal act as Aquinas sees 
it, as a potential channel of grace.  Marital intimacy that is undertaken humanly—engaging 
reason and will—stands to approach numerous spiritual goods.  Observance of the marital 
debt orders the spousal relationship in equality; when offered as a remedy to concupiscence, 
the marital act practices concern for the good of the other rather than selfish seeking of 
one’s own pleasures.  Pursuing the good of proles out of obedience to the commandment, or 
religion, or charity, offers practice in the ordering of man toward God.  Seeking this good 
for the sake of building up the Body of Christ is a work of pure charity which orders the 
spouses both to God and to the community. 
A modern reader might complain that Saint Thomas’ handling of marital intimacy 
seems entirely calculated to strip it of its mystery and beauty by reducing it to the coarsest 
level of human exchange.  But a careful look at Saint Thomas’s account reveals that “fairest 
love” was very much at stake.  Moreover, it is precisely because of “fairest love” that 
Aquinas’ account of the marriage debt has something to offer the 21st century marriage.  
The theme of justice in marital love will be considered further in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III:  LOVE IN MARRIAGE 
Underlying nearly all critiques or dismissals of Thomas’s treatment of marriage is the 
perception that, while overemphasizing the juridical aspects of the bond, Saint Thomas 
undervalues the importance of marital love.193  This position fails to understand that for 
Aquinas, not only are justice and love not mutually exclusive, but justice is actually integral 
and foundational to the deepest forms of love.  This chapter will consider the kind of love 
that exists between the spouses, both at the natural and  sacramental levels, and the critical 
role that justice plays in both marital friendship and marital charity. 
It is certainly true that a direct reference to the love between the spouses is rare in 
Saint Thomas’s works.  Aquinas spends most of his text discussing the sacrament in 
predominantly juridical language.  Yet even at a superficial level, it is a mistake to believe 
that love does not enter into Thomas’s account of marriage.  Even while delineating the 
legal technicalities of the marriage contract, Aquinas is fully aware of the necessity of love 
as an essential component of marriage.  He argues that giving marital consent under 
compulsion or duress invalidates the marriage, because the “marriage signifies the union of 
Christ to the Church, which is made according to the freedom of love.”194  The Church’s 
laws against consanguinity between the spouses “especially observe the reasoning of love 
(rationem amoris),” for they are ordered toward increasing friendship among relatives and 
strangers.195  In upholding the sacramental nature of marriage, Aquinas gives an even more 
direct reference to the love at the foundation of marriage.  Against the objection that 
marriage, which seems rather pleasant than painful, could not be conformed to the Passion 
of Christ from which all sacraments have their efficacy, Thomas answers, “Although 
marriage does not conform to the Passion of Christ in suffering, yet it does conform to it in 
the love by which he suffered for the Church in order that she might be joined to him as 
bride.”196 
But some of the most illuminating arguments about married love actually deal with 
the friendship that exists naturally in a marriage, which discussion forms the heart of 
Thomas’s analysis of marriage in the Summa Contra Gentiles.  There, Aquinas defends 
unity and indissolubility as essential qualities of marriage by relying first on reason, without 
resorting to Scripture or magisterial documents.  The friendship between the spouses occurs 
again and again as the fundamental reason for these essential qualities of marriage. 
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1. MARRIAGE AS GREATEST FRIENDSHIP 
At the heart of this discussion, Thomas famously describes marriage as “the greatest 
friendship,” claiming, 
The greater that friendship is, the more solid and long-lasting will it be.  
Now, there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife, 
for they are united not only in the act of fleshly union, which produces a 
certain gentle association even among beasts, but also in the partnership of 
the whole range of domestic activity.  Consequently, as an indication of this, 
man must even “leave his father and mother” for the sake of his wife, as is 
said in Genesis (2:24).197 
This high praise of the marital relationship is so well-known that it is easy to overlook 
its import. To understand what it means to call marriage the greatest friendship, it is 
necessary to look at what friendship entailed for Saint Thomas.  His most extensive 
treatment of friendship occurs in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
Books 8 and 9.  The fact that friendship forms the culminating theme of the classic work on 
morals indicates already the perspective from which Thomas understands it—a perspective 
that sees justice and love as radically linked. 
In the Ethics, friendship is defined as “a virtue, or like a virtue” because it is a 
permanent habit of living with and doing good to another.  Any friendship is founded on a 
communicatio, a shared good.  Friendship in the fullest sense must be founded on the virtue 
of the members to be perfect and lasting.  While some friendships are founded on the goods 
of usefulness or pleasure, Aquinas recognizes that these friendships are by definition 
imperfect; they are only analogously called friendships, since they end when these goods 
cease: 
The philosopher does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms 
that it is either a virtue or with a virtue.  For we might say that it is a moral 
virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different 
aspect from justice.  For justice is about works done in respect of another 
person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the 
aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the 
Philosopher explains.  Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue 
distinct of itself from the other virtues.  For its praiseworthiness and 
virtuousness are dereived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is 
based on the moral goodness of the virtues.  This is evident from the fact that 
not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship 
based on pleasure or utility.  Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is 
something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue.198 
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This point is important for understanding Aquinas’s claim that marriage is the greatest 
friendship.  The reasons that he gives in the Summa Contra Gentiles seem rooted in 
pleasure (fleshly union) and utility (management of the home).  Yet these goods would 
never suffice to qualify an association as a true friendship at all, let alone the greatest 
friendship.  He specifies in  his Commentary on the Ethics, “That [friendship] between good 
men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper sense, while the remaining kinds 
are called friendship from a likeness to this.”199 It is clear that Saint Thomas has other 
aspects of marriage in mind which justify applying this superlative to the marital union. 
If the essence of friendship is “living with and doing good to another,” certainly 
spouses live more intimately with each other than any other associates.  The kind of good 
that they do for each other, to constitute a true friendship, would have to go beyond the 
useful goods of providing for each other’s bodily needs to the real good of virtue.  We have 
begun to see in the previous chapter how the fulfillment of the marital debt can be an act of 
virtue. 
Nevertheless, what distinguishes the marital friendship from the “gentle association” 
that is found between any animal mates, or the accomplishment of “the whole range of 
domestic activity” that could be expected from any capable servants, is a certain equality 
that exists between husband and wife.  That this equality informs Aquinas’s understanding 
of the marital relationship is evident both from his comments on Aristotle’s account of 
friendship, and from the arguments that Aquinas gives for marital unity and indissolubility 
in the Summa Contra Gentiles.  Equality, in turn, is the connecting point between friendship 
and justice. 
A. Friendship and Justice 
The important relationship between friendship and justice becomes apparent from the 
beginning of the discussion of friendship in the Commentary on the Ethics.  Both friendship 
and justice are civic virtues, which means that each is a habit arising from deliberate choice, 
and each deals with relation to another.  Moreover, friendship and justice both involve a 
mutual return of goods.  But Saint Thomas states that equality and proportion are not found 
in the same way in justice and friendship, for 
It pertains to friendship to use an equality already uniformly established, 
but it pertains to justice to reduce unequal things to an equality.  When 
equality exists the work of justice is done.  For that reason equality is the 
goal of justice and the starting point of friendship.200 
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This is true because the close union at the heart of friendship “cannot exist between 
widely separated persons.”201 That justice is ordered to friendship as to a greater good is 
also apparent from the fact that “legislators have greater zeal for maintaining friendship 
among citizens than even justice itself which is sometimes omitted, for example, in the 
infliction of punishment, lest dissension be stirred up.”202  Moreover, “perfect justice 
preserves and restores friendship.”203  Thus justice exists for the sake of friendship, both in 
the polis and in the life of the individual. 
The equality achieved by justice underpins Thomas’s arguments against polygamy 
and divorce in the Summa Contra Gentiles: 
friendship consists in an equality.  So if it is not lawful for the wife to 
have several husbands, since this is contrary to the certainty as to offspring, 
it would not be lawful, on the other hand, for a man to have several wives, 
for the friendship of wife for husband would not be free, but somewhat 
servile.  And this argument is corroborated by experience, for among 
husbands having plural wives the wives have a status like that of servants.204 
Theo Belmans notes how remarkable it is that Thomas’s fundamental argument 
against polygamy derives not from Saint Paul or from the Gospels, but from the 
philosophical requirements of friendship.205  Moreover, Aquinas is attentive that this 
friendship should surpass the “gentle association” of animals to attain the free and equal 
friendship of virtuous humans. 
Saint Thomas argues against polygamy from other angles, but the justice and equality 
required by friendship remains his essential reason.  For example, he quotes Aristotle’s 
comment that one cannot have a strong friendship with many people, so for a husband who 
has several wives “the friendship cannot be equal on both sides.  So the friendship will not 
be free, but servile in some way.”206  Polygamy further impedes the freedom of the wife to 
enjoy the pleasures of conjugal relations at will, which is unfair in comparison to the 
husband.207 
The higher justice required by a true friendship also figures into the arguments 
Aquinas gives against divorce.  He points out that if a man were permitted to abandon his 
wife once she had lost the “beauty and fecundity” of her youth, “he would damage that 
woman contrary to natural equity.”208  Equity also dictates that since a wife is in a certain 
way subject to her husband, she would not have the right to divorce him, so if he had such a 
right it would be unfair to her and would turn marriage into a slavery instead of “an 
association of equals.”209 
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Friendship both depends upon the equality achieved by justice and gives rise to a new 
kind and level of justice, for “justice is differentiated according to the diversity of 
friendship. . . justice and injustice increase in proportion as they are done to closer 
friends.”210   Saint Thomas develops this idea later in his description of the special 
“domestic justice” that exists between husband and wife: 
A wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, since he 
stands related to her as to his own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. V.28), 
is nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his father, or 
a slave from his master:  for she is received into a kind of social life, that of 
matrimony, wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. V.6) there is 
more scope for justice between husband and wife than between father and 
son, or master and slave, because, as husband and wife have an immediate 
relation to the community of the household, as stated in Polit. i.2.5, it 
follows that between them there is domestic justice rather than civic.211 
B.  The Shared Good at the Heart of the Greatest Friendship 
The reason for the greater justice between husband and wife is their shared life as 
equals ruling the household.  It is worthwhile to reflect a moment on the nature of this 
communicatio,  for it is the reason that marriage is the greatest of friendships, since a 
friendship is greater according as it is based on a greater shared good.  This fact illuminates 
the truly shocking character of Saint Thomas’s use of this superlative.  He does not, like the 
Greek philosophers, deem the highest friendship the one that arises from a common search 
for truth.  Even his community of Dominican confreres, which shared academic endeavors 
and spiritual practices, does not merit the designation “greatest friendship.” 
The spouses enjoy a greater friendship than fellow philosophers or religious confreres 
for a number of reasons, each deriving from the Aristotelian definition of friendship.  They 
live together more closely and “do good to each other” more directly than fellow religious, 
whose daily activities are directed more towards Christ than towards each other.  While 
pursuers of truth share the highest good of the human intellect, the common pursuits of 
spouses encompass all the elements of the human being in the most intimate way.  Conjugal 
union is the most intimate of bodily unions; it is a natural union based in man’s genus (and 
Aquinas’s regard for this aspect further proves that he does not have a manichean attitude 
towards sex).  But there is a  “reason for conjugal friendship which belongs to man alone;” 
marriage “occurs not only for the procreation of children but also for the functions needed 
in human living.”212 Thomas gives examples of spouses sharing the provision of all other 
bodily needs through the management of the household.  But the “functions needed in 
human living” must also extend to the highest natural good of man, virtue; we have already 
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glimpsed in chapter 2 a few ways that this growth in virtue is possible in marriage.  Because 
man will always be a rational animal, the fleshly union engages his rational soul, providing 
a chance to practice virtue in contradiction to the tugs of concupiscence.  Aquinas 
comments that any “friends become better by working together and loving each other;”213 
this natural effect of friendship opens the possibility for the mutual sanctification that is an 
effect of sacramental marriage. 
But does marriage, generically taken, offer any shared intellectual good, by 
comparison with a Platonic friendship or the friendship of fellow Dominican masters at the 
Sorbonne?  Here again the importance of educandi prolis is at work as subtext.  Spouses do 
not only share the entire range of domestic activity to provide for their own physical needs; 
they share the government of the household for the sake of rearing children to virtuous 
adulthood.  The role of lawgiver is that of agent and perfecter. Aristotle construes marriage 
as a microcosm of aristocratic government—rule for the common good, divided among the 
best individuals.  Among nations, the main disadvantage of aristocracy is that these 
honorable rulers have less power to do good than a single virtuous ruler would.214  In the 
household, this is not a danger, since the spouses have an immediate relation to the 
community they govern. In fact, spouses are situated to be the consummate lawmakers, for 
they have the greatest impact on the virtue of the children they raise and the most effective 
relation to the community they rule. 
All of these elements amount to a superlative common good shared by the spouses:  
they form the least corruptible, most efficient form of government with respect to their 
household; the community they direct is ordered toward the highest good of its members—
virtue—and their relationship to it is disposed to have the greatest effect on those members’ 
virtue;  their role as agents and perfecters of their children’s virtue engages their own 
intellects, wills, and passions in the practice of prudence. 
Moreover, the direction of the home for the education of children in virtue is the 
shared good of the husband and wife.  While a bishop or abbot may hold a greater office in 
their respective communities as governor and perfecter in spiritual things, bishops and 
abbots do not share this task in friendship with another.  Secular rulers, on the other hand, 
may share the government of polities, but their effectiveness as legislators is necessarily 
diminished by their distance from their subjects.  The married couple’s direction of the 
household for the common good of the family forms the foundation for the greatest 
friendship because it is directed toward the highest goods of the human being in the most 
intense ways. 
It is clear that in calling marriage the greatest friendship, Saint Thomas included 
vastly more than romantic affection.  Beside his vision of an enduring relationship that 
augments the virtue of both parties and engages every level of their persons, most modern 
ideas of marital love would pale in comparison.  Yet marriage as “the greatest friendship” 
still only addresses marital love at the natural level.  The real conjugal love for Saint 
Thomas is the love of charity. 
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2. CHARITY IN MARRIAGE 
While Thomas’s understanding of friendship draws much from Aristotle, he does not 
conform to Aristotle’s account in every way.  For example, Aristotle states that the equality 
that friendship consists in renders a friendship between God and man intrinsically 
impossible.215  Moreover, even among the most virtuous men, a friend would never will his 
friend the greatest good, that of divinization, because this would mean the loss of his 
friendship.216  Aquinas must address both of these contradictions in his treatise on charity in 
order to prove that charity is essentially a friendship between man and God, and by charity 
one necessarily wills the highest good—God—to one’s neighbor.  These differences will 
reveal important truths about the nature and ordering of charity. 
A.  Marriage in the order of charity 
In Question 23 of the Summa Theologiae, II-II, Aquinas defines charity as a 
friendship between man and God, which extends to others insofar as one loves them for 
God’s sake, and  wishes to share beatitude with them in heaven.  The friendship between 
man and God is made possible by God’s sharing of his life and happiness with man, which 
is the communicatio underlying this friendship.  However, charity must comprise more than 
God’s gift of the Holy Spirit; in order to be truly an act of the human will, charity depends 
on a created form empowering the human will to love perfectly.  This habitual form, which 
is also a gift from God, enables the love of friendship between man and God to be mutual 
and, in a certain way, proportionate.  Charity extends to other humans for God’s sake, 
As, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves 
all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in 
any way . . . in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our 
enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the 
friendship of charity is chiefly directed.217 
As we saw in part one of this chapter, friendship depends significantly on justice for 
its very existence, and it generates its own special justice.  Since charity is in essence a 
friendship, charity will require justice as an essential part of it and will be accompanied by 
justice even at its highest levels.  This will be evident from an examination of Thomas’s 
question on the order of charity in the Summa Theologiae. 
In the article referred to in Chapter 1, “Christian Marriage:  Contract or Covenant?”  
Paul Palmer, S.J. takes Thomas to task for his ranking of spousal love beneath love of one’s 
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parents in the order of charity.218  Saint Thomas has attracted much criticism and 
engendered much misunderstanding by this question.  A cursory reading of Question 26 of 
the Secunda Secundae would lead the reader to believe that Saint Thomas expects charity to 
conform to the following progression: 
 God 
 One’s own soul 
 One’s father 
 One’s mother 
 Other benefactors 
 Beneficiaries, including children 
 One’s own body and one’s spouse 
This order would seem to rank all others, including oneself, ahead of one’s spouse.  In 
article 11, Thomas expressly addresses the question of whether one should love one’s 
parents more than one’s spouse.  He argues in the sed contra that a man should love his 
wife as his own body, his body less than his neighbor, and among neighbors, he should love 
his parents most.  “Therefore, he ought to love his parents more than his wife.”219 
But the text calls for a deeper reading at a number of levels.  When Aquinas embarks 
upon the tricky task of ranking various human relationships, he considers the relationships 
per se, prescinding from the level of virtue or holiness in the individuals: 
The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such 
like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the 
Philosopher remarks.  Hence Ambrose220 says:  Good servants should be 
preferred to wicked children.221 
Since the relationships are considered strictly speaking, he ranks them according as 
they relate to the two principles of charity:  some people should be loved more because of 
their closeness to charity’s object, God; others should be loved more because of their 
closeness to charity’s subject, the human lover. 
A person can be “close” to God through greater holiness, and this is the kind of 
goodness that will determine the order of charity in heaven.  But a person can also deserve a 
higher place by resembling God in any character of good; for example, as a father or a 
benefactor has acted as “a principle of good to the man he has benefited, he has the 
character of a more excellent good.”222  The kind of closeness that relates a person to the 
subject of charity is the more familiar kind:  the closeness of blood relatives, of friends and 
spouses, and of beneficiaries. 
The two principles also give rise to two kinds of increase in love.  The individuals 
closer to God should be willed a greater good.  Since charity wills the same good to all—the 
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enjoyment of beatitude—loving those “more” who possess an added excellence  means 
willing them the deeper participation of Divine Beatitude that they deserve based on that 
excellence.223  Those with a “closer connection” to the lover will be loved with greater 
intensity of affection, for “the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who 
loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more 
intense affection as to the good he wishes for them.”224 
After explaining the greater honor due to parents, Aquinas cites four reasons that love 
is more intense for one’s children than one’s parents.  Each of these reasons derives from 
considering one’s child as part of himself in some way.  Similarly, beneficiaries elicit more 
intense love than benefactors because we love our own work, as a sign of our being, living, 
and acting; we love to see evidence of our own virtue; we prefer doing something to 
passively receiving benefits; and lastly, giving is more difficult than receiving, and we love 
better what has cost us more dearly. 
These four descriptions of the relation of benefactor to beneficiary reach into the  
ontological foundations of love:  we love our work because it is a sign to us of our being; 
our virtue illustrates to us our goodness; benefaction is action; lastly, the aspect of 
difficulty represents the power to strive for a prize that is so central to the human destiny.  
The parent-child relationship is the quintessential example of a relationship for the good of 
the one ruled; as such, children are the pre-eminent beneficiaries.  Doing good (rather than 
having it done to one) is so much more appealing to the affections because its 
characteristics remind the giver of his goodness, his action, and his power.  In short, by 
active giving a man appears more like God—indeed, in a way he becomes more like Him.  
Yet even this capacity to imitate and resemble Him is His gift, right down to the basic gift 
of one’s being; to forget this is to yield to the original temptation to desire to “become like 
gods.” 
The latent danger in the more intense, spontaneous love that arises for those closer to 
the lover is that it could easily lose the character of charity.  This possibility explains why 
Saint Thomas’ emphasis in the order of love of neighbor is on the more duteous, less 
intuitive love that is owed to  benefactors and parents.  Rather than representing signs of our 
own power, benefactors are examples of our relation to a principle, reminders of our 
dependence, signs of our existential condition:  “What do you have that you did not 
receive?” (1 Corinthians 4:7).  As such they direct man’s mind to God, the essential object 
of charity.  In his ranking of benefactors and principles above more intimate loves, Aquinas 
emphasizes that charity becomes idolatry as soon as it takes its gaze from the principle. 
Yet he does not neglect the role of those closer to the subject in the cultivation of 
charity.  In Question 24 on the subject of charity, he states that “charity increases by being 
intensified in its subject.”225  The only way that a form like charity, whose being consists in 
inhering in its subject, can grow is if “God makes it to have a greater hold on the soul.”226  
How and when God increases the intensity of charity is a mystery of grace, but acts of 
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charity may lead to this increase by disposing a person to act more readily out of love.  Thus 
the importance of man’s closest connections can be seen as regards his progress in charity: 
it does not follow that what is more visible is more loveable, but that we 
meet with it before others . . . for since our neighbor is more visible to us, he 
is the first loveable object we meet with, because ‘the soul learns, from those 
things it knows, to love what it knows not,’ as Gregory says.227 
If loving nobler neighbors teaches man to direct his heart toward the good, loving his 
closest neighbors teaches him to love fervently.  Family members are the first ‘loveable 
objects we meet with;’ they afford the first occasions of practicing charity, and they 
continued to provide the most frequent opportunities to strengthen this virtue.    When the 
force of this natural affection combines with the supernatural impulse of the Holy Spirit in 
willing eternal happiness of those closest,  natural love is perfected and brought to its 
highest consummation.  Meanwhile, supernatural love is strengthened by this natural 
intensity.  This is the dynamic we have already glimpsed in the interaction of natural virtue 
and charity in the marital act. 
Of all close relations, the spousal relation is the closest.  The sources of this intimacy 
were discussed as part of the greatest natural friendship.  In fact, Aquinas’s explanation of 
domestic justice shows that the wife is closer than any other neighbor:  since “marriage is a 
certain unity, just as a man is the same thing as himself,”228 she is closer to the man than 
anyone but himself. 
Accordingly, Saint Thomas specifies that, while a man loves his parents more “as his 
principles and considered as a more exalted good,” 
But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because 
she is united with her husband as one flesh . . . Consequently a man loves his 
wife more intensely but his parents with greater reverence.229 
Saint Thomas’s ranking of parents above wife does not mean that in a famine one 
should feed one’s parents at the expense of one’s wife and children; nor does it mean that a 
man must take his parents’ part rather than his wife’s in a disagreement.  These scenarios 
contradict the Scripture that Saint Thomas quotes so often:  Therefore a man must leave 
father and mother and cleave to his wife (Gen. 2:24). 
Moreover, his identification of the wife with the man’s body indicates certain facets 
of her role in this order of charity.  Aquinas actually devotes considerable space to defining 
the kind of charity that one should have for one’s body.  The body is to be loved as an 
“instrument of justice unto God,” to be used for God’s service.230  Obviously not everything 
that Saint Thomas says about the body can be applied to the wife:  she is not an irrational 
instrument, nor is she destined to enjoy beatitude only by overflow from her husband.  
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Rather, the metaphor serves to underscore the radical unity of the married couple.  The 
wife, related to her husband as his body, acts with him as united principle in the exercise of 
charity.  The ranking of the parent above the spouse in the order of charity is actually a 
testament to the unity of the spouses: as a united principle the two may sacrifice together for 
the good of their neighbors. 
Saint Thomas relegates the wife to the lowest place in the order of charity precisely 
because the union of the spouses is so strong; because love is intense between them, it 
needs to be trained to where it is less intense, more owed.  Meanwhile, the intensity of 
affection between the spouses acts as a school for charity.  This function of marital love 
represents the supernatural fulfillment of Aristotle’s conclusion that a man needs virtuous 
friends in order to practice and increase his own virtue.  It also corresponds to the modern 
understanding of marriage’s role in the mutual sanctification of the couple. 
Those who have the closest bonds excite the greatest affection, but those above us 
remind us of the justice that underlies charity:  “the love of the beneficiary for the 
benefactor is more of duty . . .  On the other hand, the love of the benefactor for the 
beneficiary is more spontaneous.”231   But in fact, the notion of debt is never far away from 
any of the varieties of charity that Saint Thomas ascribes to our neighbors.  For example, as 
regards children and parents, “The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and 
honor, whereas that [debt] due to the effect is one of influence and care.”232  Even those 
more spontaneous and intimate loves are sketched in terms of obligation:  “in this life, a 
man, by the inclination of charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for 
he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity.”233 
Debts are not outside the range of charity.  Our image of spontaneous charity, 
overflowing from a loving heart must not neglect order, duty, debt, and justice.  This is 
precisely the reason for ranking the parents ahead of the spouse in the order of charity:  the 
deliberate, willed love of charity must be trained to aspire to the greater, rational good.  The 
fundamental reason for willing those closer to God a greater good is that “it belongs to 
charity to wish God’s justice to be maintained.”234 Matthew Levering draws out the 
dependence of charity on justice in his article, “Juridical Language in Soteriology: Aquinas' 
Approach”: 
the  “justice” that God wills for rational creatures is not an impersonal or dryly 
legalistic state of “being-made-righteous.” Rather, God wills that rational creatures 
intimately share in his justice by sharing perfectly in his divine will:  in other words, by 
embodying not merely human justice, but divine charity.  The theological virtue of charity, 
for Aquinas, is friendship with God (for God’s own sake), based on the supernatural 
fellowship or communication with him that he gives us by the movement of the Holy Spirit.  
Without the moral virtue of justice, a person could not possess such friendship.  If we be 
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have unjustly toward our neighbor (by lying, stealing, gossiping, etc.), then we cannot 
pretend to have charity for God. . . injustice strikes at the root of all communion.235 
Moreover, some of the most compelling evidence of the intertwining of charity and 
justice is that a failure in charity does not in itself destroy charity’s presence in the soul, but 
a failure of justice—a transgression of the Decalogue—would drive charity out of the soul, 
“since whatever is contrary to His commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and 
therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying charity.”236 
Paul Palmer’s complaint about the ranking of the spouse in the order of charity arises 
from a deeper misunderstanding of the nature of charity.  Palmer pits Gaudium et Spes 
against Aquinas to draw a contrast between marital love and charity: 
Marital love is not Christian charity (caritas), although the law of 
charity demands that the love of husband and wife be marital or conjugal.  
Nor is marital love to be confused with love of one’s neighbor, and even of 
one’s enemy.  Married love is as exclusive as charity is inclusive, for the 
simple reason that marital love is covenant love.237 
In contrasting charity’s “inclusivity” with marriage’s exclusivity, Palmer fails to 
grasp the very points Aquinas tried to convey in the order of charity.  Charity is a deliberate, 
rational love; it is an enduring love which derives its longevity from the habit of the will 
and the mind’s direction of this love to God above all, and other things in a certain relation 
to him.  In directing the love of charity where the affections do not tend, Aquinas means to 
teach us that loving God involves an “exclusivity” surpassing any human affection.  Indeed, 
Palmer should have recognized that the love of God is the archetypal covenant love. 
The danger of the modern tendency to focus on the love of the spouses is the risk of 
founding the institution of marriage on an emotion, which, by its very definition, will 
change.  Yet does accepting this fact mean that Saint Thomas does indeed discount the love 
between the spouses, as his 20th-century critics complain? 
To answer this criticism, we will consider the discovery of Frère Marie Leblanc, 
OSB, whose article “Amour et procréation dans la théologie de saint Thomas,” traces a 
previously unremarked development in Thomas’s thought.238 
B.  The union of the spouses 
Frère Leblanc confines his study to only a few of Saint Thomas’s works (the 
Sentences Commentary, Summa Contra Gentiles, Summa Theologiae, In Mattheum, In 
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Ephes. and In I Cor.) and to only the themes of love and procreation, not all of marriage.  
He argues that, while Saint Thomas maintained the primacy of procreation as an end of 
marriage throughout his career, his understanding of marital love underwent a subtle 
evolution. 
Through what Frère Leblanc terms “les méandres” of Aquinas’s earliest work, he 
defines marriage, as we have seen in chapter 1, as a conjunctio: 
Since by marriage two people 
are ordered to one single generation 
and education of children, and 
therefore to one single domestic 
life, it is clear that in marriage there 
is a conjunctio, because of which 
“husband” and “wife” are said; and 
such a conjunctio by the fact that it 
is ordained to some one thing, is 
marriage.  However, the conjunctio 
of bodies or of souls is consequent 
upon marriage. 
cum per matrimonium 
ordinentur aliqui ad unam 
generationem et educationem 
prolis, et iterum ad unam vitam 
domesticam; constat quod in 
matrimonio est aliqua conjunctio, 
secundum quam dicitur maritus et 
uxor; et talis conjunctio ex hoc 
quod ordinatur ad aliquod unum, 
est matrimonium; conjunctio autem 
corporum vel animorum ad 
matrimonium consequitur.239 
The union or conjunctio derives from marriage’s ordering to procreation.  Leblanc 
notes that “dans cette conjunctio qui est d’ordre à la fois spirituel et matériel apparaît un 
élément affectif; saint Thomas parle d’un uxorius affectus, mais comme en passant et à 
propos d’une question accidentelle.”240  While Leblanc is careful to point out that the 
secondary end of marriage is no less essential for being secondary, nevertheless, he detects 
a certain “maladresse” or “hésitation de pensée” in Aquinas’s attempts in the Sentences 
Commentary to explain the relation of the two ends to each other, and to reconcile these 
ends with Augustine’s three goods:  “Le lien affectif des époux entre eux, bien que 
clairement affirmé, paraît en même temps partiellement occulté.”241 
The Summa Contra Gentiles brings a certain precision and developing of the themes 
found in the Sentences Commentary.  We have seen Saint Thomas’s emphasis there on the 
friendship and equality of the spouses.  Leblanc notes another shift in the Summa Contra 
Gentiles: 
Il laisse de côté le langage de la finalité première et des finalités 
secondes.  L’ordination du mariage à la procréation et le lien d’amitié intense 
entre les époux sont tous deux nettement affirmés; ils sont l’un et l’autre des 
biens de mariage, mais ne sont pas dits deux finalités.  Autrement dit, la 
relation de l’un à l’autre n’est pas clarifiée.242 
Leblanc credits this “prise de conscience” to Aquinas’s study of friendship in the 
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, as well as his meditations on Genesis, the Gospel 
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of Matthew, and the epistles of Saint Paul.  While in his Scriptural commentaries Saint 
Thomas continues to attribute the same purposes to the marital act, he no longer uses the 
language of primary and secondary end in marriage.  Meanwhile, the mutual love of the 
spouses comes to the foreground through his study of Scripture. 
In the commentary on Matthew 19:4, Aquinas gives two reasons that God willed “a 
multitude of men should arise from a man and a woman”:  “to signify that the form of 
matrimony was from God.  Likewise, so that they would love one another more.”243 
In the Ephesians commentary, Saint Thomas details three aspects of the conjunctio, 
following a different order of emphasis than he has used before.  The spouses are united 
first by the affectus dilectionis between them; secondly by their shared life (conversatio); 
and thirdly by their carnal union.  Leblanc points out that this explanation represents a 
change for Saint Thomas from his earlier treatment of the marital union.  In the 
Commentary on the Sentences, the physical union of the couple for the sake of procreation 
is given as the chief reason for the conjunctio, and the shared life of the couple exists in 
service to the bonum prolis.  But since the text of Ephesians 5 takes as its principle 
marriage’s representation of Christ’s love for the Church, the love between the spouses is 
ranked first here, and the physical union last. 
The question we have just discussed on the order of charity in the Summa Theologiae 
offers a similar subtle change in nuance.  Saint Thomas closes the article by specifying that 
in loving one’s wife as one’s own body, the comparison does not indicate “equality of 
love”—ranking the wife as equal to the body—but rather “motive of love,” “for the 
principal reason why a man loves his wife is her being united to him in the flesh.”244  
Leblanc draws the distinction between Aquinas’s use of this metaphor as compared with his 
analysis in the Commentary on the Sentences: 
Dans le commentaire des Sentences, unum corpus se rapporte à “l’acte 
de la génération en vue duquel on prend femme (uxor in actum generationis 
assumitur) » [In Sent. III, d 29, a 7, ad 3] ; c’est pourquoi l’amour pour l’ 
épouse est amour de bienveillance, du même degré que l’amour pour les 
enfants.  Dans la Somme le una caro se rapporte à la conjunctio même de 
l’homme et de la femme sans que référence soit faite à l’acte de génération ; 
l’intensité de l’amour de l’homme pour son épouse vient de cette union elle-
même.245 
But the subtle evolution toward a greater emphasis on the bond of love between the 
spouses reaches its most explicit expression later in the Summa Theologiae.  Since the 
portion on marriage in the Supplement was constructed by Aquinas’s students from his 
Commentary on the Sentences texts, we cannot know how Saint Thomas might have altered 
his approach to marriage.  But Leblanc has discovered an exciting modification in the 
portion of the Summa that Aquinas did complete, his discussion of the marriage of Joseph 
and Mary in the Tertia Pars. 
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To begin with, Leblanc underscores that everything essential to marriage remains 
unchanged in Thomas’s thought:  its role as an office of nature, sacramental sign of Christ 
and the Church, and remedy for concupiscence.  But in what touches the bond between the 
spouses, something new emerges.  Rather than speaking in terms of primary and secondary 
ends of marriage, Saint Thomas speaks of primary and secondary perfections—the 
perfections that arise from the form and from the end of a thing: 
Now perfection of anything is twofold; first, and second.  The first 
perfection of a thing consists in its very form, from which it receives its 
species; while the second perfection of a thing consists in its operation by 
which in some way a thing attains its end.  Now the form of matrimony 
consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife 
are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered.  And the 
end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children:  the first of 
which is attained by conjugal intercourse; the second by the other duties of 
husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their 
offspring.246 
This distinction allows Saint Thomas to explain how the marriage of Mary and Joseph 
was a true marriage, despite the absence of physical union. 
The new categories of first and second perfection preserve the primacy of procreation 
as an end of marriage, but also emphasize the bond of friendship as essential to what 
marriage is.  Leblanc explains Aquinas’s abandonment of the terms primary and secondary 
end: 
Si [cette catégorie philosophique] peut se révéler encore apte à désigner 
le don de la vie à une descendance comme fin première, elle est désormais 
inapte à caractériser le lien d’amitié entre les époux, ce lien, vu son 
importance, ne paraît plus pouvoir être caractérisé comme “second”; de plus, 
il n’est pas à proprement parler une “fin” du mariage mais la réalité elle-
même constitutive du mariage.247 
In the Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas defined marriage as a conjunctio of 
man and woman, ordered to the bonum prolis and a shared domestic life; the conjunctio 
corporum vel animorum was a consequence of this original union.248  But in the Summa 
Theologiae, this conjunctio animorum is deemed the essence of marriage, because it is the 
perfection of the form of marriage. 
This vision of marriage as a union of souls brings an ordering to the variety of 
expressions Saint Thomas used earlier for the secondary end: fides, mutuum obsequium, 
communicatio operum, etc.  Now the fides of the couple is seen as deriving from the form 
of marriage, while the mutual service is part of the perfection of the end.  Moreover, it gives 
the union of hearts and the aim of procreation what Leblanc calls “une priorité réciproque, 
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tout en établissant entre eux un lien structurel.”249  This reciprocal priority makes sense of 
the Genesis account of the union of man and woman as helpmeets prior to the command to 
increase and multiply.  Saint Thomas adumbrated this relationship in his commentary on 
Matthew 19: 4 (1550).  Although the designation of the two ends of marriage always 
precluded reducing marital love to the level of a means to the end of procreation, the terms 
formal and final perfection make their relationship and interdependence explicit and 
metaphysically grounded. 
In this gentle evolution, Frère Leblanc suggests, Saint Thomas anticipated the shift in 
language that occurred in Vatican II and Humanae Vitae.  Yet a careful adherence to his 
philosophical terms could prevent the misinterpretations of doctrine that have ensued:  the 
tendency to equate the two ends of marriage such that the two seem to be in competition 
with each other.  Leblanc points out that the inevitable result of speaking of primary and 
secondary ends is the weakening of the secondary end, which is undoubtedly the reason for 
the current resistance to this terminology.  Moreover, ranking both ends as principal and 
equal risks what Leblanc calls “une destructuration du mariage, car une réalité ne peut 
avoir, métaphysiquement parlant, qu’une fin principale.” 
Underlying Saint Thomas’s treatment of marital love is the assumption that marriage 
consists in a radical unity between husband and wife.  Leblanc’s research has shown that 
Saint Thomas refined his expression of this idea throughout the course of his career.  The 
language of first and second act, or first and second perfection, prevents two ends from 
being pitted against each other and clarifies their relationship.  Union is not an end that 
marriage accomplishes, it is the reality that marriage is.  The procreation and education of 
children is what marriage does because of what it is. 
The radical unity of the spouses is the source of Aquinas’s ranking of the wife 
beneath the parents in the order of charity.  This unity means that the husband loves his wife 
with an intensity surpassing all other relationships.  But it also means that the husband 
counts on his wife to be joined with him as closely as his own body in serving others, and in 
paying honor to those above him. 
This unity also provides the grounds for calling marriage at the natural level “the 
greatest friendship.”  The spouses are united not only in sexual intercourse but in all the 
activities that pertain to human living and virtue.  Their shared service to the home and the 
rearing of children unites all their faculties in the common pursuit of the highest natural 
human goods. 
Yet in each of these examples we have seen how the intimate bond of the spouses 
with each other is ultimately ordered ad extra, requiring a united service to the household, 
to the children, to more distant neighbors in the Church and in the polis.  This is the 
interchange that accounts for marriage’s place in the law and among the sacraments.  The 
intimate community that the spouses form between themselves is for the sake of the larger 
community:  the world and the Body of Christ.  These themes will be addressed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV:  MARRIAGE AND LAW 
The fundamental issue for modern readers of Aquinas on marriage is whether the 
juridical has any place in a theological treatment of this institution.  We have seen that the 
legal and moral due is not only essential to marriage but indispensable precisely to conjugal 
love. 
Yet the integral relationship that law itself has to marriage remains to be addressed.  
One difficulty in understanding the importance and beauty of law for Saint Thomas lies in 
the modern tendency to associate law with restrictiveness, oppression, and domination.  In 
our study of the conjugal act, we noted how Aquinas’s description of handing over one’s 
body to the power of another evokes the notion of slavery.  But the problem lies deeper.  To 
modern sensibilities, the entire realm of law evokes this comparison.   Too often law is 
viewed as shackles and penalties.  Even when law is seen as a means to sculpting a virtuous 
populace, we consider these virtues to be attainable only through legal constraints and 
punishment.  Let us look briefly at what slavery actually entails for Saint Thomas, in order 
to show how different his vision of law is from ours. 
81 
 
1. SLAVERY IN CONTRAST WITH LAW 
The definition of a slave, according to Saint Thomas, is a person who is used as an 
instrument by another—who does not act out of his own rational will but the upon the will 
of another.250  Aquinas also describes the slave as a “living tool; the slave’s actions are all 
for the master’s good, not for his own benefit or for a shared good.”251 
Interestingly, references to slavery arise several times in Thomas’s treatment of 
marriage.  For example, he argues that parental consent is not necessary for a marriage to be 
contracted since 
a girl is not in the power of her 
father like a slave, so that she does 
not have power over her own body, 
but like a daughter to be educated; 
and thus according to the fact that 
she is free, she can give herself into 
the power of another without the 
consent of her father, as also some 
man or woman may enter religious 
life without the consent of parents, 
since the person is free. 
puella non est in potestate 
patris quasi ancilla, ut sui corporis 
potestatem non habeat, sed quasi 
filia ad educandum; et ideo 
secundum hoc quod libera est, 
potest se in potestatem alterius 
absque consensu patris dare, sicut 
etiam potest aliquis vel aliqua 
intrare religionem absque consensu 
parentum, cum sit persona libera.252 
The comparison rests on the prior, though unstated, premise that marriage results 
from the free consent of both parties, and to the extent that either consent is not free, the 
marriage is invalidated. 
In the simile quoted in chapter 2, Aquinas compares marriage, and religious life, to a 
state of slavery voluntarily assumed: 
Both states, namely religious 
life and marriage, contain 
something similar, namely a 
perpetual obligation; and therefore 
either state is something like 
servitude.  But the obligation in 
marriage is not to the work of 
perfection, but to rendering the 
bodily debt. 
Uterque enim status, scilicet 
religionis et matrimonii, aliquid 
simile habet, scilicet perpetuam 
obligationem; et ideo uterque status 
est quasi alicuius servitutis. Sed 
obligatio matrimonii non est ad 
opus perfectionis, sed ad 
reddendum carnale debitum.253 
The physical aspect of marriage—transferring power over one’s body to another—
brings about several references to slavery in relation to the conjugal act.  For example, in 
inquiring whether the marital debt is binding upon spouses as though commanded by a 
                                                 
250 Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 19, (On servile fear).  See also In Sent. IV, Dist. 36, question 1, art. 4, corpus. 
251 Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8, Lecture 10, 1699. 
252 In Sent. IV, Dist 28, Q. 1, art. 3, ad 1. 
253 De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae, Capitulum 25.  
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precept, Saint Thomas responds categorically, “as a slave is in the power of his lord, so also 
is one spouse in the power of the other.”254  This in turn is the reason that a state of 
servitude that is unknown to one’s spouse is an impediment to marriage, since the 
commands of the slave’s master might prevent his rendering of the marital debt.  In this 
situation, two people have a claim over the slave’s body, his master and his spouse.255 
Furthermore, the conjugal act itself is compared to slavery.  In one of Aquinas’s more 
startling statements, he comments on I Corinthians that marriage is not good for a man 
because, “as to the body . . . a man subjects himself to a woman by marriage and makes 
himself a slave out of a freedman.  This is the most bitter of all servitudes.”256 
After calling marriage the greatest friendship, in part because of conjugal intimacy, 
the condemnation of the conjugal act as the “bitterest of all servitudes” comes as quite a 
shock.  But here the definition of slavery can make sense of this strong statement.  Earlier in 
the same passage, Saint Thomas has quoted Augustine’s comment that “Nothing so casts a 
man down from the citadel of his power as that contact of bodies without which a wife 
cannot be had,”—referring to the eclipse of reason that occurs in the marital act.  It is the 
same quotation he uses later in the Summa Theologiae, to address whether any venereal act 
can be without sin.  There, Aquinas qualifies that conjugal intimacy does not prevent virtue, 
just the highest perfection of virtue.  The I Corinthians commentary focuses on the same 
distinction, for it is a text justifying Saint Paul’s statement that it is better to remain 
continent than to marry, but it is better to marry than to burn.  To clarify this, Saint Thomas 
says later in the commentary that “it is good to marry, although it is a lesser good.  But to 
burn is an evil.  Therefore it is better . . . that a man should have the lesser good than incur 
the evil of incontinence.”257 
But in calling the marital act the most bitter of slaveries, Aquinas’s seemingly harsh 
words refer to the fact that during the act a man’s lower powers do not obey reason; he is 
being governed by his lowest faculties.  It is bitterer than any other slavery because even in 
ordinary human bondage a man is at least subject to another rational being.  In this slavery, 
a man’s rational will is not supplanted by the rational will of another, but by his own 
subrational faculties. 
Yet it is the contrast that Saint Thomas draws between marriage and slavery that 
reveals the most about marriage and its relation to law.  In the passages noted in chapter 3, 
Saint Thomas argues that marriage must be indissoluble and monogamous, or else the wife 
risks becoming a slave rather than a partner.258  This occurs because the husband of many 
women does not have time to form equal friendships with each.  A similar point is made in 
the Commentary on the Sentences, where Aquinas says that the patriarchs’ slave-girls were 
like wives as far as the primary end of matrimony went, but not the secondary end, for “the 
                                                 
254 In Sent. IV, dist 32, Q. 1, Art. 1, sed contra: “sicut servus est in potestate domini sui, ita et unus conjugum 
in potestate alterius.” 
255 In Sent. IV, dist 36, articula 1-3. 
256 In Cor I, Caput 7, Lectio 1, 314. 
257 In Cor I, Caput 7, Lectio 1, 335. 
258 Cf. SCG III-II, 124, paragraphs 4 and 5.   
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condition of servitude is opposed [to union], since they could not be at the same time 
partner and slave-girl.”259 
The most illuminating of these arguments occurs in the Summa Contra Gentiles: 
Again it seems obviously inappropriate for a woman to be able to put 
away her husband, because a wife is naturally subject to her husband as 
governor, and it is not within the power of a person subject to another to 
depart from his rule.  So, it would be against the natural order if a wife were 
able to abandon her husband.  Therefore, if a husband were permitted to 
abandon his wife, the society of husband and wife would not be an 
association of equals, but instead, a sort of slavery on the part of the wife.260 
In this text, Saint Thomas shows that the relationship of husband and wife does 
indeed involve subjection and government, yet it remains an association of equals.  This 
distinction brings into relief the necessity of government among free equal persons, which 
is one of the assumptions behind Aquinas’s whole philosophy of law.  Though the wife is 
“subject to her husband as governor,” this subjection does not entail domination or 
oppression.  Indeed, as was quoted above, the condition of servitude is opposed to 
partnership.  Saint Thomas conveys the same principle in the Commentary on the Sentences 
where he states that “the subjection of slavery is opposed to freedom, for slavery is when 
someone rules for his own utility, using those subject to him.”261 
If modern sensibilities tend to consider the juridical as restrictive and coercive, they 
misunderstand the notions of law and freedom according to Saint Thomas.  Elsewhere in 
the Summa Contra Gentiles, he distinguishes between the kind of rule that amounts to 
slavery, and the rule of free men: 
One who holds dominion over his own acts is free in his activity, “for 
the free man is he who acts for his own sake.”  But one who is acted upon by 
another, under necessity, is subject to slavery.  So, every other creature is 
naturally subject to slavery; only the intellectual creature is by nature free.  
Now under every sort of government, provision is made for free men for 
their own sakes, but for slaves in such a way that they may be at the disposal 
of free men.  And so, through divine providence provision is made for 
intellectual creatures on their own account, but for the remaining creatures 
for the sake of the intellectual ones.262 
Slavery is differentiated from the subjection of free citizens in two ways:  first, a slave 
is ruled for his master’s good, while a citizen is ruled for the common good—a good that 
includes his own personal good; and secondly, a slave works the will of another, while a 
free man acts from his own reason and will.  The root of human freedom in the reason of 
                                                 
259 In IV Sent, Distinction 33, question 1, article 3, questiuncula 3, ad 2:  “Erant enim uxores quantum ad 
principalem et primarium finem matrimonii, sed non quantum ad illam conjunctionem quae respicit 
secundarium finem, cui conditio servitutis opponitur, cum non possit simul esse socia et ancilla.” 
260 SCG, III, 123. 4. 
261 In Sent. IV, DiSt 24, Q.1, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 1: “subjectio servitutis repugnat libertati; quae servitus est quando 
aliquis dominatur ad sui utilitatem subjectis utens.” 
262 SCG, III:II, cap. 112.4. 
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the free man is evident in the words of Christ, “I do not call you slaves but friends, for a 
slave does not know what his master is doing” (John 15:15).  This rational self-governance 
of the governed free man which consists in ‘knowledge of what the Master is doing’ occurs 
precisely through law. 
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2. LAW IS TRUE FREEDOM 
Modern critics of Saint Thomas often reject his juridical approach because their 
concept of law entails something constricting and prohibitive.  Palmer, for example, 
emphasizes the origin of the word “contract” in contrast with the idea of marriage covenant:  
“Contract in its verbal form (contrahere) means to draw together, to restrict, to diminish, to 
limit, for example, the terms of the contractual agreement.”263  Indeed, in his discussion of 
human law, Saint Thomas himself explains law as that which restricts and coerces—the 
wicked.264  Yet while human law is the limit of most modern readers’ conception of law, to 
Aquinas it represented the palest, weakest participation in the true reality of law, and that 
law most likely to fall short of law’s true meaning. 
According to Thomas’s famous definition, law is a dictate of reason about action to 
be taken for the common good, formulated by a competent authority and promulgated to the 
people bound by it.265  This definition comprises the four causes of law:  the efficient cause 
is the legislator; the end of law is the common good of the community ruled; law is 
formally a dictate of practical reason, and law acquires material existence when it is 
promulgated to the populace.  Yet this definition applies so well to human civil law that it is 
easy to forget the wide range of reality that it encompasses. 
Law for Saint Thomas was first and foremost the plan for the universe in the mind of 
God—the Eternal Law.  All other laws, to the extent that they are laws, are participations of 
the original law that is God’s providence.  By natural law, human beings are given an 
ennobling participation in the Eternal Law, because in it we are given the ability to discern 
for ourselves the laws written into creation: 
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine 
providence in the most excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a share of 
providence, by being provident both for itself and for others.  Wherefore it 
has a share of Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its 
proper act and end:  and this participation of the eternal law in the rational 
creature is called natural law…the light of natural reason, whereby we 
discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural 
law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of Divine light.266 
Other creatures participate in the Eternal Law only passively by being ruled by it as 
they are moved according to the natures that God gave them.  Only the rational creature has 
the privilege of active participation by understanding and choosing to act in accord with 
providence.  Natural law is our chance to govern ourselves rationally according to God’s 
plan, to be co-operators with the divine legislator. 
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264 Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 96, art. 5.  
265 Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 90, art. 1-4. 
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Law is such a unifying and elevating concept for Saint Thomas that he sums up the 
Paschal Mystery, the Gospel, and the sacraments under the title the New Law.  The life of 
grace is a divine law because it makes known to man what he should do and it is ordered to 
the highest common good of the human race, eternal happiness.  Moreover, the new 
dispensation is the most perfect of the laws that man participates in, because it includes the 
grace that makes its fulfillment possible. 
In keeping with the words of Christ in John 15:15, law raises man from the level of 
slaves to the level of friends: “Every law aims at establishing friendship, either between 
man and man, or between man and God.”267  As man’s opportunity to understand and 
cooperate in God’s plan for the economy of salvation, it is arguable that law makes man 
more godlike than anything else.  By obeying and formulating laws, man imitates and 
assists the divine work of governing the universe, and propels himself, by his own actions, 
toward his own good. 
A. Aquinas’s Account of Marriage Seen from a Juridical Perspective 
Up to this point we have looked primarily at contemporary scholars who criticize 
Saint Thomas’s treatment of marriage for being too juridical.  We have seen that, under the 
conscious or unconscious influence of modern philosophy, these attitudes arise from 
underrating the importance that law holds in Aquinas’s thought. 
However, there is another area of recent research which appreciates Saint Thomas’s 
juridical theory as protecting and upholding the peace of the community and the rights of 
the individual.  Since marriage represents such an important institution to communities as 
well as individuals, these new natural law theorists invariably find themselves addressing 
conjugal issues.  The field of natural law theory is especially vast and would take us 
somewhat far afield from our topic if we were to explore it with the depth that it deserves.  
For our purposes, we will refer only briefly to two scholars who discuss marriage in Saint 
Thomas from a juridical perspective.  A very brief acquaintance will reveal that also among 
this latest generation of natural law theorists, Aquinas’s teaching is subject to 
misinterpretation.   Scholars of Saint Thomas’s juridical writings are just as likely to 
underestimate the importance of the spiritual in law (and in marriage in particular) as 
theologians are to miss the spiritual character of law for Aquinas. 
John Finnis, for example, espouses a legal and political theory drawn from Saint 
Thomas, which he uses to defend permanence and monogamy in marriage.268  Nevertheless, 
Finnis’s understanding of Aquinas’s jurisprudence remains tethered in the natural world. 
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268 See Finnis, "Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good" (The Monist 91.3[2008]: 388) and “Law, Morality, and 
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This fact is to a certain extent understandable given that, as Jean Porter explains, he is 
translating and justifying Saint Thomas’s natural law theory for a modern audience which 
may not be open to the fulness of Aquinas’s cosmology.269  In doing so, Finnis is following 
Thomas’s own advice, which he quotes from Aquinas’s response to the quodlibetal 
question, “Should academic arguments be made from reason or from authority?”: 
Any activity is to be pursued in a way appropriate to its purpose.  
Disputations have one or other of two purposes. 
One sort is designed {ordinatur} to remove doubts about whether such-
and-such is so.  In disputations of this sort you should above all use 
authorities acceptable to those with whom you are disputing; with Jews, for 
example, you should appeal to the authority of the Old Testament; with 
Manichees, who reject the Old Testament, you should use only the New; 
with Christians who have split off from us, e.g. the Greek [Orthodox], who 
accept both Testaments but reject the teaching of our [Catholic] saints, you 
should rely on the authority of Old and New Testaments and of those church 
teachers {doctores} they do accept.  And if you are disputing with people 
who accept no authority, you must resort to natural reasons.270 
Finnis can hardly be faulted for taking this approach, given the fact that his readers 
need to be convinced of the very most fundamental aspects of marriage.  As a legal theorist 
and political philosopher, he engages jurists and academics who deny the very fact that 
marriage exists only between a man and a woman.  Given such a context, it is hardly 
surprising that his description of Aquinas’s teaching on marriage never touches on the 
sanctifying power of the sacrament.  He typically translates Saint Thomas’s designation of 
marriage’s two-fold end as “the actualisation, expression and experience of marriage.”  In 
an earlier article on marriage, he explains marriage from a natural law perspective in the 
following way: 
Why are sex acts . . . unreasonable unless marital?  Implicit in Aquinas’ 
often misunderstood work is a rarely recognised train of thought, 
substantially as follows. 
Marriage, in which a man and woman would find their friendship and 
devotion to each other fulfilled in their procreation, nurture, protection, 
education and moral formation of their children, is an intrinsic, basic human 
good.  Sexual intercourse between the spouses, provided it is authentically 
marital, actualises and promotes the spouses’ mutual commitment in 
marriage (their marital fides).  But my sex act with my spouse will not be 
truly marital—and will not authentically actualise, and allow us in a non-
illusory way to experience, our marriage—if I engage in it while I would be 
willing in some circumstance(s) to engage in a sex act of a non-marital kind . 
. . To regard any of such types of sex act as morally acceptable is to regard 
one or more of them as something I might under some circumstances engage 
in, and this state of mind undermines the marital character of my sex acts 
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with my spouse.  In short, the complete exclusion of non-marital sex acts 
from the range of acceptable human options is a pre-condition for the truly 
marital character of any spouses’ intercourse. 
Moreover, without the possibility of truly marital intercourse the good 
of marriage is seriously impaired… For it disintegrates the intelligibility of 
my marriage; our sex acts no longer truly actualise and enable us 
authentically to experience our marriage; they are unhinged from the other 
aspects of our mutual commitment and project.  And this unhinging or dis-
integration threatens—runs contrary to—both of the goods inherent in the 
complex basic good of marriage:  not only the good of friendship and fides 
but also the good of procreation and of the children whose education etc. so 
depends on the context of a good marriage.  So any kind of assent—even if 
conditional—to non-marital sex is unreasonable.  (Indeed, all sexual 
immorality, including all willingness to treat it as a potentially acceptable 
option, is contrary to love-of-neighbour, i.e. of children).  And so it is 
immoral and out of line with human nature (and, Aquinas adds, with God’s 
intentions about human conduct).271  
Finnis must be given credit for a remarkable translation of Saint Thomas’s teaching 
on marriage into contemporary idiom.  When we consider that he was writing in the context 
of a debate over the morality of homosexual relations, it is not surprising that God is 
relegated to a parenthetical mention at the end of the discourse.  This was an attempt to use 
natural reason alone in order to make some basic truths of natural law convincing to those 
who accept no authority.  But in fact, what results is not a vision of marriage that eclipses 
non-marital relations in its wisdom and beauty, but rather a somewhat squalid picture of 
marriage. Yet it will be impossible for Finnis to give a truly inspiring and attractive account 
of traditional marriage doctrine—or an accurate representation of Aquinas’s teaching—as 
long as he sets God to the side in the argument. 
The reason for this failure comes from ignoring the essentially theological meaning 
that law holds for Saint Thomas.  Natural law comes from God as the creator of human 
nature, and it is ordered toward God as the common good;272 it is by definition a 
participation in the Eternal Law, divine providence.  Finnis cannot hope to accurately 
represent Saint Thomas’s teaching on marriage even from a purely juridical perspective 
while his purview remains so limited to the sociological realm.  Russell Hittinger points out 
the danger in this pervasive error: 
The thought of Thomas Aquinas has, of course, become nearly 
synonymous with “Catholic” doctrine of natural law.  It would take volumes 
to dispel the modern misperceptions and misrepresentations of his natural 
law theory.  Many misperceptions are due to the fact that . . . those 
discussions in Thomas are often lifted out of context and debated as if they 
were independent of theology, natural or revealed. 
                                                 
271 Finnis, “Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual Orientation’,”  pp. 38-39. 
272 See Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas and the Divinity of the Common Good,” pp. 211-233; and Stephen 
Brock, “The Primacy of the Common Good and the Foundations of Natural Law in St. Thomas,” pp. 234-255; 
in Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life (Levering and Huetter, eds.; 
Catholic University of America Press:  Washington, D.C., 2010). 
89 
 
I have no intention of trying to dispel all these misperceptions at their 
proper level of detail and complexity.  Two general points, however, need to 
be made.  First, nowhere does Thomas define natural law in anything but 
theological terms.  Indeed, in answer to the objection that for there to be both 
an eternal law and a natural law was a needless duplication, Thomas 
responds: “this argument would hold if the natural law were something 
diverse from the eternal law, whereas it is nothing but a participation 
thereof.”  Natural law is never (and I must emphasize never) defined in terms 
of what is first in the (human) mind or first in nature.273 
As Hittinger insists, any account of Aquinas’s law theory that ignores law’s divine 
origin and orientation neglects its most essential defining features. Such a treatment strips 
natural law of its efficient cause, its final cause, and its formal cause; when pared down to 
its subject matter alone it loses coherency and authority and becomes one human argument 
among many.  Hittinger draws out the necessary result of 
… the tendency of contemporary readers to interpret magisterial 
discourse about natural law without the doctrine of providence—that is, 
without the principles that would allow us to think of natural law as “law.”  
From this follows the impression that talk about natural law is a rhetoric 
designed to achieve consensus about matters of public policy, or, worse still, 
conclusions grounded in Church authority.274 
To be sure, Finnis’s object is not to interpret magisterial documents, but to engage 
opponents who do not accept the Church’s authority.   Nevertheless, his account of Aquinas 
in any area of jurisprudence will be gravely inadequate unless he recognizes that law is 
necessarily and essentially theological for Saint Thomas.  Perhaps Finnis only employs 
Aquinas’s theories for the sake of a persuasive argument, without hoping to expose the 
deeper meaning and consequences of this portrayal of marriage.  Yet it is revealing that 
Finnis’s colleague, Jean Porter, employs Saint Thomas’s natural law principles to argue in 
favor of homosexual “marriages”.275 
The problems with Porter’s account of Saint Thomas’s legal theory are many and 
varied.276  Fr. Kevin Flannery has addressed specifically the errors in Porter’s reasoning in 
her most recent book, where she sees an “underdetermination” in the conclusions drawn 
from natural law precepts, which would open a possibility of drawing other conclusions 
pertaining to human sexuality, contradictory to those drawn by Saint Thomas.277  In an 
article addressing Porter’s arguments for sexual license and homosexuality in an earlier 
work, Fr. Lawrence Dewan points out Aquinas’s correlation of the principles of reason that 
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“are in function of nature” in both speculative and practical matters; Fr. Dewan concludes, 
“The harm that is being done by such sins is to the very possibility of right judgment 
concerning our lives.”278  He quotes Saint Thomas’s explanation of the seriousness of 
sexual sins from the same article: 
in sins against nature, in which the very order of nature is violated, 
injustice [iniuria] is done to God himself, the one who orders nature.  Hence, 
Augustine says, in Confessions 3 [chap. 8; in PL 32:689]: “…In fact the 
social relation itself [ipsa societas] that we ought to have with God is 
violated when that same nature of which he is author is polluted by 
perversity of sexual passion.” 
Dewan summarizes, “Thomas thinks of human well-being as indissociable from the 
relation to God; thus the first commandment of the Decalogue, laying the foundation for 
human goodness, must bear on the ultimate end of the human will, which is God.”279  Porter 
also falls into error when she attempts to employ natural law without attending to its author 
or end. 
A thorough treatment of the new natural law theorists would take us very far from our 
subject.  For our purposes it is enough to note that the very fact that “natural law” can be 
used to argue to diametrically opposite accounts of marriage shows how rudderless this 
theory becomes when isolated from Saint Thomas’s full definition.  As Hittinger remarked, 
removing God from natural law leaves us “without the principles that would allow us to 
think of natural law as ‘law’,” and reduces it to a rhetorical tool. 
Although considering Finnis’s and Porter’s accounts of marriage in detail lies beyond 
the scope of this paper, it suffices to show that, just as theologians of marriage have 
misunderstood the essentially theological nature and ordination of law for Saint Thomas, so 
too have jurisprudents themselves.  As Joseph Koterski writes, 
Despite attempts of various kinds since the Enlightenment to sever, or at 
least to ignore, the connection between the natural moral law and God as its 
ultimate source, natural law theory is necessarily theological.  This is not to 
say that one cannot come to know any number of moral precepts (for 
instance, that murder is wrong, or that promises should be kept, or that 
parents should be honored) without explicitly invoking God or having any 
particular theories about morality in mind.  To say that would be to ignore 
one of the most compelling features of natural law theory—that its most 
fundamental directives will be readily obvious to anyone of open mind and 
good will who reflects on human conduct, without any need to study natural 
law theory.  But it is to say that when we are discussing not some particular 
precept of the natural moral law but natural law theory, considered precisely 
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as a theory for explaining the nature of morality, natural law theory is 
ineluctably theological.280 
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Reinhard Huetter and Matthew Levering.  Washington, D.C.:  Catholic University of America Press, 2010), p. 
256. 
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3. MARRIAGE AND LAW 
According to Saint Thomas’s broader conception of law, sacraments are an aspect of 
divine law, under the New Law.  This fact makes more sense of Thomas’s constant use of 
juridical categories in his analysis of marriage.  For him, law cannot be divided against 
sacraments. 
This interconnection can be seen in many characteristics of the life of grace.  Both 
sacraments and law require sensible and external signs; both are ordered to the good of the 
community through the perfection of the individual.  Aquinas’s thorough treatment of the 
conditions for marital consent reminds us that, like the sacraments, legal action deals with 
internal realities mediated through signs and words; like the sacraments, juridical works are 
public for the sake of the community.  Civil law is like a natural sacrament:  it is a sign of 
God’s providence—albeit veiled—and our participation in His plan for our salvation. 
Yet human law is not only a natural preparation for the sacraments of the Church.  
Saint Thomas’s honoring of natural marriages and Old Testament marriages reflects his 
respect for natural law and for the Old Law, for these are also participations in Eternal Law, 
though imperfect ones damaged by original sin.  Similarly, despite its imperfections and 
limitations, human law, in representing rational self-governance, makes man a co-worker 
with God in the divine rule of the universe. 
A.  Marriage as the intersection of procreation and law 
Law represents one of man’s highest participations in divine action.  But if any other 
human activity could compete for this dignity, it would be procreation. 
In a surprising response in his treatise on the creation of man, Aquinas determines 
which bears most the image of God, human or angelic nature.  Although the angels 
resemble God more in having a more perfect intellectual nature, he says, 
we observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that 
man proceeds from man, as God from God. . . in these and the like things the 
image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels.  But these do 
not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we 
presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise 
even brute animals would be to God’s image.281 
Because of his rational nature, man’s procreation makes him even more to the image 
of God than an angel.  Unlike angels, humans can reproduce; unlike animal reproduction, 
human reproduction is the generation of a person by a person.  While animals generate 
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animals by sexual reproduction, man’s reproduction is procreation only because it occurs in 
the context of rational self-governance—in the context of law. 
The intersection of law and procreation is marriage.  This statement should no longer 
evoke notions of animal breeding regulated by draconian ordinances.  By now it should be 
clear that Saint Thomas had in mind something potentially divinizing in his vision of both 
procreation and of law.  With these themes in mind, we can see how weighted every word is 
in this statement of Aquinas: 
generation is the only natural act that is ordered to the common 
good…As a result, since law is established for common good, those matters 
which pertain to generation must, above all others, be ordered by laws both 
divine and human.  Now, laws that are established should stem from the 
promptings of nature, if they are human; . . .But, if they are divine laws, they 
not only develop the prompting of nature but also supplement the deficiency 
of natural instinct, as things that are divinely revealed surpass the capacity of 
human reason.  So, since there is a natural prompting within the human 
species, to the end that the union of man and wife be undivided, and that it 
be between one man and one woman, it was necessary for this to be ordered 
by human law.  But divine law supplies a supernatural reason, drawn from 
the symbolism of the inseparable union between Christ and the 
Church,…And thus, disorders connected with the act of generation are not 
only opposed to natural instinct, but are also transgressions of divine and 
human laws.282 
Marriage has an essential relation to each and every kind of law: as an office of 
nature, its essential qualities are discernible by reason under natural law; as relating to the 
human community it is regulated by human law; as representing Christ and the Church, it is 
regulated by divine law, both old and new.  But the fundamental reason that marriage, 
“above all other matters” is ordered by each of these laws is that “generation is the only 
natural act that is ordered to the common good.”  The interconnection between law and 
generation arises because both law and generation are ordered to the common good. 
B. Marriage and the common good 
Before discussing the role of marriage in the common good, we should review what 
the common good consists in for Saint Thomas.  We tend to think of common goods as 
possessions that are divided among all the members of the community.  Yet anything that 
can ultimately only be enjoyed by one individual is, properly speaking, a private good.  
Food that is shared, or money that is condivided among many, or even public property like 
roads or libraries, cannot truly be held in common, for any piece that is possessed or used 
by one member can thereby not be possessed by another.  A true common good is only 
increased by more members sharing in it, and it is not enjoyed by any members of the 
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community, unless all members share in it equally.283  Thus it becomes clear that true 
common goods must be immaterial.  Goods like justice,284 order, or peace are things that 
every member of the community possesses more as more members of the community 
possess it.  This fact shows that a true common good is the good of each member. 
Moreover, the common good of any community is ordered to the larger common good 
of the communities to which it belongs.  The internal order of the army is for the sake of 
victory; the victory of the army is for the sake of the peace of the nation that it defends.  The 
common goods aimed at by civil law are civil goods like peace and justice  in the polis.  But 
these goods in turn must conduce to the “intelligible and heavenly good” aimed at by divine 
law.285  All laws are subsumed under the Eternal Law, which moves all things to the final 
end of the universe. 
We can now see that when Saint Thomas speaks of human generation as ordered to 
the common good, his vision must go far beyond the notion of numerical population 
increase.  Likewise, his philosophy of law rises above the restrictions and compulsion that 
are the recalcitrant’s only experience of law.  Both law and procreation are ordered to the 
common good of the universe:  they are both active, pivotal human participations in God’s 
providence. 
C. The Common Good of the Universe 
It is the paramount importance of the common good for Saint Thomas that 
differentiates his analysis of marriage from many current attempts to develop a theology of 
marriage.  We have seen that a misconception of the common good underlies each of the 
erroneous interpretations of Aquinas that we have discussed. 
In chapter 1, Palmer criticized the juridical treatment of marriage, because in his view 
legal contracts are “used of buying and selling, lending and leasing, of hiring and engaging 
the services of another”—in other words, contracts have to do with private goods.286  He 
neglected the nature of human law as ordered to the common good, and the particular nature 
of the marital contract as intrinsically related to the community and to God.  Meanwhile, 
DeBroglie construed the personal pleasures of marriage as the incentive that attracts couples 
to serve the common good unknowingly.  According to this schema, married couples 
embark upon matrimony for the sake of romantic affection and personal fulfillment, but as 
                                                 
283 When using words like “equally,” we must resist the temptation to think in terms of quantity; this would be 
to imagine peace or fellowship as private goods.  All members of a peaceful community share in its peace 
“equally” in the sense that no one is excluded from sharing the common peace, not in the sense that each 
possesses an equal amount of peace. 
284 Justice can be considered a common good where it is understood as informing the community, through just 
laws, justly made and enforced.  An individual’s personal virtue of justice is obviously not a common good, 
although a community of individuals who were each personally just would certainly enjoy justice as a 
common good of the polis. 
285 ST, I-II, Q. 91, Art. 5. 
286 Palmer, “Christian Marriage:  Contract or Covenant,” page 619. 
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long as they obey the laws of the Church in doing so, they will contribute to the 
perpetuation of the species while they pursue their own aims.  It is mystifying to guess how 
DeBroglie’s common good yields any good to the individuals of the community; 
meanwhile, the Church as lawgiver seems to seek the multiplication of souls rather than 
their salvation, in DeBroglie’s conception.  Moreover, by being induced to serve the 
common good unconsciously, the married couple is reduced to the level of irrational 
creatures, who serve the ends of providence by acting out of their natures without intention.  
This unwitting, automatic action strips away the rational creature’s privilege of deliberate 
obedience to law and freedom to act toward his own good. 
In chapter 2, Milhaven confused the good of the spouses with the pleasure of the 
spouses.  In contrast to this, Aquinas considers the purpose of the marital act as either a 
remedy for concupiscence or for the generation of children.  Either purpose can constitute 
an act of virtue for the spouses, which may conduce to their individual attainment of the 
ultimate good.  But even from a temporal perspective, approaching marital intimacy as an 
opportunity to bear the spiritual burdens and temptations of one’s spouse represents a 
shared good of a higher and more enduring kind than the unitive possibilities of shared 
pleasure that Milhaven would settle for. 
Milhaven fears that an emphasis on procreation will deprive the spouses of the 
personal good of sexual pleasure.  Yet the shared pleasure in a common activity is only the 
slightest of the shared goods that Aquinas envisages for the couple.  And in point of fact, 
experiencing pleasure in a shared activity is still only a private good, since each person’s 
pleasure can only be enjoyed by him alone. 
In chapter 3, we saw that the shared good of the household community was the source 
of what Aquinas calls “the greatest friendship.”  Marriage merits this superlative because 
managing the household together engages the spouses at the physical, moral, and 
intellectual level in a shared pursuit of the highest natural goods, such as order, virtue, and 
peace.  Yet this direction of the home is for the sake of an even higher common good, the 
raising of children to virtuous adulthood.  This aim of the parents in their childrearing will 
ultimately benefit the larger community—the polity or the Church—by producing virtuous 
citizens which, in turn, increases the justice and charity of these communities.  At the level 
of supernatural charity, Saint Thomas reiterates that the love between the spouses must be 
turned ad extra, making them into a united principle in the service of others.  Even where 
no children are mentioned, the spouses’ love is an intrinsic common good that is ordered to 
extrinsic common goods. 
In Chapter 4, we have seen that even approaching Aquinas’s teaching on marriage 
from a juridical perspective, Finnis and Porter do not attain an accurate picture of his 
doctrine as long as they neglect the importance of God in the account of law.  One reason 
for this is that law is by definition ordered to the common good.  Lower laws may be aimed 
at lower common goods, but every common good is subsumed under a larger one, until 
ultimately all common goods are ordered to the supreme common good of the universe, 
which is God.  The earthly common good toward which a civil law is ordained must respect 
the higher common good to which it is ordered, or it will not retain the ratio of law. 
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If the common good seems to play what Michael Waldstein calls “an architechtonic 
role in St. Thomas”287 that is because it is the end of every created thing in the universe.  
What is difficult for us to realize is that it is also the good of every created thing in the 
universe—it is not a greater good to which some creatures are sacrificed, but the shared 
good of all creatures, enjoyed most especially by rational creatures. 
The juridical is integral to marriage in every respect, not as a necessary evil, but as a 
result of the nature of man and his ordering to God.  Aquinas recognized that human 
reproduction goes beyond the physical increase of population; because we are rational 
animals, all our deliberate acts have eternal ramifications.  Human reproduction merits the 
name “procreation” because it is the only reproductive act that results in the creation of an 
immortal, rational soul.  Nevertheless, it is not only the generation of a child that constitutes 
procreation, but the rearing and education of that child to virtuous adulthood and the 
sanctity that will enable that child to enjoy the rewards of eternal life. 
All the aspects of married life—from forming a lifelong compact of faithful co-
operation, to engaging in marital intimacy, to rearing and educating children, to the married 
couple’s relationship to the larger community—depend upon a rational self-governance that 
participates in divine reason.  This is none other than law.  Law is the principle that unites 
the rational creature to God and the community even before and apart from the person’s 
experience of sanctifying grace.  As Matthew Levering writes, “For Aquinas, juridical 
categories, correctly understood, are the very means by which our intrinsic (and therefore 
personal) relationship to God, in the intimate union of holiness, is most truly expressed.”288 
                                                 
287 Michael Waldstein, “The Common Good in Saint Thomas and John Paul II” Nova et Vetera, Eng. Ed. Vol. 
3 No. 3 (2005) p. 569. 
288 Matthew Levering, “Juridical Language in Soteriology: Aquinas' Approach” (Angelicum 80/2 [2003]) p. 
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CONCLUSION 
Much of the reason that Saint Thomas’s marriage theology has been set to the side in 
recent years arises from a certain discomfort with his use of juridical language to describe 
marriage.  However, the charge that Aquinas’s account of marriage is too juridical to 
adequately convey its sanctity arises from a misunderstanding of the juridical in Saint 
Thomas. 
Marriage is unusual in that it spans time: it was established at the creation of man, it 
remained part of human life after our lapse into sin, it was elevated to the level of one of the 
seven sacraments by the redemption, and it represents an eschatological foreshadowing of 
the end times.  Because it pertains to man’s nature also apart from grace, it gives us a 
glimpse of the soteriological and eschatological importance of law.  Everywhere that 
marriage is, there is law, because law and marriage both fulfill the same function:  both are 
human activities that order (and even unite) man to God.  Both law and marriage emanate 
from the same lawgiver and are both ordered toward the same end.  Eternal law predates 
creation, and orders within it all of history, culminating in the Paschal Mystery. 
Law makes sense of the complex tangle that is the history of marriage.  The reason 
that valid marriage could exist in paradise, under the Mosaic law, as one of the seven 
sacraments of the Church and validly among the unbaptised to this day derives from 
marriage’s relationship to the law that orders the universe.  Marriage parallels the presence 
of law at every level.  It has accompanied man from his creation, regulated by civil law in 
every society.  As God refined man’s faculties through the Old Law, and healed them in the 
New Law, He concomitantly instructed man further in the nature of marriage. 
One reason for the ineluctable link between marriage and law arises from their 
relation to human nature. 
Marriage, Law, and Human Nature 
We, under the influence of modern philosophy, have lost the sense of nature.  This 
failure plays a role in all the mistaken understandings we have addressed.  Although the 
nature of many things (the nature of human action, or the nature of pleasure, for example), 
and the very idea of nature itself all feature in a complete understanding of marriage, the 
root problem is a failure to understand the nature of the human being. 
The juridical is intrinsic and essential to marriage, not as a necessary evil, but as a 
result of human nature.  Humans are rational animals.  Our rationality means that we are in 
the image of God and graced with the freedom to govern our own actions.  Our animality 
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means that we can reproduce creatures like ourselves, who require our care and instruction 
as they mature in their own rationality.  Our ability to form a lifelong, indissoluble, and 
exclusive union for the protection of this project derives from our intellectual souls.  The 
nature of the rational animal is the reason that the sacrament of marriage depends on a legal 
contract. 
The rational nature of the human soul also underlies the relationship between the two 
ends of marriage.  Our rational nature means that humans learn little by little; it means that 
knowledge comes to us through instruction and virtue is formed in us by repeated acts.  
Thus the shared generation of children entails a lifelong cooperation between the parents in 
order to raise those children to the virtue that is worthy of their human dignity.  If we try to 
apologize for marriage’s procreative end by directing the intentionality of the couple to the 
private goods they will derive from their friendship, we promote a Cartesian understanding 
of human action, which divides body from soul and activity from the choice that initiates it.  
Moreover, such an account deprives man of the rational animal’s crowning privilege:  to act 
deliberately for his end.  In contrast to DeBroglie’s depiction, the spouses who undertake 
the shared project of the worthy education of their children, aware of its political and eternal 
ramifications, illustrate in their union the greatness of marriage as a truly human endeavor, 
as well as a possible means of sanctification. 
Aquinas’s approach to marital intimacy delves deeper into the constitution of the 
human soul.  When any human faculty attains the end it was made for, pleasure is the 
experience accompanying this fulfillment.  Pleasure for Aquinas is not limited to bodily 
sensual pleasures, but extends as well to the fulfillment of any faculty, including the 
intellect.  Contemporary attitudes toward marriage that focus on the pleasure accompanying 
a faculty’s fulfillment while trying to exclude the fulfillment itself become caught in a 
contradiction.  Contemporary readings of Saint Thomas that construe pleasure as a 
mechanism attached to certain behaviors by God in order to induce humans to act gravely 
misunderstand that nature is an internal principle of acting. 
Rather, the human spouse’s ability to engage in conjugal acts out of an intention that 
goes beyond his own gratification reveals further the privilege of self-rule.  Christian 
spouses are offered the additional grace of being able to engage in these acts out of charity 
or justice, thereby meriting eternal life for themselves and assisting the spouse to avoid sin 
and remain in grace.  Our rational nature is the reason that conjugal relations can constitute 
a “gift of self” that truly benefits the receiver. 
Man’s nature as a rational animal allows him to act deliberately for a good that goes 
beyond his own private good.  The rationality of the married couple is the reason that their 
friendship can be the “greatest friendship.”  A certain justice between the man and the 
woman, which is the foundation of friendship, allows marriage to be the greatest friendship, 
even when the marriage is not a sacrament. Beyond the “pleasant association” that results 
from their physical relationship at the animal level, the couple’s shared rational government 
of their home is ordered to a common good that itself directly impacts the common good of 
their larger community. 
When the friendship between the spouses is transformed by Christian charity, even 
finer facets of human nature become relevant.  The aspect of justice as rational ordering or 
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rendering what is due is what makes marriage a school for charity.  The intensity with 
which love grows in the soul of the human lover must be ordered by his reason if love is to 
continue to drive him toward the good.  The spousal cooperation reaches its highest 
expression when the couple is united in directing their charity toward God, and toward 
others through Him. 
The order of charity reveals one of the highest ways that marriage is oriented to the 
common good.  While every creature acts for the common good of the universe by nature, 
the rational nature of the human being means that he can envisage the common good 
deliberately in his actions.  Every law, to the degree that it is a law, is ordered to the 
common good.  Yet common goods exist in a hierarchy ordered by the Eternal Law to the 
Universal common good.  The common good of each community, aimed at by the law 
governing that community must ultimately be ordered to the common good of the universe. 
The parents’ direction of the home aims at a domestic common good, but in turn that 
common good is subsumed in the common goods of both the polis to which the household 
belongs and where the marriage is sacramental, in the common good of the Body of Christ. 
Marriage, even when not a sacrament, provides a platform in which human spouses 
can intelligently act for the common good.  Even as a natural institution, marriage has 
public elements that reveal its ordination to the public good. The common good of the 
marital union, which is ordered to the good of the household and the larger communities of 
polis and Church, furnishes a very accessible example of the subsidiarity of common goods.  
Spouses acting for the good of their marriage can see the ramifications of their actions for 
the good of each larger community to which they belong.  Law in all its aspects—from the 
natural law to human civil law, to the personal virtue of justice—allows the human being to 
order his actions deliberately to a good that transcends his private goods. 
Aquinas does not discuss marriage in legal categories because of a lack of 
understanding of the dignity and beauty of the human person, but just the contrary.  The 
privilege not only of obeying but of making law raises man above the animals, divinizing 
him and making him a cooperator in divine government. 
Law for Aquinas represents, as it were, the other arm by which God works his mercy.  
It is the mode by which God involves us in divine providence.  Natural law has been 
referred to, as Russell Hittinger reminds us, as “the first grace,” for it was given to man to 
engage him in his own salvation before and apart from grace.289  An even greater 
participation in the rule of the universe belongs to the Christian, who “sees what his master 
is doing” by the light of grace and the human faculties healed by the Paschal Mystery. 
                                                 
289 Russell Hittinger tells in his book by the same title that the use of the term “the first grace” to describe 
natural law comes from “the letter of a presbyter named Lucidus who recanted of certain doctrines condemned 
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natural law is said to be the “first grace of God” (per primam Dei gratiam) before the coming of Christ (in 
adventum Christi).  Lucidus also affirmed that, according to Romans 2:15, the natural law is “written in every 
human heart.”  (Hittinger, The First Grace:   Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World. 
Wilmington, Del: ISI Books, 2003, p. xi.) 
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Law gives man a divine orientation.  It does not coerce or suppress him (except to the 
degree that he has departed from the rule of reason).  While Porter and Finnis value 
Aquinas’s account of natural law, they miss the same truth that  scholars miss in Aquinas’s 
marriage theology:  the truth that law is intrinsically and essentially a path to sanctity for 
Saint Thomas. 
Viewing marriage with Saint Thomas through a juridical lens is not a desacralization 
of marriage.  Rather, it is evident that Aquinas finds the Trinity in the origin, essence, and 
end of marriage in each of the aspects of marriage we have considered.  We have seen the 
ways that law and marriage are rooted in human nature.  Now let us look at the ways that 
law and marriage are ordered to the divine. 
Marriage, Law, and Divinity 
Marriage and law are both rooted in the constitution of the rational animal.  Because 
of man’s material and rational nature, he can participate in divine providence in a way not 
given to the rest of the material world, and in a way not shared by angels.  The natural law, 
the human law that results from it, and every individual act of prudence derived from man’s 
participation in divine reason are a cooperation in the God’s governance of the universe.  
Moreover, this participation is only possible because of the image of the Trinity that man 
bears in his reason and will.  Lawrence Dewan emphasizes the divinizing character of 
natural law as follows: 
Our moral sense not only “seems” godlike.  It is godlike. 
Long before any modern view of morality as transcendent or sacred, 
there is the sort of medieval Scholastic thinking that one finds in the works 
of Thomas Aquinas.  Consider the prologue to the prima secundae of the 
Summa theologiae—the presentation of the whole of morals, precisely in the 
light of the human being as the image of God, and this in function of mans’ 
ability to determine his own actions.  And although there is obvious and 
profound continuity between the animal world and the human world, there 
is, for Thomas, an infinite difference.  Consider the chapters of SCG 3.111-
3.113, which precisely introduce the treatises on law and grace.  The 
argument is that providence, althought it is concerned with all creatures, has 
a special character as regards the rational creatures.  Furthermore, basing 
himself on the condition of the intellectual nature, Thomas in chapter 112, 
teaches that the rational creatures are cared for for their own sake, whereas 
the nonrational creatures are cared for for the sake of the rational….The 
position of the human being is such that the human soul is the goal of all 
matter, but the human soul requires special creation by God for each 
individual, beyond ordinary natural generation.290 
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Thomistic Ethics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 248-249. 
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Father Dewan’s comments touch on one important consequence of human rational 
nature for marriage.  Human generation is procreation because it involves human 
cooperation in this individual creation of an immortal soul, existing in the image of God.  
Man’s intellectual nature means that he can govern his actions in imitation of God; when 
these actions extend to the perpetual contract of marriage and the choice to engage in 
conjugal relations, they may have “infinite” consequences that reach beyond the spouses 
personal trajectories.  Because of man’s rational nature and his resulting privilege of self-
governance, the generation of human offspring remains incomplete unless those offspring 
are brought up in virtue, and, in a sacramental marriage, with faith.  The juridical aspects of 
the marriage contract represent our attempts to live up to this privilege which, even more 
than any other human act, carries eternal ramifications.  The deliberative action which is 
ours because we are made in the image of the Trinity must be applied above all to the 
actions that bring new images of the Trinity into the world. 
Even where conjugal relations are not considered under the aspect of a procreative 
act, the Trinity remains present as source and goal of spousal action.  As a remedy for 
concupiscence, marital intimacy reveals the mercies that the Eternal Law also extends to 
those outside sanctifying grace—whether under the old dispensation or engaged in a natural 
marriage.  Yet within a sacramental marriage, the exercise of marital fidelity in the conjugal 
act offers spouses the chance to act simultaneously out of justice and charity.  The marital 
“duties” arise from a prior gift of self in the marriage pact.  This “irrevocable giving” recalls 
Saint  Thomas’s treatment of the Holy Spirit as Gift, and his statement that “in any giving, 
the first gift is Love.”  The love that precipitates the spouses’ commitment to each other is 
fortified by the actions reinforcing marital fidelity—actions of giving what is due, of justice. 
The combined impact of this love, obedience, and justice in marital intimacy works 
directly in contrast to the effects of original sin—a perverted concupiscence and the 
disordering of male-female relations.  The sanctification accomplished by marriage occurs 
not only in the gift, but specifically through the “paying of the debt,” which has the 
potential to become an ecclesial and eschatological act insofar as one spouse is laying 
himself down to assist the other to remain in grace.  Thus, “paying what is due,” the 
quintessential act of justice, can act in reparation for the loss of original justice.  Yet these 
spousal intentions are only capable of countering the effects of original sin because of their 
resemblance and relation to the Paschal Mystery, in which the Son of God laid himself 
down out of love and obedience:  “Who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard 
equality with God something to be grasped.  Rather he emptied himself, taking the form of 
a slave . . . becoming obedient to death, even death on a cross” (Philippians 2:6-8). 
The Trinity is the end-goal of charity.  The sanctifying power of marriage and the way 
it specifies the universal call to holiness is evident in Saint Thomas’s ranking of the spouse 
in the order of charity.  Though the spouses enjoy the “greatest friendship” in regard to the 
responsibilities they share with respect to the household, in relation to those outside it they 
form a single principle of love and duty.  The husband’s love for his wife is “most intense” 
since she is the closest to him, but this closeness is for the sake of training the spouses’ 
hearts in greater love. 
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The juridical is integral to marriage under its every aspect, not as a necessary evil, but 
as essential to love in its fullest complement. 
Law is sanctifying in being ordered to the common good, for each common good has 
an ordering to a higher common good.  God is the common good of the universe, the 
common good to which every common good is ordered.  The Trinity is the eternal 
legislator, conducting all things to this universal common good through His law. 
However, we will not be able to tease apart too precisely the ways that marriage and 
law are rooted in human nature from the ways that they are rooted in the divine, and for 
good reason.  Marriage and law were both intended as means of uniting man with God.  
Moreover, to see human nature as an independent cause in itself, isolated from God’s 
action, would be to fall prey to the original sin and to the errors of modern philosophy.  
Human nature is an image of the Trinity, as well as bearing the creature’s trace of its 
creator; all God’s gifts to humankind were given for the sake of bringing man back into 
union with him.  Law and marriage illustrate this truth in a particularly rich way. 
“Marriage has its cause in us” because God willed from the beginning to give into 
human hands the power to form this sign of his love and his wisdom.  By elevating this 
human relationship to the heights that it can attain through deliberate intention of the 
common good—through law—God gave us the possibility of symbolizing His redemption 
of mankind while actively assisting to bring others into it.  Marriage contains a reflection of 
the Trinity, not like a mirror reflection, but as a prism reflects the light split into various 
colors.  When regarded through the prism of law, the many dimensions under which 
marriage represents and actualizes God’s salvation of man shine forth. 
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APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF IN SENT. IV, 26-42 
PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF AQUINAS’S TREATISE ON MARRIAGE 
With a few exceptions, academic articles on Aquinas’s marriage theology have relied 
increasingly on the Supplement to the Summa Theologiae in recent decades.  Some authors 
include references to the original passages cited in the Commentary on the Sentences, but 
nevertheless they quote from the more accessible text, which Saint Thomas did not 
compose.  Although the text of the Supplement is materially the same as that of the Treatise 
on Marriage in the Commentary on the Sentences, it does omit sizeable excerpts. 
Moreover, the one innovation that the Supplement makes on Aquinas’s treatment of 
marriage is its presentation of themes in slightly altered order.  Since Saint Thomas was 
obliged to follow Peter Lombard’s outline in his Commentary on the Sentences, readers of 
the Supplement might assume that its questions follow the order that Aquinas would have 
chosen himself.  However, such an assumption lacks any documentation.   
In fact, the more scientific editors of Aquinas’s works in recent decades are 
vociferous and unanimous in their denunciation of the Supplement as a poorly-compiled 
amateur work.  In his “Catalogue of St. Thomas’s Works,” Ignatius Eschmann inveighs 
against “the so-called Supplementum, put together with scissors and paste from pieces cut 
out of Aquinas’s writings on the Sentences (especially Bk. 4).”291  Meanwhile, Clémont 
Suermondt argues in his introduction to the critical edition of the Leonine, that 
I would never want to attribute the Supplement to that dearest 
companion of Saint Thomas, Brother Reginald of Piperno, as is commonly 
done today on the sole authority of the catalogue mentioned of Stams, even 
though it is otherwise not immune to obvious errors.292 
The most compelling reason for discrediting this long-enduring legend is that studies 
have shown the author of the Supplement “to have been a man devoid of serious learning, a 
most neglectful scribe, to the point that the study of his analyses had already shown him 
unequal to meeting this most difficult task, I might even say completely inept.”293 
                                                 
291 Ignatius T. Eschmann,  “A Catalogue of St. Thomas’s Works.” In E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of 
St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L.K. Shook, (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN; 1956), p 388. 
292 “Supplementum adiudicare omnino non vellem carissimo socio S. Thomae, fratri Reginaldo de Piperno, ut 
communiter hodie fit ex sola auctoritate noti catalogi Stamsiensis, etiam ceteroquin non immunis ab erroribus 
manifestis.” De Textu Critico Leonino Summae Theologiae, (Torino:  Marietti, 1948),  p.xii. 
293 “fuisse hominem eruditionis expertem (cf. Praef. Suppl. Tom. XII, p. xx b), scriptorem negligentissimum 
(cf. l. c. p. xiii, n. 33-44), quemadmodum studium analysium eum iam revelaverat huic muneri perdifficili 
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In the introduction to the Leonine edition, similar reasoning is used to disqualify Peter 
of Auvergne as the author of the Supplement: 
he shows signs of good acumen, which is in complete opposition to the 
slipshod work of the Supplement.  The author acts so negligently and so 
hastily, and gives such an ignorant analysis, that for this reason alone we 
could not believe the Supplement to have been compiled by Peter of 
Auvergne.294 
The Leonine editors go on to entertain the possibilities of other authors, including 
Henry of Gorcum, but the reality that emerges is that the resolution of this question would 
take a work of archeology.  Moreover, its importance to the study of Saint Thomas’s 
marriage theology is doubtful. 
Instead, we would like to direct attention back to the treatise on marriage in the 
Commentary on the Sentences.  Although it was written in Saint Thomas’s youth, the 
arguments that were repeated from it in later works suggest that his teaching on marriage 
underwent few if any substantial changes (with due regard for the development discovered 
by Frère Marie Leblanc and discussed in Chapter 3). 
However, in order that such a translation be truly accessible to modern anglophone 
readers, we should address a few historical and linguistic peculiarities of the text. 
A. On Saint Thomas’s Use of Language 
In the Preface to his translation of Plato’s Republic, Allan Bloom holds up as an ideal 
for translators 
the accuracy of William of Moerbeke’s Latin translations of Aristotle.  
These versions are so faithful to Aristotle’s text that they are authorities for 
the correction of the Greek manuscripts, and they enabled Thomas Aquinas 
to become a supreme interpreter of Aristotle without knowing Greek. 
Such a translation is intended to be useful to the serious student, the one 
who wishes and is able to arrive at his own understanding of the work.  He 
must be . . . given the means of transcending the limitations of the 
translator’s interpretation, enabled to discover the subtleties of the elusive 
original.  The only way to provide the reader with this independence is by a 
slavish, even if sometimes cumbersome, literalness—insofar as possible 
                                                                                                                                                     
obeundo imparem, ne dicam plane ineptum (cf. l.c. p. iii sq).” De Textu Critico Leonino Summae Theologiae, 
(Torino:  Marietti, 1948),  p. xii. 
294 “boni ingenii signa ostendit, cui perfunctiorium opus Supplementi omnino contradicit.  Tam negligenter et 
praecipitanter, tam imperite analyseon auctor egit, ut ob eam vel solam rationem credere non possimus 
Supplementum compilaturm esse per Petrum de Alvernia.” Opera Omnia, T. 12:  Summa Theologiae, Tertia 
Pars et Supplementum. (Romae: Leoninum, 1906), Praefatio in Supplementum, p. xvii. 49. 
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always using the same English equivalent for the same Greek word...The 
translator should conceive of himself as a medium between a master whose 
depths he has not plumbed and an audience of potential students of that 
master who may be better endowed than is the translator.295 
While the following translation of In IV Sententiarum, Distinctions 26-42, also aimed 
to emulate the method of William of Moerbeke, this work of Saint Thomas does pose 
particular problems to the translator.  In the first place, students of Saint Thomas are 
familiar with certain technical terms that he uses routinely, which depend upon extensive 
philosophical understandings.  Some examples of these expressions are “act” and 
“potency,” “form” and “matter,” “substance” and “accident,” to name only a few of the 
most obvious.  While it would be instantly apparent to a scholar of Aquinas that something 
“accidental” has to do with how something is, or being in a certain respect, the word carries 
a very different meaning for a reader who is not steeped in Thomistic or Aristotelian 
language.  This poses a difficulty to translation, since the intelligent reader who is not 
familiar with Saint Thomas is to some extent the intended audience of this translation.   
Presumably, a scholar who is familiar with Aquinas would be reading his work in the 
original Latin.  But as stated in the introduction to this thesis, the primary aim of this 
translation is to make Saint Thomas’s own teaching on marriage available to students of 
marriage theology.  The “literalness” that Bloom indicates as the translator’s goal must be 
balanced against the necessity of conveying what Saint Thomas was saying to an audience 
potentially unversed in his vocabulary. 
The translation of this treatise has given me a new appreciation for Saint Thomas’s 
use of language.  Indeed, he is known as the master of distinguo, and he has gone down in 
history for solving many a philosophical and theological debate by carefully distinguishing 
the differing ways in which an equivocal word is being used.  We see this gift at work in 
our study of his distinction of the several meanings of concupiscence, and the various 
senses of love. 
But the translation of the treatise of marriage reveals that Saint Thomas is also a 
master of synonyms.  He is wonderfully free from the modern tendency of loading an entire 
philosophical argument into the definition of one word, and using that word as code for the 
whole thesis. For him, the spoken word is a vehicle or container for an intellectual word or 
concept.  He uses words as vehicles or even servants to ideas, rather than making the reader 
enslaved to the word.  This absence of excessive reverence for particular words follows 
from his very Aristotelian appreciation for nature; it is not uncommon to find in the Sed 
contra of an article the simple argument, “This is the way that people normally speak.”296 
What this natural use of language means to the translator is that a one-to-one literal 
translation of words, such as Bloom recommends (“always using the same English 
equivalent for the same Greek [or Latin] word”), not only poses a challenge to practicality, 
but it may result in a translation that is not necessarily as faithful to Saint Thomas’s 
thought.  He routinely uses synonyms for the same idea in the very same paragraph, where 
                                                 
295 Allan Bloom. The Republic of Plato:Translated, with Notes, an Interpretive Essay, and a New 
Introduction. [New York]: Basic Books, 1991, p. xi. 
296 In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, A. 1, qc. 2, sed contra. 
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it is evident that he is not intending to distinguish two different aspects by the use of two 
different words.  For example, he usually refers to lex naturae (more rarely lex naturalis) to 
mean natural law, yet there are places where he calls it ius naturae or ius naturale.  Finally 
in the corpus of Distinction 33, Question 1, Art. 1, he makes it clear that he is using them as 
simple interchangeable synonyms: 
therefore a natural concept was 
placed in him, by which he is 
directed to acting appropriately, 
and this is called natural law or 
natural right. 
ideo naturalis conceptio ei 
indita, qua dirigatur ad operandum 
convenienter, lex naturalis vel jus 
naturale dicitur.297 
He uses consuetudo and mos similarly as synonyms in the first objection to the same 
article: 
It seems that to have several 
wives is not against the Law of 
Nature.  For custom does not 
prejudice natural right.  But to have 
several wives was not a sin when it 
was a custom, as is found in the 
text from Augustine. 
Videtur quod habere plures 
uxores non sit contra legem 
naturae. Consuetudo enim juri 
naturali non praejudicat. Sed 
habere plures uxores peccatum non 
erat quando mos erat, ut ab 
Augustino in littera habetur.298 
In an objection in a later article he uses the two words again synonymously: 
Augustine says about two 
wives, that when it was the custom, 
it was not a sin.  But in the time of 
the Law, there was such a custom 
that a divorced woman would take 
another husband, as is clear from 
Deut 24:2:  and when, having 
departed, the woman has taken 
another husband, etc... 
Augustinus, dicit de duabus 
uxoribus, quod quando mos erat, 
peccatum non erat. Sed tempore 
legis erat talis consuetudo quod 
repudiata alium virum ducebat, ut 
patet Deut. 24, 2: cumque egressa 
virum alterum duxerit et cetera.299 
But his response shows that, while it is natural to apply them interchangeably, in this 
particular case they convey different nuances: 
In these words of Augustine, 
mos  is not taken as "custom," but 
rather as "just act," according as 
from mos one is said to be law-
abiding or morigeratus, because he 
is of good morals, or as from mos 
in illo verbo Augustini mos 
non ponitur pro consuetudine, sed 
pro actu honesto, secundum quod a 
more aliquis dicitur morigeratus, 
quia est bonorum morum, vel sicut 
a more philosophia moralis 
                                                 
297 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q. 1, A. 1, corpus. 
298 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q. 1, A. 1, ad  1. This objection gives another example of lex naturae and jus naturale 
being used interchangeably from one sentence to the next. 
299 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q. 2, Art. 2, qc3, obj 2 
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moral philosophy is named. nominatur. 300 
Another example of the fungibility of certain words has even more relevance to our 
theme.  We might be inclined to consider the term “marriage vows” to be a more recent 
designation for the expression of marital consent.  Saint Thomas analyzes the expression of 
consent in minute detail, but he does not refer to the form of the sacrament or the sealing of 
the contract as marriage “vows.”  The reason is quite obvious to students of Aquinas; vows 
are the mode of entering the religious life.  His definition of vows even forms part of his 
treatise on marriage—in order to determine and explain the impediment to marriage that is 
posed by religious vows.  Aquinas defines a vow as 
a certain contract of a promise 
between God and man.  Whence, 
since a contract made between men 
in good faith obliges someone to 
necessary observance, more 
strongly does a vow in which a 
man promises something to God, in 
those matters to which the vow 
extends. 
quidam promissionis contractus 
inter Deum et hominem. Unde cum 
contractus bonae fidei inter 
homines factus obliget ad 
necessariam observationem, multo 
fortius votum quo homo Deo 
aliquid promittit, in his dumtaxat ad 
quae votum se extendit.301 
The resemblance, between a vow, which is a contract between God and man, and the 
marital contract, is not lost on Saint Thomas.  In the discussion of the requirements for valid 
consent, one objection notes that “by religious vows a person contracts a spiritual marriage 
with God.”302 
The marriage contract, on the other hand, is a contract between men—which is to say, 
the spouses—rather than an agreement between man and God.  Sometimes to consent is 
added an oath (juramentum), by which “something is confirmed by divine truth.”303  
Nevertheless, Aquinas is careful to distinguish that the oath is not an essential part of the 
contract: 
an oath is employed for the 
confirmation of a statement; 
wherefore it only confirms what is 
signified in words, nor does the 
thing signified change... An oath 
does not work to make a new 
obligation, but confirms the one 
already made. 
juramentum adhibetur pro 
confirmatione dictorum; unde illud 
tantum confirmat quod in dictis 
significatur, nec significatum 
mutat... juramentum operatur 
aliquid non novam obligationem 
faciens, sed factam confirmans.304 
                                                 
300 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q. 2, Art. 2, qc3, ad 2. 
301 In IV Sent., D. 38, Q. 1, Art. 3, qc. 1, corpus. 
302 In IV Sent., D. 27. Q. 2, Art. 2, qc. 3, obj. 3: “per votum religionis homo contrahit matrimonium spirituale 
cum Deo.” 
303 In IV Sent., D. 28, Q. 1, Art. 1, obj. 2: “per juramentum veritate divina firmatur aliquid.” 
304 In IV Sent,. D. 28, Q. 1, Art. 1, corpus and ad 4.  
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Thus it seems clear that for Saint Thomas the expression of marital consent between 
two human beings is something essentially different from a vow, which is a contract of 
spiritual marriage between man and God.  Nevertheless, in the consideration of whether 
consent is the efficient cause of marriage, the question is raised concerning the consent of 
“people who... are mute, or of diverse languages.”305  Saint Thomas answers that 
Although such people cannot 
express their own vows to each 
other in words, they can however 
express it by nodding.  And such 
nods are counted as words. 
quod quamvis non possint vota 
sua mutuo verbis tales exprimere, 
possunt tamen exprimere nutibus; 
et tales nutus pro verbis 
computantur.306 
Here we have the casual use of votum to refer not to the spiritual but to the 
sacramental or natural marriage.  Aquinas’s meaning is unmistakeable, but he gives no 
reason for referring to the marital consent as something that he defines later as a contract 
between man and God.  It must be, indeed, a casual use of the word, based on the fact that 
“This is the way that people normally speak.”  Although it is clear that votum was not the 
usual name for the exchange of marital consent, apparently the reference would have been 
clear to St. Thomas’s readers. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous use of synonyms without clear distinction is in Saint 
Thomas’s vocabulary for referring to sexual intercourse.  He uses at least seven different 
explicit names for sexual intercourse (carnalis copula, carnalis conjunctio, coitus, 
concubitus, carnalis commixtio, accessus ad mulierem, cognoscere mulierem). In addition 
he uses several expressions that we  might be tempted to consider euphemisms or oblique 
references, such as debitum coniugale, usus matrimonialis, actus maritalis. In fact, as we 
have seen in the chapter on the marital debt, and we will see further on in the discussion of 
uti and frui, these are not used in circumlocution, but on the contrary to specify when 
Aquinas wishes to focus on a very particular aspect of the marital act.  The marital debt 
bears a central importance in its exemplification of justice, as was discussed in Chapter 2.  
The “use of marriage” refers to an important distinction between marriage’s “first act” or 
“first perfection” and its operation or use. 
A careful tracking of Saint Thomas’s use of the seven explicit expressions listed 
above does not indicate any deliberate distinctions being made by them.  Rather, the reader 
is given the impression that Aquinas very naturally employed whichever first came to his 
mind while in the course of composing.  There may be a slight predominance of one 
expression over the others in various Distinctiones,307 but it is never so consistent as to 
                                                 
305 In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 2, qc. 2, obj. 2: “matrimonium potest esse inter aliquos qui suum consensum 
sibi mutuo verbis exprimere non possunt: quia vel sunt muti, vel diversarum linguarum.” 
306 Dist. 27, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 2, ad 2. 
 
307 For example, carnalis copula: Dist. 27, Q. 1, A. 3 (entrance into religious life before and after); D. 28, Q. 
1, A. 2 (whether intercourse with a pledge about the future causes marriage); D. 28, Q. 1, A. 4(whether marital 
consent is to intercourse); Q. 34, Q. 1, A. 2 (whether impotence or evil spells impede the contract);D. 39, q.1, 
a. 5 (divorce and separation); D.41, Q.1, A. 1, qc.1 (definition of affinity);carnalis conjunctio:D. 26, Q. 1, A.1 
(whether marriage natural); D. 28, Q. 1, A. 4 (whether marital consent is to intercourse);D. 31, Q. 1, A. 3 
(spiritual union contrasted with fleshly); carnalis commixtio: D. 26, Q. 2, A. 4 (whether integral to marriage), 
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suggest any deliberate meanings.  In a general way, it might be said that Saint Thomas uses 
copula in discussions of the contract, the consent, or legal matters, coniunctio when 
focusing on the natural aspect of the act, or contrasting it with the spiritual union, 
concubitus when referring to the marital act in comparison with fornication, and coitus 
when emphasizing the sheer biology of the act (or quoting popes or fathers).  Nevertheless, 
in making these general classifications, it is important to note that in nearly every article 
that shows a slight reoccurence of one expression, one or two others appear alongside, with 
no distinction. 
Moreover, the words copula and conjunctio are used throughout the text not only to 
designate the fleshly union, but also the larger concept of conjugal union itself.  This brings 
us to the largest and most interesting linguistic issue involved in translating the treatise on 
marriage. 
1. The Linguistic Problem of Two Things that Become One:  Conjunctio vs. Unio 
The majority of problems that face a translator of Saint Thomas’s treatise on marriage 
derive without a doubt from the ontological peculiarities of two things that become one in a 
certain respect, while remaining two.  Aquinas defines marriage as belonging to the genus 
of conjunctio, which an initial translation might render most naturally as “union” or 
“uniting.”  However, two further developments in the same article make such a translation 
impractical as well as inaccurate: 
unio duorum ad aliquod unum non fit nisi secundum conjunctionem. 
Hoc autem fit per matrimonium, ut patet Genes. 2, 24: erunt duo in carne 
una. Ergo matrimonium est in genere conjunctionis... Conjunctio 
adunationem quamdam importat; unde ubicumque est adunatio aliquorum, 
ibi est aliqua conjunctio.308 
The use of unio and adunatio in the very definition of conjunctio begs the question:  
what exactly is the difference between conjunctio and unio, which compells us to translate 
conjunctio as the clumsily literal “conjoining”?  We will briefly examine the other texts in 
the treatise on marriage where Aquinas uses these two words before returning to the pivotal 
texts above. 
Saint Thomas uses the word unio several times in the treatise to describe friendship, 
stating, for example, “friendship is a certain tie or union.”309  He explains the cause of the 
union in friendship further: 
Although an act of a lover can 
pass to someone who does not love, 
Ad primum ergo dicendum, 
quod quamvis actus amantis possit 
                                                                                                                                                     
concubitus: D. 33, Q. 1, A. 3, (whether polygamy, concubinage against natural law),  D. 33, Q. 3, A. 1 
(virginity), D. 41, Q. 1, A.1, qc. 3 (whether affinity caused by illicit intercourse). coitus: D. 41, Q. 1, A. 
3(illegtimate sons arise from illicit intercourse). 
308 In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 1, qc. 1, sed contra and corpus. 
309 In IV Sent., D. 40, Questio unica, Art. 1, corpus: “amicitia ligatio sive unio quaedam est.” 
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nevertheless, the union between 
them cannot be unless there is 
mutual loving.  And thus the 
Philosopher says in Book 8 of the 
Ethics, that friendship, which 
consists in a certain union, requires 
love in return. 
transire in non amantem, tamen 
unio inter eos non potest esse nisi 
sit mutua amatio; et ideo dicit 
philosophus in 8 Ethicor., quod ad 
amicitiam, quae in quadam unione 
consistit, requiritur redamatio.310 
The suggestion is that union is a spiritual uniting, a one-ness that results from mutual 
love or another spiritual bond.  This impression is confirmed by Aquinas’s use of the word 
unio to refer to a spiritual relationship in the discussion of the impediment of “spiritual 
family relationship” (being a godparent or godchild): 
a union of spirit does not pass 
over into the flesh.  But marriage is 
a fleshly conjoining.  Therefore 
since spiritual familial relationship 
is a union of spirit, it cannot cross 
over to impede marriage. 
unio spiritus non transit in 
carnem. Sed matrimonium est 
carnalis conjunctio. Ergo cum 
cognatio spiritualis sit unio 
spiritus, non potest transire ad 
matrimonium impediendum.311 
Here unio refers to a spiritual relationship, which is contrasted with the conjunctio of 
a fleshly union.  However, it would not be true to assume that by using these two words, 
Saint Thomas always means to divide the spiritual from the bodily.  Further on in the same 
question dealing with spiritual kinship, the two words are again used side by side: 
It seems that spiritual family relationship does not pass from a man to his wife.  For 
spiritual and bodily unions are disparate things, and of different genera.  Therefore, a 
spiritual family relationship is not conveyed by means of the fleshly union, which is 
between the man and his wife. 
Videtur quod spiritualis cognatio non transeat a viro in uxorem. Quia 
spiritualis unio et corporalis sunt disparatae, et diversorum generum. Ergo 
mediante carnali conjunctione, quae est inter virum et uxorem, non transitur 
ad spiritualem cognationem.312 
On the one hand, Aquinas is again using conjunctio for a fleshly union.  However, he 
uses unio to refer to unions of both kinds:  spiritual and bodily. 
When the two terms are applied to the union of Christ and the Church, their 
relationship becomes even more difficult to discern, as in the following objection and reply: 
every sacrament of the new 
law effects what it represents.  But 
marriage does not effect the union 
of Christ and the Church which it 
omne sacramentum novae legis 
efficit quod figurat. Sed 
matrimonium non efficit 
conjunctionem Christi et Ecclesiae 
                                                 
310 In IV Sent., Dist. 29, Q. 1, Art. 3, qc. 2, ad 1.  
311 In IV Sent., Dist. 42, Q. 1, Art. 1, obj. 3. 
312 In IV Sent., Dist. 26, Q. 2, Art. 1, ad 4. 
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signifies. quam significat. 
The union of Christ to the 
Church is not a res contenta in this 
sacrament, but a res significata non 
contenta. 
unio Christi ad Ecclesiam non 
est res contenta in isto sacramento, 
sed res significata non contenta.313 
Here the union of Christ and the Church is referred to first as a conjunctio, and second 
as a unio.  We have no reason to believe that Saint Thomas is correcting the objector’s use 
of conjunctio by his choice of unio in the response.  Nor does it seem to have any bearing 
on the physical or spiritual nature of the union, since the union of Christ and the Church is 
mystical and supernatural, but it was accomplished through the Incarnation and the Passion.  
Furthermore, none of these themes seem to have any immediate bearing on the objection 
and its reply.  The words are, to all appearances, simple synonyms.  The impression is the 
same in another discussion of the union of Christ and the Church: 
marriage signifies the 
conjoining of Christ and the 
Church.  But no baseness exists 
there.  Therefore, neither can 
marriage be contracted for a base 
reason. 
matrimonium significat 
conjunctionem Christi et 
Ecclesiae. Sed ibi non cadit aliqua 
turpitudo. Ergo nec matrimonium 
potest contrahi propter aliquam 
turpem causam. 
The union itself is a sign of the 
conjoining of Christ and his 
Church, the action of the ones 
uniting is not; therefore the 
argument does not follow. 
Ad quintum dicendum, quod 
ipsa unio est signum conjunctionis 
Christi et Ecclesiae, et non operatio 
unitorum: ideo ratio non 
sequitur.314 
Here the marriage of Christ and the Church is referred to as a conjunctio while the 
human marriage that represents it is called a unio.  Again, we are reinforced in the belief 
that the two words are here being used by Saint Thomas as interchangeable.  In fact, the 
only place in the treatise on marriage where Aquinas uses the two words with careful 
distinction is in the article we cited first, which defines marriage as belonging to the genus 
of conjunctio. 
the union of two into one does 
not happen except by a con-joining.  
But this happens through marriage, 
as is evident from Genesis 2:24:  
they were two in one flesh.  
Therefore, marriage is a kind of 
unio duorum ad aliquod unum 
non fit nisi secundum 
conjunctionem. Hoc autem fit per 
matrimonium, ut patet Genes. 2, 
24: erunt duo in carne una. Ergo 
matrimonium est in genere 
                                                 
313 In IV Sent., Dist. 26, Q. 2, Art. 1, objection 4 and ad 4. 
314 In IV Sent., Dist. 30, Q. 1, Art. 3, objection 5 and ad 5. 
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con-joining. conjunctionis.315 
In this article, and only here where Saint Thomas is about the task of giving a logical 
definition, we see the precise relationship of a unio to a conjunctio.  Unio is the larger 
category, and it is the result of the conjunctio.  The explanation is further developed in the 
corpus of the same article: 
con-joining conveys a certain 
uniting together; wherefore 
whereever there is a uniting of  
certain things together, there is 
some kind of con-joining. 
.. Conjunctio adunationem 
quamdam importat; unde 
ubicumque est adunatio 
aliquorum, ibi est aliqua 
conjunctio. 316 
Conjunctio is an action by which a union of two things occurs.  Saint Thomas 
explicitly addresses this aspect of conjunctio in his discussion of marriage made for base 
reasons. 
"Conjoining" can be taken for 
the relation itself which is marriage 
and as such it is always from God, 
and it is good no matter what the 
reason for which it was made:  or it 
can be taken for the act of those 
who are joined, and in this way it is 
sometimes evil, and is not from 
God, simply speaking. 
conjunctio potest accipi pro 
ipsa relatione quae est 
matrimonium; et talis semper est a 
Deo, et bona est a quacumque fiat 
causa: vel pro actu eorum qui 
conjunguntur; et sic est quandoque 
mala, et non est a Deo, simpliciter 
loquendo.317 
Here conjunctio can refer to the action of joining together or the union that this 
joining accomplishes.  This equivocation makes sense of some of the foregoing word 
choices that we have seen.  Most of these refer to the relation of two people united, but not 
every unio is a conjunctio.  For example, when considering consanguinity, Saint Thomas 
comments that one relationship can impede another: 
those things that are more 
closely related and similar have a 
better and stronger union.  But 
marriage is a certain kind of union.  
Therefore, since consanguinity is a 
certain kind of closeness, it does 
not impede marriage, but rather 
helps it. 
Praeterea, eorum quae sunt 
magis propinqua et similia, melior 
et firmior est conjunctio. Sed 
matrimonium quaedam conjunctio 
est. Ergo cum consanguinitas sit 
propinquitas quaedam, 
matrimonium non impedit, sed 
magis juvat. 
It is not unfitting for one of 
two unions to be impeded by the 
Ad quintum dicendum, quod 
non est inconveniens duarum 
                                                 
315 In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 1, qc. 1, sed contra. 
316 In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 1, qc. 1, corpus. 
317 In IV Sent., D. 30, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 2 and ad 2. 
113 
 
other; for just as where there is 
identity there is not 'likeness,' so 
also the bond of consanguinity can 
impede the union of marriage. 
unionum unam ab altera impediri; 
sicut ubi est identitas, non est 
similitudo; et similiter 
consanguinitatis vinculum potest 
impedire matrimonii 
conjunctionem.318 
While marriage is alternately called a unio and a conjunctio, not all unions are con-
joinings.  As this text illustrates, it would be strange to call blood kinship a “conjoining.”  It 
is a union, because it is a way that two persons are somehow one; however, two separate 
entities are not brought together in consanguinity (except in thought). Family relationship is 
a union that is inborn in both parties; it is a sharing or one-ness that is not the result of 
action. 
This fact illuminates another important aspect of conjunctio.  As Aquinas explains in 
the body of the article on marriage as a conjoining, separate persons cannot become one 
except by being ordered together toward one end: 
con-joining conveys a certain 
uniting together; wherefore 
whereever there is a uniting of  
certain things together, there is 
some kind of con-joining.  But 
things that are ordered to some one 
thing, are said to be united together 
in their ordering to it; as when 
many men are united for one 
military expedition or for business 
affairs to be carried out, by that fact 
they are called fellow soldiers or 
business partners; and thus, since 
by marriage two people are ordered 
to one single project for the 
generation and education of 
children, and therefore to one 
single domestic life, it is clear that 
in marriage there is a conjoining, 
because of which "husband" and 
"wife" are said; and such a 
conjoining, by the fact that it is 
ordained to some one thing, is 
marriage. However, the conjoining 
of bodies or of souls follows upon 
marriage. 
conjunctio adunationem 
quamdam importat; unde 
ubicumque est adunatio 
aliquorum, ibi est aliqua 
conjunctio. Ea autem quae 
ordinantur ad aliquod unum, 
dicuntur in ordine ad aliud 
adunari; sicut multi homines 
adunantur ad unam militiam vel 
negotiationem exequendam, ex qua 
dicuntur commilitones ad invicem, 
vel socii negotiationis; et ideo, cum 
per matrimonium ordinentur aliqui 
ad unam generationem et 
educationem prolis, et iterum ad 
unam vitam domesticam; constat 
quod in matrimonio est aliqua 
conjunctio, secundum quam dicitur 
maritus et uxor; et talis conjunctio 
ex hoc quod ordinatur ad aliquod 
unum, est matrimonium; 
conjunctio autem corporum vel 
animorum ad matrimonium 
consequitur.319 
                                                 
318 In IV Sent., D. 40, Q. unica, Art. 3, arg5-ad 5 
 
319 In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 1, qc. 1, corpus 
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Now we see why Saint Thomas chose the word conjunctio rather than unio where it is 
a matter of definition.  The kind of union that marriage is, more properly should be called a 
con-joining, since the two persons do not cease to be two substances.  Their union consists 
in the fact that they become a united principle of action for a shared end.  While it is not 
incorrect to speak of the union of souls and bodies in marriage, and Scripture infallibly 
states that the two become one flesh, nevertheless, in this giving of definitions Aquinas calls 
our attention to the way these statements must be understood.  Conjunctio recognizes the 
metaphysical reality that the spouses remain two persons with separate souls and bodies. 
Such a nuance to the word conjunctio is exactly what we should expect, given that it is 
derived from jugum –yoke.  The conjugal relationship is intended to remind us of a team of 
horses or oxen yoked together:  the two are one when considered as a united principle of 
action.  The choice of unio, on the other hand, is better suited to cases of spiritual union and 
organic oneness, like consanguinity. 
Nevertheless, we should remember that a conjunctio is a certain kind of unio: the kind 
of unio that happens by a uniting or adunatio, or the kind of unio that happens through a 
shared goal.  Outside of the process of definition, Saint Thomas uses the two words almost 
interchangeably, according to the normal way that people speak.  Therefore, outside of 
Distinction 27, Question 1, Article 1, we have translated these words as “union” or 
“conjoining” according to whichever seemed most natural. 
Conjunctio and unio highlight the ongoing tension that animates the language of 
marriage.  A marriage is one, but it is composed of two distinct parties.  Accordingly, Saint 
Thomas speaks of the inseparabilitas of the union.  In English, however, separability is a 
quality that can only be possessed by two things.  Thus, the spouses can be separated, but 
the marriage cannot.  Therefore, where inseparabilitas is predicated of a marriage, I have 
translated it as indissolubility; where Aquinas speaks of a marriage being “separated” 
(separari), I have used the word “dissolved,” or the classic Scriptural translation “put 
asunder,” which conveys the sense of some one thing being broken into two.  In English, 
spouses can be separated, but a marriage, as a single entity, cannot. 
A corollary to this issue relates to what canon law defines as one of the essential 
properties of marriage:  unity.320  However, the “unity” that Saint Thomas and Canon Law 
refer to is not the-fact-of-being-united or the conjunctio between the spouses.  Rather, as an 
essential property of marriage, this unity means “oneness”:  the fact of having only one 
spouse.  Since this misunderstanding occurs even among highly educated readers of Canon 
Law, we have attempted to deflect this misunderstanding by translating unitas as 
“monogamy” in the areas of the treatise on marriage where it comes under discussion.  It is 
true that “monogamy” literally means “one wife.” Yet since it conveys the principle of unity 
of spouse to modern readers, and since, in the articles where it is discussed the notion of 
monoandry is summarily dispatched, we think it best conveys the meaning of unitas: 
However the law of 
monogamy is not humanly 
Lex autem de unitate uxoris 
non est humanitus, sed divinitus 
                                                 
320 Code of Canon Law, 1056:  “The essential properties of marriage are unity and indissolubility, which in 
Christian marriage obtain a special firmness by reason of the sacrament. 
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ordained, but divinely instituted, 
neither by word or writing handed 
down, but impressed on the heart, 
like those things which belong in 
any way at all to the law of nature. 
instituta, nec unquam verbo aut 
litteris tradita, sed cordi impressa, 
sicut et alia quae ad legem naturae 
qualitercumque pertinent.321 
2. Uti  and Frui 
One of the technical expressions that Saint Thomas uses for marital intimacy is usus 
matrimonii, the “use” of marriage: 
thus they belong to the use of 
marriage, by which both children 
are produced and the conjugal pact 
is preserved. 
sic pertinent ad usum 
matrimonii, per quem et proles 
producitur, et pactio conjugalis 
servatur.322 
By speaking of “using one’s wife,” the last thing Aquinas intends to convey is an 
action objectifying or “taking advantage of” the spouse.  Rather this usus refers to an 
important philosophical distinction concerning marriage’s first and second perfection or 
“act.”  The two levels of any substance’s being are, first, existence, and second, the ability 
to act based on that existence.  Accordingly, the marital bond is its first perfection, its 
essence; marital intimacy is the operation that follows from its first being: 
integrity is twofold.  One 
which is found according to the 
first perfection, which consists in 
the very being of a thing; another 
which is attendant upon the second 
perfection, which consists in 
operation.  Since therefore carnal 
commingling is a certain activity or 
use of marriage, through which a 
faculty is given for this use, carnal 
commingling will be of the second 
integrity of marriage, and not of the 
first. 
duplex est integritas. Una quae 
attenditur secundum perfectionem 
primam, quae consistit in ipso esse 
rei; alia quae attenditur secundum 
perfectionem secundam, quae 
consistit in operatione. Quia ergo 
carnalis commixtio est quaedam 
operatio, sive usus matrimonii, per 
quod facultas ad hoc datur; ideo erit 
carnalis commixtio de secunda 
integritate matrimonii, et non de 
prima.323 
... But the third good 
[sacrament] does not pertain to the 
use of marriage, but to its very 
essence, as was said; whence it 
Sed tertium bonum non 
pertinet ad usum matrimonii, sed 
ad essentiam ipsius, ut dictum est, 
unde facit ipsum matrimonium 
                                                 
321 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q. 1, art. 2, corpus. 
322 In IV Sent., D. 31, Q. 1, art. 3,  corpus. 
323 In IV Sent., D. 26, Q. .2, art. .4.corpus 
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makes marriage itself dignified, but 
not its act 
honestum, non autem actum ejus.324 
The distinction as applied to marriage is important, for it allows Aquinas to explain 
the validity of a Josephite marriage,325 the purity of intention of St. John’s marriage 
vows,326 and the fact that consent to marriage is consent to marital relations only 
implicitly.327  The “use” of marriage defines the rights of the couple with respect to each 
other: in marriage they are not consenting to have intercourse with each other, but rather 
each consents to give the other power over himself as regards intimacy: 
A woman has power over the 
body of her husband not simply 
speaking concerning all things, but 
only concerning the use of 
matrimony. 
mulier habet potestatem in 
corpore viri non simpliciter 
quantum ad omnia, sed solum 
quantum ad matrimonii usum..328 
This distinction concerning the ‘power of the use’ of matrimony also sets marriage 
apart as a perpetual contract in which a person gives “not just the fruit but the tree,” as Saint 
Thomas explains in discussing the merit of a vow: 
he that vows something and does it, subjects himself to God more than 
he that only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but 
also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he 
gives more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, 
as Anselm  observes (De Simil. viii).329 
Consent to intimacy itself can happen outside of marriage and can be temporary.  A 
commitment to give the power to have intercourse is necessarily a long-term arrangement: 
for the power of carnal union, 
to which one consents, is the cause 
of carnal union, as the power of 
using what is one's own is the 
cause of its use. 
quia potestas carnalis copulae, 
in quam consentitur, est causa 
carnalis copulae, sicut potestas 
utendi re sua est causa usus.330 
Yet for obvious reasons, usus and uti cannot be rendered as “to use one’s wife.”  As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the expression “to use one’s wife” was employed in recent years by 
John Paul II to convey most effectively the sin of engaging in sexual intercourse exclusively 
                                                 
324 In IV Sent., D. 31, Q. 2, art. 2, corpus. 
325In IV Sent., D. 30, Q. 2, art. 2. Whether the marriage of the Blessed Virgin was valid.  
326 According to tradition, John the Evangelist was the groom at the wedding at Cana, and left to follow Jesus 
after contracting marriage but before its consummation.  St. Thomas must answer an objection that argues that 
consenting to marriage involves consenting to marital intercourse, such that a person could no longer be a 
virgin “in mind as well as body.”  See In IV Sent., D. 28, Q. 1, art. 4, sed contra. 
327 In IV Sent., D. 28, Q. 1, art. 4. 
328 In IV Sent., D. 33, Q.1, Art. 3, qc. 1. 
329 St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 3 IIa IIaeQQ. 1-148. (Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1981), Q. 88, 
Art. 6.  See also In IV Sent., D. 38, Q. 1, Art. 2, qc. 3 corpus.   
330In IV Sent., D. 28, Q.1, art. 4, corpus  
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for one’s own pleasure.  There the word “use” conveys the typical attitude toward a thing or 
an object, as contrasted with the correct disposition one should have toward a person.  For 
this reason, where Aquinas employs uti I have sometimes translated it as “make use of 
one’s conjugal rights,” or “to avail oneself of one’s wife.” 
among the Greeks and other 
Eastern churches, holy orders 
impedes marriage from being 
contracted, but not the use of a 
marriage already contracted; for 
they can avail themselves of a 
marriage contracted beforehand, 
although they cannot contract 
marriage again.  But in the Western 
church, it impedes marriage and the 
use of marriage 
ordo impedit matrimonium 
contrahendum, non tamen 
matrimonii prius contracti 
usum;possunt enim matrimonio 
prius contracto uti, quamvis non 
possint matrimonium de novo 
contrahere. Sed apud Occidentalem 
Ecclesiam impedit matrimonium, et 
matrimonii usum. 331 
However, “make use of one’s rights” would likely contribute to the perception of 
Saint Thomas’s marriage theology that we are trying to dispel: that of a legal contract 
bordering on human trafficking.  Nor does “availing oneself of one’s wife” offer any real 
solution; however much it suggests “seeking help” in its nuances, by definition it too 
reduces to use. 
For this reason, when the context allows it, I have sometimes chosen to translate uti 
according to its secondary definition as “to enjoy”—to enjoy one’s wife, to enjoy one’s 
rights, to enjoy one’s marriage: 
then neither could know if the 
other is truly his spouse; and thus 
he will be a fornicator whenever he 
enjoys the rights of marriage. 
tunc neuter poterit scire de 
altero an sit ei verus conjux; et ita 
erit fornicator quandocumque 
matrimonio utetur.332 
the prophecy is referred to the 
mystery of Christ and the Church, 
which [Adam] forsees, not to the 
enjoyment of the woman which 
could be perceived by natural 
reason with sense alone. 
prophetia referatur ad 
mysterium Christi et Ecclesiae, 
quod praevidit; non ad usum 
mulieris quae solo sensu percipi 
poterat naturali ratione.333 
However, any student of theology would recognize that a translation of uti as “enjoy” 
risks venturing dangerously close to another theological precipice. 
In Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana, he draws a distinction between using (uti) 
creatures and enjoying (frui) them: 
                                                 
331 In IV Sent., D. 37, Q. 1, Art. 1, corpus. 
332 In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 2, qc. 4, objection 4. 
333 In IV Sent., D. 26, Expositio. 
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To enjoy something is to cling to it with love for its own sake.  To use 
something, however, is to employ it in obtaining that which you love, 
provided it is worthy of love.334 
 
The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit.335 
Augustine’s teaching, which must certainly be in any reader’s mind when he comes 
across the words uti and frui, is that all creation was given to us for our use; only God is to 
be enjoyed.  Moreover, creatures are meant to be used to attain the enjoyment of God: 
Some things are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and there are others which are to be 
enjoyed and used.  Those things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed.  Those things 
which are to be used help, and as it were, sustain us as we move toward blessedness in order 
that we may gain and cling to those things which make us blessed.  If we who enjoy and use 
things, being placed in the midst of things of both kinds, wish to enjoy those things which 
should be used, our course will be impeded and sometimes deflected, so that we are 
retarded in obtaining those things which are to be enjoyed, or even prevented altogether, 
shackled by an inferior love.336 
An initial reading of St. Augustine does suggest that he would recommend using the 
spouse as a means to attain heaven.  This is certainly how many of the authors mentioned in 
Chapter 2 have understood Aquinas’s teaching that marriage furnishes a remedium 
concupiscentiae: the spouse represents a permissible means of gratifying the sexual appetite 
so as not to be guilty of mortal sin.  We have discussed in Chapter 2 the ways that this 
reading underestimates Saint Thomas.  In fact, he anticipates our uti and frui confusion in 
the very article where he addresses the morality of approaching one’s spouse for the sake of 
pleasure alone.  There, the objector invokes Augustine’s argument: 
whoever does not refer the use 
of creation to God, enjoys the 
creature, which is a mortal sin.  But 
whoever avails himself of his wife 
because of delectation alone, does 
not refer this use to God. 
quicumque usum creaturae non 
refert in Deum, creatura fruitur; 
quod est peccatum mortale. Sed 
quicumque uxore propter solam 
delectationem utitur, hunc usum 
non refert in Deum. Ergo mortaliter 
peccat.337 
This objection and its reply poses a delicate task to the translator, since it seems to us 
that Saint Thomas would agree with John Paul II that to use one’s spouse (according to the 
modern meaning of use) for pleasure would be a sin—it would be, as Aquinas says 
elsewhere in the article, to see “nothing else in her than what [one] might look for in a 
                                                 
334 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, D.W. Robertson, trans., (New York: Macmillan, 1987), Bk. I:iv, 
page 9. 
335 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, D.W. Robertson, trans., (New York: Macmillan, 1987), Bk. I:v, 
page 10. 
336 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, D.W. Robertson, trans., (New York: Macmillan, 1987), Bk. I:iii, 
page 9. 
337 In IV Sent., D. 31, Q. 2, art. 3, obj. 3. 
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prostitute.”338  However, to use one’s wife according to the proper use of marriage (a use 
that “is ordered by what is needed for the good of offspring”339) is to enjoy a good that God 
has created and a benefit that God has granted to him.  Moreover, the bond of affection and 
charity between the spouses dictates that this “use” is not the kind of “use” that turns a 
person into a tool or a means.  And indeed, in his response to the objection sparked by 
Augustine’s teaching, Saint Thomas defends the spouses’ ability to take advantage of this 
good, yet without suggesting that they are taking advantage of each other. 
Although he does not refer this 
delectation to God in act, 
nevertheless, he does not place in it 
the final end of his will; otherwise 
he would seek it indifferently 
wherever he could find it.  
Therefore he does not necessarily 
rest in the enjoyment of a 
creature, but he enjoys a creature 
for itself.  But this is for God's sake 
habitually, although not actually. 
quamvis delectationem non 
referat actu in Deum, tamen non 
ponit in ea ultimum voluntatis 
finem; alias eam ubicumque 
indifferenter quaereret; et ideo non 
oportet quod creatura fruatur, sed 
utitur creatura propter se; se autem 
habitualiter propter Deum, quamvis 
non actu.340 
The sense of utitur propter se seems best conveyed by “enjoy for itself,” since the 
very notion of “using” to our minds seems to go against “propter se.” In turn, the sinful 
character of creatura  fruatur fails to come across in “enjoy a creature.”  The very word frui 
is derived from fruit, which Aquinas tells us, is something last and to be enjoyed;341 he 
clearly has nothing against the enjoyment of creation.  Therefore we have translated fruatur 
as “resting in the enjoyment” of something.  This sets it apart as the kind of enjoyment that 
should be found in God alone. 
With this translation, Aquinas is able to make his meaning clear:  a married person is 
able to enjoy marital intimacy without sinning only when he makes use of marriage 
appropriately, without a will that is disordered in relation to God or to the other person.  
This meaning to his language is confirmed in a separate discussion where he quotes Saint 
Paul and comments on his turn of phrase: 
The Apostle did not prohibit 
the marital act in those words, as 
neither the possession of things, 
when he said, those who make use 
of this world, as though not using 
it. But in both he prohibits resting 
in their enjoyment:  which is clear 
from the way of speaking itself:  
apostolus in verbis illis non 
prohibuit matrimonii actum, sicut 
nec rerum possessionem, cum dixit: 
qui utuntur hoc mundo, sint quasi 
non utentes. Sed in utroque 
fruitionem prohibuit; quod patet ex 
ipso modo loquendi: non enim 
dixit: sint non utentes, vel non 
                                                 
338 In IV Sent., D. 31, Q. 2, A. 3, ad  1. 
339 In IV Sent., D. 32, Q. 1, art. 2, qc. 2, corpus. “ordinatus est omnis matrimonii usus quo bonum prolis 
impenditur.”  
 
340 In IV Sent., D. 31, Q. 2, A. 3, ad 3. 
341 See Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q.11, art. 1. 
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for he did not say, "let them not 
use" or "let them not have," but "as 
if not using, or not having." 
habentes: sed quasi non utentes, vel 
non habentes.342 
B. Situating Saint Thomas’s Treatise on Marriage Historically 
One of the largest obstacles to a greater appreciation for Saint Thomas’s contribution 
to marriage theology is certainly the very different historical context he taught in.  Of all the 
subjects Aquinas wrote about, marriage is, of course, one of the most subject to the dictates 
of time, place, and culture.  Aquinas acknowledges this fact himself in several places: 
human nature is not unmoving 
like the divine nature; and thus 
those things that are of divine law 
are diversified according to diverse 
states and conditions of man. 
natura humana non est 
immobilis sicut divina; et ideo 
diversificantur ea quae sunt de jure 
naturali, secundum diversos status 
et conditiones hominum.343 
Those things that are of natural 
law in general need an institution as 
to their determination, which is 
applicable in different ways to men 
in different conditions; just as it is 
of natural law that wrongdoing is 
punished, but how a certain 
punishment is appointed to a 
certain crime is done by the 
determination of positive law. 
illa quae in communi sunt de 
jure naturali, indigent institutione 
quantum ad eorum 
determinationem, quae diversimode 
competit secundum diversos status; 
sicut de jure naturali est quod 
maleficia puniantur; sed quod talis 
poena tali culpae apponatur, per 
determinationem juris positivi 
fit.344 
It goes without saying that much of the law and customs surrounding marriage were 
very different in Saint Thomas’s day.  Undoubtedly, Aquinas faced less of a need to defend 
the procreative end of marriage by comparison with the “unitive end.”345  Considerations of 
inheritance and succession were obvious and compelling to his contemporaries.  In an age 
when a couple’s failure to have children and raise them to adulthood could plunge a region 
into warfare and result in the deaths of thousands, marriage’s relation to its own primary 
end and to the common good appeared in concrete and urgent ways. 
Yet one cannot help but see in Saint Thomas’s approach to marriage that his attention 
is firmly on the metaphysical consequences of this fragile human institution.  He had to 
address the contemporaneous human laws governing marriage (and, in some cases, compare 
                                                 
342 In IV Sent., D. 26, Q. 1, Art. 3, ad 2. 
343 In IV Sent., D. 26, Q. 1, Art. 2, ad 3. 
344 In IV Sent., D. 26, Q. 2, Art. 2, ad 1. 
345 We have already discussed in chapter 1 the fact that Aquinas did not consider the unitive aspect of 
marriage as an end, but as a formal cause.   
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them to older ones) because the laws of the here and now are how God wills for us to 
encounter marriage.  That an institution which began at the creation of the human race, and 
will endure until the Wedding Feast of the Lamb, should be subject to fickle local law is in 
a certain way a participation in the particularity and humility of the Incarnation. 
For this reason, we will discuss briefly the elements of the marriage contract and 
ceremony that Aquinas was faced with.  Some themes seem so completely conditioned by 
historical milieu as to be entirely irrelevant to the modern student of the sacraments.  Yet 
even here we will see that Saint Thomas’s attention never leaves the soteriological import 
of these details.  For all the legal, medical, and cultural elements that must factor into his 
account of marriage, Aquinas’s vision remains ever theological.  The most important and 
interesting aspect of marriage for him was its unchanging, eternal signification. As Peter 
Kwasniewski describes, 
[Thomas’s] statement that “the conjoining of Christ to the Church, that 
marriage signifies, is perfected by charity,” [D.26.2.3] amounts to saying 
that this state of life . . . both objectively assimilates the spouses to that 
supreme mystery of redemptive love and subjectively fills them with it.  
This, it would seem is implied in the statement that grace is the reality 
contained by the sacrament (its res contenta).   Unfortunately for us, he did 
not explicate this truth as much as he might have done; still greater mysteries 
commanded his attention, the sovereign mystery of the Eucharist most of all. 
And with good reason:  the Eucharist, says Thomas again and again, really 
contains the One who suffered for us, and thus brings the communicant to 
the very source and goal of charity.  What Christian marriage symbolizes is 
truly present in the Eucharist; it is this sacrament that brings about and ever 
deepens the “spiritual marriage”... 
Indeed, it is this “marriage” between God and man that captivates 
St.Thomas even more than the human marriage that signifies it.346 
Saint Thomas had to harmonize a theology of unchanging truths with an attention to 
the practical details of the sacrament that were (and are) still developing. 
One of the most well-known examples of this kind of development can be seen in 
Aquinas’s treatment of clandestine marriage.  In his discussion of “consent exchanged in 
secret” in Distinction 28, Question 1, article 3, Saint Thomas repeatedly underscores that, 
while clandestine marriages are sinful, and forbidden by the Church, they are in fact valid, 
since all the essential components of the sacrament are present.  The Tridentine document, 
Tametsi, changed this teaching, by making the parish priest, church, and two witnesses 
essential to the form of the sacrament.347  Yet as the very title of the document expresses, 
this change in the form of the sacrament occurred notwithstanding the truth of Aquinas’s 
teaching.  Tametsi emphasizes that although the essence of the sacrament is the exchange of 
                                                 
346 Peter Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas on the Grandeur and Limitations of Marriage,” Nova et Vetera, English 
edition, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2012), p. 423-424 and 427. 
347 John P. Beal, “Introduction to Canons 1055-1165,” New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2000) p. 1326.  
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consent (a fact that is reinforced by canon 1116 of the current code348), nevertheless, the 
damage that the practice of clandestine marriages had caused to the Church and society349 
had impelled the Church to increase the requirements for the form.  However, the change 
highlights an underlying theme of Saint Thomas’s theology of marriage.  It is because of 
marriage’s manifold effects on the secular community that marriage is subject to human 
laws.350  The impact that clandestine marriages could have on nations and on the Church 
illustrates further the very concrete relation that marriage has to the common good. 
1.  The Marriage Rite and Contract 
The jurisprudence that Saint Thomas inherited was a combination of elements of 
Roman legal practice and Medieval Gallic and Germanic customs.  The legacy of Roman 
law was that “consent was both necessary and sufficient to bring about a marriage.”351 
Moreover, consent had to be given continuously by the spouses for the marriage to remain 
valid:  “if they withdrew their intention to be married then the marriage ended.”352 The 
preaching and rulings of bishops, popes, and Church fathers regarding the indissolubility of 
marriage had gradually changed the understanding of consent in the marriage contract;353 
Aquinas gives philosophical reinforcement to church teaching by distinguishing that 
consent is the efficient cause of marriage, not the formal cause.354 
On the other hand, the marriage customs of Germanic and Gallic tribes had focused 
on consummation and pregnancy as foundations of a marriage’s validity; by the sixth 
century, marriage rituals in northern Europe involved a priest’s blessing of a couple in their 
nuptial bed, before all their kinsfolk.355  Jurists and theologians had struggled for centuries 
to define the exact importance of consummation within marriage.356  Aquinas deploys not 
only philosophical distinctions between marriage’s “first act” (or “first perfection”) and 
“second act” or “use,” he offers a theological analogy for the relationship of consummation 
to consent: 
                                                 
348 Canon 1116 provides for exceptions to canonical form in the event that priests or deacons are lacking, there 
is danger of death, or the situation threatens to continue for over a month.  This provision is made so that 
canonical form does not “unduly abridge the exercise of the natural right to marry when authorized witnesses 
are lacking or rarely available.”  Beal, New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, p. 1334. 
349 One of the more illustrative examples is the case of Edward IV Plantagenet of England, whose clandestine 
marriage threatened to plunge England into renewed bloodshed during the War of the Roses. 
350 Cf. In IV Sent., D. 26, Q. 2, art. 2, corpus. 
351 Brendan Killeen, What Brings A Marriage into Existence?A Historical Re-examination of the Canon Law 
of the Latin Church, p. 5. 
352Killeen, p. 8. 
353 John P. Beal, “Introduction to Canons 1055-1165,” New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2000) p. 1235. 
354 See In IV Sent., D. 27, Q. 1, Art. 2, qc. 2. 
355 James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, (Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), pp. 87-88.  Fr. Stan Parmisano tells us that a ritual of blessing and incensing the nuptial chamber 
was still included in Roman marriage liturgy through the fifteenth century, citing the rituals of York, Hereford, 
Sarum (Salisbury), and Paris (“Spousal Love in the Medieval Rite of Marriage,” Nova et Vetera, English 
Edition, Vol. 3, Num. 4 (2005), pp. 790-791).  
356 For a description of the customs and the theological response to them, see E. Schillebeeckx, Marriage:  
Human Reality and Saving Mystery, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), pp. 280-296. 
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Before carnal intimacy 
marriage signifies the conjoining of 
Christ to the soul by grace; which 
indeed is dissolved by a contrary 
spiritual disposition, namely, sin.  
But by carnal intimacy is signified 
his conjoining with the Church by 
the assumption of human nature 
into the unity of his person, which 
is indivisible in every way. 
matrimonium ante carnalem 
copulam significat illam 
conjunctionem quae est Christi ad 
animam per gratiam; quae quidem 
solvitur per dispositionem 
spiritualem contrariam, scilicet 
peccatum; sed per carnalem 
copulam significat conjunctionem 
ad Ecclesiam quantum ad 
assumptionem humanae naturae in 
unitatem personae, quae omnino est 
indivisibilis.357 
Saint Thomas had to balance the obvious importance of consummation at the natural 
and legal levels against the ideal of a spiritual union based on mutual consent.  Also at 
stake, was the validity of Joseph and Mary’s marriage, which was never consummated; 
moreover, if the object of marital consent were conjugal intercourse, the marriage of the 
Blessed Virgin would have suffered from vitiated consent.  Accordingly, Aquinas had to 
explain the larger indissolubility of marriage while defending the marital chastity of the 
Blessed Virgin (undoubtedly, a cause near and dear to his heart). 
The marital laws and customs that had grown out of the blending of Roman and 
Germanic practices also contribute to complications in language.  Roman marriage 
ceremonies were enacted by a paterfamilias, and sometimes involved a betrothal, a dowry, 
and were completed by a domumductio;358 Germanic ceremonies for Kaufehe revolved 
around a handing over or Anvertrauung of the bride by the head of her family, after a 
Muntvertrag between the two families involved.359  While the different cultures placed the 
emphasis on various elements of the process, the steps show marked similarities.  By St. 
Thomas’s time, the language and the law of marriage had come to shows traces of all these 
elements; nevertheless, St. Thomas had to redefine the terminology in some ways in order 
to clarify the theological emphasis. 
2.  Desponsatio vs. Sponsalia 
Under Roman law, a desponsatio was a betrothal agreement between a suitor and the 
paterfamilias of his prospective bride.  Historians tell us that the Germanic equivalent was 
more or less the Muntvertrag, as the first step in the marriage process.360 
For these people, marriage did not come about when the parties exchanged consent, 
but as the end of a process involving several steps, each of which was necessary to 
constitute a marriage:  a man’s petition to a woman’s father for her hand (petitio), betrothal 
                                                 
357In IV Sent., D. 27. Q. 1, Art. 3, qc. 2, ad 2. 
358 Brundage, p. 34; Killeen, p. 4. 
359 Brundage, p. 128; Killeen, pp. 34-36. 
360 Brundage, p. 128. 
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by public agreement of the parties’ families (desponsatio), provision of a dowry to the 
woman’s family (dotatio), the handing over of the woman to the man (traditio), and the 
physical consummation of the union by sexual intercourse (consummatio).  Until all of 
these steps had been completed, the marriage was incomplete.361 
However, when Aquinas uses the word desponsatio, it is clear that it does not 
correspond to either “betrothal” or “engagement.”  Sponsalia is the word that St. Thomas 
defines as a pledge of future marriage: 
the sacramental causes bring 
about by signifying, wherefore they 
effect what they signify:  and since 
when someone expresses his 
consent in terms of the future, it 
does not signify that he contracts 
marriage, but that he promises he 
will do it; and thus such an 
expression of consent does not 
effect the marriage, but the 
disposition for it, which is called 
"betrothal." 
causae sacramentales 
significando efficiunt, unde 
efficiunt quod significant: et quia 
cum aliquis consensum suum per 
verba de futuro exprimit, non 
significat se facere matrimonium, 
sed promittit se facturum; ideo talis 
expressio consensus non facit 
matrimonium, sed dispositionem 
ejus, quae sponsalia nominantur.362 
Here the promise of marriage in the future is expressly ruled out as a promise 
effecting marriage itself.  Although in ancient practice a marriage could be contracted 
through various steps, the sacramental character of this contract means that the only 
effective consent is the present-tense consent. 
On the other hand, desponsatio is not strictly equivalent to contrahere/contractus, 
nubere/nuptias, consentire/consensus.  Where possible, we have chosen to translate it as 
“promising in marriage” or “exchange of promises.” St. Thomas calls desponsatio the cause 
of marriage, by whose solemnity a marriage is completed: 
it is to be said that in marriage 
there are three things to consider.  
First, its essence, which is a 
conjoining; and according to this it 
is called "conjugal."  Secondly, its 
cause, which is promising in 
marriage; and according to this it is 
called "nuptials" from nubere, to 
veil, for in the very solemnity of 
promising in marriage, by which 
marriage is brought about, the 
heads of the ones being married are 
veiled. 
in matrimonio est tria 
considerare. Primo essentiam 
ipsius, quae est conjunctio; et 
secundum hoc nominatur 
conjugium. Secundo causam ejus, 
quae est desponsatio; et secundum 
hoc vocantur nuptiae a nubere, quia 
in ipsa solemnitate desponsationis 
qua matrimonium perficitur, capita 
nubentium velantur.363 
                                                 
361 Beal, p. 1236. 
362 In IV Sent., D. 27, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 3, corpus. 
363 In IV Sent., D 27, Q 1, A 1, qc 2, corpus. 
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This is clearly not a betrothal, for betrothals do not cause marriage.  In his discussions 
of Old Testament types, however, it would create confusion to speak of God’s ‘promising to 
marry’ the Israelite people.364  Here we have used the traditional word, “espouse,” which in 
English carries a certain ambiguity, but nevertheless conveys a stronger bond than 
“betrothal”: 
And furthermore, this is 
expressly against what we have in 
Jeremiah 3, Ezekiel 16, Hosea 2, 2 
where the mention of the espousal 
of the synagogue is expressly 
made; wherefore, she was not as a 
concubine, but as a wife. 
Et praeterea hoc est expresse 
contra id quod habetur Hierem. 3, 
Ezech. 16, Oseae 2, 2, ubi expresse 
fit mentio de desponsatione 
synagogae; unde non fuit sicut 
concubina, sed sicut uxor. 
If a desponsatio were a betrothal, it would not have been sufficient to transform 
Hosea’s harlot into a wife, according to canon law.  The root of desponsatio is sponsum, 
pledge; while this commitment of pledges gave a certain legal firmness to the agreement in 
ancient cultures, those contracts were completed in the physical transfer of the bride to the 
groom’s home (traditio, domumductio or Trauung). Aquinas must delineate that a pledging 
of oneself in the present tense constitutes a marriage, independent of any subsequent 
cohabitation.  In addition, the fact that a sacrament depends on the contract means that 
greater specificity is required to identify the moment of grace. 
3.  A toro divortium vs. repudium 
St. Thomas refers to the Mosaic divorce laws with the expressions 
repudiare/repudium and libello repudii (Distinction 33, Question 2).  On the other hand, in 
the only Question considered in Distinction 35, he discusses the possibility of divortium on 
account of fornication in one of the spouses.  This is a possibility opened up by the words of 
Christ in Matthew 5:32.  However, Saint Thomas makes it clear that by divortium and the 
verb dimittere, he does not intend “divorce” as we understand it.  Initially, he even calls it a 
“separation”: 
here he considers a toro 
separation because of the sin of 
fornication, which similarly takes 
away the marital act although the 
marriage bond endures. 
hic determinat de separatione 
a toro propter peccatum 
fornicationis, quae similiter actum 
matrimonii tollit vinculo 
matrimoniali durante.365 
It becomes quickly clear that the divortium at issue here is what we would call a 
separation, in which the marriage still exists, and neither party has the right to remarry.366  
Aquinas makes another distinction that differs slightly from our understanding of legal 
                                                 
364 Even if this is what he seems to do in Hosea 2:19-20. 
365 In IV Sent., Distinction 35, Prologue. 
366 In IV Sent., D. 35, Q. u., art. 5. 
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terms.  In current secular marriage law, legal separations are said to happen a mensa et 
thoro; this kind of separation legally ends cohabitation between the spouses.367  It is 
distinguished from a divorce as commonly understood today, which is a vinculo 
matrimonii.368  St. Thomas’s a toro separation, however, pertains more specifically to the 
conjugal rights: 
a man can send away his wife 
in two ways.  In one way, only 
from the bed; and in this way he 
can dismiss her by his own 
judgment as soon as he discovers 
the fornication of his wife; nor is he 
bound to render the debt to her 
when she requires it, unless he is 
compelled by the Church; and in 
that case rendering the debt 
prejudices none of his rights.  In 
another way, both a mensa et toro; 
and in this way she cannot be sent 
away except by the Church's 
verdict.  And if she had been 
dismissed in any other way, he 
ought to be forced to cohabit with 
her, unless her husband could prove 
the fornication of the incontinent 
one.  Now this dismissal is called 
separation; and therefore it must be 
admitted that separation cannot be 
granted unless by the judgment of 
the Church. 
vir potest dimittere uxorem 
dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad 
torum tantum; et sic potest eam 
dimittere quam cito sibi constat de 
fornicatione uxoris, proprio 
arbitrio; nec tenetur reddere 
debitum exigenti, nisi per 
Ecclesiam compellatur; et taliter 
reddens nullum sibi praejudicium 
facit. Alio modo quantum ad 
torum et cohabitationem; et hoc 
modo non potest dimitti nisi judicio 
Ecclesiae; et si alias dimissa fuerit, 
debet cogi ad cohabitandum, nisi 
possit ei vir incontinenti 
fornicationem probare. Haec autem 
dimissio divortium dicitur; et ideo 
concedendum est quod divortium 
non potest celebrari nisi judicio 
Ecclesiae.369 
A separation a toro for Saint Thomas is not necessarily an end to cohabitation, but 
merely the suspension of the marital debt.  Accordingly, we have translated dimittere, as 
“send away” or “put away” rather than “divorce” as was formerly used, since calling this 
arrangement a ‘divorce’ seems to contribute to a misconstrual of Church teaching even 
today. 
                                                 
367 Henry Campbell Black. Black's Law Dictionary; Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and 
English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern. (St. Paul, Minn: West Pub. Co, 1968), p. 6: “a mensa et thoro:  
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369 In IV Sent., Dist. 35, Q. u., Art. 3, corpus. 
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4.  The Deliberate Love in a Marriage that is no Love Match 
Undoubtedly, however, the greatest hurdle to a modern reader’s understanding of 
Saint Thomas’s theology of marriage is the fact that the thoroughly deliberate process of 
choosing a spouse has given way, in the West, to marriage and engagement based on the 
affections of the couple.  The prejudice is widespread, as Fr. Stan Parmisano states: 
Notwithstanding substantial studies to the contrary, it remains 
commonplace among specialists in literature, in Church history, and 
historical theology, as also with the more popular mind, that he patristic and 
medieval Chruch had little regard for marriage as a bond of love between 
husband and wife.370 
We must resist the temptation to reject Aquinas’s juridical approach on the grounds 
that marriages are contracted very differently today.  It is easy to assume, because marriage 
today (at least in Western, developed societies) takes place for purely affective reasons, that 
our modern, Western conception of marriage ensures more spousal love and accords more 
dignity to the human person.  Such an attitude naively ignores the fact that happy Catholic 
marriages are still arranged in many parts of the world, and areas where marriages typically 
occur for emotional reasons suffer a divorce rate many times higher than areas that follow 
the traditional process. In commenting on the choice of the word consortium to define 
marriage in canon law, Fr. Ladislas Orsy reminds us 
In choosing the word consortium, canon law tries to strike a middle 
course between the ideal of a perfect union of minds and hearts, and the 
unsatisfactory state of a merely external association, so that the legitimate 
marital customs and traditions of various peoples could be 
accommodated...We have to be careful not to make an exaggerated version 
of Western personalistic philosophy so absolute that the marriages of 
Christians living in another culture should be considered invalid.371 
Moreover, arranged marriage was the norm all over the world for centuries.  Whether 
such marriages were valid is not the issue here, but rather whether they represented a truly 
inferior experience of spousal love.  Chinese Catholic diplomat John C.H. Wu gives an 
indication from his own experience of the quality of the relationship in an arranged 
marriage. 
Although I was engaged not by my own will, I had absolutely no doubt 
that the one to whom my parents had matched me was predestined to be my 
wife.  In one sense, such a betrothal had a greater dignity than the civil 
engagement by the free choice of the parties; because it was, as it were, 
registered in Heaven.  If one has chosen one’s own fiancee, one is liable to 
wonder at times if one has made the right choice. If on the other hand, one 
believes, as we did, that every marriage is made in Heaven, there could be no 
                                                 
370 Stan Parmisano, “Spousal Love in the Medieval Rite of Marriage,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 3, 
No. 4 (2005), p. 785. 
371 Ladislas Orsy, Marriage in Canon Law: Texts and Comments, Reflections and Questions,(Wilmington, 
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room for regret . . . did you choose your parents, your brothers and your 
sisters?  And yet you love them all the same.372 
Modern students of marriage theology must resist the tendency to assume that the 
love-matches that have become the Western norm in the last 200 years have made true and 
deep spousal love possible for the first time.  Such a belief would make us much more 
subject to the confines of our cultural milieu than Aquinas was, for the marriages that he 
addressed followed a pattern that had existed for thousands of years in countless different 
societies. 
In his theology of marriage, Saint Thomas assumes a spousal relationship that is 
deliberate, rational, and accomplished through a considerable juridical process.  
Nevertheless, it is a relationship that is “made according to the freedom of love,”373 and 
which constitutes the “greatest friendship,”374  “a sweet partnership,”375 where the love is 
the “most intense”376 among human relations.  Moreover, as we have attempted to show, a 
careful reading of Aquinas that draws upon every area of his teaching indicates that this 
deliberate juridical approach to marriage has much to teach the modern reader.  This vision 
of love incorporates every power of the human being, from his reason to his lowest 
appetites; it considers his first beginnings, his ancestral heritage and his final end; it attends 
to the most intimate unspoken desires of the spouses and to their impact on their political 
community and on the communion of saints.  It is these aspects that we have called 
‘juridical’ that permit marriage to be something more enduring and supernatural than a love 
that springs from emotions alone. 
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COMMENTARY ON THE 
SENTENCES IV 
DISTINCTION 26 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the Master has discussed the 
sacrament of orders, which is ordered to the 
spiritual multiplication of the Church, here he 
begins to consider matrimony, which is ordered 
to the material multiplication of the faithful; 
and it is divided into two parts: in the first he 
considers matrimony; in the second, persons 
contracting matrimony (Distinction 34), where 
he says: now it remains to consider which 
persons are eligible for contracting marriage. 
The first is in two parts: in the first he 
determines those things which pertain to 
matrimony, inasmuch as it is a sacrament; in 
the second he determines the causes of 
matrimony, Distinction 27, where he says: after 
this we must turn to what is wedlock. The first 
is in two parts: in the first he considers the 
institution of marriage; in the second, its 
signification: for these two things are common 
to all the sacraments, where he says, since 
other sacraments, etc... 
Concerning the first, he does three things: 
first he shows the two institutions of 
matrimony; secondly, he shows the difference 
between them, where he states: the first 
institution had a precept; thirdly, he excludes 
certain errors which can be occasioned by what 
has been said, where he says: however, there 
were several heretics who detested wedding. 
Concerning the second, he does two things; 
first he shows the difference between the 
second institution and the first, by the fact that 
the first was in precept, the second was granted 
as an indulgence; secondly he shows how this 
indulgence should be taken, where he says: but 
indulgence is taken in diverse ways. 
Since then, wedlock is a sacrament, it is a 
sacred sign and a sacred thing. Here he 
considers the signification of matrimony; and 
concerning this he does two things: first he 
determines the signification of matrimony; 
secondly he excludes certain false opinions, 
which arose from those things said before, 
where he says: wherefore it is that certain 
learned men said that the woman who does not 
experience carnal intimacy does not belong to 
a marriage. 
Concerning this he does three things: first 
he sets forth those things that seem to be based 
on the opinion stated; secondly he shows this 
opinion to be false, where he says: therefore if 
someone takes this according to the surface of 
the words, he is led into error; thirdly he 
responds to the test, where he says: but those 
things posited above are to be understood by 
the same reason stated, etc... 
This is a twofold question. The first, 
concerning marriage according as it is in the 
office of nature. The second, concerning that 
according to which it is a sacrament. 
Concerning the first there are four things 
to be asked: 1) whether marriage is natural 2) 
whether now it is under command; 3) whether 
its act is licit; 4) whether it can be meritorious. 
Article 1 
Whether marriage is natural 
1. It seems that marriage is not natural. 
For natural law is what nature has taught all 
animals. But in other animals there is sexual 
union without marriage. Therefore matrimony 
is not of natural law. 
2. Furthermore, that which is of natural 
law is found in men, whatever their state. But 
marriage has not existed in men of every state: 
for, as Cicero says in the beginning of his 
Rhetoric,377 men were living in the woods in the 
beginning, and then no one knew his own 
children, nor any particular wedding 
ceremonies in which marriage consists. 
Therefore it is not natural. 
3. Furthermore, natural things are the 
same among all men. But marriage is not the 
same among all men, since it is celebrated in 
different ways under diverse laws. Therefore it 
is not natural. 
4. Furthermore, those things without 
which the intention of nature can be preserved 
do not seem to be natural. But nature intends 
the conservation of the species by generation, 
which can happen without marriage, as is clear 
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in the case of fornicators. Therefore, marriage 
is not natural. 
But to the contrary is what is said in the 
beginning of the Digests: the union of a 
husband and wife, which we call marriage, is a 
natural right. 
Moreover, in Book 8 of the Ethics, 
chapters 12-14, the Philosopher says that man 
is more naturally a conjugal animal than a 
political one. But man is naturally political and 
social, as he himself says. Therefore, he is 
naturally conjugal, and thus wedlock, or 
marriage, is natural. 
I answer that something is said to be 
natural in two ways. In one way, as it is caused 
by necessity from the principles of nature, as to 
be moved upward is natural to fire, etc,; and in 
this way marriage is not natural, nor are any of 
those things that are completed by means of 
free will. In another way "natural" is said of 
what nature inclines to, but it is completed by 
means of free will, as acts of virtues are called 
natural; and in this way also marriage is 
natural, for natural reason is inclined to it in 
two ways. First, as concerns its principal end, 
which is the good of offspring: for nature does 
not intend only their generation, but their 
upbringing, and their advancement to the 
perfect state of man as man, which is the state 
of virtue. Wherefore, according to the 
Philosopher, we have three things from our 
parents: namely, being, nourishment, and 
learning. But a son may not be educated and 
instructed by a parent, unless he has certain, 
definite parents: which would not be, unless 
there were some obligation of a man to a 
particular woman, which constitutes marriage. 
Secondly, as to the secondary end of 
matrimony, which is the mutual service that the 
spouses devote to each other in domestic 
matters. For as natural reason dictates that men 
live together, because one man is not sufficient 
to himself in all things which pertain to life, by 
reason of which man is said to be naturally 
political; so also of those things which are 
needed for human life, certain works are suited 
to men and certain to women; wherefore nature 
moves that there be a certain association of a 
man with a woman, in which marriage consists. 
And the Philosopher sets forth these two 
reasons in Book 8 of the Ethics. 
1. The nature of man inclines to something 
in two ways. In one way, because it befits the 
nature of his genus: and this is common to all 
animals. In another way, because it befits the 
nature of the difference by which the human 
species exceeds its genus, inasmuch as man is 
rational; like the acts of prudence and 
temperance. And thus the nature of the genus, 
although it is one among all animals, yet it is 
not in all in the same way; so also it is not 
inclined in the same way in all, but according 
to what befits each one. Therefore the nature of 
man inclines to marriage on the part of the 
difference, as was assigned by the second 
reason; wherefore the philosopher assigns this 
reason to men above all animals. But as to the 
first reason, it inclines on the part of the genus; 
wherefore it says that the procreation of 
children is common to all animals. 
Nevertheless, it does not incline to this in the 
same way in all animals, for with certain 
animals, the children are sufficiently able to 
seek their own food immediately after birth, or 
one parent suffices for their sustenance: and 
among these animals there is no determination 
of male to female. Among those animals whose 
children need the sustenance of both, but for a 
little time, some determination is found 
corresponding to that time; as is seen among 
certain birds. But in man, since the child needs 
the care of parents for a long time, there is the 
greatest determination of male to female, to 
which also the nature of the genus inclines. 
2. The words of Cicero can be true of a 
certain nation; if however, it is taken as the 
beginning of that particular tribe, when it 
became distinct from other nations. For this 
effect, to which natural reason inclines, is not 
attained by all nations. But [his statement] is 
not true universally, for from the beginning of 
the human race Sacred Scripture reports that 
there were marriages. 
3. According to the Philosopher, in Book 6 
of the Ethics, human nature is not unmoving 
like the divine nature; and thus those things that 
are of divine law are diversified according to 
diverse states and conditions of man; while in 
divine matters things do not naturally vary at 
all. 
4. Nature does not only intend the being of 
the children, but also their being complete, for 
which marriage is required, as is clear from 
what has been said. 
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Article 2 
Whether marriage remains under precept until now. 
1. It seems that marriage remains under 
precept until now. For a command obliges as 
long as it is not revoked. But the first institution 
of marriage was under precept as is said in the 
text, nor is it ever read that this precept was 
revoked, but rather confirmed, Matthew 19, 6: 
what God has joined together, let no man 
separate. Therefore up to now marriage is 
under precept. 
2. Furthermore, the precepts of natural law 
oblige in every age. But marriage is of natural 
law, as was said. Therefore, etc., 
3. Furthermore, the good of a species is 
better than the good of the individual: for the 
good of a nation is more divine than the good 
of one man, as is said in Book I of the Ethics. 
But the precept given to the first man for the 
conservation of the individual by the nutritive 
act, obliges even now. Therefore, much more 
does the precept of marriage, which pertains to 
the conservation of the species. 
4. Furthermore, where the obligating 
reason remains, the same obligation must 
remain. But men were obliged to marry in 
ancient times because of this: lest the 
multiplication of the human race should cease. 
Since, therefore, the same thing would result if 
anyone could freely abstain from marriage, it 
seems that marriage is still under precept. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7:37: whoever does not give his 
virgin in marriage, does better--that is, than 
someone who does give her away in marriage. 
Therefore, the contract of marriage is not now 
under precept. 
Moreover, a prize should be given to no 
one for the transgression of a precept. But a 
special prize is owed to virgins, namely the 
golden crown. Therefore, marriage is not under 
precept. 
I answer that nature inclines to something 
in two ways. In one way, as toward that which 
is necessary for the perfection of the individual; 
and such an obligation obliges anyone; for 
natural perfections are common to everyone. In 
another way it inclines to what is necessary for 
the perfection of the multitude: and since many 
things are of this kind, of which one would 
impede another, every man is not obliged by 
such an inclination in the mode of a precept; 
otherwise every man would be obliged to 
farming and building, and duties of this kind, 
which are necessary to human community: but 
for the inclination of nature it is enough if these 
tasks are completed by different men in 
different ways. Since, then, it is necessary for 
the perfection of the human multitude that 
some are in service to the contemplative life, 
which is most greatly impeded by marriage, the 
inclination of nature to marriage does not 
oblige by the mode of a precept, even 
according to the philosophers; wherefore, 
Theophrastus proves that for a wise man it is 
not expedient to marry. 
1. That precept has not been revoked; but 
neither does it oblige each and every one 
because of the reason given, except back in the 
days when the scarcity of human beings 
required everyone to be available for 
generation. 
2, 3. To the second and third the solution 
is evident from what has been said. 
4. Human nature commonly inclines to 
diverse offices and acts, as was said. But since 
it is in diverse ways in different men, according 
to how it is individuated in this man or that 
man; one man inclines more to one of those 
offices, another to another. And from this 
diversity together with divine providence, 
which moderates all things, it happens that one 
man chooses one task, like farming, another 
chooses something else. And so it also happens 
that certain men choose matrimonial life and 
certain choose contemplative life. Whence no 
danger is imminent. 
Article 3 
Whether the marital act is always a sin. 
1. It seems that the marital act is always a 
sin. For 1 Corinthians 7:29 says, those who 
marry, let them be as if unmarried. But the 
unmarried do not have the marital act. 
Therefore, even married people would sin in 
that act. 
Furthermore, Isaiah 69:2: your iniquities 
have made a division between you and your 
God. But the marital act divides man from 
God; wherefore in Exodus 19 it is commanded 
to the people who had to see God, that they not 
approach their wives; and Jerome says that in 
the marital act the Holy Spirit did not touch the 
hearts of the prophets. Therefore, it is iniquity. 
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3. Furthermore, that which is base in itself 
cannot be made good in any way. But the 
marital act has concupiscence attached to it, 
which is always base. Therefore it is always a 
sin. 
4. Furthermore, nothing is excused if it is 
not a sin. But the marital act needs to be 
excused by the goods of marriage, as the 
Master says. Therefore, it is a sin. 
5. Furthermore, the judgment of things 
identical in species is the same. But marital 
lying together is of the same species as the act 
of adultery, since it results in the same thing, 
namely, the human species. Therefore, since 
the act of adultery is a sin, the act of matrimony 
is as well. 
6. Furthermore, excess in passions 
corrupts virtue. But there is always an excess of 
pleasure in the marital act, to the extent that it 
absorbs reason, which is the principal good in 
man; wherefore the Philosopher in Book 7 of 
the Ethics says that it is impossible for man to 
understand anything during that delectation. 
Therefore, the marital act is always a sin. 
But to the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7:36: a 
virgin does not sin if she marries; and 1 
Timothy, 5:14: I would like for the young girls 
to marry, in order to bear children. But 
procreation of children cannot happen unless 
by carnal union. Therefore the marital act is not 
a sin; otherwise, the Apostle would not have 
wished it. 
Moreover, no sin is commanded. But the 
marital act is commanded, in 1 Corinithians 
7:3: a man should render the debt to his wife. 
Therefore it is not a sin. 
I answer that given that bodily nature was 
instituted by God, it is impossible to say that 
those things pertaining to the conservation of 
bodily nature, and to which that nature is 
inclined, are universally bad; and therefore, 
since the inclination to the procreation of 
children, by which the nature of the species is 
conserved, is natural, it is impossible to say that 
the act by which children are procreated is 
universally illicit, so that in it could not be 
found the mean of virtue; unless it is argued 
according to the insanity of certain people, that 
corporeal things were caused by an evil god; 
from which is derived perhaps that opinion 
which is touched on in the text. And that is the 
worst heresy. 
1. The Apostle did not prohibit the marital 
act in those words, as neither the possession of 
things, when he said, those who make use of 
this world, as though not using it. But in both 
he prohibits resting in their enjoyment: which 
is clear from the way of speaking itself: for he 
did not say, "let them not use" or "let them not 
have," but "as if not using, or not having." 
2. We are joined to God according to the 
habit of grace, and according to the act of 
contemplation and love. Therefore, anything 
that separates the first union, is always a sin; 
but not what separates the second: for a licit 
occupation dealing with inferior things distracts 
the soul, so that it is not capable of being joined 
to God in act; and this particularly happens in 
carnal union, in which the mind is absorbed 
because of intense delectation; and because of 
this, for those men to whom it belongs to 
contemplate divine things, or to treat sacred 
things, abstinence from their wives is enjoined 
for that time; and according to this also it is 
said that the Holy Spirit did not touch the 
minds of the prophets with the act of revelation 
of secrets, when they were availing themselves 
of their marital rights. 
3. That baseness of concupiscence which 
always accompanies the act of matrimony is 
not the baseness of fault, but of punishment, 
coming from our first sin; so that namely the 
lower powers and members of the body do not 
obey reason; and because of this the argument 
does not follow. 
4. Something is properly said to be 
excused which has a resemblance to evil, and 
yet is not evil, or not as much as it seems: and 
of these things, some are excused entirely, and 
some to a certain degree; and since the marital 
act has likeness to an inordinate act because of 
the corruption of concupiscence, therefore, for 
the good of marriage it is excused entirely, so 
that it is not a sin. 
5. Although they are the same in species 
of nature, nevertheless they differ in species of 
moral act, which may differ by one 
circumstance, for example to approach one's 
own wife or not one's own wife; just as also to 
kill a man by violence or by justice makes 
different species of moral act, although it is one 
species of nature, yet one is licit and the other 
illicit. 
6. The excess of passion which corrupts 
virtue, does not only impede the act of reason, 
but takes away the order of reason; which the 
intensity of delectation in the marital act does 
not do, for even if man is not ordered at that 
moment, nevertheless he is pre-ordered by 
reason. 
133 
 
Article 4 
Whether the marital act is meritorious. 
1. It seems that the marital act is not 
meritorious. For Chrysostom says about 
Matthew: even if marriage does not carry a 
punishment for those availing themselves of it, 
nevertheless, it does not furnish a reward 
(mercedes). But merit is said in respect of a 
reward. Therefore, the marital act is not 
meritorious. 
2. It is not meritorious to give up what is 
praiseworthy. But virginity is praiseworthy, 
and because of it marriage is given up. 
Therefore, the marital act is not meritorious. 
3. Furthermore, whoever takes advantage 
of indulgences made to him, enjoys a benefit 
received. But no one merits by being offered a 
benefit. Therefore, the matrimonial act is not 
meritorious. 
4. Furthermore, merit consists in 
difficulty, like virtue. But the marital act does 
not have any difficulty, but rather delectation. 
Therefore it is not meritorious. 
5. Furthermore, what cannot be done 
without venial sin, is never meritorious; for 
man cannot simultaneously merit and demerit. 
But in the marital act there is always venial sin: 
for even the first movement in pleasure like this 
is a venial sin. Therefore the act mentioned 
cannot be meritorious. 
But to the contrary every act in which a 
precept is fulfilled is meritorious, if it is done 
out of charity. But the marital act is of this 
kind: for it is said in 1 Corinthians 7:3: a man 
must render the debt to his wife. Therefore, etc. 
. .. 
Moreover, every act of virtue is 
meritorious. But the act mentioned is an act of 
justice, which is called the rendering of a debt. 
Therefore it is meritorious. 
I answer that since no act proceeding from 
deliberate will is indifferent, as was said in 
Book I, Distinction 40, Question 1, Article 5, 
the marital act is always either a sin or it is 
meritorious in someone who has grace. For if a 
virtue leads one to the marital actâ€”whether 
justice, in order to render the debt, or religion, 
in order to procreate children for the worship of 
Godâ€”it is meritorious. But if sexual desire 
(libido) should move one, yet remaining within 
the goods of marriage, so that a man in no way 
wants to approach some other woman, then it is 
a venial sin. But if it is borne beyond the goods 
of marriage, so that one would do it with any 
woman whatsoever, it is a mortal sin. However, 
nature cannot move unless ordered by reason, 
and thus it will be motivated by virtue; or else 
it is not ordered, and then it will be motivated 
by sexual desire (libido). 
1. The root of meriting as to the 
substantial prize is charity itself: but as to some 
accidental prize, the ratio of merit consists in 
the difficulty of the act; and thus the marital act 
is not meritorious, except in the first way. 
2. Man can merit in lesser things and in 
greater things: wherefore when someone 
forgoes a lesser good so that he might do the 
greater, his abandoning a less meritorious act is 
to be praised. 
3. An indulgence sometimes has to do 
with lesser evils; and thus the marital act is 
indulged according as sexual desire moves one 
to it while remaining within the bounds of 
marriage, for thus it is a venial sin. But 
according as virtue moves one to it, so that it is 
meritorious, it does not require an indulgence 
unless as to the indulgence of lesser goods, 
which is the same as a concession. Nor is it 
unfitting that that man who takes advantage of 
this concession, merits: for the good use of the 
benefits of God is meritorious. 
4. Difficulty of a work is required for the 
merit of the accidental prize, but for meriting 
the essential prize, the difficulty required 
consists in ordering to the mean, and this is also 
in the marital act. 
5. The first movement according to which 
it is called venial sin, is the motion of the 
appetite toward something inordinately 
delectable, which is not in the marital act; and 
thus the argument does not follow. 
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QUESTION 2 
Prologue 
Next we must consider marriage as it is a 
sacrament: and concerning this there are four 
things to be asked: 1) whether it is a sacrament; 
2) about its institution; 3) about its effect; 4) 
about its integrity. 
Article 1 
Whether matrimony is a sacrament 
1. It seems that marriage is not a 
sacrament. For every sacrament of the new law 
has some form, which is of the essence of the 
sacrament. But the blessing which is done by 
the priests in the marriage ceremony is not of 
the essence of matrimony. Therefore it is not a 
sacrament. 
2. Furthermore, a sacrament, according to 
Hugh, is a material element. But marriage does 
not have for its matter any material element. 
Therefore, it is not a sacrament. 
3. Furthermore, the sacraments have 
efficacy from the passion of Christ. But by 
matrimony a man is not conformed to the 
Passion of Christ, which was painful, since it 
has pleasure attached to it. Therefore, it is not a 
sacrament. 
4. Furthermore, every sacrament of the 
new law effects what it represents. But 
marriage does not effect the union of Christ and 
the Church which it signifies. Therefore, 
marriage is not a sacrament. 
5. Furthermore, in the other sacraments, 
there is something that is res and sacramentum. 
But this cannot be found in marriage since it 
does not impress a character; otherwise it could 
not be repeated. Therefore it is not a sacrament. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Ephesians 5:32, this is a great sacrament, etc .. 
. 
Moreover, a sacrament is a sign of a 
sacred thing. But marriage is this kind of thing. 
Therefore, etc... 
I answer that a sacrament carries a certain 
remedy of holiness for man against sin, shown 
by sensible signs, as was said in Distinction 1, 
Question 1, Article 2, questiuncula 1. 
Wherefore, since this is found in marriage, it is 
counted among the sacraments. 
1. The words in which the matrimonial 
consent is expressed are the form of this 
sacrament, not the blessing of the priest, which 
is a certain sacramental. 
2. The sacrament of matrimony is 
completed by the action of the one who avails 
himself (uti) of this sacrament, just like 
penance; and thus, as penance does not have 
any other matter than those sensible acts 
themselves which are in place of a material 
element, so it is with marriage. 
3. Although marriage does not conform to 
the Passion of Christ in suffering, yet it does 
conform to it in the love, by which he suffered 
for the Church in order that she might be joined 
to him as bride. 
4. The union of Christ to the Church is not 
a res contenta in this sacrament, but a res 
significata non contenta; and no sacrament can 
bring about such a thing, but it has another 
thing contained and signified, which it brings 
about, as will be said. However, the Master 
argued that it was a res non contenta; for he 
was of this opinion, that there could not be any 
other res except a res contenta. 
5. Also in this sacrament there are three 
things: for sacramentum tantum are the 
external acts appearing; but res et sacramentum 
is the obligation which a man has toward a 
woman by such acts; but the final res contenta 
is the effect of this sacrament: but it is not the 
res contenta that the Master describes. 
Article 2 
Whether marriage should have been instituted 
before sin 
1. It seems that marriage should not have 
been instituted before sin. For what is of 
natural law does not need an institution. But 
marriage is that kind of thing, as is clear from 
what has been said. Therefore, it did not have 
to be instituted. 
2. Furthermore, sacraments are a certain 
medicine against the sickness of sin. But 
medicine is not prepared unless for someone 
sick. Therefore before sin, it did not have to be 
instituted. 
3. Furthermore, one institution suffices for 
one thing. But marriage was also instituted 
after sin as is stated in the text. Therefore 
before sin it was not instituted. 
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4. Furthermore, the institution of a 
sacrament should be from God. But before sin 
the words which pertain to marriage were not 
spoken by God, but by Adam: those words that 
God said, increase and multiply, were also said 
to the beasts, in whom there is no marriage. 
Therefore, marriage was not instituted before 
sin. 
5. Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament of 
the new law. But sacraments of the new law 
took their beginning from Christ. Therefore, it 
did not have to be instituted before sin. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Matthew 19:4: do you not read that the one 
who made man from the beginning, made them 
male and female, etc... 
Moreover, marriage was instituted for the 
procreation of offspring. But before sin the 
procreation of children was necessary for man, 
as was said in Book II, Distinction 20. 
Therefore, marriage had to be instituted before 
sin. 
I answer that nature inclines to marriage, 
intending a certain good, which indeed varies 
according to the diverse states of man, and thus 
it is fitting that in regard to that good, it is 
instituted in different ways for the different 
states of men. 
And thus marriage was instituted before 
sin, according as it is ordained to the 
procreation of offspring, which was necessary 
also when sin did not exist. But according as it 
is a remedy provided against the wound of sin, 
it was instituted after sin in the time of the law 
of nature. But according to the determination of 
persons, it had its institution under the law of 
Moses. Yet, according as it represents the 
mystery of the union of Christ and the Church, 
it had its institution under the new law; and 
according to this it is a sacrament of the new 
law. But as to the other benefits which are 
consequent upon marriage, like friendship and 
mutual service devoted to each other by the 
spouses, it has its institution in civil law. But 
since it is of the ratio of a sacrament that it be a 
sign and a remedy, thus the middle institutions 
have to do with it under the ratio of a 
sacrament; but as to the first institution, it has 
to do with what it is in the office of nature; as 
to the last, what it is in the office of civic life. 
1. Those things that are of natural law in 
general need an institution as to their 
determination, which is applicable in different 
ways to men in different conditions; just as it is 
of natural law that wrongdoing is punished, but 
how a certain punishment is appointed to a 
certain crime is done by the determination of 
positive law. 
2. Marriage is not only a remedy against 
sin, but is principally in the office of nature; 
and thus it was instituted before sin, but not as 
a remedy. 
3. According to the different things that 
need to be determined in matrimony, it is not 
unfitting that it have diverse institutions; and 
thus one institution is not the same as the other. 
4. Marriage before sin was instituted by 
God in this, that he formed the woman for the 
man from his side as a helper, and he said to 
them: increase and multiply, etc.; although he 
said this to the other animals, it was not to be 
fulfilled in the same way as with men. But 
Adam brought forth those words, inspired by 
God, as he understood the institution of 
marriage to have been done by God. 
5. Marriage as a sacrament of the New 
Law was not instituted before Christ, as is clear 
from what has been said. 
Article 3 
Whether marriage confers grace 
1. It seems that marriage does not confer 
grace. For according to Hugh, the sacraments 
confer invisible grace by sanctification. But 
marriage does not have any sanctification 
which is of its essence. Therefore, grace is not 
conferred in it. 
2. Furthermore, every sacrament that 
confers grace confers it by its matter and its 
form. But the acts that are the matter in this 
sacrament are not causes of grace; and the 
words expressing consent are not a cause of 
grace, since there is no sanctification from 
them. Therefore, grace is given in no way in 
marriage. 
3. Furthermore, the grace ordained against 
the wound of sin is necessary for all who have 
that wound. But in all men is found the wound 
of concupiscence. If therefore, in marriage 
grace is given against the wound of 
concupiscence, all men should contract 
marriage; and thus it would be extremely stupid 
to abstain from marriage. 
4. Furthermore, infirmity does not receive 
medicine from the same thing from which it 
takes intensity. But by marriage, concupiscence 
gains intensity, for just as the Philosopher says 
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in Book 3 of the Ethics, the concupiscible 
appetite is insatiable, and grows by its own 
operation. Therefore, it seems that in marriage 
a remedy of grace is not bestowed against 
concupiscence. 
But to the contrary, the definition and the 
thing defined should be convertible. But in the 
definition of sacrament is included causality of 
grace, as was clear in Distinction 1. Therefore 
since marriage is a sacrament, it will be a cause 
of grace. 
Moreover, Augustine says that marriage is 
a remedy for the diseased. But it is not a 
remedy except to the extent that it has some 
effect. Therefore it has something of efficacy 
for repressing concupiscence. But 
concupiscence is not repressed except by grace. 
Therefore grace is conferred in it. 
I answer that concerning this there are 
three opinions. 
For certain people said that marriage is a 
cause of grace in no way, but it is only a sign. 
But this cannot stand. For according to this it 
would not differ at all from the sacraments of 
the Old Law; wherefore there would be no 
reason why it should be enumerated among the 
sacraments of the New Law. For the remedy 
that it offers for the satisfying of concupiscence 
lest it should drive someone over the edge from 
being too strictly restrained, it possessed also in 
the Old Law by the very nature of the act. 
And thus others have said that grace is 
conferred here in order to withdraw one from 
evil: for the act is excused from sin, which 
would have been a sin without marriage. But 
this would be scarcely anything: for this was 
also the case in the Old Law. So they say that it 
withdraws one from evil by diminishing 
concupiscence, lest it be borne outside the 
goods of marriage; by that grace there is no 
help for acting well, however. But this cannot 
stand, for it is the same grace which impedes 
sin and which inclines to good, just as the same 
heat which removes cold also warms. 
Wherefore, others say that marriage, 
inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of 
Christ, is able to confer a grace helping those 
things to be done which are required in 
marriage; and this is more probable: for 
wherever a certain divine faculty is given, help 
is also given by which man can fittingly make 
use of that faculty; as is clear that some 
members of the body correspond to each of the 
powers of the soul, by which they may 
discharge an act. Wherefore, since in marriage 
a man is given by divine institution the faculty 
of enjoying (uti) his wife for the procreation of 
children, grace is also given without which he 
could not do this fittingly; just as with the 
power of holy orders spoken of above, so also 
what grace is now given in this sacrament is 
like the res contenta. 
1. Just as the water of baptism is able to 
touch the body and cleanse the heart by its 
contact with the flesh of Christ, so marriage has 
this from the fact that Christ represented it in 
his Passion; and not principally by some 
sanctification of the priest. 
2. Just as neither the water of baptism nor 
the form of words bring about grace 
immediately, but a character; so the external 
acts and the words expressing consent directly 
effect a certain bond of obligation, which is the 
sacrament of marriage; and a bond of this kind 
operates dispositively for grace by the power of 
divine institution. 
3. That argument would hold unless some 
more efficacious remedy could be applied 
against the illness of concupiscence. But a 
greater remedy is applied by spiritual works 
and mortification of the flesh by those who do 
not make use of marriage. 
4. Against concupiscence a remedy may 
be applied in two ways. In one way is on the 
part of concupiscence itself, as it is repressed in 
its root; and thus marriage offers a remedy by 
the grace which is given in it. In another way, 
on the part of its act; and this in two ways. In 
one way as the act to which concupiscence 
inclines loses baseness externally; and this 
happens through the goods of marriage, which 
ennoble carnal concupiscence. In another way, 
as the act having baseness is impeded; which 
happens by the very nature of the act; for as 
long as concupiscence is satisfied in the 
conjugal act, it is not so incited to other 
corrupting influences; because of which the 
Apostle says, 1 Corinthian 7:9, it is better to 
marry than to burn. For although the works 
corresponding to concupiscence secundum se 
are bound to increase concupiscence; yet 
according as they are ordered by reason, they 
repress it: for by repeated acts are left behind 
similar habits and dispositions. 
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Article 4 
Whether carnal commingling is of matrimonial 
integrity. 
1. It seems that carnal commingling is 
integral to marriage. For in the very institution 
of marriage was said, Genesis 2:24, there were 
two in one flesh. But this does not happen 
unless by carnal commingling. Therefore, it is 
integral to marriage. 
2. Furthermore, what pertains to the 
signification of the sacrament is necessary to 
the sacrament, as was said before. But carnal 
commingling belongs to the signification of the 
sacrament, as is said in the text. Therefore, it is 
integral to the sacrament. 
3. Furthermore, a sacrament like this is 
ordered to the conservation of the species. But 
conservation of the species cannot happen 
without carnal commingling. Therefore, it is 
integral to the sacrament. 
4. Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament, 
by which the remedy is supplied against 
concupiscence, concerning which the Apostle 
says, 1 Corinthians 7:9, that it is better to 
marry than to burn. But this remedy is not 
furnished to those who do not commingle 
carnally. Therefore, the same as above. 
But to the contrary, in paradise there was 
matrimony. But there was not carnal intimacy. 
Therefore, carnal commingling is not integral 
to marriage. 
Moreover, a sacrament, by its very name, 
carries sanctification. But without carnal 
commingling, marriage is holier, as is said in 
the text. Therefore, carnal commingling is not 
necessary to the sacrament. 
I answer that integrity is twofold. One 
which is found according to the first perfection, 
which consists in the very being of a thing; 
another which is attendant upon the second 
perfection, which consists in operation. Since 
therefore carnal commingling is a certain 
activity or use of marriage, through which a 
faculty is given for this use, carnal 
commingling will be of the second integrity of 
marriage, and not of the first. 
1. Adam was speaking of the integrity of 
marriage as regards both perfections, for a 
thing is recognized by its act. 
2. The signification of a res contenta is 
necessary to the sacrament, and carnal 
commingling does not belong to this 
signification, but to the rem non contentam, as 
is clear from what has been said. 
3. A thing does not arrive at its end except 
by its proper act; wherefore by the fact that the 
end of marriage is not had without carnal 
commingling, is shown that it is of its second 
integrity, and not its first. 
4. Before carnal commingling happens, 
marriage is a remedy by the grace that is given 
in it, although not by the act, which belongs to 
its second integrity. 
Exposition 
Although other sacraments received their 
beginning after sin and because of sin, the 
sacrament of marriage is read to have been 
instituted by the Lord also before sin. It seems 
that he should have considered matrimony 
before the order of the sacraments: for what is 
animal is before what is spiritual, as is said in 1 
Corinthians 15. And it must be said that 
although it is first in the way of generation, 
nevertheless, in the way of perfection and 
sanctification it is last; and thus that sacrament 
which has a minimum of spirituality should be 
ordered last among the sacraments. 
One taken from his ribs, and from thence 
formed into a woman. Concerning this, what is 
said in Book II, Distinction 18. 
To have spoken prophetically, that the 
prophecy is referred to the mystery of Christ 
and the Church, which he forsees, not to the 
enjoyment of the woman which could be 
perceived by natural reason with sense alone. 
Nor does it follow that if he foresaw the 
mystery of the incarnation, he foreknew his 
own fall, even supposing that Christ would not 
have become incarnate if man had not sinned: 
for there are many things of which one does not 
exist without the other, although one can be 
understood without the other. 
He has a remedy, not a prize, that is, the 
accidental one, as virginity has; namely, the 
golden crown. 
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DISTINCTION 27 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the Master has determined 
concerning the institution of marriage and its 
signification, here he begins to determine 
concerning its causes; and this is divided into 
two parts: the first, concerning the constituent 
causes of marriage; the second, concerning the 
causes dignifying it, Distinction 31, where he 
says, After these things concerning the goods of 
wedlock: what they are, and how they excuse 
coitus. The first part is divided into two: in the 
first he determines the efficient cause of 
marriage; in the second, its final cause, around 
the end of Distinction 30, where it says, having 
set forth what the efficient cause of marriage is, 
it is reasonable to show on account of which 
cause marriage must be, or customarily would 
be, contracted. The first is divided into two 
parts: in the first part, he determines the 
efficient cause of marriage; in the second he 
establishes the impediment of that cause, 
Distinction 29, where he says, but it is 
necessary that conjugal consent be free of 
coercion. The first part is divided into two 
parts: in the first he shows that consent makes 
marriage; in the second he shows how that 
consent must be, Distinction 28, where it says, 
here it should be asked, whether consent about 
the future, even with an oath added, would 
bring about the conjugal union. The first is 
divided in two: in the first, having set forth 
what is intention, he defines marriage, so that 
the cause is taken proportionate to the effect; in 
the second, he shows what the cause of 
marriage is, where he says: But the efficient 
cause of marriage is consent. And here it is 
divided into three: in the first he proposes what 
he intends; in the second part he proves the 
proposition, where it says: But that consent 
effects marriage is proved by the evidence 
below; in the third part he excludes errors, 
where it says: Yet certain people claim that true 
marriage is not contracted before the handing-
over and carnal intimacy. And this is divided 
into two parts: in the first part, the parts of their 
error are traced; in the second part, he excludes 
it, where he says, But we answer these men in 
this way. Concerning the first, he does three 
things: first he sets forth the false opinion of 
those men; second, he sets forth the proof of it, 
where he says: Because, indeed, there is a big 
difference between a betrothed and a spouse, 
from which fact they argue . . . etc.; thirdly, he 
sets forth their answer to the test applied for 
truth, where he says: But the authorities 
mentioned . . . wish to be understood in this 
way. 
Therefore we respond to these things. 
Here he answers the demonstration of those 
things; and concerning this he does three 
things: first he establishes a certain distinction, 
by which the aforementioned authorities are 
resolved; secondly he proves that distinction 
through the diverse authorities of the saints, 
where he says: for sometimes they call "brides" 
those who have had such an exchange of 
promises, where a conjugal pact was made 
concerning the present; thirdly, he 
demonstrates it by reasons, where he says: and 
it is known that that bride who was pledged 
only in the future, does not remain a widow in 
the event of the groom's death. 
Here there is a three-fold question. First, 
concerning matrimony. Second, concerning 
betrothals. Third, concerning bigamy. Three 
things are to be asked concerning the first: 1) 
What is matrimony? 2) Whether consent is the 
cause of matrimony? 3) Whether matrimony 
can be dissolved by entrance into religious life? 
Article 1 
Whether marriage is a kind of con-joining 
(conjunctionis) 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that marriage is not a kind of 
con-joining. For the bond by which they are 
somehow bound, differs from con-joining itself 
as a cause from its effect. But marriage is a 
certain bond by which the two joined are bound 
in marriage. Therefore, it is not a kind of con-
joining. 
2. Furthermore, every sacrament is a 
sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible 
accident. Therefore, marriage, since it is a 
sacrament, will not be in the genus of relation; 
and so neither in the genus of con-joining. 
3. Furthermore, a con-joining is an equal-
sided relation, like equality. But the relation of 
equality is not one in number in both of two 
extremes, as Avicenna says. Therefore, nor is 
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there one con-joining; and thus if marriage is in 
the genus of con-joining, there will not be only 
one marriage between two spouses. 
But to the contrary, a relation is that 
according to which two things are referred to 
each other. But in marriage they are referred to 
each other in some way: for it is said, a man is 
husband to his wife, and a wife is wife to her 
husband. Therefore marriage is a kind of 
relation, nor is it anything other than a con-
joining. 
Furthermore, the union of two into one 
does not happen except by a con-joining. But 
this happens through marriage, as is evident 
from Genesis 2:24: they were two in one flesh. 
Therefore, marriage is a kind of con-joining. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. In addition. It seems that matrimony is 
inappropriately named. For a naming should be 
made from the more noble. But a father has 
greater dignity than a mother. Therefore, the 
con-joining of the two should rather be named 
from the father than from the mother. 
2. Furthermore, a thing should be named 
from that which is of its essence; since the ratio 
which the name signifies, is the definition, as is 
said in Book 4 of the Metaphysics. But nuptials 
are not of the essence of marriage. Therefore, 
matrimony should not be called nuptials. 
3. Furthermore, a species cannot be named 
by a proper name from that which is of the 
genus. But con-joining (conjunctio) is the 
genus of marriage. Therefore, it should not 
properly be called conjugal union(conjugium). 
But to the contrary is the common way 
that people speak. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. In addition. It seems that it is unfittingly 
defined in the text. For in the definition of 
husband, it is necessary that marriage be 
included: for a husband is one who is joined to 
a wife in marriage. But he includes marital 
conjoining in the definition of matrimony. And 
therefore it seems that these definitions are 
circular. 
2. Furthermore, just as a man is made the 
husband (maritus) of his wife through 
marriage, so also a woman is made the wife of 
her husband. Therefore, it should not be called 
a "marital con-joining" any more than an 
"uxorial con-joining." 
3. Furthermore custom belongs to the 
genus of mores. But frequently those joined in 
marriage are of completely different mores. 
Therefore the following should not be included 
in the definition of marriage: retaining an 
indivisible custom of life. 
4. Furthermore, other definitions given for 
marriage are found. For according to Hugo, 
marriage is the consent to conjoining of two 
suitable persons. But according to some people, 
marriage is a consortium of shared life, and a 
community of divine and human law. And it 
must be determined how these definitions 
differ. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question, that con-
joining conveys a certain uniting together; 
wherefore whereever there is a uniting of 
certain things together, there is some kind of 
con-joining. But things that are ordered to some 
one thing, are said to be united together in their 
ordering to it; as when many men are united for 
one military expedition or for business affairs 
to be carried out, by that fact they are called 
fellow soldiers or business partners; and thus, 
since by marriage two people are ordered to 
one single project for the generation and 
education of children, and therefore to one 
single domestic life, it is clear that in marriage 
there is a conjoining, because of which 
"husband" and "wife" are said; and such a 
conjoining, by the fact that it is ordained to 
some one thing, is marriage. However, the 
conjoining of bodies or of souls follows upon 
marriage. 
1. Marriage is the bond by which they are 
bound formally, not effectively; and thus it is 
not necessary that it be anything other than the 
conjoining. 
2. Although the relationship itself is not a 
sensible accident, nevertheless, its causes can 
be sensible: nor is it required in the sacrament 
that the res et sacramentum be sensible (for in 
this way the aforementioned conjoining is 
related in this sacrament), but the words 
expressing consent, which are the sacramentum 
tantum and the cause of the aforementioned 
conjoining, are sensible. 
3. A relation is founded on something as 
its cause, as similitude is founded on quality; 
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and in something as its subject, which would be 
the very things that are similar; and its unity 
and diversity can be seen in these two aspects. 
For therefore in similitude quality is not the 
same in number in both things but it is the same 
in species. And again, the subjects of the 
similitude are two in number, and it is the same 
way with equality; thus both equality and 
similitude are two different things in every way 
in number, in both matters of equality and of 
similarity. But the relation that is marriage, is 
one in each of its extremes, on the part of the 
cause, since it is ordered to one and the same 
project of generation. But on the part of the 
subjects, it has diversity of number. And 
therefore this relation is one and manifold: and 
the fact that it is manifold on the part of the 
subjects, is signified in these names, "husband" 
and "wife." But the fact that it is one, is 
signified in the name "matrimony." 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it is to be said that 
in marriage there are three things to consider. 
First, its essence, which is a conjoining; and 
according to this it is called "conjugal." 
Secondly, its cause, which is promising in 
marriage; and according to this it is called 
"nuptials" from nubere, to veil, for in the very 
solemnity of promising in marriage, by which 
marriage is brought about, the heads of the 
ones being married are veiled. Thirdly, the 
effect, which is children; and thus it is called 
"matrimony," as Augustine says against 
Faustus, on account of this, that a woman 
should not marry for anything else, except so 
that she might be a mother. Also, it can be 
called matrimony, like matris munium (the 
duties of a mother), that is, office: for the office 
of educating the children falls mostly to 
women. Or it is called matrimony, like matrem 
muniens (fortifying the mother): for now she 
has that by which she is defended and fortified, 
namely, a husband. Or it is called matrimony, 
like matrem monens (warning the mother), lest 
she leave her husband, to cleave to another. Or 
it is called matrimony, like materia unius 
(matter of one), since by it a conjoining 
happens for a united bringing-forth of children 
materially, so that it may be called matrimony 
from monos and materia. Or it is called 
matrimony, as Isidore says, from matre and 
nato (mother and child), for by marriage, in a 
certain way, the mother of a child is made. 
1. Although the father is nobler than the 
mother, nevertheless, concerning children the 
mother is more dutiful than the father. Or thus, 
since the woman was chiefly made for this, that 
she might be a helper to the man with children 
for the man; but the man was not made for the 
sake of this; whence "mother" belongs more to 
the ratio of matrimony than "father." 
2. Sometimes essentials are known by 
accidentals, and thus also they can be named 
through accidentals, since the name is given for 
the sake of knowing the thing. 
3. Sometimes a species is named from that 
which is of the genus, because of an 
imperfection of the species, namely when it has 
completely the ratio of the genus yet it doesn't 
add anything that belongs to its dignity, as 
when the accidental characteristic retains the 
name of the common characteristic. But 
sometimes this happens because of a 
perfection, when the ratio of the genus is 
completely found in one species, and not in 
others; as animal is denominated from anima, 
which refers to the animated (living) body, 
which is the genus of animal; but animation is 
not found perfectly in animated (living) things 
that are not animals; and it is the same way in 
this argument: for the conjoining of man and 
woman by matrimony is the greatest since it is 
a conjoining of souls and of bodies; and 
therefore it is named conjugium. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it must be said that, 
as was said above, in marriage three things are 
to be considered: namely, its cause, its essence, 
and its effect. And according to this three 
definitions are found to be given for 
matrimony. For the definition of Hugh touches 
the cause, namely consent, and is not per se. 
But the definition set forth in the text touches 
upon the essence of marriage, namely, 
conjoining, and it adds a determinate subject by 
saying: between eligible persons. It also 
establishes a specifying difference by saying 
marital: for since matrimony is a conjoining 
that is ordered to some one thing, such a 
conjoining is specified by what it is ordered to; 
and this is what maritum (husband) refers to. It 
also includes the virtue of this conjoining, that 
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it is indissoluble, in saying, retaining an 
indivisible custom of life. 
But the other definition touches the effect 
to which marriage is ordered; namely, common 
life in domestic matters. And since any 
community is ordered by some law, for this 
reason is included the regulating of this 
communion, which is divine and human law: 
for other communities, such as business 
associations and military bodies, have been 
instituted by human law alone. 
1. Sometimes prior things, from which a 
definition should be given, are not named; and 
therefore, in the definition of some things 
certain things are included which are posterior 
simply speaking, but which are prior with 
respect to us: as in the definition of quality the 
Philosopher includes quale (what kind), when 
he says: quality is that according to which we 
are said to be of a certain kind. And so also 
here in the definition of matrimony is included 
"marital conjoining," so that the sense is that 
marriage is a conjoining of those things that 
require the office of a husband, which could 
not be named by one name. 
2. This difference touches upon the end of 
the conjoining, as was said; and since, as the 
Apostle says (1 Corinth. 7), the man is not for 
the sake of the woman, but the woman for the 
sake of the man; therefore this difference 
should be taken rather from the man than from 
the woman. 
3. Just as civil life does not convey the 
singular act of this person or of that person, but 
those things which pertain to civil community; 
so conjugal life is nothing other than the 
companionship belonging to that kind of 
community; and therefore, the custom of this 
life is always an indivisible one, however 
diverse may be the singular acts of each of the 
two. 
4. To the fourth the solution should be 
evident from what has been said. 
Article 2 
Whether consent is the efficent cause of matrimony. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. Thus we proceed to the second article. 
It seems that consent is not the efficient cause 
of matrimony. For sacraments are not from 
human will, but from divine institution. But 
consent belongs to the will. Therefore, it is not 
the cause of marriage, just as it is not a cause of 
any other sacraments. 
2. Furthermore, the same thing is not a 
cause of itself. But marriage seems to be 
nothing other than consent: for the consent 
itself signifies the conjoining of Christ to the 
Church. Therefore, consent is not the cause of 
marriage. 
3. Furthermore, the cause of one thing 
should be one. But matrimony is one thing 
between two people, as was said: however, the 
consents of two people are diverse, for they are 
from diverse persons, and also they are 
consents to diverse things: for on one side the 
consent is to the man, and on the other side the 
consent is to the woman. Therefore, mutual 
consent is not the cause of matrimony. 
But to the contrary is what Chrysostom 
says: It is not coitus, but free will that causes 
marriage. 
Moreover, one person does not receive 
power over what is freely another's, unless by 
his consent. But by marriage both spouses 
receive power over each other's bodies, as is 
evident from 1 Corinth. 7, since beforehand 
each would have had free power over his own 
body. Therefore, consent effects marriage. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. In addition. It seems that it is not 
necessary that consent be expressed by words. 
For a person is handed over into the power of 
another by marriage, just as also happens by a 
vow. But a vow obligates with respect to God, 
even if it is not expressed in words. Therefore, 
consent also brings about the obligation of 
marriage even without the expression of words. 
2. Furthermore, there can be a marriage 
between people who are not able to express 
their consent to each other by words, if, for 
example, they are mute, or of diverse 
languages. Therefore, the expression of consent 
by words is not required for marriage. 
3. Furthermore, if what is necessary to the 
sacrament is omitted for any reason 
whatsoever, there is no sacrament. But in some 
cases there is matrimony without the 
expression of words: as when a girl remains 
silent out of modesty, her parents commit her 
to the man. Therefore the expression of words 
is not necessary to marriage. 
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But to the contrary, marriage is one of the 
sacraments. But in every sacrament some 
sensible sign is required. Therefore, also in 
marriage; and thus here it is necessary at least 
that there be words expressing consent 
sensibly. 
Moreover, in marriage a contract is made 
between a man and a woman. But in every 
contract there needs to be an expression of 
words, by which men oblige themselves to each 
other. Therefore in marriage there must be 
consent expressed in words. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. In addition. It seems that consent 
expressed in words concerning the future 
brings about marriage. For just as the present 
refers to the present, so is the future related to 
the future. But consent expressed through 
words concerning the present effects marriage 
in the present. Therefore, consent expressed 
through words concerning the future effects 
marriage in the future. 
2. Furthermore, in marriage a certain 
obligation is brought about by the words 
expressing consent, just as in other civil 
contracts. But in other contracts the obligation 
does not differ whether it is made through 
words about the present or about the future. But 
consent expressed in terms of the present 
causes marriage in the present. Therefore, 
consent expressed in terms of the future causes 
marriage in the future. 
3. Furthermore, by religious vows a 
person contracts a spiritual marriage with God. 
But a religious vow is made by words 
concerning the future, and it is binding. 
Therefore, in the same way marriage can be 
brought about by words about the future. 
But to the contrary is the fact that a man 
who consents to one woman in words 
concerning the future, and afterward consents 
to another in words concerning the present, 
should, according to the laws, have the second 
one as his wife. But this would not be the case 
if consent by words about the future effected 
matrimony: for by the fact that there is a valid 
marriage with one, it could not be contracted 
with another while she lives. Therefore, 
consent through words concerning the future 
does not bring about marriage. 
Moreover, whoever promises that he will 
contract something, does not yet do it. But 
whoever consents through words about the 
future, promises that he will contract marriage. 
Therefore, he does not contract it with her as 
yet. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
1. In addition. It seems that the expression 
of consent through words, also if interior 
consent should be lacking, effects marriage. 
For no one should be acquitted of fraud and 
deception according to the laws. But that man 
who expresses in words consent that he doesn't 
have in his heart, commits a deception. 
Therefore he should not get away with it 
(patrocinari), such that he is rendered free 
from the obligation of matrimony. 
2. Furthermore, mental assent cannot be 
known to anyone unless as far as it is expressed 
by words. If, therefore, the expression of words 
does not suffice, but interior consent is required 
in both spouses, then neither could know if the 
other is truly his spouse; and thus he will be a 
fornicator whenever he enjoys the rights of 
marriage. 
3. Furthermore, if someone is proved to 
have consented to someone else through words 
about the present, he is forced to have her as 
his wife, under pain of excommunication, even 
if he says that mental consent was lacking; also 
if he has afterward consented to another with 
words expressive of his mental consent. But 
this would not be the case, if mental consent 
were required for marriage. Therefore it is not 
required. 
But to the contrary is what Innocent III 
says in the Decretals: without consent, the other 
things are insufficient to perfect the conjugal 
covenant (foedus). 
Moreover, intention is required in all the 
sacraments. But that man who does not consent 
in his heart, does not have the intention of 
contracting marriage. Therefore no marriage 
happens. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that in all 
sacraments there is some spiritual operation by 
the mediation of a material operation which 
signifies it; just as by the bodily cleansing in 
baptism an interior spiritual cleansing happens; 
wherefore, since in marriage there is a certain 
spiritual conjoining, inasmuch as marriage is a 
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sacrament, and another material one according 
as it is in the office of nature and civil life; it is 
fitting that by the mediation of matter a 
spiritual thing is done by divine power; 
wherefore, since the conjoinings of material 
contracts happen by mutual consent, it is fitting 
that the matrimonial conjoining is also done in 
this manner. 
1. The first cause of the sacraments is 
divine power, which works our salvation in 
these things; but the secondary, instrumental 
causes are material operations having efficacy 
from divine institution; and in this way consent 
is the cause in matrimony. 
2. Marriage is not the consent itself, but a 
certain union of two ordered to each other, as 
was said, which consent effects. Nor does 
consent, properly speaking, signify the 
conjoining of Christ to the Church, but his will, 
by which it happened that he was conjoined to 
the Church. 
3. Just as marriage is one thing in what the 
conjoining happens for, although it is manifold 
on the part of the ones conjoined; so also 
consent is one thing in what is consented to, 
namely, the aforementioned conjoining, 
although it is manifold on the part of the ones 
consenting: nor is it consent to the man 
directly, but to the conjoining of the woman 
with the man; and likewise, for the man's part, 
he consents to his conjoining with the woman. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that, as is clear from what was already said, the 
matrimonial conjoining happens in the manner 
of obligation in material contracts. And since 
material contracts cannot be made unless the 
contracting parties express their wills to each 
other with words, therefore, it is also necessary 
that the consent effecting matrimony be 
expressed in words, so that the expression of 
words is related to matrimony as the exterior 
washing is related to baptism. 
1. In a vow there is no sacramental 
obligation, but only a spiritual one; and 
therefore it is not necessary that it be in the 
mode of material contracts for it to be binding, 
as it is with marriage. 
2. Although such people cannot express 
their own vows to each other in words, they can 
however express it by nodding. And such nods 
are counted as words. 
3. As Hugh of St. Victor says, those who 
are conjoined must consent to each other in 
such a way that they receive each other of their 
own wills (spontanee); which is judged to 
happen in the espousal if they do not speak 
against it; whence the words of the parents are 
counted in this case as if they were those of the 
girl: for it is a sufficient sign that they are hers 
from the fact that she does not contradict them. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it is to be said that 
the sacramental causes bring about by 
signifying, wherefore they effect what they 
signify: and since when someone expresses his 
consent in terms of the future, it does not 
signify that he contracts marriage, but that he 
promises he will do it; and thus such an 
expression of consent does not effect the 
marriage, but the disposition for it, which is 
called "betrothal." 
1. Consent is expressed in terms of the 
present, and the words are in the present tense, 
and in the present it is consented to for the 
same time; but when consent is made in terms 
of the future, the words are in the present tense, 
but it is consented to in the future; and 
therefore it is not for the same time, and 
because of this it is not the same thing. 
2. Even in other contracts which use future 
words, one party does not transfer power over 
his own affairs to the other if he says, "I will 
give to you"; but only when he uses present 
tense words. 
3. In the vow of religious profession, an 
act of spiritual marriage is expressed in terms 
of the future, namely, obedience, or observance 
of the rule, and not the spiritual marriage itself. 
But if spiritual marriage were vowed in the 
future, it would not be a spiritual vow, for 
someone is not yet a monk by this fact; but he 
pledges that he will be a future monk. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
To the fourth question it should be said 
that external washing is related to baptism as 
the expression of words is related to this 
sacrament, as was said. Wherefore just as if 
someone receives an external washing while 
not intending to receive a sacrament, but doing 
it as a game or trickery, he would not be 
baptised; so also the expression of words 
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without interior consent does not effect 
matrimony. 
1. Here there are two things: first, the lack 
of consent, which one must justify to himself in 
the court of conscience in order for him not to 
be bound by the bond of matrimony, although 
not in the external forum of the Church, in 
which things are judged according as they are 
adduced; and second, the deceitful words; and 
this will not stand up either in the forum of 
penance, nor in the forum of the Church, for in 
either place it is punished. 
2. If mental consent is lacking in one 
party, marriage exists in neither party: since 
marriage consists in a mutual conjoining, as 
was said. However, it can be probably believed 
that there is no deception unless signs of 
deception appear: since good is presumed of 
any one, unless the contrary is proved; 
wherefore that party in whom there is no 
deception is excused from sin by ignorance. 
3. In such a case the Church compels him 
to stay with his first wife, since it judges based 
on what appears externally. Nor is it deceived 
in justice, although it may be deceived in fact. 
But that man should undergo excommunication 
rather than be intimate with his first wife, or he 
should flee to other remote regions. 
Article 3 
Whether one spouse, also after carnal intimacy has 
taken place, can enter religious life against the will 
of the other spouse? 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that one spouse, even after 
carnal intimacy, can enter religious life against 
the will of the other spouse. For divine law 
should favor spiritual things more than human 
law does. But human law has permitted this. 
Therefore much more should divine law have 
permitted it. 
2. A lesser good does not impede a greater 
good. But the state of matrimony is a lesser 
good than the state of religious life, as is clear 
from 1 Corinthians 7. Therefore, a man should 
not be impeded by marriage from entering 
religious life. 
3. Furthermore, in any religious life a 
certain spiritual marriage occurs. But it is 
permissible to pass from a more lax to a more 
strict religious order. Therefore, someone is 
also allowed to pass from the more lax 
marriage, which is the carnal one, to the stricter 
marriage, which is the marriage of religious 
life, even against the will of one's wife. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7, so neither should spouses 
abstain from marriage except by mutual 
consent to be free for prayer for a time. 
Moreover, no one can licitly infringe upon 
the rights of another (facere quod est in 
praejudicium alterius) against that person's 
will. But for one spouse to take religious vows 
infringes upon the rights of the other: for one 
has power over the body of the other. 
Therefore, one cannot take religious vows 
without the other's consent. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. In addition. It seems that also not before 
carnal intimacy. For the indissolubility of 
marriage belongs to the sacrament of marriage, 
inasmuch as it signifies the perpetual 
conjoining of Christ to the Church. But there is 
a true sacrament of marriage after the words of 
consent are expressed in terms of the present 
but before carnal intimacy. Therefore a division 
cannot be made by one party entering religious 
life. 
2. Furthermore, in the consent itself, 
expressed in terms of the present, one spouse 
transfers power over his own body to the other 
spouse. Therefore the debt can be exacted right 
away, and the other is bound to render it. And 
therefore one cannot pass over into religious 
life while the other is unwilling. 
3. Furthermore, Matthew 19:6 says, what 
God has joined together, let no man separate. 
But the conjoining which exists before carnal 
intimacy was divinely done. Therefore it 
cannot be separated by human will. 
But to the contrary is that, according to 
Jerome, the Lord called John from his wedding. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. In addition. It seems that if a woman's 
husband has entered religious life before carnal 
intimacy took place, she cannot marry another. 
For that which can remain with marriage, does 
not dissolve the matrimonial bond. But the 
matrimonial bond remains between those who 
both vow to enter religious life. Therefore, by 
the fact that one enters religious life, the other 
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is not absolved from the marital bond. But as 
long as the marital bond remains for one 
person, he may not marry anyone else. 
Therefore, etc . . . 
2. Furthermore, a man, after entering 
religious life, can return to the world before his 
profession. But therefore a woman could marry 
another after her husband entered religious life, 
and he could marry another once he returned to 
the world; which is absurd. 
3. Furthermore, by the new decretals, a 
religious profession made before a year is 
considered none at all. Therefore, if after such a 
profession someone should return to his wife, 
she is bound to receive him: therefore, neither 
by her husband's entrance into religious life, 
nor by his vow is the woman given power to 
marry another: otherwise one woman would 
have two husbands. 
But to the contrary, no one can oblige 
another to those things that belong to the life of 
perfection. But continence is one of the things 
that belong to the life of perfection. Therefore, 
a woman should not be constrained to 
continence by her husband's entrance into 
religious life, and so she can marry. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer the first question by saying that 
no one can make an offering to God from what 
belongs to another; wherefore, since in a 
consummated marriage the body of the man 
has already become his wife's, he cannot offer 
himself to God by a vow of continence without 
her consent. 
1. Human law was considering marriage 
only as it is a duty (officium); but divine law 
according as it is a sacrament, by which it has 
absolute indissolubility; and therefore, they are 
not the same. 
2. It is not unusual for a greater good to be 
impeded by a lesser good which is contrary to 
it, just as also good is impeded by evil. 
3. In every religious community marriage 
is contracted with one person, namely, Christ, 
for whose sake someone is pledged to one 
religious community rather than another 
because of many things; but material marriage 
and religious life are not directed toward the 
same person; therefore it is not the same. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that before carnal intimacy there is only a 
spiritual bond between the spouses, but after it 
there is a carnal bond between them as well. 
And therefore, just as after carnal intimacy, 
marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so also it 
is dissolved before carnal intimacy by entrance 
into religious life: for the religious life is a 
certain spiritual death, by which someone, by 
dying to the world, lives for God. 
1. Before carnal intimacy marriage 
signifies the conjoining of Christ to the soul by 
grace; which indeed is dissolved by a contrary 
spiritual disposition, namely, sin. But by carnal 
intimacy is signified his conjoining with the 
Church by the assumption of human nature into 
the unity of his person, which is indivisible in 
every way. 
2. Before carnal intimacy the body of one 
has not been transferred to the power of the 
other absolutely, but under the condition that if 
meanwhile the other spouse should not aspire 
to the fruits of a better life: but by carnal 
intimacy this transfer is said to be completed, 
for then each person enters into bodily 
possession of the power handed over to each 
other. Wherefore, even before carnal 
intercourse someone is not bound to render the 
debt immediately after the marriage is 
contracted in terms of the present; but the time 
of two months is given to him, for three 
reasons. First, so that in the meantime he might 
deliberate about entering religious life. 
Secondly, so that the necessary things may be 
prepared for solemnization of the wedding. 
Thirdly, lest the husband should hold cheap a 
wife whom he did not have to pine in wait for. 
3. The matrimonial conjoining before 
carnal intimacy is something imperfect as 
regards first being, as was said above, but not 
consummated as regards second act which is 
operation; and likewise for bodily possession; 
and thus it does not have indivisibility in every 
way. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it must be said that 
just as the bodily death of a man dissolves the 
matrimonial bond so that the wife may marry 
whomever she wishes according to the 
statement of the Apostle, so also after the 
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spiritual death of the man by entry into 
religious life, she could marry whomever she 
wanted. 
1. When both vow continence by 
simultaneous vows, then neither may renounce 
(abrenuntiat) the conjugal bond; and thus it 
remains even after; but when only one makes 
the vow, then he renounces as much of the 
conjugal bond as is in himself; and thus the 
other is loosed from this bond. 
2. Someone is not considered dead to the 
world by entrance into religious life until he 
has made his profession; and thus until that 
time his wife is bound to wait for him. 
3. A profession made in this way before 
the time determined by law, is judged as if it 
were a simple vow; whence after a man's 
simple vow, the woman is not bound to render 
the debt to him, but she does not have the 
power to marry another; and so it is with this. 
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QUESTION 2 
Prologue 
Next is to be asked concerning betrothals 
(sponsalibus); and about this three things are to 
be asked: 1) What are betrothals? 2)Who can 
contract a betrothal? 3)Whether betrothals can 
be invalidated. 
Article 1 
Whether betrothals are fittingly called the promise 
of a future wedding. 
1. It seems that betrothals are not fittingly 
called the promise of a future wedding, as we 
have from the words of Pope Nicholas. For as 
Isidore says, someone is not a bridegroom 
(sponsus) because he promises, but because he 
pledges himself (spondet), and gives sureties 
(sponsores) of his pledge. But from the 
betrothal, someone is called a bridegroom. 
Therefore, it is misnamed a promise. 
2. Furthermore, whoever promises 
something should be compelled to keep it. But 
the man who contracts a betrothal is not 
compelled by the Church to contract a 
marriage. Therefore a betrothal is not a 
promise. 
3. Furthermore, in a betrothal there is 
sometimes not only a promise, but an oath is 
added to it, and some earnest money. Therefore 
it seems that it should not have been defined 
only as a promise. 
4. Furthermore, marriages should be free 
and absolute. But betrothals are sometimes 
done under the condition of also receiving 
money. Therefore it is not fittingly called a 
promise to wed. 
5. Furthermore, a promise, which regards 
future things, is blamable (vituperatur) 
according to James 4. But there should not be 
anything blamable about the sacraments. 
Therefore, nor should there be the promise of 
future nuptials. 
6. Furthermore, no one is called a 
bridegroom (sponsus) except by a betrothal 
(sponsalibus). But someone is called a 
bridegroom from present nuptials, as is said in 
the text. Therefore, betrothals are not always a 
promise of future nuptials. 
I answer that, as was said above, 
consenting to conjugal intimacy in terms of the 
future does not make a marriage, but the 
promise of marriage, and this promise is called 
betrothal from pledging (spondendo), as 
Isidore says. For before the use of written 
records, people used to give securities of 
marriage, by which they pledged to consent to 
each other under the laws of matrimony, and 
they also gave guarantees. However, that 
promise happens in two ways: absolutely or 
conditionally. Absolutely, in four ways. The 
first is by a mere promise, as when it is said, "I 
will receive you as my own," and vice versa. In 
the second, a betrothal pledge (arrhis 
sponsalitiis) is given, like money (pecunia) or 
something of this kind. The third is with a ring 
as pledge (subarrhatione). In the fourth, with 
an accompanying oath. But if it is a promise 
given conditionally, then we must make a 
distinction: for either it is an honorable 
condition, as when is said, "I will receive you, 
if your parents agree," and then, when the 
condition is fulfilled, the promise stands, and if 
the condition is not fulfilled, then the promise 
does not stand. Or it is dishonorable, and this 
can be in two ways: either it is contrary to the 
goods of matrimony, as if I said, "I will receive 
you, if you will procure drugs of sterility," and 
then the betrothal is not contracted; or it is not 
contrary to the goods of marriage, as if I said, 
"I will receive you, if you consent to my secret 
thievery." And then the promise stands, but the 
condition should be taken away. 
1. The betrothal ceremony itself and the 
giving of sureties is confirmation of the 
promise; and thus it is named from what is 
more perfect. 
2. By such a promising, one person is 
obliged to contract marriage with another; and 
he sins mortally who does not keep his 
promise, unless a legitimate impediment 
intervenes; and because of this the Church even 
compels by imposing penance for the sin. 
However, if brought to trial, it is not 
compelled: for forced marriages are wont to 
have bad ends; unless perhaps an oath 
accompanied it: for then, certain people say, it 
must be compelled; although it would not seem 
so to others, because of the reason mentioned 
above, particularly if there is a danger of 
uxoricide. 
3. Those things are only added for 
confirming the promise; wherefore, they are 
not something other than the promise. 
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4. That condition which is attached does 
not remove the freedom of marriage: for if it is 
dishonorable, it should be rejected; but if it is 
honorable: either concerning good things 
simply, as if is said, "I will receive you, if our 
parents agree," and this condition does not 
remove the freedom of the betrothal, but 
increases its honorableness; or else it concerns 
matters of utility, as if one says, "I will contract 
with you, if you will give me 100__"; and then 
this is not considered as selling matrimonial 
consent, but it is understood as a promise of 
dowry; whence the marriage does not lose its 
freedom. Sometimes, however, the condition of 
money is attached in the mode of a penalty; and 
then, because marriages should be free, such a 
condition does not stand, nor can that penalty 
be exacted from someone who does not want to 
complete the marriage. 
5. James does not intend to prohibit 
someone from making any kind of promise 
concerning the future, but that he should not 
promise as someone having assurance of his 
own life; wherefore he teaches that the 
condition should be attached, if God wills; 
which, even if the words are not expressed, 
should be understood in the heart. 
6. In marriage can be considered the 
matrimonial conjoining itself, and its act. And 
from the pledging of the first in the future he is 
called the bridegroom, from the betrothal 
contracted in terms of the future; and from the 
pledging of the second, someone is called a 
bridegroom also when marriage is contracted in 
terms of the present, for in so doing, he pledges 
the act of matrimony. However, from the first 
pledging it is properly called betrothal 
(sponsalia), which is a certain sacramental of 
marriage, like the exorcisms in baptism. 
Article 2 
Whether the age of seven years is fittingly assigned 
for the contracting of betrothals. 
1. It seems that the age of seven years is 
not fittingly assigned for contracting betrothals. 
For a contract that can be made by others, does 
not require discretion in those to whom it 
pertains. But betrothals can be made by 
parents, without the knowledge of either of the 
betrothed. Therefore, they can happen just as 
well before seven years as after. 
2. Furthermore, the use of reason is 
required for someone to contract a betrothal, 
just as also for consenting to a mortal sin. But 
as Gregory tells in the Fourth Dialogue, a 
certain boy was destroyed by the devil because 
of the sin of blasphemy. Therefore, also before 
the age of seven years a betrothal may be 
contracted. 
3. Furthermore, betrothals are ordered to 
marriage. But in marriage the same age is not 
assigned for a girl as for a boy. Therefore 
neither in betrothals should the age of seven be 
assigned to both. 
4. Furthermore, people can contract 
betrothals from the time that they can agree to 
future nuptials. But such signs of agreeableness 
frequently appear in boys before the age of 
seven years. Therefore, before then they can 
contract betrothals. 
5. Furthermore, if certain people contract 
betrothals before seven years of age, and then 
after the age of seven years but before the time 
of puberty, they contract in terms of the 
present, a betrothal is considered to be between 
them. But this is not from the second contract, 
for at that time they do not intend to contract a 
betrothal, but a marriage. Therefore, it is from 
the first contract; and on this account betrothals 
may be contracted before seven years of age. 
6. Furthermore, in those things which are 
done by many people together, what is lacking 
to one, is supplied by another, as is clear 
among those rowing a ship. But the contract of 
betrothal is a certain common action between 
the contractants. Therefore, if one of them is a 
young man, he can contract a betrothal with a 
girl who is not seven years old: for what is 
lacking in age to one, is made up for in the 
other. 
7. Furthermore, if some people on the 
verge of puberty, although before it, contract in 
terms of the present, there is considered to be a 
marriage between them. Therefore, by the same 
reasoning, if before the age of seven years, but 
close to it, they should contract in terms of the 
future, a betrothal will be considered to be 
between them. 
I answer that seven years is the age 
determined by law for contracting a betrothal 
reasonably enough: for since the betrothal is a 
certain promise of future things, as was said, it 
is necessary that it be between those who in 
some way are able to promise such things; 
which is only those who have a certain 
prudence concerning future matters, which 
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requires the use of reason, in respect to which 
three stages are noted according to the 
Philosopher in Book 1 of the Ethics. The first is 
when someone neither understands by himself, 
nor can receive from another. The second stage 
is when a man can grasp from another, but 
alone he is not sufficient to himself for 
understanding. The third is when a man can 
already receive from another, and consider 
things for himself. And since reason in man 
grows strong gradually, as the movements and 
fluidity of humors are quieted; therefore, man 
obtains the first state of reason before the age 
of seven years; and for this reason he is not 
qualified for any contract at that time, and so 
neither for a betrothal. But a man begins to 
arrive at the second stage at the end of seven 
years, wherefore also this is the established 
time for a boy to go to school. But a man 
begins to arrive at the third stage at the end of 
the second seven years, as concerns those 
things which pertain to his person, regarding 
which his natural reason develops more 
quickly; but as concerns those things which are 
outside him, at the end of the third seven years. 
And thus before the first seven years, a man is 
not qualified to make any contract; but in the 
end of the first seven years, he begins to be 
capable of promising something in the future, 
especially concerning those things to which 
reason is naturally inclined; but not of obliging 
himself with a perpetual bond, for at that point 
he does not have a firm will. And thus at such 
an age betrothals may be contracted. But in the 
end of the second seven years he can already 
oblige himself in those things which pertain to 
his own person, whether to the religious life or 
to conjugal life. But after the third seven years 
he can also oblige himself regarding other 
things, and according to the laws the power of 
disposing of his own things is constituted to 
him after twenty-five years of age. 
1. If before the years of puberty a betrothal 
contract is made by others, both parties or 
either one may denounce it; wherefore, at that 
time nothing was enacted (actum), as seen in 
the fact that also no affinity is contracted by 
this; and therefore a betrothal which is 
contracted between certain persons by some 
other persons has strength as long as those 
between whom it is contracted do not denounce 
it when they reach the due age; by which they 
are understood to consent to those things which 
were done by others. 
2. Certain people say that the boy of 
whom St. Gregory speaks was not damned, nor 
did he sin mortally, but that vision was shown 
to his father to make him sorry, for he had 
sinned in not correcting the boy in that sin. But 
this is expressly against the intention of 
Gregory's saying that the father of the boy, who 
neglected the soul of his little son, did not take 
care of the little sinner in the fires of Gehenna. 
And thus it should be said that for mortal sin a 
present consent is also enough; but in a 
betrothal the consent is to something future. 
However, much greater discretion of reason is 
required to plan in the future than to consent to 
one present action; and thus a man is able to sin 
mortally before he is able to oblige himself to 
something in the future. 
3. At the time of a marriage contract, not 
only is there required a disposition on the part 
of the use of reason, but also on the part of the 
body, so that the time is suited to generation. 
And since at twelve years of age a girl becomes 
capable of the act of generation, a boy, 
however, at the end of the second seven years, 
as the Philosopher says in Book 9 of the 
History of Animals; yet they receive the use of 
discretion at the same time, which alone is 
required for a betrothal; and therefore in 
betrothals, one age is determined for both of 
them, but not in marriage. 
4. That agreeableness which is in boys 
younger than seven years of age does not 
proceed from the perfect use of reason, since 
they are not yet fully susceptible to learning; 
but it is more dependent on the movement of 
nature than on any reason; and thus such an 
agreement does not suffice for contracting 
betrothals. 
5. Although in this case they do not enact 
a marriage by the second contract, nevertheless, 
they show that they have confirmed the prior 
permission; and therefore the prior contract 
gains firmness. 
6. Those rowing a ship act in the mode of 
a single cause; and thus, what one lacks can be 
supplied by another: but those contracting a 
betrothal act as distinct persons, for a betrothal 
cannot be except between two people: 
wherefore in both parties is required what 
would be sufficient for contracting; and thus a 
lack in one person impedes the betrothal, nor 
can it be supplied by the other person. 
7. In a betrothal it is also the same: if the 
contractants are approaching the age of seven 
years, the betrothal contract has strength, for 
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according to the Philosopher in Book 2 of the 
Physics, where both are lacking equally, 
nothing seems to be lacking. However, this 
approximation is determined by certain people 
to be a period of six months; but it is better that 
it be determined based on the condition of the 
ones contracting, for in certain children the use 
of reason is more advanced than in others. 
Article 3 
Whether a betrothal could be dissolved 
1. It seems that a betrothal cannot be 
dissolved by one member entering religious 
life. For when I have promised money to 
someone, I cannot licitly contract a debt to 
someone else. But that person who contracts a 
betrothal promises his body to the woman. 
Therefore, he cannot further offer himself to 
God in the religious life. 
2. Again, it seems that neither should it be 
dissolved when one of the betrothed transfers 
himself to a distant region. For in doubtful 
matters, the safer part is to be chosen. But it 
would be safer if the other party waited for 
him. Therefore, she is bound to wait for him. 
3. Again, it seems that neither would the 
contract be dissolved by an illness which one 
person incurred after the betrothal contract. For 
no one should be punished for suffering. But a 
man who incurs infirmity, is punished by the 
fact that his right to have his fiancee is taken 
away. Therefore, because of bodily infirmity 
the betrothal contract should not be invalidated. 
4. Again, it seems that neither because of 
an affinity intervening, as, for example, if the 
bridegroom should should sleep together 
fornicariously with a family member of the 
bride: for according to this, the bride would be 
punished for the sin of the groom, which is 
unfitting. 
5. Again, it seems that the two cannot 
release each other from this contract. For this 
shows a great inconstancy, that first they would 
contract, and afterward they would release each 
other. But such things should not be tolerated 
by the Church. Therefore, etc... 
6. Again, it seems that neither on account 
of the fornication of one of them. For one 
person does not yet receive power over the 
body of the other by a betrothal: and so it 
seems that they sin against each other in no 
way, if they fornicate in the meantime: and thus 
a betrothal should not be invalidated by this. 
7. Again, it seems that neither by a 
contract with someone else in terms of the 
present. For a second sale does not repeal a first 
sale. Therefore, neither does a second contract 
repeal a first one. 
8. Again, it seems that neither can it be 
dissolved because of a defect of age. For what 
does not exist cannot be dissolved. But before 
the determined age a betrothal contract would 
be null. Therefore, it cannot be invalidated. 
I answer that in all the above-mentioned 
cases the betrothal contract would be dissolved, 
but in various ways. For in two of these 
instances, namely when one person takes 
refuge in religious life, and when the one party 
contracts with another person in terms of the 
present, by the law itself (ipso jure) the 
betrothal is invalidated. But in all other cases it 
must be invalidated according to the judgment 
of the Church. 
1. Since a promise like that is purely 
spiritual, it is dissolved by spiritual death, as 
was said. 
2. That doubt is resolved by the fact that 
the other did not appear in the time established 
for the completion of the marriage; wherefore 
if on one person's part, nothing was lacking for 
the marriage to be completed, he may marry 
another without any sin; if however, it was his 
fault that the marriage was not completed, he 
must do penance for the sin of a breach of 
promise or of oath, if an oath was attached, and 
to contract with another, if he wants, by the 
judgment of the Church. 
3. If before the matrimonial contract one 
of the betrothed incurs some grave infirmity, 
which extremely debilitates him, such as 
epilepsy, or paralysis; or deforms him, such as 
his nose being cut off, or being bereft of his 
eyes, or something of this kind; or which is 
against the good of offspring, as leprosy which 
tends to infect the children; then the betrothal 
can be invalidated, lest the two should 
displease each other, and the marriage so 
contracted may be doomed to a bad end. Nor is 
anyone punished for his suffering, but he does 
incur a loss by his suffering, which is not 
unusual. 
4. If the groom has known a relative of his 
bride, or vice versa, then the betrothal must be 
nullified; and to prove this, rumor alone is 
sufficient because of the scandal to be avoided. 
For causes that have their effects in the future, 
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are impeded from producing their effects not 
only by what is, but also by what will be. 
Wherefore, just as an affinity, if it were at the 
time of the betrothal contract, would have 
impeded that contract; so also if it should 
intervene before the marriage, which is a 
certain effect of a betrothal, the first contract is 
impeded by its own effect. Nor does this 
detract something from the other party, but 
rather benefits her; for she is released from 
someone who has made himself odious to God 
by fornication. 
5. Certain people do not accept this case: 
but against them stand the Decretals, which 
expressly say, in regard to those who contract 
an association of fidelity, and afterward remitt 
the same to each other, it can be tolerated in 
patience, if those who have contracted a 
betrothal mutually release each other. But to 
this they say that the Church allows this lest a 
worse thing should result, rather than that this 
be de jure. But this does not seem to fit the 
example that the Decretals give. And thus it 
should be said that it is not always a sign of 
inconstancy to retract what previously was 
affirmed: for our plans are uncertain, as it says 
in the Book of Wisdom. 
6. Although those contracting a betrothal 
had not yet given to each other the power over 
their respective bodies, nevertheless, by this act 
one is made suspect to the other of not keeping 
faith in the future. And thus one can protect 
himself against the other by nullifying the 
betrothal. 
7. That argument holds, if both contracts 
were of one ratio: but the second contract of 
marriage is stronger than the first of betrothal: 
and thus it dissolves it. 
8. Although this was not a true betrothal, 
nevertheless there was here a certain mode of 
betrothal; and thus lest it seem to be acceptable, 
upon arriving at legal age they should seek 
dissolution of the betrothal to be made by the 
judgment of the Church for the sake of a good 
example. 
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QUESTION 3 
Prologue 
Next bigamy should be examined; and 
concerning this three things are to be sought: 1) 
Whether irregularity accompanies bigamy; 2) 
whether this is resolved by baptism; 3) whether 
it can be dispensed in such irregularity. 
Article 1 
Whether irregularity is attached to bigamy 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that irregularity is not attached 
to that bigamy which arises from someone 
having two wives successively. For multitude 
and unity are consequent on being. Therefore 
being and non-being do not add up to any 
multitude. But as to that man who has two 
wives successively, when one is in being, the 
other is not in being. Therefore by this fact a 
man has not become the husband of more than 
one wife, which would prohibit him from the 
episcopate according to the Apostle. 
2. Furthermore, a greater sign of 
incontinence appears in someone who 
fornicates with several women than someone 
who has several wives sucessively. But by the 
first a person is not made irregular. Therefore 
neither from the second. 
3. Furthermore, if bigamy causes 
irregularity, either this is by reason of the 
sacrament or by reason of carnal intimacy. But 
it is not for the first reason; for then if someone 
had contracted with one woman in terms of the 
present, and if she had died before carnal 
intimacy took place, and he had taken another 
wife, it would seem irregular; which is against 
the decree of Innocent III. Nor again is it for 
the second reason, since according to this even 
those who fornicated by sleeping with many 
women would be irregular, which is false. 
Therefore in no way does bigamy cause 
irregularity. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. In addition. It seems that irregularity is 
not attached to the bigamy which happens 
when a man has two wives at the same time, or 
successively one wife de jure, and another de 
facto. For where there is no sacrament, there 
cannot be a defect of sacrament. But when 
someone contracts with a woman de facto and 
not de jure, there is no sacrament there: for 
such a conjoining does not signify the 
conjoining of Christ with the Church. 
Therefore, since irregularity does not follow 
upon bigamy except from some defect in the 
sacrament, it seems that irregularity does not 
follow upon such bigamy. 
2. Furthermore, someone approaching a 
woman with whom he contracts de facto and 
not de jure, commits fornication, if he does not 
have another woman as his legal wife; or else 
he commits adultery, if he does have another. 
But to divide his own flesh among many 
women by fornication or adultery does not 
cause irregularity. Therefore, neither does the 
aforesaid mode of bigamy. 
3. Furthermore, it happens that one person, 
before he has known another carnally with 
whom he contracted de jure, contracts with 
another de facto, not de jure, and knows her 
carnally, either when the first one has died or 
the first one is still living. Such a man has 
contracted with more than one woman, either 
de jure or de facto; and nevertheless he is not 
irregular, for his own flesh is not divided 
among many women. Therefore, by the 
abovementioned mode of bigamy, irregularity 
is not contracted. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. In addition. It seems that irregularity is 
not contracted by the fact that someone takes as 
his wife a woman who is not a virgin. For 
someone is impeded more by his own defect 
than by the defect of another. But if the man 
contracting is not a virgin, he does not become 
irregular. Therefore, much less if his wife is not 
a virgin. 
2. Furthermore, it can be that someone has 
deflowered a certain woman, and afterward 
takes her as a wife. Such a person does not 
seem to become irregular; for he does not 
divide his flesh among many women, nor in 
fact does his wife; and nevertheless, he takes a 
corrupted woman for his wife. Therefore such a 
mode of bigamy does not cause irregularity. 
3. Furthermore, no one can contract 
irregularity unless voluntarily. But when 
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someone involuntarily takes a wife who is not a 
virgin, as when he believes her to be a virgin, 
and afterward, when he knows her, finds that 
she has been corrupted. Therefore such a mode 
does not always cause irregularity. 
4. Furthermore, corruption following 
marriage is more destestable than before 
marriage. But if a wife, after the marriage is 
consummated, is known by another, her 
husband is not made irregular; otherwise he 
would be punished for the sin of his wife: also, 
it can be that after he knows this, he might 
render to her the debt when she asks before she 
is condemned of adultery. Therefore, it seems 
that this kind of bigamy does not cause 
irregularity. 
But to the contrary is what Gregory says: 
we command that you never make illicit 
ordinations, neither a bigamist, whether 
someone who has not chosen a virgin for his 
wife, or unknowingly has such a wife; nor 
someone having vitiated any part of his body, 
whether in penance, or liable to whatsoever 
grievous condition, should you allow to 
approach holy orders. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer the first question that someone is 
constituted a minister of the sacraments by the 
sacrament of orders; and the one who should 
administer the sacraments to others, should 
himself suffer no defect in the sacraments. But 
a it is a defect in the sacrament when the full 
signification is not found in a sacrament. But 
the sacrament of matrimony signifies the 
conjoining of Christ with the Church, which is 
of one to one; and thus it is required for the 
perfect signification of the sacrament that the 
man be the husband of only one woman, and 
the wife be the wife of only one man. And 
therefore, bigamy, which destroys this, 
produces irregularity. And there are four kinds 
of bigamy. The first kind is when someone has 
more than one wife de jure in succession. The 
second, when someone has more than one wife 
at the same time, one de jure, and another de 
facto. The third, when he has more than one 
wife in succession, one de jure, and another de 
facto. The fourth, when someone takes a 
widow as his wife. And there is irregularity 
attached to all of these things. However, 
another consequent reason is assigned, for in 
those who receive the sacrament of orders, the 
greatest spirituality should appear: for at some 
times they administer spiritual thingsâ€”the 
sacraments; at others, they teach spiritual 
things and should be occupied with spiritual 
things. Wherefore, since concupiscence, by 
which the whole man is turned into the flesh, is 
greatly opposed to spirituality, no sign should 
appear in them of permanent concupiscence, 
which does in fact appear in bigamists, who 
refused to limit themselves to one wife. 
Nevertheless, the first argument is better. 
1. A multitude of several wives at the 
same time is a multitude of existent things 
simply speaking; and thus such a multitude is 
completely opposed to the signification of the 
sacrament; and because of this it destroys the 
sacrament; but a multitude of wives in 
succession is a multitude only under a certain 
aspect; and thus it does not remove the 
signification of the sacrament completely, nor 
does it do away with the essence of the 
sacrament, but rather its perfection, which is 
required in those who dispense the sacraments. 
2. Although there is a greater sign of 
concupiscence in fornicators, yet it is not such 
an enduring concupiscence; for in fornication 
one person does not oblige himself to another 
in perpetuity. And therefore, here there is no 
defect of sacrament. 
3. Bigamy causes irregularity inasmuch as 
it takes away the perfect signification of 
matrimony, which consists indeed in the 
conjoining of souls, which occurs through 
consent, and in the conjoining of bodies; and 
thus by either reason it is necessary that the 
bigamy which causes irregularity be 
simultaneous; wherefore what the Master says 
in the text is abrogated by the Decretals of 
Innocent, which state that consent in terms of 
the present alone suffices for introducing 
irregularity. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that in the second two kinds of bigamy, 
irregularity is contracted: for although there is 
no sacrament in the other person, there is 
however, a certain likeness to a sacrament; 
wherefore those two kinds are secondary, and 
the first is principal in causing irregularity. 
1. Although here there is no sacrament, 
there is nonetheless some likeness to a 
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sacrament, which does not exist in fornication 
or adultery; and therefore it is not the same. 
2. And from this the answer to the second 
objection is clear. 
3. In such a case someone is not 
considered a bigamist, for the first marriage did 
not have its perfect signification. Nevertheless, 
if by the judgment of the Church the man is 
compelled to return to the first woman, and to 
know her, immediately he becomes irregular: 
for sin does not cause irregularity, but 
imperfection of signification does. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it should be said that 
in the conjoining of Christ and the Church, 
unity is found on the part of both; and 
therefore, whether division of flesh is found on 
the part of the man or on the part of the woman, 
there is a defect in the sacrament, but 
nevertheless in different ways: for on the part 
of the man it is required that he has not taken 
another as his wife, not that he be a virgin; but 
on the part of the wife it is required also that 
she be a virgin; the reason of which is assigned 
by the decretists: for the bishop signifies the 
Church militant, whose care he bears, in which 
there are many corruptions; but the bride 
signifies Christ, who was a virgin. So that on 
the part of the bride virginity is required, but 
not on the part of the bride groom, for someone 
to become a bishop. But this argument is 
expressly against the Apostle, (Ephesians 
5:25): husbands, love your wives, as Christ 
[loved] the Church; from which it is clear that 
the wife signifies the Church, and the 
bridegroom, Christ; and again, since the man is 
head of the woman, as Christ of the Church. 
And therefore others say that by the 
bridegroom Christ is signified, by the bride is 
signified the Church triumphant, in which there 
is no stain; but, Christ first had the synagogue 
as concubine, and thus nothing is taken away 
from the perfection of the signification of the 
sacrament, if the bridegroom had a concubine 
beforehand. But this is extremely absurd: for 
just as there is one faith of ancient and modern 
men, so there is one Church; wherefore those 
who served God in the time of the synagogue 
belong to the unity of the Church in which we 
serve God. And furthermore, this is expressly 
against what we have in Jeremiah 3, Ezekiel 
16, Hosea 2, 2 where the mention of the 
espousal of the synagogue is expressly made; 
wherefore, she was not as a concubine, but as a 
wife. And furthermore, according to this, 
fornication would be a sacrament of that 
conjoining, which is absurd; and thus before 
the gentiles were espoused by Christ into the 
faith of the Church, they were corrupted by the 
devil through idolatry. And otherwise it must 
be said that a defect in the sacrament itself 
causes irregularity; however, corruption of the 
flesh that takes place outside matrimony and 
precedes matrimony, makes no defect in the 
sacrament on the part of that person in whom 
the corruption is, but it makes a defect on the 
part of the other; for the act of someone 
contracting marriage is not directed to himself 
but is directed to the other; and thus it is 
specified by its term, which is also in relation 
to that act, like the matter of the sacrament. 
And so if a woman were susceptive of holy 
orders, as a man is made irregular by the fact 
that he takes a wife who has been corrupted, 
but not by the fact that he has been corrupted 
when he makes the contract, so a woman would 
be irregular if she contracted with a corrupted 
man; but not if she herself, having been 
corrupted, contracted, unless she had been 
corrupted in another marriage beforehand. 
1. And from this the answer to the first 
objection is evident. 
2. In such a case there are diverse 
opinions: yet probably it is that there is no 
irregularity, for he did not divide his own flesh 
among several women. 
3. Irregularity is not a punishment 
inflicted, but a certain defect of the sacrament; 
and thus it is not necessary that it always be 
voluntary bigamy that causes irregularity; and 
thus that man who takes a corrupted wife, who 
believes her to be a virgin, is irregular when he 
knows her. 
4. If a woman fornicates after having 
contracted marriage, the man is not made 
irregular by that fact, unless after her 
adulterous corruption he should know her 
again. For otherwise, the corruption of his wife 
in no way reflects upon the matrimonial act of 
the man. But also if he should be compelled to 
render the debt to her by right, or because of 
his own conscience, if she should ask for the 
debt before her condemnation as an adulterer, 
he would become irregular; although 
concerning this there may be opinions. But 
what was said is most probable, for here we do 
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not seek what would be a sin, but the 
signification only. 
Article 2 
Whether bigamy is dissolved by baptism. 
1. It seems that bigamy is dissolved by 
baptism. For Jerome says in On the Letter to 
Titus, that if someone had more than one wife 
before baptism, or one before and one after, it 
is not bigamy. Therefore, bigamy is dissolved 
by baptism. 
2. Furthermore, whatever does what is 
more, does what is less. But baptism takes 
away all sin, which is more serious than 
irregularity. Therefore, it takes away the 
irregularity of bigamy. 
3. Baptism takes away all punishment 
arising from an act. But the irregularity of 
bigamy is of this kind. Therefore, etc... 
4. Furthermore, a bigamist is irregular 
inasmuchas he is lacking in his representation 
of Christ. But by baptism one is conformed 
fully to Christ. Therefore, irregularity is 
dissolved by that. 
5. Furthermore, sacraments of the New 
Law are more efficacious than sacraments of 
the old law. But sacraments of the Old Law 
dissolved irregularities, as was said by the 
Master in Book I. Therefore, also baptism, 
which is the most efficacious sacrament in the 
New Law, resolves the irregularity contracted 
by bigamy. 
But to the contrary is what Augustine 
says, they understand more acutely who 
forbade ordaining a man who either as a 
catechumen or pagan had a second wife, for it 
is a question of the sacrament, not of sin. 
Moreover, as it says in the same place, a 
woman, if she was ruined as a catechumen or 
pagan, cannot take the veil among the virgins 
of God after baptism. Therefore, by the same 
reasoning, neither can a bigamist be ordained 
after baptism. 
I answer that baptism dissolves faults, it 
does not dissolve marriages (conjugia). 
Wherefore since irregularity results from 
marriage itself, it cannot be taken away by 
baptism, as Augustine says. 
1. In this case, the opinion of Jerome is not 
upheld; unless perhaps we wish to explain that 
he speaks about a higher dispensation. 
2. It is not necessary that whatever does a 
greater thing should do a lesser thing, unless it 
is ordered to it, and that is not the case here, for 
baptism is not ordered to taking away 
irregularity. 
3. This is to be understood concerning the 
punishments which follow upon actual sin as 
inflicted, not about to be inflicted; for someone 
does not recuperate his virginity by baptism, 
nor the division of his flesh. 
4. Baptism conforms one to Christ as 
concerns the power of the mind, not the state of 
the flesh, which is considered in virginity, or in 
division of the flesh. 
5. Those irregularities were contracted by 
passing causes, not perpetual ones, and thus 
they could also be removed through those 
sacraments; and besides, those sacraments were 
ordered to that end; but baptism is not. 
Article 3 
Whether a dispensation may be given to a bigamist 
1. It seems that a dispensation may not be 
given to a bigamist. For it is said in Extra De 
Bigamis, With clergymen, who, in whatever 
way possible, have united themselves in 
marriage with second wives, just as with 
bigamists, it is not permitted to give a 
dispensation. 
2. Furthermore, no dispensation can be 
given from divine law. But all the things which 
are named in the canon belong to divine law. 
Since, then, the Apostle says in the canonical 
Scriptures, it is necessary that a bishop have 
had only one wife; it seems that this cannot be 
dispensed. 
3. Furthermore, no one may give a 
dispensation in those things which are 
necessary to the sacrament. But not to be 
irregular is necessary to the sacrament of holy 
orders, since signification, which is essential to 
the sacrament, would be lacking. Therefore, no 
dispensation can be given for this. 
4. Furthermore, what was reasonably done 
cannot be changed reasonably. But if a 
dispensation can be given to a bigamist, then 
irregularity was unreasonably attached to him; 
which is unfitting. 
But to the contrary is that Pope Lucius 
gave a dispensation to the bishop of Palermo 
who was a bigamist. 
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Moreover, Pope Martin says: If the reader 
would accept a widow for his wife, he may 
remain in the lectorate; or if it were necessary, 
he could be made a subdeacon; but nothing 
higher: likewise, if he had been a bigamist. 
Therefore, at least up to the subdiaconate a 
dispensation may be given. 
I answer that irregularity is not attached to 
bigamy by natural law, but by positive law; nor 
again is it something essential to holy orders 
that a man not be bigamous; as is evident from 
the fact that if someone bigamous advances to 
holy orders, he receives a character; and 
therefore the Pope can dispense completely 
from such irregularity, but a bishop only as to 
the minor orders. And certain people say that 
also as to the higher orders among those who 
wish to serve God in the religious life, in order 
to avoid the dispersal of religious. 
1. By that decretal, the difficulty is shown 
to be the same in granting a dispensation to 
those men who have contracted de facto with 
many women, as if they had contracted de jure; 
not that the power of the Pope is lessened in 
such cases. 
2. This is true as regards those things 
which are of natural law, and as regards those 
things which are necessary to the sacraments 
and to the faith; but in other things which are 
by the institution of the apostles, since the 
Church has now the same power of establishing 
and abolishing that it had then, a dispensation 
can be given by the one who holds supremacy 
in the Church. 
3. Not every signification is of the essence 
of the sacrament, but only that which belongs 
to its office of sacrament; and this is not 
removed by irregularity. 
4. In particular things a reason cannot be 
found that applies equally to all, because of 
their diversity; and thus what has been 
universally established by considering those 
things which happen in most cases, can also be 
reasonably removed by a dispensation in a 
certain determinate case. 
Exposition 
If however, they express in words what 
actually they don't wish in their hearts, if there 
is no coercion or deception here; that 
obligation of words . . .causes matrimony. And 
here the Master is speaking about the external 
forum of the Church, in which it is judged 
according as things appear; and deception 
hidden in the heart is not assumed, unless it is 
somehow expressed through external signs, like 
someone calling himself by some other name. 
But as to the forum of conscience it is not true 
what the Master says here. He chooses the 
solitude of the desert etc., Although hermits do 
not promise any obedience whatsoever, 
nevertheless, they do have a vow of continence 
added, and after the custom their vow is 
solemnized after the time determined. 
Also if he was already tonsured. But he is 
not bound to defer the tonsure and the religious 
habit; for either his profession was not valid, if 
he took his vow against his wife's objection; or 
else if she did not contradict, and yet remained 
in the world, he took his vow of profession; and 
although it was a valid vow, it is still suspended 
for a time while his wife lives since it was to 
her disadvantage. Wherefore, after the death of 
his wife he is bound to return to religious life, 
nor can he marry another. But meanwhile he is 
not bound to defer the habit or the tonsure, 
whether because of the censure of his wife, or 
for the sake of avoiding scandal. 
For which the man joined in marriage did 
not advance further to holy orders. The Master 
and Pelagius are speaking according to the 
strict construction of law, wherefore today 
according to the new law it is not held; for 
there is no obstacle on the part of the 
sacrament, as was said before. 
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DISTINCTION 28 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the Master shows that consent is the 
efficient cause of marriage, here he shows how 
the consent that brings about marriage must be; 
and it is divided into two parts: in the first part 
it is inquired whether consent in terms of the 
future, confirmed by an oath, brings about a 
marriage; in the second he shows what is that 
consent that makes marriage, where he says: 
since consent about the present brings about a 
marriage, here it should be asked what the 
consent pertains to. Concerning the first he 
does two things: first he determines the truth; 
secondly he objects to the contrary, where he 
says: but the opinions mentioned seem to go 
against what the laws hand down. 
And concerning this he does two things: 
first he objects against what was immediately 
determined; secondly against what was held in 
the previous distinction, and there he says: 
those opinions also in so far as it was said, that 
consent alone causes wedlock, it seems to go 
against what Pope Evaristus said, and both are 
divided into objection and solution, as is clear 
from the text. 
Here there are four things to be asked: 1) 
whether an oath accompanying the consent 
expressed in terms of the future, causes 
marriage? 2) whether carnal intimacy 
accompanying it? 3) whether secret consent in 
terms of the present suffices to cause a 
marriage? 4) in what does the consent that 
makes marriage coonsist? 
Article 1 
Whether an oath added to consent in terms of the 
future causes marriage 
1. It seems that an oath added to consent 
in terms of the future causes marriage. For no 
one can oblige himself to do something against 
divine law. But to fulfill an oath is divine law, 
as is clear from Matthew 5:33: yet render to the 
Lord your oaths. Therefore, no subsequent 
obligation can make it so that a man should not 
fulfill an oath he made before. If, then, after 
consenting to some woman in terms of the 
future confirmed by an oath, someone should 
oblige himself in terms of the present, it seems 
that nevertheless he must keep the first oath. 
But this would not be unless by that oath the 
marriage were completed. Therefore, an oath 
joined to consent about the future, causes 
marriage. 
2. Furthermore, divine truth is stronger 
than human truth. But by an oath, something is 
confirmed by divine truth. Therefore, since 
words expressing consent in the present, in 
which there is only human truth, complete a 
marriage, it seems that much more could words 
of the future bring this about, if they were 
confirmed by an oath. 
3. Furthermore, according to the Apostle 
in the Letter to the Hebrews, the end to all 
controversy . . . is an oath. Therefore, at least 
in a law-court, more is established by an oath 
than by a mere word. If therefore someone 
should consent by a mere word to one woman 
in terms of the future that were confirmed by 
an oath, it seems that by the judgment of the 
Church he must be compelled to remain with 
her, and not with any other woman. 
4. Furthermore, words about the future, 
simply uttered, make a betrothal. But here an 
oath is at work. Therefore, it causes something 
more than a betrothal. But beyond the 
betrothal, there is nothing more except 
marriage. Therefore, it causes marriage. 
But to the contrary, what is about to be, is 
not. But the addition of an oath does not change 
the fact that terms of the future signify consent 
about the future. And therefore, under these 
conditions, there is no marriage. 
Moreover, after the marriage has been 
completed, no other consent is necessary for 
the marriage. But after an oath, some consent 
does have to happen, which brings about the 
marriage; otherwise it would be in vain to 
swear about what is yet to be. Therefore, it 
does not make a marriage. 
I answer that an oath is employed for the 
confirmation of a statement; wherefore it only 
confirms what is signified in words, nor does 
the thing signified change; and thus since 
words concerning the future by their very 
meaning are not capable of causing marriage, 
since what is promised in the future is not done 
yet, even if an oath should occur, the marriage 
is not enacted yet, as the Master says in the 
text. 
1. To fulfill a licit oath is of divine law, 
but not to fulfill an illicit one. Wherefore, if 
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some obligation occuring after an oath should 
make it to be illicit, when before it had been 
licit, it does not detract from divine law if 
someone does not keep the oath made 
previously; and it is thus in the case proposed. 
For what is sworn illicitly is promised illicitly; 
but a promise of what belongs to someone else 
is illicit; wherefore, the consent attendant upon 
terms of the present, by which someone 
transfers mastery over his own body to another, 
makes the preceding oath illicit, which 
beforehand had been licit. 
2. Divine truth is most efficacious for 
strengthening what is avouched to it. 
3. Wherefore the answer to the third is 
clear. 
4. An oath does not work to make a new 
obligation, but confirms the one already made; 
and thus someone sins more gravely who 
violates it. 
Article 2 
Whether carnal intimacy causes marriage after 
consent expressed in terms of the future 
1. It seems that carnal intimacy after 
consent expressed in terms of the future makes 
marriage. For consenting in deed is greater than 
consenting in word. But that man who 
commingles carnally consents by his deed to 
the promise that he made beforehand. 
Therefore it seems that a marriage is made 
much more by this than if it is done only by 
words about the present. 
2. Furthermore, not only consent 
expressed, but also understood causes 
marriage. But there can be no greater construal 
of consent than carnal intimacy. Therefore, by 
this a marriage is accomplished. 
3. Furthermore, every carnal union outside 
of marriage is a sin. But a woman does not 
seem to sin if she admits her betrothed to carnal 
intimacy. Therefore, marriage is brought about 
by this. 
4. Furthermore, a sin is not forgiven unless 
something is restored that was taken away. But 
someone cannot restore what was taken away 
from a woman who was deflowered under the 
pretext of marriage, unless he takes her in 
marriage. Therefore, it seems that even if after 
carnal intimacy with one woman, he has 
contracted in terms of the present with another, 
he is bound to return to the first; which would 
not be the case unless a marriage were between 
them. Therefore, carnal intimacy after consent 
about the future causes marriage. 
But to the contrary is what Pope Nicolas 
says: if consent was lacking at the wedding, all 
the other celebrations, even with coition itself, 
are in vain. 
Moreover, what is consequent upon 
something does not bring it about. But carnal 
intimacy follows marriage, as effect follows 
cause. Therefore, it cannot cause marriage. 
I answer that we can speak of marriage in 
two ways. In one way, as to the forum of 
conscience; and thus in the truth of reality, 
carnal intimacy is not capable of making a 
marriage complete whose previous betrothal 
took place in terms of the future, if internal 
consent is lacking: for even words expressing 
consent in the present, if mental consent were 
lacking, would not cause marriage, as was said 
above. But as to the judgment of the Church it 
is otherwise: and because in external judgment 
things are judged according to what is 
outwardly apparent, since nothing can more 
expressly signify consent than carnal 
intercourse, according to the judgment of the 
Church, carnal intercourse following upon 
betrothal is judged to cause a marriage, unless 
other signs appear indicative of fraud or deceit. 
1. That man who mingles carnally 
consents to carnal intimacy by his act 
according to the truth of the matter. But one 
does not consent to marriage by this fact alone, 
unless according to the interpretation of the 
law. 
2. That interpretation does not change the 
truth of the matter, but the judgment which is 
made of matters externally. 
3. If a betrothed woman receives her 
groom, believing that he wants to consummate 
the marriage, she is excused from sin, unless 
other signs indicating fraud should appear; as 
if, for example, there are a number of 
conditions separating them, like nobility of 
birth, or fortune, or another clear sign that 
might appear. But the bridegroom, on the other 
hand, sins both by fornicating and (what is 
more) by the fraud that he commits. 
4. In such a case if the groom has taken 
another woman beforehand, he is bound to take 
her as his wife, if they are of equal conditions, 
or if the bride is of a better condition. But if he 
has married another, he has now become 
powerless to fulfilll what he is bound to: and 
thus it suffices if he should provide for her 
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marrying. And some people say that the groom 
is not even bound to this, if he is of a much 
better condition, or if there was some evident 
sign of fraud: for it can be probably presumed 
that the bride was not deceived but contrived 
herself to be deceived. 
Article 3 
Whether consent made in secret in terms of the 
present causes marriage 
1. It seems that consent made in secret in 
terms of the present does not cause marriage. 
For a thing existing in the power of one person 
is not transferred to the power of another unless 
by the consent of the one in whose power it 
was. But a girl was in the power of her father. 
Therefore, she cannot by marriage pass over 
into the power of a husband, unless her father 
consents. And thus, if consent happens in 
secret, even expressed in terms of the present, 
there will not be a marriage. 
2. Furthermore, in marriage our act is like 
the essence of the sacrament, just as it is in 
penance. But the sacrament of penance is not 
perfected unless by mediating ministers of the 
Church, who are the ones who dispense the 
sacraments. Therefore, neither can marriage be 
completed in secret without the priestly 
blessing. 
3. Furthermore, baptism, which can 
happen in secret and in public, is not prohibited 
by the Church from happening in secret. But 
the Church prohibits clandestine marriages. 
Therefore it cannot happen in secret. 
4. Furthermore, between persons who are 
related in the second degree, no marriage can 
be contracted, since the Church prohibits it. But 
likewise, the Church prohibits clandestine 
marriage. Therefore, these cannot be valid 
marriages. 
But to the contrary, where the cause 
happens, the effect happens. But the efficient 
cause of marriage is consent expressed in terms 
of the present. Therefore, whether it be done in 
public, or in secret, a marriage results. 
Moreover, whereever there is the due form 
and the due matter, there is a sacrament. But in 
a secret marriage, the due matter is preserved 
for they are persons legally capable of 
contracting; and the due form, which are words 
expressing consent in the present. Therefore, 
here there is a valid marriage. 
I answer that just as in other sacraments 
certain things are of the essence of the 
sacrament, and if omitted, the sacrament would 
not be, but certain others belong to the 
solemnity of the sacrament, and if omitted the 
sacrament would be validly completed, 
although it would be a sin for the one who 
made the omission; so also, consent expressed 
in terms of the present between persons legally 
capable of contracting, causes marriage: for 
these two things are of the essence of the 
sacrament; but other things are of the 
solemnization of the sacrament, since they are 
employed so that marriage may be fittingly 
done; wherefore if they are omitted, it is a valid 
marriage, although they would sin by 
contracting it, unless they were excused by 
some legitimate reason. 
1. A girl is not in the power of her father 
like a slave-girl, so that she does not have 
power over her own body, but like a daughter 
to be educated; and thus according to the fact 
that she is free, she can give herself into the 
power of another without the consent of her 
father, as also some man or woman may enter 
religious life without the consent of parents, 
since he or she is a free person. 
2. Our act in penance, although it is of the 
essence of the sacrament, is still not sufficient 
for bringing about the proximate effect of the 
sacrament, namely, absolution from sins; and 
thus it is necessary that for the perfection of the 
sacrament an act of the priest occurs. But in 
marriage our acts are the sufficient cause for 
bringing about the proximate effect, which is 
the obligation: for anyone of his own right can 
oblige himself to another: and thus the blessing 
of the priest is not required for marriage as of 
the essence of the sacrament. 
3. It is also prohibited that someone 
receive baptism except from a priest, unless in 
the case of necessity. But marriage is not a 
sacrament of necessity; and thus there is no 
similar reason. But clandestine marriages are 
prohibited because of the dangers that tend to 
result from them: for frequently in such matters 
there is some fraud on the part of one or the 
other; frequently also, they cross over into 
other unions, when they repent of what they 
have done so impetuously and many other evils 
happen from this; and beyond this, these 
marriages have an appearance of shame. 
4. Clandestine marriages are not 
prohibited as being against the essential 
components of marriage, as marriages are 
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prohibited between persons legally ineligible, 
who are improper matter for this sacrament; 
and thus it is not the same thing. 
Article 4 
Whether the consent which makes marriage, is 
consent to carnal intimacy 
1. It seems that the consent which makes 
marriage, is consent to carnal intimacy. For as 
Jerome says: for those vowing virginity, it is 
condemnable not only to marry, but even to 
want to marry . But it would not be 
condemnable, unless it were contrary to 
virginity; to which nuptials are not opposed, 
except by reason of carnal intimacy. Therefore, 
the consent of the will that there is in a 
wedding, is consent to carnal intimacy. 
2. Furthermore, all those things that are in 
marriage between a man and a woman can be 
licitly between a brother and sister, except for 
carnal intimacy. But marital consent cannot be 
licitly between them. Therefore, marital 
consent is consent to carnal intimacy. 
3. Furthermore, if a woman should say to 
a man, I consent to you provided that you will 
not know me, it is not marital consent: for there 
is something here that is contrary to the 
substance of the spoken consent. But that 
would not be unless the consent uttered were 
consent to carnal intimacy. 
4. Furthermore, the beginning in anything 
corresponds to the consummation. But 
marriage is consummated by carnal intimacy. 
Therefore, since it is begun by consent, it 
seems that the consent is to carnal intimacy. 
But to the contrary, no one who consents 
to carnal intimacy is a virgin in mind and body. 
But blessed John the Evangelist was a virgin in 
mind and body after his marital consent. 
Therefore, he did not consent to carnal 
intimacy. 
Moreover, the effect corresponds to the 
cause. But consent is the cause of marriage. 
Since therefore, carnal intimacy is not of the 
essence of marriage, it seems that the consent 
which causes matrimony is not consent to 
carnal intimacy. 
I answer that the consent that makes 
marriage is consent to marriage, for the proper 
effect of the will is the very thing willed; 
wherefore the consent that causes marriage is 
related to carnal intimacy in just the same way 
that carnal intimacy is related to marriage. But 
marriage, as was said above, is not essentially 
carnal union itself, but a certain association of a 
man and a woman ordered to carnal intimacy 
and other things which pertain to a man and a 
woman as a result, according to which they 
give power to each other as regards carnal 
intimacy; and this association is called conjugal 
union. Wherefore it is clear that those men 
spoke well who said that to consent to marriage 
is to consent implicitly to carnal intimacy, not 
explicitly. For it should not be understood 
except as an effect is implicitly contained in its 
cause: for the power of carnal union, to which 
one consents, is the cause of carnal union, as 
the power of using what is one's own is the 
cause of its use. 
1. Consent to marriage is condemnable 
after a vow of virginity, because by such 
consent power is given to what is not 
permitted; as if someone gave someone else the 
power to take something that had been given to 
him for safekeeping, he would sin--not only in 
actually handing it over to him. Concerning the 
consent of the Blessed Virgin, however, we 
will speak in a little while. 
2. Between a brother and sister there 
cannot be the power of having each other in 
carnal intimacy, as neither can carnal intimacy 
occur licitly; and thus the argument does not 
follow. 
3. That condition set forth is not only 
opposed to the act but also to the power of 
carnal intimacy, and thus it is contrary to 
marriage. 
4. The beginning of marriage corresponds 
to the consummation, as a habit or power 
corresponds to the act which is its operation. 
The arguments to the contrary show that 
consent is not explicitly given to carnal 
intimacy; and this is true. 
Exposition 
Without which it is done legitimately as 
regards its power, but not the dignity 
(honestas) of the sacrament. Against. In the 
second marriage there is no blessing of the 
priest, and yet it has the dignity of matrimony. 
And it must be said that the dignity of the 
perfect signification of marriage is not there; 
wherefore, because of a defect of the sacrament 
the blessing is omitted. 
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Consent does not cause marriage etc... 
Here is understood as to the judgment of the 
Church, but as to the judgment of conscience 
only consent makes marriage firm. 
For not from the head, nor from the feet, 
but from the side. It seems that it is taken from 
the most excellent place: for the heart is the 
most important of the members, and beside it 
are the ribs. And it must be said that the heart is 
the most noble as regards the origin of life, but 
the head as to the full complement of virtues, in 
which movement and sense happen, in which 
consist the sensitive life. 
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DISTINCTION 29 
Prologue 
After the Master has shown that consent is 
the cause of marriage, here he shows what 
impedes the consent, so that no marriage can be 
effected. And this is divided into two parts: in 
the first is considered the impediment of 
compulsion; in the second the impediment of 
error, Distinction 30, where he says: nor does 
coercion alone impede or exclude consent, but 
also error. The first is divided in three: in the 
first part he shows that coercion of consent 
does not bring about marriage; in the second he 
shows that if after the coercion, free consent 
should come forth, it will be a valid marriage, 
where he says: nevertheless those who are 
joined against the will of one of the parties, or 
by coercion, if afterward from a certain space 
of time they have lived together without 
contradiction and complaint, they seem to have 
consented by having had the possibility of 
leaving or protesting; in the third, how 
someone may be understood to have consented, 
where he says: but consenting is proved. 
Here four things are to be asked: 1) 
Whether some consent may be compelled 2) 
whether any compulsion could happen to a 
steadfast man; 3) whether forced consent 
causes marriage; 4) whether someone can be 
compelled by his father to contract marriage. 
Article 1 
Whether some consent can be compelled 
1. It seems that no consent may be 
compelled. For compulsion cannot happen to a 
free will, no matter what its condition, as was 
said in Book 2, Distinction 25, Question 1, 
Article 1. But consent is an act of free will. 
Therefore, it cannot be compelled. 
2. Furthermore, violence, which is the 
same as compulsion, according to the 
Philosopher, is what has its principle outside, 
with the one suffering the force contributing 
nothing. But the principle of every consent is 
within. Therefore no consent can be compelled. 
3. Furthermore every sin is completed in 
consent. But what completes a sin, cannot be 
compelled; for according to Augustine, no one 
sins in what he cannot avoid. But since force is 
defined by jurists as being the impetus of a 
larger thing, which cannot be repelled; it seems 
that consent cannot be compelled or violent. 
4. Furthermore, domination is opposed to 
freedom. But compulsion belongs to 
domination, as is clear in a certain definition 
from Cicero: for he says that force is the 
impetus of the dominant thing retaining a thing 
within foreign boundaries.378 Therefore force 
does not happen to a free will; and thus neither 
does it happen in consent which is its act. 
But to the contrary what cannot be cannot 
impede something. But the compulsion of 
consent impedes marriage, as is said in the text. 
Therefore, consent can be compelled. 
Furthermore, in marriage there is a certain 
contract. But in contracts the will can be 
compelled; wherefore, the legislator 
adjudicates for the full restitution, the contract 
not standing because it was done by force or 
because of grave fear. Therefore, consent can 
also be forced in marriage. 
I answer that compulsion or violence is 
twofold. One kind is what causes absolute 
necessity, and this kind of violence is called 
"violence simply-speaking" by the Philosopher; 
as when someone impells something else to 
move bodily. The other kind causes a 
conditioned necessity; and the Philosopher 
calls this "mixed violence," as when someone 
casts his cargo into the sea, lest it should 
endanger him; and in this violence, although 
what is done is not voluntary per se, 
nevertheless, considering the circumstances, 
here and now it is voluntary. And since acts are 
about particulars, therefore it is voluntary 
simply-speaking, and involuntary in a certain 
respect. Wherefore this kind of violence or 
compulsion can exist in consent, which is an 
act of the will; but the first kind cannot. And 
since this compulsion happens by the fact that 
someone fears some imminent danger, thus this 
is the same force as grave fear, which forces 
the will in a certain way; but the first kind of 
force happens also in bodily acts. And since the 
legislator does not consider only interior acts, 
but rather external ones, by force is understood 
compulsion simply- speaking, which is why 
                                                 
378 The Leonine commission notes that Albert’s 
Commentary on the Sentences also ascribes this 
statement to Cicero, but it has not been found in 
Cicero’s works. (Opera Omnia, T. 12:  Summa 
Theologiae, Tertia Pars et Supplementum. (Romae: 
Leoninum, 1906), Praefatio in Supplementum, p. 
xxiii. 
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force is distinguished from grave fear. But now 
we are considering interior consent, in which 
compulsion or force, which is distinguished 
from fear, does not happen. And thus, in the 
case proposed, compulsion is the same as fear. 
However, according to juridical experts, grave 
fear is trepidation of the mind by reason of 
instant or future danger. 
And by this the answers to the objections 
are clear: for first arguments deal with the first 
kind of compulsion, and the second arguments 
deal with the second kind. 
Article 2 
Whether compulsion from grave fear can happen to 
a steadfast man 
1. It seems that the compulsion by grave 
fear cannot happen to a steadfast man. For 
someone steadfast is precisely someone who 
doess not quail among dangers. Since then 
grave fear is a trepidation of the mind by 
reason of imminent danger, it seems that he 
would not be compelled by grave fear. 
2. Furthermore, death is, of all terrible 
things, the end, according to the Philosopher in 
Book III of the Ethics, as though it were the 
most complete among terrible things. But the 
steadfast are not compelled by death: for a 
brave man will also undergo the dangers of 
death. Therefore no grave fear can happen to a 
steadfast man. 
3. Furthermore, among other evils, the 
danger to reputation is particularly feared by 
good men. But the danger of disgrace is not 
considered a fear affecting steadfast men; for as 
the law says,the fear of disgrace is not included 
in that edict which was made about grave fear. 
Therefore, neither does any other fear affect a 
steadfast man. 
4. Furthermore, when someone is 
compelled by fear, the fear leaves sin in its 
wake: for it makes him promise something that 
he does not wish to do; and thus it makes him 
lie. But a steadfast man does not commit the 
least sin on account of any fear. Therefore, no 
grave fear affects a steadfast man. 
But to the contrary, Abraham and Isaac 
were steadfast men. But grave fear affected 
them; for because of grave fear they said that 
their wives were their sisters. Therefore grave 
fear can affect a steadfast man. 
Moreover, everywhere that there is mixed 
violence, there is some kind of fear compelling. 
But anyone, however steadfast he may be, can 
suffer such violence: for if he is at sea on the 
point of shipwreck, he throws his cargo 
overboard. Therefore, grave fear can affect a 
steadfast man. 
I answer that for grave fear to affect 
someone is for someone to be forced by grave 
fear. However, someone is forced by fear when 
he does something that otherwise he would not 
wish, in order to avoid what he fears. In this 
matter, though, the steadfast man is 
distinguished from the inconstant man in two 
ways. First, as regards the quality of the danger 
that is feared; for the steadfast man follows 
right reason, by which he knows what may be 
good to do or to forgo. 
But always a lesser evil or a greater good 
must be chosen; and thus the steadfast man is 
forced by fear of the greater evil to suffer the 
lesser evil; but he is not forced to the greater 
evil in order to avoid the lesser evil. 
But the inconstant man is forced to the 
greater evil because of fear of the lesser evil; 
for example, to sin out of fear of bodily pain. 
But an obstinate man on the contrary cannot 
even be forced to suffer or do the lesser evil for 
the sake of avoiding the greater evil; wherefore, 
the steadfast man is the mean between the 
inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly, they 
differ as regards the estimation of the imminent 
danger: for the steadfast man is not forced, 
except by a strong and probable judgment, but 
the inconstant man can be forced by a light 
judgment, as in Proverbs 18: 1: the impious 
man flees when no one is pursuing. 
1. The steadfast man, as the Philosopher 
says of a brave man, is intrepid, not because he 
fears nothing, but because he does not fear 
what it is not fitting to fear, or where or when it 
is not fitting. 
2. Sins are the greatest of evils; and 
therefore the steadfast man can in no way be 
forced to them; indeed a man should rather die 
than allow such evils, as the Philosopher also 
says in Book III of the Ethics. But certain 
bodily damages are less than others, which are 
among those particulars that pertain to the 
person, like death, flogging, rape, and 
enslavement. And thus by these things, the 
steadfast man is forced to undergo other bodily 
damages, and these are contained in this verse: 
dishonor or status, flogging, or killing. Nor 
does it matter whether this pertains to one's 
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own person, or one's wife's, or one's children, 
or others like this. 
3. Disgrace, although it is a great damage, 
nevertheless can happen easily to someone; and 
therefore the fear of disgrace is not considered 
as affecting a steadfast man according to the 
laws. 
4. The steadfast man is not forced to lie, 
for at that moment he does wish to give; but 
nevertheless afterward he may wish to seek 
restitution, or at least to appeal to the court, if 
he promised that he would not seek restitution. 
But he can't promise that he won't appeal to the 
court, since this would be against the good of 
justice, to which he cannot be forced--that 
namely, he should act against justice. 
Article 3 
Whether consent under compulsion invalidates 
marriage 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that consent under compulsion 
does not invalidate marriage. For consent is 
required for marriage, just as the intention is 
required for baptism. But someone compelled 
by fear into receiving baptism does receive the 
sacrament. Therefore, also someone compelled 
by some fear to consenting is obliged in 
marriage. 
2. Furthermore, mixed violence, according 
to the Philosopher, has more of the voluntary 
than of the involuntary. But consent cannot be 
compelled other than by mixed violence. 
Therefore, it does not entirely exclude the 
voluntary; and thus there still is a marriage. 
3. Furthermore, someone who was 
compelled to consent in marriage, should be 
counseled it seems to remain in that marriage: 
for promising and not keeping one's promise 
has a species of evil, from which the Apostle 
wishes us to abstain. But this would not be the 
case, if consent under compulsion did away 
with marriage altogether. 
To the contrary is what the decretals say: 
Since consent does not take place where grave 
fear or compulsion intervene, it is necessary 
that where common consent is required, the 
matter of compulsion is excluded. But in 
marriage, common consent is required. 
Therefore, etc . . . 
Moreover, marriage signifies the union of 
Christ to the Church, which is made according 
to the freedom of love. Therefore, it cannot 
happen by compelled consent. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. In addition. It seems that compelled 
consent at least on the part of the one coercing, 
would cause marriage.For marriage is a sign of 
spiritual union. But spirtual union, which 
happens through charity, can exist toward 
someone who does not have charity. Therefore, 
also a marriage to someone who does not wish 
it. 
2. Furthermore, if some woman who had 
been coerced, afterward gave her consent, it 
would be a valid marriage. But the man who 
had coerced her in the first place, would not be 
bound by her consent. Therefore, he was bound 
in the marriage by the first consent. 
But to the contrary, marriage is an equal-
sided (aequiparantiae) relation. But such a 
relation is equally in both members. Therefore 
if there should be an impediment on the part of 
one, there will not be a marriage on the part of 
the other. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. In addition. It seems that neither does 
marriage happen by conditional consent. For 
what is placed under a condition, is not simply 
enunciated. But in marriage it is necessary that 
the words be simply expressive of consent. 
Therefore, a condition of any consent would 
not cause marriage. 
2. Furthermore, a marriage must be 
certain. But where something is said under a 
condition, it is subject to doubt. Therefore, such 
consent does not cause marriage. 
But to the contrary, in other contracts an 
obligation is made under a condition, and it 
stands as long as the condition is fulfilled. 
Therefore, since marriage is a certain contract, 
it seems that it could be done by conditioned 
consent. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question, that the 
marriage bond is perpetual: wherefore, what is 
opposed to perpetuity, invalidates marriage. 
But fear grave enough to affect a steadfast man 
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removes the perpetuity of the contract, for 
restitution can be sought it its entirety: for the 
kind of compulsion from fear that would affect 
a steadfast man, and no other kind, destroys 
marriage. But a steadfast man is judged 
virtuous, which is the measure of all human 
works, as the Philosopher says in Book III of 
the Ethics, chapters 9 and 10. But certain 
people379 say that if consent is present, even 
though compelled, there is an inner marriage 
before God, but not as regards one's state in the 
Church, which presumes there to have been no 
interior consent because of fear. But this is 
nothing: for the Church should not presume a 
sin of anyone without it being proved. A person 
has sinned, however, if he has said that he 
consented, and did not consent. Wherefore the 
Church presumes him to have consented, but it 
judges consent that has been extorted to be 
insufficient for causing matrimony. 
1. Intention is not an efficient cause of the 
sacrament in baptism, but only elicits the action 
of the agent. But consent is the efficient cause 
in marriage, and therefore, it is not similar. 
2. Not every voluntariety is sufficent for 
marriage, but only complete voluntariety: for it 
must be perpetual, and therefore it is impeded 
by mixed violence. 
3. It should not always be concluded in 
this situation that a person should remain in a 
marriage, but only when a danger is feared 
from its dissolution; but anyway he would not 
sin, for not to keep a promise that someone 
made unwillingly, is not a species of evil. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it must be said that 
marriage is a certain relation, and a relation 
cannot arise in one extreme without happening 
in the other; so whatever impedes marriage in 
one, impedes it in the other. For someone 
cannot be a husband without a wife, nor a wife 
without a husband, just as neither can someone 
be a mother without a child. And thus it is 
commonly said that marriage cannot limp along 
on one foot. 
1. Although an act of a lover can pass to 
someone who does not love, nevertheless, the 
union between them cannot be unless there is 
                                                 
379 Huguccio, according to William of Rennes, 
(Opera Omnia, T. 12:  Summa Theologiae, Tertia 
Pars et Supplementum. (Romae: Leoninum, 1906), 
Praefatio in Supplementum, p. xxiii.) 
mutual loving. And thus the Philosopher says 
in Book 8 of the Ethics, that friendship, which 
consists in a certain union, requires love in 
return. 
2. By the free consent of the one who was 
formerly compelled, a marriage does not 
happen, unless to the degree that the preceding 
consent remains in the other party to its full 
strength. Wherefore if he should dissent, no 
marriage would occur. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
The condition set forth either has to do 
with the present or with the future. If it 
concerns the present, and it is not contrary to 
marriage, it is either honorable or dishonorable, 
and the marriage stands if the condition is 
fulfilled, and it does not stand if it is not 
fulfilled. But if it is contrary to the goods of 
marriage, it does not bring about a marriage, as 
was also said about betrothals. But if the 
condition has to do with the future: either it is a 
necessary condition like the sun rising 
tomorrow; and then there is a marriage, for 
such future things are already present in their 
causes; or it is a contingent condition, such as 
the giving of money, or the acceptance of the 
parents. And then the judgment is the same of 
such consent as of consent that is made in 
terms of the future: so that it does not cause 
marriage. 
And by this the answers to the objections 
are clear. 
Article 4 
Whether someone can be compelled to marriage by 
the command of his father 
1. It seems that someone could be 
compelled to contract marriage by his father's 
command, for Colossians 3:20 states, sons, 
obey your parents in all things. Therefore also 
in this they are bound to obey them. 
2. Furthermore, in Genesis 28, Isaac 
commanded Jacob that he not take a wife from 
among the daughters of Canaan. But he would 
not have commanded unless he were able to 
command by law. Therefore a son is bound to 
obey his father in this. 
3. Furthermore, no one must promise, 
especially by an oath, on behalf of someone 
else whom he cannot compel to keep the 
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promise. But parents promise future marriages 
on behalf of their children, and even strengthen 
it with an oath. Therefore they can force their 
children to fulfill it by their command. 
4. Furthermore, the spiritual father, 
namely the Pope, can compel a spiritual 
marriage by his precept, namely for someone 
receiving the episcopate. Therefore a carnal 
father can do this for a carnal marriage. 
But to the contrary, if the father 
commands marriage, the son can enter religious 
life without sinning. Therefore, he is not bound 
to obey him in this. 
Moreover, if he were bound to obey, the 
betrothal contracted by the parents without the 
consent of the children would be binding. But 
this is against his rights. Therefore, etc. . . 
I answer that since marriage is like a 
certain perpetual servitude, a father cannot 
compel his child to marry by his command, 
since the child is of a free condition. But he can 
induce him by reasonable grounds, and then the 
son is subject to this reason as he is to the 
command of his father. And if this reason 
compels him out of necessity or honor, the 
command of his father will also compel him in 
the same way, otherwise not. 
1. The words of the Apostle are not to be 
understood concerning those matters in which 
the son is as free as the father; and marriage is 
one of these, by which a son becomes a father. 
2. Jacob was bound to do what Isaac 
commanded for other reasons as well, whether 
because of the malice of those women, or 
because the seed of Canaan was about to be 
dispersed from the land which had been 
promised to the seed of the patriarchs; and 
therefore Isaac could command. 
3. They do not swear except under a 
certain understood condition: that the children 
will agree; and they are obligated to bring them 
up in good faith. 
4. Certain people say that the Pope cannot 
command someone to accept the episcopate: 
for consent should be free. But if this were 
held, the ecclesiastical order would perish. For 
unless someone can be compelled to undertake 
the rule of the Church, the Church could not be 
preserved; since the men most suited would 
never want to undertake this unless they were 
compelled. And thus it should be said that it is 
not the same thing here, for there is no bodily 
servitude in spiritual marriage as in corporeal 
marriage: for spiritual marriage is a certain 
office of administering the common welfare; 1 
Corinthians 4:1: so let man consider us, as 
ministers of Christ. 
Exposition 
The legates of the prince drew back from 
the Jordan. It seems that a marriage cannot be 
done by intermediaries, for if before the arrival 
of the mediary, one of the parties should 
change his mind, there would be no marriage. 
And it must be said that someone can establish 
another as his proxy for the purpose of 
consenting: nevertheless, if beforehand he 
should change his mind about consenting, it is 
not a marriage, whether in the truth of the 
matter, nor according to the judgment of the 
Church, if by some signs he should appear to 
have changed his mind. But by the fact that 
consent happened through intermediaries, the 
marriage holds as if he himself had done it. 
But he is proved to consent who does not 
openly contradict. This is understood as to the 
forum of the Church: for as to the forum of 
conscience, if internally he should dissent 
although externally he does not make any 
protest, there is no marriage. 
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DISTINCTION 30 
After the Master has showed that 
matrimonial consent is impeded by 
compulsion, here he shows that it is impeded 
by error; and this distinction is divided into 
three parts: in the first he considers the 
impediment of error; in the second, concerning 
the consent that there was in the marriage of 
the Blessed Virgin, where he says, Something 
should be added to the foregoing; in the third 
part, concerning the final cause of matrimony, 
where he says, having set forth what is the 
efficient cause of marriage, it follows that we 
should show the reason for which marriage is 
usually contracted, or should be contracted. 
About this he does three things. First he shows 
which error impedes marriage; secondly, he 
objects to the contrary, where he says, But it is 
objected about Jacob, etc.; thirdly, he resolves 
it, where he says, But what was done in a 
mystery there, is an exploit not handed down 
immorally. Something should be added to the 
foregoing. Now he considers the consent that 
there was in the marriage of the Blessed Virgin; 
and concerning that the does two things: first 
he shows what kind of consent that was; 
secondly he shows that that marriage was 
complete, where he says Between them, as 
Augustine says, was a complete marriage. 
Having set forth what is the efficient cause of 
marriage, etc. Then he considers the final 
cause of marriage; and first concerning the 
causes of marriage in general; secondly the 
causes of the marriage of the Blessed Virgin, 
where he says: However the marriage of Mary 
and Joseph had other special reasons. 
Concerning the first he does two things: first he 
sets forth the final causes of marriage, both 
principal and secondary; secondly, excludes 
error, where he says: Nor should we agree with 
those who say that a marriage that is 
contracted for these less honorable reasons, is 
not a marriage. Whereby he does two things: 
first he shows that an evil aim does not mean 
that there will not be a valid marriage, where he 
says: and although a marriage may be 
contracted with no good aim, when the beauty 
of the one contracting is what moves the soul, 
nevertheless the marriage is valid. Here there is 
a twofold question. First, concerning marriage 
in general. Second, concerning the marriage of 
the Blessed Virgin. 
QUESTION 1 
Concerning the first question, three things 
are to be asked: 1) Whether error impedes 
matrimony by its very nature; 2) Which errors? 
3) On the final cause of matrimony. 
Article 1 
Whether error should be considered an impediment 
to marriage per se 
1. It seems that error should not be 
considered an impediment to marriage per se. 
For consent, which is the efficient cause of 
marriage, is impeded in the same way as the 
voluntary. But the voluntary, according to the 
Philosopher in Book 3 of the Ethics. Chapter 7, 
is considered to be impeded by ignorance, 
which is not the same thing as error: since 
ignorance means no cognition; while error does 
not: for error is to take false things for true, 
according to Augustine. Therefore, not error, 
but rather ignorance, should have been counted 
here as an impediment to marriage. 
2. Furthermore, the only thing that can 
impede marriage by its very nature is what is 
contrary to the goods of marriage. But error is 
not. Therefore, error, of its own nature, does 
not impede marrage. 
3. Furthermore, as consent is required for 
marriage, so also is intention required for 
baptism. But if someone baptizes John and 
believes that he baptizes Peter, nevertheless 
John is validly baptized. Therefore error does 
not exclude marriage. 
4. Furthermore, between Leah and Jacob 
there was a valid marriage. But there was an 
error there. Therefore, error does not exclude 
marriage. 
But to the contrary is what is said in the 
digests: What is so contrary to consent as 
error? But consent is required for matrimony. 
Therefore, error impedes matrimony. 
Moreover, consent is called something 
voluntary. But error impedes the voluntary, 
since the voluntary, according to the 
Philosopher, and Gregory of Nyssa, and John 
Damascene, is what has its principle in 
someone knowing particulars, for an action is 
about particulars. And this does not happen in 
someone who errs. Therefore, error impedes 
matrimony. 
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I answer that whatever impedes a cause, of 
its very nature likewise impedes the effect. But 
consent is the cause of matrimony, as was said; 
and therefore, whatever does away with 
consent, does away with marriage. But consent 
is an act of the will, which presupposes the act 
of the intellect. Yet when the first is lacking, 
the second will necessarily not happen. 
Therefore, when error impedes cognition, a 
defect of consent results as well, and 
consequently, a defect in the marriage. And 
therefore, by natural law, error can do away 
with marriage. 
1. Ignorance differs, simply speaking, 
from error: for ignorance by its very nature 
does not carry any act of the intellect: but error 
forms a perverse judgment of reason about 
something. However, as concerns what 
impedes willing, it makes no difference 
whether it is called ignorance or error, for no 
ignorance can impede willing unless it has 
error attached to it, inasmuch as the act of the 
will presupposes estimation or judgment of 
something it is directed toward. Wherefore, if 
there is ignorance, there is necessarily error: 
and for this reason error is also counted as if it 
were a proximate cause. 
2. Although error is not in itself contrary 
to marriage, it is contrary to marriage as 
regards its cause. 
3. The baptismal character is not caused 
directly by the intention of the one baptizing, 
but by the material element being outwardly 
applied. However the intention works only as 
directing the material element to the proper 
effect. But the conjugal bond is caused directly 
by consent; and therefore it is not similar. 
4. As the Master says in the text, the 
marriage which was between Leah and Jacob 
was not completed by the fact that they slept 
together through an error, but by the consent 
which was supplied afterward. However both 
parties were excused from sin, as is clear from 
the text. 
Article 2 
Whether any error may impede matrimony 
1. To the second article we proceed thus. 
It seems that any error might impede 
matrimony, and not only error of condition or 
of persons, as is stated in the text. For what 
applies to something secundum se, applies to its 
entire extent. But error by its very nature 
contains what would impede marriage, as was 
said. Therefore, any error may impede 
marriage. 
2. Furthermore, if error impedes marriage 
because of the kind of thing it is, then a greater 
error should impede more greatly. But the error 
of faith, which is in heretics who do not believe 
in this sacrament, is greater than the error of the 
person. Therefore, it should impede more than 
the error about the person. 
3.  
Furthermore, error does not void marriage 
except insofar as it takes away the voluntary. 
But ignorance of any circumstance whatsoever 
destroys the voluntary, as is evident in Book 3 
of the Ethics. Therefore, not only the errors of 
person or of condition can impede matrimony. 
4. Furthermore, just as the condition of 
slavery is an accident added to a person, so also 
is the quality of the body or of the soul. But the 
error of condition impedes marriage. Therefore, 
by the same reasoning, should the error of 
quality or of fortune. 
5. Furthermore, just as slavery or liberty 
belongs to the condition of the person, so also 
nobility or being base-born, either dignity of 
status or its absence. But the error of the 
condition of liberty or slavery impedes 
marriage; so an error in the other things 
mentioned should also. 
6. Furthermore, just as the condition of 
slavery impedes marriage, so also disparity of 
worship, and impotence to have intercourse, as 
will be said later. Therefore, just as the error of 
condition sets an impediment to marriage, so 
also should an error about other things of this 
kind should be listed as an impediment to 
marriage. 
But to the contrary, it seems that neither 
would an error of person impede marriage. 
Since just as a purchase is a certain contract, so 
also is marriage. But in buying and selling if 
one is given gold equivalent to some other 
gold, it does not impede the sale. Therefore, 
neither should marriage be impeded if in place 
of one woman another is received. 
Furthermore, it can happen that two 
people may be detained for many years by one 
such error, and they may have sons and 
daughters together. But it would be very 
burdensome to say then that they should 
separate. Therefore, an error in the beginning 
should not thwart marriage. 
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Furthermore, it can happen that the brother 
of the man to whom a woman believes she has 
consented presents himself to her in his 
brother's place, and mingles carnally with her. 
Therefore it seems that she could not return to 
the one to whom she believed she had 
consented, but should remain with his brother; 
and thus the error of the person does not 
impede marriage. 
I answer that just as the error that causes 
something to be involuntary may excuse it as 
sin, so also error may impede matrimony in the 
same way. However, error does not excuse 
from sin, unless it be an error of a circumstance 
whose presence or absence makes a difference 
of licit or illicit in the act. For if someone 
strikes his father with an iron rod, which he 
believes to be wooden, he is not excused 
completely, although perhaps somewhat; but if 
someone believes he strikes his son for the sake 
of discipline, and he strikes instead his father, 
he is excused from all, if all due reasonable 
care has been taken. Whence it is necessary 
that the error which impedes marriage be an 
error of what pertains to the essence of 
matrimony. However marriage itself is 
contained in two things: namely, persons who 
are joined and the mutual power over each 
other, in which marriage consists. The first, 
however, is taken away by an error in the 
person, the second by the error of condition, 
since a slave cannot transfer power over his 
own body to another without the consent of his 
master, and because of this these two errors 
impede marriage, and not others. 
1. Error does not impede marriage from 
the nature of a genus, but from the nature of an 
added difference; namely, according as it is an 
error concerning the essence of marriage. 
2. The error of a non-believer about 
marriage has to do with the consequences of 
marriage, as whether it is a sacrament, or if it is 
licit; and therefore this kind of error does not 
impede marriage, just as neither does an error 
about baptism impede the reception of the 
character, provided that one intends to do or to 
receive what the Church gives, however much 
he believes it to be nothing. 
3. Not all kinds of ignorance of 
circumstance cause something to be 
involuntary such that it is excused from sin, as 
was said above; and because of this, the 
argument does not follow. 
4. Diversity of fortune does not change 
anything that belongs to the essence of 
marriage, nor does diversity of quality, in the 
way that the condition of servitude does; and 
therefore the argument does not follow. 
5. An error about nobility as such does not 
do away with marriage for the same reason that 
neither does an error about a quality. But if the 
error about nobility or dignity amounts to an 
error about the person, then it impedes 
marriage; whence if the consent of the woman 
is intended directly to that person, an error 
about his nobility does not impede the 
marriage. If however, she directly intends to 
consent to the son of the king, no matter who 
that might be, and then if another should be 
presented to her as the son of the king, it is an 
error of the person and it would impede 
marriage. 
6. Error of those impediments to marriage 
that make persons ineligible, also impedes 
marriage. But he does not mention errors in 
those things, since they impede marriage 
whether there be an error or not. As, for 
example, if someone contracts with a 
subdeacon, whether she knows it or not, there 
is no marriage. But the condition of slavery 
does not impede, if the slavery is known, and 
therefore there is no comparison. 
7. Money is received in contracts as the 
measure of other things, and not as if it were 
sought for its own sake, as is clear from Book 5 
of the Ethics. And therefore, if that money 
which is owed is not given, but rather some 
equivalent thing, nothing prevents the contract. 
But if there be an error about something sought 
for itself, it would impede the contract, as if, 
for example, a donkey were sold in place of a 
horse. And it is likewise in the case proposed. 
8. However long he may have been with 
her, unless he wants to consent anew, there is 
no marriage. 
9. If beforehand she had not consented to 
his brother, she can keep the one whom she 
received by error. Nor can she return to his 
brother, especially if she has been carnally 
known by the one whom she received. If 
however she had consented to the first man in 
words of the present, she cannot have the 
second while the first is living; but she can 
either leave secular life, or return to the first: 
and ignorance excuses the sin committed, just 
as it would also be excused after the marriage, 
if she were fraudulently known by someone 
related to her husband, since the fraud of 
another should not prejudice one's own rights. 
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Article 3 
Whether matrimony takes place when someone 
gives consent for dishonorable reasons 
1. It seems that marriage cannot exist by 
someone's giving consent for dishonorable 
reasons. For the account of one thing is one. 
But marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it 
cannot happen by the intention of another end, 
rather than that end to which God has instituted 
it, namely, the procreation of children. 
2. The joining of marriage is from God, as 
is clear from Matt 19:6: whom God has joined, 
let no man put asunder. But the marital union 
that is made for base reasons is not from God. 
Therefore, it is not a marriage. 
3. Furthermore, in other sacraments if the 
intention of the Church is not preserved, it is 
not a valid sacrament. But the intention of the 
Church in the sacrament of marriage is not for 
the sake of any base reason. Therefore, if 
marriage is contracted for some base reason, it 
will not be true marriage. 
4. Furthermore, according to Boethius, 
what has a good end is itself good. Therefore, it 
is not marriage if it is made for an evil end. 
5. Furthermore, marriage signifies the 
conjoining of Christ and the Church. But no 
baseness exists there. Therefore, neither can 
marriage be contracted for a base reason. 
But to the contrary, whoever baptizes 
someone with the intention of making money, 
baptizes truly. Therefore also someone who 
contracts with someone else, with the intention 
of making money, has a true marriage. 
Furthermore, the same idea is proved by 
the examples and authorities who are cited in 
the text. 
I answer that the final cause of matrimony 
can be taken in two ways: namely per se and 
per accidens. Indeed, the cause of marriage per 
se is that to which marriage is of itself 
ordained, and this is always good; namely the 
procreation of children, and the avoidance of 
fornication. But its final cause per accidens is 
that which the contracting parties intend from 
this marriage. And since what is intended from 
a marriage follows upon a marriage; and prior 
things are not changed by what comes later, but 
rather the reverse; therefore, the marriage does 
not receive goodness or badness from that 
cause. But the contractants themselves do, 
since it is their end per se. And since per 
accidens causes are infinite, such causes of 
marriage can be infinite, some of them being 
honorable and others dishonorable. 
1. To the first it should be said that it is 
true of a per se and principal cause; but what 
has one per se and principal end can have many 
secondary per se ends and infinite accidental 
ends. 
2. "Conjoining" can be taken for the 
relation itself which is marriage and as such it 
is always from God, and it is good no matter 
what the reason for which it was made: or it 
can be taken for the act of those who are 
joined, and in this way it is sometimes evil, and 
is not from God, simply speaking. Neither is it 
unfitting that some effect be from God, of 
which the cause is evil; like children who are 
conceived through adultery. For it is not from 
that cause insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it 
has something of good, that it is from God, 
although it is not simply from God. 
3. The intention of the Church which 
intends to give the sacrament is necessary to 
any sacrament, so that nothing happens in the 
sacraments when it is not observed; but the 
intention of the Church which intends the 
benefit coming from the sacrament, has to do 
with the sacrament being well-done and not 
with what is necessary to it. Whence, if this is 
not observed, nonetheless there is a true 
sacrament; but the one neglecting this intention 
sins; just as if in baptism one did not intend the 
health of the soul which the Church intends. 
Likewise, that man who intends to contract 
marriage, however much his marriage is not 
ordained to the end that the Church intends, 
nevertheless, contracts a valid marriage. 
4. That evil intent is not the end of 
marriage, but of the ones contracting marriage. 
5. The union itself is a sign of the 
conjoining of Christ and his Church, the action 
of the ones uniting is not; therefore the 
argument does not follow. 
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QUESTION 2 
Next is inquired about the marriage of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary, and about this three 
things are to be asked: 1. concerning the vow 
and the marriage of the Blessed Virgin; 2. 
whether this marriage was perfect; 3. whether it 
was ever consummated, as Elvidius said. 
Article 1 
Concerning the vow and the marriage of the Blessed 
Virgin 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that the Blessed Virgin should 
not have vowed virginity. For in the law a curse 
was due to those who do not leave any of their 
seed upon the earth, as is clear from 
Deuteronomy 7. But the status of the law has 
endured until now. Therefore she should not 
have vowed virginity. 
2. Furthermore, the vow of virginity 
belongs to the counsels of perfection. But such 
perfection should have been begun by Christ, 
who came to complete the law with the 
counsels. 
But to the contrary, in the mother of Christ 
should have been every perfection. But the vow 
of virginity is of greatest perfection. Therefore 
it should not have been absent in her. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
Moreover, it seems that she should not 
have been joined in matrimony 
1. Since for those vowing virginity, not 
only marrying but even wishing to marry is 
blamable, as Jerome says. But nothing 
blamable should be in the Blessed Virgin. 
Therefore, after she vowed virginity, she 
should not have married. 
2. Furthermore, vowing virginity would 
expose one to danger, if one were to hand 
oneself over to the power of a man. But this is a 
sin. Therefore, the Blessed Virgin should not 
have handed herself over to the power of 
another in marriage; therefore, neither should 
she have married. 
3. Furthermore, whoever consents in 
marriage, consents in some way to carnal 
intimacy, at least implicitly. But consenting to 
carnal intimacy diminishes in some degree the 
purity of virginity, at least as regards the spirit 
of virginity. Since then, to the mother of God 
was due such purity, that greater purity under 
God could not be understood, as Anselm says, 
it seems that she should not have married. 
But to the contrary is what is said in Matt 
1:18: When the Mary, the mother of Jesus, was 
espoused to Joseph; in the text and in the gloss. 
Furthermore, Christ by his birth had to 
make virginity so commendable, that he did not 
detract from marriage. He could not, however, 
have more greatly affirmed both than by being 
born to a married virgin. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Moreover, it seems that the causes 
ascribed to her marriage in the text are not 
fitting. For the devil, since he had natural 
lucidity, could understand more things by 
natural understanding than man. But man can 
also know through his senses whether someone 
is a virgin. Therefore, much more powerfully 
was the devil able to know this. 
2. Furthermore, the devil knows well that 
that girl is a virgin who was never united with a 
man. But the devil could have known that 
Joseph never had been united with her carnally. 
Therefore, by the fact that she was married, the 
Mother of God's virginity was not hidden from 
him. 
3. Furthermore, the mystery of the divinity 
of Christ was shown to be not less miraculous 
than the virginity of his mother. But the devil 
saw that miracle, so it is not fitting that the 
mystery of Jesus' incarnation was concealed 
from him by the marriage of his mother. 
4. Besides, if she were not married, she 
could not have been stoned under suspicion of 
fornication, as with adultery. Therefore, it 
seems that it was not for this that it was 
necessary for her to marry. 
5. Furthermore, from the fact that she had 
married, the Jews who discovered the 
Scripture, Behold a virgin shall conceive, were 
more built up against the faith; and thus the 
virginity of the mother should not have been 
hidden. 
6. Besides, Christ came so that he might 
suffer our labors, and by this fact, take them 
away. Therefore it was not fitting that his 
mother should have a husband for his service. 
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Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer that in the Blessed Virgin had to 
display everything that was of perfection. 
However at the time, marriage was preferred to 
virginity because of the expectation of blessed 
children coming by the way of generation, 
although nevertheless, virginity is the best 
thing in itself. Therefore the Blessed Virgin 
vowed virginity as the most excellent thing and 
the thing most acceptable to herself, not though 
simply speaking, but under the most honorable 
condition, that is, unless God should will 
otherwise. Nor was that condition added as 
though she was unsure whether she wanted to 
remain a virgin, but whether she should; and 
this is what Augustine says in the text, that she 
proposed that she would persevere as a virgin, 
unless God commanded otherwise. 
1. The Blessed Virgin was the threshold 
between the Old Law and the New, as dawn is 
between night and day; and thus in her vow she 
was sensitive to the New Law, inasmuch as she 
vowed virginity; as well as the old, inasmuch 
as she attached conditions to it. 
2. The perfection of the counsels as 
regards their consummation had to have been 
begun by Christ. But as regards a certain 
inchoation, it was fittingly begun by his 
mother. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it is to be said that 
it was fitting for the mother of Christ to be 
joined in marriage because of the reasons given 
in the text, and also for other reasons, of which 
the first is that it signified the Church, which is 
virgin and bride. Secondly, so that through 
Joseph the geneology of Mary might be woven: 
for it was not the custom of the Hebrews to 
compute the geneology on the part of the 
woman. Third, so that the excuse might be 
taken away from virgins, if they were disgraced 
by fornication. Fourth, so that Christ might 
affirm marriage by his birth. Fifth, so that the 
greater perfection of virginity might be 
displayed in the Blessed Virgin, since she 
remained a virgin even in matrimony. 
1. After the vow of virginity made 
absolutely, a person cannot consent to marriage 
without sinning; for if it were solemnly vowed, 
it would not be a valid marriage. If, however, it 
were a simple vow, a valid marriage is what 
would follow, although those contracting it 
would sin. Yet the vow of the Blessed Virgin 
was not made solemnly, but simply expressed 
in her heart; neither was it absolute, but under 
condition, as is clear from the text; and 
therefore, she could consent to marriage 
without sinning and by the special counsel of 
the Holy Spirit, to whose management her vow 
was conditionally subject. 
2. Before the Blessed Virgin contracted 
with Joseph, she was assured by divine 
inspiration that Joseph had been similarly 
promised; and therefore she did not expose 
herself to danger by marrying him. Nor did any 
of the truth perish because of this, since that 
intention was not conditionally added to the 
consent, for such a condition, since it would be 
against one of the goods of matrimony, namely 
the procreation of children, would invalidate 
the marriage. 
3. Carnal intimacy was included implicitly 
in the consent of the Blessed Virgin, just as act 
is implicitly contained in potency, as is evident 
from what was said above, in Distinctio 28, Qu. 
1, Art. 4. The potentiality for carnal intimacy, 
however, is not contrary to virginity, nor did it 
diminish anything of her own purity unless by 
reason of the act itself, which was certainly 
never in the design of the Blessed Virgin, since 
she was already assured that the act would 
never occur. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it is to be said that 
the reasons which are set forth in the text are 
fitting. The first is taken on the part of the One 
conceived, namely that the birth be concealed 
from the devil; the second on the part of the 
mother, namely that she not be stoned; and the 
third reason is on the part of Joseph, that he 
might serve the mother and the child, and 
furnish testimony of her virginity. 
1. By his natural understanding the devil 
could perceive well the virginity of the Mother 
of God despite the fact that she had married, 
unless he was prevented by divine power from 
the accurate examination of what was about 
her. 
2. And the answer to the second objection 
is similar. 
3. By another miracle he could not 
manifestly recognize Jesus as the Son of God: 
since at the same time he saw in Him signs of 
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weakness and strength; whence if sometimes 
something of His divinity was confessed, it 
proceeded more from presumption than from 
certitude. But this, because of the foregoing 
prophecy, would have been the most certain 
sign of the living Son of God. 
4. Stoning implies disrepute: or since on 
her mother's side she was of a priestly lineage; 
which is clear from the fact that Elizabeth, who 
was of the daughters of Aaron, is said to have 
been related to her (Luke 1). However, the 
daughter of a priest, apprehended in unchastity, 
even if unmarried, was to be burned, as is clear 
from Leviticus 21; but on her father's side, she 
was of the line of David. For the daughters of 
Aaron were able to be joined in marriage with 
those of the royal tribe or also with any of the 
other tribes, by the fact that they did not receive 
an inheritance separate from the other tribes. 
And thus from this fact no confusion could 
have arisen from the prophecy, which 
confusion was the reason for the prohibition 
against contracting marriage between members 
of different tribes. 
5. The Lord preferred to permit the Jews 
to be uncertain of his own divinity rather than 
of the chastity of His mother, for He knew that 
the reputation of virginity is fragile. 
6. Christ did not of necessity have to 
refuse comfort: since this would be more an act 
of perversity than of humility. 
Article 2 
Whether the marriage mentioned was fully a 
marriage 
1. It seems that the marriage described 
was not complete. For a complete marriage 
proceeds from absolute consent. But the 
Blessed Virgin did not seem to have consented 
absolutely in matrimony, as neither did she 
vow absolutely, since in both she committed 
herself to divine governance, as is said in the 
text. Therefore, it was not a perfect marriage. 
2. Furthermore, the signification is of the 
essence of marriage, inasmuch as it is a 
sacrament. But that marriage was not complete 
in its signification, as it says in the text. 
Therefore, 
3. Where the final consummation is 
lacking, there is no true completion. But the 
marriage of the Blessed Virgin was never 
consummated. Therefore it was not truly 
completed. 
4. Furthermore, a marriage is said to be 
complete from the fact that it possesses the 
good of offspring. But that marriage did not 
have the good of offspring, since the child who 
was educated in that marriage was not the 
effect of that marriage, just as neither is an 
adoptive son called a good of marriage. 
Therefore. 
5. After a marriage is complete, one is not 
allowed to send away one's spouse. But Joseph, 
although he was a just man, wanted to send 
Mary away secretly, as it says in Matt 1. 
Therefore, the marriage was not yet complete. 
But to the contrary, the works of God are 
complete (Deut 32:4). But that marriage was 
divinely inspired. Therefore it was complete. 
Furthermore, unless marriage is complete, 
the members are not called spouses (conjuges). 
But Mary was called Joseph's spouse (Matt. 1). 
Therefore a complete marriage existed between 
them. 
I answer that the perfection of marriage is 
twofold. The first refers to its very being, 
which comes to be through consent expressed 
in words of the present. And by such 
perfection, this marriage was complete. The 
other perfection refers to operation, and thus 
this marriage was not complete, for the proper 
act of marriage is carnal intimacy. 
1. The Blessed Virgin consented 
absolutely to marriage, as confirmed by divine 
inspiration. But while consenting thus to 
marriage, she had committed her own virginity 
to God, as it says in the text. 
2. The essence of marriage is not from any 
signification whatsoever, but only that 
signification by which the effect of the 
sacrament is signified; and therefore the 
argument does not follow. 
3. This argument proceeds from the 
second kind of perfection, which is called the 
consummation of a marriage. 
4. A child is not called the good of 
marriage only because he is generated through 
marriage, but also inasmuch as he is accepted 
and educated in marriage; and thus the good of 
this marriage was a child, but not in the first 
way. Neither is a child born of adultery, 
however, or an adoptive son who is educated in 
marriage, a good of marriage; for marriage is 
not ordained to the education of those, as this 
marriage was specially ordained to the end that 
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this child should be received into it and 
educated. 
5. Joseph did not wish to send Mary away 
so that he could take another wife, or because 
of any suspicion, but because he feared to 
cohabit with such holiness because of his 
reverence; whence it was said to him, "Do not 
fear," (Matt.1:20). 
Article 3 
Whether this marriage was ever consummated 
1. It seems that this marriage was 
consummated at some time. For it is said in 
Matt 1:18, before they came together, she was 
found to be with child by the Holy Spirit. And 
in verse 25, he did not know her until she had 
given birth to her first-born son. Therefore it 
seems that afterward, he did know her. 
2. Furthermore, "the first" is said with 
respect to a second. But Christ is called the 
first-born son of the virgin by the authorities 
brought forth. Therefore, after the first, she had 
another; and thus this marriage, at least after 
the birth of Christ, was consummated. 
3. Furthermore, the words of the Gospel 
writer were never lacking in expressing his 
intention. But they never expressed that Joseph 
did not know his wife at all. Therefore, after 
the generation of Christ, the marriage was 
consummated. 
4. Furthermore, Joseph is called the father 
of Christ in many places in the Gospels, and He 
is also said to have had brothers; but this would 
not be if the marriage had never been 
consummated. Therefore, etc. . . 
5. Furthermore, two bodies cannot be in 
the same place at the same time. Therefore, 
Christ could not have exited the womb of his 
mother while leaving her virginity intact; and 
thus it would not have been unfitting for the 
marriage to have been consummated. 
6. Furthermore, Abraham and other fathers 
who enjoyed marriage had the greatest of 
dignity. Therefore, nothing would have been 
lost to the mother of Christ, if she had 
consummated her marriage. 
7. Furthermore, Helvidius objects: if it is 
base thing for Christ for his mother to be 
known after his birth, how much more so for 
him to have been borne through the genitals of 
the virgin. 
But to the contrary, virginity is preferred 
to corruption. But the mother of Christ had to 
be in the most excellent state. Therefore she 
had to be a virgin, and thus her marriage could 
not have been consummated. 
Furthermore, it is not probable that Joseph 
dared to approach the womb that he knew was 
a temple of God, as Jerome says. 
I answer that the mother of Christ 
remained a virgin before the birth, and in the 
birth, and after the birth for all eternity. But the 
Jews and the Ebionites detract from her 
virginity before the birth, saying that Christ 
was born from the seed of Joseph. The 
philosophers, on the other hand, dispute her 
virginity during the birth, saying that two 
bodies cannot be in the same place. But 
Helvidius, a certain idiot and priest, dared to 
calumniate her virginity after the birth; for, 
believing chatter to be eloquence, finding some 
subject to disagree about, he began by 
blasphemies of the Mother of God, saying that 
she had been known by Joseph after the birth of 
Christ. And against him, St. Jerome composed 
a book. 
1. â€˜Before'does not always denote the 
order to what is future according to the truth of 
the matter, but sometimes it is said regarding 
what is expected in the future according to the 
usual course of things: as in, â€˜before he had 
reached twenty years of age, he was dead.' And 
so it is in this situation. And likewise, the 
"until:" sometimes it means that which 
preceded will be terminated by this coming 
thing which is expected, as when it is said, "Sit 
here, until I come"; sometimes, however, not 
this way, as when it is said in 1 Corinth 15:25: 
He must reign until he may place all his 
enemies under his feetâ€”not that the time of 
his reign will be finished at the subjection of 
his enemies, but the subection of the enemies is 
included in the time of the reign. 
2. â€˜Firstborn' is said of the one before 
whom there is no one, notwithstanding there 
may not be another after him. Otherwise only-
begotten sons would not have had the right of 
primogeniture, nor would they have had to be 
offered to God according to the Law, which is 
false. 
3. The evangelists did not mention what is 
more credible, in favor of expressing what is 
less credible. Less believable is it that a virgin 
should conceive (which the evangelists said), 
than that after the birth she should have been 
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preserved a virgin; and therefore, they did not 
take the trouble to say it. 
4. Joseph is called the "foster father" of 
Christ, as is evident from Luke 3. And again, 
Christ was made his adopted son, as certain 
people say. Others, though, were called the 
brothers of Jesus by reason of family relation, 
since they were of the same family: since 
neither did Mary have another son, nor did 
Joseph, who was also a virgin, as it is said. 
5. This is true according to nature; but by 
a miracle it can happen that two bodies are in 
the same place at the same time, as will be 
shown in Distinctio 44. Moreover, that birth 
and conception was entirely miraculous. Some 
even say that Christ assumed the gift of 
subtlety at that time. But the first reason is 
better. 
6. However good might be the state of 
consummated marriage, nonetheless the state of 
virginity is much higher. And this befitted the 
Mother of God. 
7. According to St. Jerome, The more 
humiliating things He suffered for me, the more 
I owe Him; provided that by these things 
nothing is detracted from the perfection of His 
virtue. But the privation of virginity would take 
away from the perfection of His mother as 
regards the virtue of her soul. 
Expositio textus 
For if the devil, transforming himself into 
an angel of light, were believed to be good, this 
is not a dangerous error. This should be 
understood, when it does not proceed to the 
point of adoration, or, if it should, only under 
the condition that it is Christ; otherwise it 
would pose the danger of idolatry. If some 
heretic by the name of Augustine or Ambrose 
were to present himself to another Catholic, 
and were to invite him to imitation of his own 
faith, if that man were to assent, the expression 
of whose faith can he be said to have consented 
to? This is true when it has not proceeded to 
the point of the expression of some error; 
otherwise there would have been the danger of 
infidelity, if someone consented to him. 
She consented to carnal intimacy, not 
explicitly but implicitly, as was said. 
Jacob loved Rachel's comeliness in face 
and in charming appearance. It should be 
known that comeliness of face was not a 
principal reason, but a secondary one; and this 
can be perfectly well without sin, and 
sometimes even without venial sin. If however, 
the sexual desire (libido) for her beauty were 
the principal cause, he would not have been 
excused from mortal sin, if it were unbridled 
sexual desire. 
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DISTINCTION 31 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the master has determined the causes 
by which matrimony itself is constituted, here 
he determines the reasons for its dignity 
(honestas); namely, the goods of the union, by 
which the marital act is dignified; and this is 
divided into two parts: in the first, he 
determines the goods of marriage as regards 
marriage, and this is what we now consider; in 
the second part, he shows how goods of this 
kind existed in the marriage of the patriarchs, 
Distinction 33, where he says, Here we 
consider the ancient fathers, etc. The first part 
is divided into two: first he determines the 
goods of the union for which the marital act is 
excused. Secondly, he determines about the 
marital act, which is excused through the 
aforementioned goods, according as it has the 
nature of something owed; Distinctio 32, where 
he says, Also it must be known, since although 
in all other things the man is set over the 
woman . . .yet in paying the debt of marriage 
they are equals. The first of these points is 
divided in two: first he determines how the 
goods of the union are found in marriage; 
secondly he shows when the conjugal act may 
be excused for their sake: Therefore when these 
three goods converge in any marriage at the 
same time, they avail to the excuse of sexual 
relations. The first has two parts: in the first he 
shows what the three goods of the union are; in 
the second, how they are ordered to marriage: 
It should be known that a marriage is 
contracted by some people where these three 
goods do not accompany it. And regarding this 
he does two things: first he shows that one of 
the goods mentioned is found in every 
marriage, namely, the sacrament; although not 
the other twoâ€”that is, fidelity and 
offspringâ€”which at times are absent from a 
marriage in actuality (in actum); and second he 
considers the marriage in which the intention of 
those two things is not preserved: It is often 
asked, when a man and a woman, he not a 
husband and she not the wife of another, 
copulate with each other not for the sake of 
procreating sons, but only for the sake of lying 
together out of incontinence, etc. And 
regarding this he does three things: first he 
considers the marriage in which the good of 
children is not intended; and secondly, one in 
which it is not only not intended, but even 
impeded: Indeed, those who procure drugs of 
sterilization, are not spouses, but are 
fornicators; thirdly, he considers a certain 
related question: here those who procure 
abortions are usually inquired about. 
Therefore, when these three goods concur 
at the same time in any union, they avail to the 
excusing of carnal intercourse. Here he shows 
how the conjugal act is excused by the 
aforementioned goods, and concerning this he 
does two things: first, he determines the truth; 
secondly, he poses objections to the contrary, 
where he says, But if lying together, which is 
the cause of offspring, is free from sin, what 
does the Apostle permit according to 
forbearance? And regarding this he does two 
things: First, he objects to the excusing of the 
matrimonial act, showing that marriage does 
not need an excuse; secondly, he shows that it 
cannot be excused, if is free of sin: But perhaps 
someone might say, etc. And regarding this he 
does two things: first he objects through 
reasoning; secondly through authority: Blessed 
Gregory, however, seems to feel otherwise; and 
each of these is divided into objection and 
resolution, as is clear from the text. 
Here is a twofold question. First, 
concerning the goods of matrimony. Second, 
excusing the marital acts by the aforementioned 
goods. Regarding the first, three things are to 
be sought: 1) whether certain goods should 
excuse matrimony; 2) what and how many they 
might be; 3)how they are ordered to 
matrimony. 
Article 1 
Whether matrimony should have some goods by 
which it may be excused 
1. It seems that marriage should not be 
excused by certain goods. For as the 
conservation of the individual, which occurs 
through those things that pertain to nutrition, is 
intended by nature; so also the conservation of 
the species, which occurs through marriage; 
and much more, as the good of the species is 
much better and more godlike than the good of 
one individual. But no one needs to be excused 
from the act of nourishing himself. Therefore, 
neither from matrimony. 
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2. Furthermore, according to the 
Philosopher, in Book 8 of the Ethics, the 
friendship which is between a husband and 
wife, is natural, and comprises in itself the 
honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. But 
what is honorable in itself does not require any 
excuse. Therefore neither should excuses be 
attributed to matrimony. 
3. Furthermore, marriage was instituted as 
a remedy and an office of nature, as was said 
above in Distinction 23, question 2, articles 1 
and 2. But insofar as it is a office, it does not 
require any excusing, for then it would also 
have needed excusing in Paradise, which is 
false: for there marrying was honorable, and 
the bridal-bed was immaculate, as Augustine 
says. Likewise, nor does it require an excuse as 
a remedy, for neither do the other sacraments, 
which were instituted as remedies for sin. 
Therefore marriage does not need excuses like 
this. 
4. Furthermore, the virtues direct us 
toward all things that can be done honorably. If 
therefore marriage can be dignified by certain 
goods, it requires no other dignifying qualities 
than virtues of the soul. And thus no other 
goods should be ascribed to marriage by which 
it may be dignified, as neither are they ascribed 
to other things to which virtues direct us. 
But to the contrary, wherever an 
indulgence is given, there is necessarily some 
ratio of excuse. But marriage is conceded to 
the state of our weakness according to 
indulgence, as is evident from 1 Cor 7. 
Therefore it is necessary for it to be excused by 
certain goods. 
Furthermore, matrimonial sleeping 
together and fornication are of the same species 
of nature. But fornication is disgraceful in 
itself. Therefore, for matrimonial intercourse 
not to be disgraceful, it is necessary that 
something be added to it which carries with it 
dignity, and draws it into another species of 
moral act. 
I answer that no wise man should endure 
any forfeiture unless for the sake of some 
recompense of something of equal or better 
good; whence the choice of something which 
has some forfeiture attached to it requires the 
acquisition of some good, by which 
recompense it is ordered and dignified. In the 
union of a man and a woman, however, the 
forfeiture of reason occurs: for, at the moment 
of extreme pleasure, reason is eclipsed, so that 
it cannot understand anything while it lasts, as 
the Philosopher says: on the other hand, 
because of the tribulation of the flesh, which it 
befits such people to maintain out of concern 
for temporal things, as is clear from 1 Cor 7; 
and therefore, the choice of such a union 
cannot be ordered, unless through the 
recompense of certain things by which carnal 
union is said to be dignified. And these things 
are the goods which excuse marriage, and 
render it honorable. 
1. In the act of eating there is not so 
intense a pleasure that it eclipses reason, as in 
the aforementioned delectation. Both because 
the generative power, through which original 
sin is transmitted, is infectious and corrupt, 
while the nutritive power, by which it is not 
transmitted, is corrupt but not infectious; and 
because anyone senses more a defect in himself 
as an individual than the defect of the species. 
Whence to stimulate someone to eat, which 
remedies a defect in the individual, the feeling 
of that very defect suffices. But to induce 
someone to the act which remedies the defect 
of the species, divine providence has attached 
delectation to that act, which also moves other 
animals in which there is no infection of 
original sin. And therefore, there is no 
comparison. 
2. Those goods which dignify marriage 
belong to the nature of marriage; and therefore 
it does not need them, like some sort of exterior 
things that dignify it, but like things within it 
causing that dignity which arises from its own 
nature. 
3. Marriage by the very fact that it is both 
office and remedy possesses the ratio of useful 
and dignified; but both of these belong to it 
because it has goods of some kind, by which it 
becomes both useful office, and remedy against 
concupiscence. 
4. An act of virtue is dignified both by 
virtue as by an inducing principle, and by 
circumstances as by its formal principles. In 
this way, however, these goods are related to 
marriage as circumstances are related to an act 
of virtue, because of which the act can be an 
act of virtue. 
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Article 2 
Whether the goods of marriage are adequately 
assigned in the text 
1. It seems that the goods of 
marriageâ€”namely, fidelity, children, and 
sacramentâ€”are inadequately described in the 
text. Since marriage does not only occur among 
men for the procreation and nurturing of 
children; but also for the consortium of a 
shared life for the sake of sharing the labors, as 
is stated in Book 8 of the Ethics. Therefore just 
as offspring are set forth as a good of marriage, 
so also the sharing of labors should be. 
2. Furthermore, the union of Christ and the 
Church, which marriage signifies, is 
accomplished by charity. Therefore among the 
goods of marriage charity should be counted 
rather than faith. 
3. Furthermore, in marriage just as it is 
required that neither spouse approach the bed 
of someone else, so it is also required that each 
one render the marital debt to the other. But the 
first requirement belongs to fidelity, as is stated 
in the text. Therefore also justice should be 
counted among the goods of marriage because 
of the rendering of the debt. 
4. Furthermore, just as indissolubility is 
required in marriage, insofar as it signifies the 
union of Christ and the Church, so also unity, 
that one woman might be for one man. But the 
sacrament which is counted among the three 
goods of marriage refers to indissolubility. 
Therefore there should be something else 
which refers to unity. 
5. But to the contrary, it seems that this list 
is excessive. For a single virtue suffices for 
dignifying a single act. But fidelity is a certain 
virtue. Therefore, it was not necessary to add 
the other two in order to dignify marriage. 
6. Furthermore, something does not 
receive the account of â€˜useful' and â€˜noble' 
from the same thing, since useful and noble are 
divided against each other in the genus of 
â€˜good.' But marriage receives the nature of 
â€˜useful' from offspring. Therefore, offspring 
should not be counted among the goods which 
dignify marriage. 
7. Furthermore, nothing should be set 
forth as a property or condition of itself. But 
these goods are considered certain conditions 
of marriage. Therefore, although marriage is a 
sacrament, the sacrament should not be 
considered among the goods of marriage. 
I answer that marriage is a natural office 
and it is a sacrament of the Church. Inasmuch 
as it is a natural office, therefore, it is ordered 
by two things, like any other act of virtue: one 
of these is required on the part of the agent 
himself, and this is the intention of the due end, 
and thus children are counted as a good of 
marriage; the other is required on the part of 
the act itself, which is good in its genus by the 
fact that deals with its due matter; and thus it is 
fidelity, by which a man approaches his own 
wife, and no other. But in addition, it has a 
certain goodness from the fact that it is a 
sacrament, and this is signified by the very 
name of sacrament. 
1. In the good of offspring is not only to 
be understood procreation of children but also 
their education, to which all sharing of labor 
between a man and a woman joined in 
marriage, is ordered as to an end, for fathers 
naturally store up treasure for their sons, as is 
seen in 2 Cor 12. And thus in the procreation of 
children another end is included, as a secondary 
end in a principal end. 
2. Fides is not taken here as the 
theological virtue faith, but as a part of justice, 
according to which it is named fidelity from the 
fact that things said are done in the observation 
of promises. For in marriage, since it is a 
certain contract, is a certain promise, by which 
a certain man is determined to a certain 
woman. 
3. Just as it is contained in the promise of 
marriage that neither party may approach the 
bed of someone else, so also that both must 
render the debt to each other; and this is even 
more important, since it results from the mutual 
power given each to the other; and therefore, 
both matters belong to fidelity; but in the text is 
stated what is less manifest. 
4. In the good of sacrament, not only 
indissolubility is to be understood, but all those 
things which follow upon marriage being a sign 
of the union of Christ and the Church. Or it 
should be said that the unity that the objection 
touches upon belongs to the good of fidelity in 
the same way that indissolubility belongs to the 
sacrament. 
5. Fides is not here taken as a certain 
virtue, but as a certain condition of virtue, from 
which fidelity is named, which is counted as a 
part of justice. 
6. Just as the due use of a useful good 
receives the account of â€˜noble,' not indeed 
from something useful, but from reason that 
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makes the right use of it, so also the ordering 
toward some useful good can make the 
goodness of nobility from the power of reason 
making the due ordination. And in this way, by 
the fact that marriage is ordained to the 
procreation of children, is useful; and 
nonetheless it is noble inasmuch as it is duly 
ordered. 
7. As the Master says in the text, the good 
of sacrament does not here refer to marriage 
itself, but to its indissolubility, which is a sign 
of the same thing of which marriage is the sign. 
Or it may be said that although marriage is a 
sacrament, nonetheless, it is one thing for 
marriage to be marriage, and something else for 
it to be a sacrament: for it was not only 
instituted in order to be a sign of a holy thing, 
but also that it might be an office of nature; and 
therefore the ratio of the sacrament is a certain 
condition coming to marriage considered in 
itself, from which also it has dignity; and 
therefore its sacramentality, as I will say later, 
is counted among the goods dignifying 
marriage: and according to this, in the third 
good of marriage, i.e. sacrament, is not only to 
be understood indissolubility, but also all those 
things which belong to its signification. 
Article 3 
Whether the sacrament is the foremost of the goods 
of marriage 
1. It seems that sacrament is not the 
principal good among the goods of marriage. 
For the end is most important in anything. But 
the procreation of children is the end of 
marriage. Therefore, the procreation of children 
is more principal among the goods of marriage. 
2. Furthermore, the difference of species, 
which completes the species, is more important 
to the ratio than the genus, just as form is more 
important than matter in the constitution of a 
natural thing. But sacrament belongs to 
marriage under the ratio of its genus; while 
offspring and fidelity belong to it under the 
ratio of difference, insofar as it is this kind of 
sacrament. Therefore, the other two are more 
principal things in marriage than sacrament is. 
3. Furthermore, just as marriage is found 
without children or fidelity, so also it is found 
without indissolubility, as is evident whenever 
one spouse enters religious life before the 
consummation of the marriage. Therefore, 
sacrament is also not chief according to this 
reason. 
4. Furthermore, the effect cannot be more 
important than its cause. But consent, which is 
the cause of marriage, is frequently changed. 
Therefore, marriage also can be dissolved; and 
thus indissolubility is not always concomitant 
with marriage. 
5. Furthermore, sacraments which have 
perpetual effects imprint a character. But in 
marriage, no character is imprinted. Therefore, 
it has no perpetual indissolubility; and thus, just 
as there can be marriage without children, so 
there can also be marriage without sacrament; 
and so the same as was said above. 
But to the contrary, that which is included 
in the definition of a thing is the most essential 
to that thing. But indissolubility, which belongs 
to the sacrament, is included in the definition 
given above of marriage, though not offspring, 
nor fidelity. Therefore, among these things the 
sacrament is more essential to marriage. 
Moreover, divine power, which works in 
the sacraments, is more efficacious than human 
power. But offspring and fidelity belong to 
marriage according as it is an office of human 
nature, while sacrament belongs to it according 
as it is divinely instituted. Therefore, sacrament 
is more important in marriage than the other 
two. 
I answer that something is said to be in a 
certain thing more principally than something 
else in two ways: either because it is more 
essential, or because it is more worthy. If 
because it is more worthy, then in every way 
sacrament is more principal among the three 
goods of the marital union: since it belongs to 
marriage inasmuch as it is a sacrament of 
grace; the other two really belong to it 
inasmuch as it is a certain office of nature. 
However, the perfection of grace is more noble 
than the perfection of nature. If, on the other 
hand, what is more essential were said to be 
more principal, then a distinction should be 
drawn: for fidelity and offspring can be 
considered in two ways. In one way, in 
themselves, and thus they belong to the use of 
marriage, by which both children are produced 
and the conjugal pact is preserved. But 
indissolubility, which the sacrament brings 
with it, belongs to marriage in itself. For by the 
very fact that in their conjugal pact the spouses 
hand themselves over to each other in 
perpetuum, it follows that they may not be 
separated, and for this reason marriage is never 
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found without indissolubility. However, 
marriage is found without fidelity and children, 
since the being of a thing does not depend upon 
its use. And according to this the sacrament is 
more essential to marriage than fidelity and 
offspring. In another way fidelity and children 
can be considered according as they exist in 
their own principles, as the intention of having 
children may be taken in place of the actual 
children, and in place of fidelity, the obligation 
of keeping fidelity, for marriage cannot exist 
without these things, since they are caused in 
marriage by the conjugal pact itself. So that if 
something contrary to these should be 
expressed in the consent which makes 
matrimony, it would not be a valid marriage. 
So by taking fidelity and offspring in this way, 
procreation of children is most essential in 
marriage, and second is fidelity, and third is 
sacrament; as also for a man the being of nature 
is more essential than the being of grace, 
however much the being of grace may be more 
worthy. 
1. The end according to intention is first in 
a thing, but according to sequence, it is last; 
and in the same way children are ordered 
among the goods of marriage; and therefore in 
one way this is the more principal end, and in 
another way not. 
2. Sacrament, even considered as the third 
good of marriage, belongs to marriage as its 
difference. For sacrament is said because of the 
signification of this determined sacred thing, 
which matrimony signifies. 
3. Marriage, according to St. Augustine, is 
a good of mortals; whence in the resurrection 
they will not marry nor be given in marriage, as 
is said in Matt 22; and therefore the bond of 
marriage does not extend beyond the life in 
which it is contracted; and therefore it is called 
indissoluble, for it cannot be dissolved in this 
life; but it can be dissolved through death, 
either a corporeal death after carnal union, or a 
spiritual death after the spiritual union alone. 
4. Although the consent which makes 
matrimony is not perpetual materially, i.e., as 
regards the substance of the actâ€”for the act 
ceases and a contrary act can succeed it. Yet, 
formally speaking, it is perpetual, for it is about 
the perpetuity of the bond, otherwise, it would 
not effect a marriage. For consent to a certain 
woman for a time does not bring about a 
marriage. And I say formally, according as the 
act receives species from its object, and 
according to this marriage receives 
indissolubility from consent. 
5. In those sacraments which imprint a 
character, the power for spiritual acts is 
transmitted. But in marriage it is a power for 
physical acts. Wherefore, by reason of the 
power which the spouses receive from each 
other, marriage belongs with the sacraments in 
which a character is imprinted, and by the fact 
that it has indissolubility, as is stated in the 
text. But it differs from those sacraments 
insofar as that power is for physical acts, and 
because of this it does not imprint a spiritual 
character. 
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QUESTION 2 
Next it should be asked how marriage may 
be excused by the aforementioned goods; and 
regarding this three things are to be asked: 1) 
whether the goods mentioned may excuse the 
marital act, so that it may not be a sin at all; 2) 
whether without them it might ever be excused 
from sin; 3) whether when it is without them it 
is always a mortal sin. 
Article 1 
Whether the marital act may be excused by the 
goods named, so that it is not a sin 
1. It seems that the marital act cannot be 
excused by the goods named, so that there is no 
sin at all. For anyone who endures the loss of a 
greater good because of a lesser good, sins, for 
it is disordered to allow this. But the good of 
reason, which is injured in the conjugal act 
itself, is greater than these three goods of the 
conjugal union. Therefore these goods do not 
suffice to excuse conjugal lying together. 
2. Furthermore, if good were added to evil 
in the genus of moral acts, the whole would be 
made evil, not good. For one bad circumstance 
makes an act evil, but one good circumstance 
does not make it good. But the conjugal act is 
evil in itself, otherwise it would not need to be 
excused. Therefore the goods added to 
marriage cannot make it good. 
3. Furthermore, wherever there is 
immoderation in the passions, there is vice in 
moral acts. But the goods of marriage cannot 
make it so that the delectation of the act is not 
immoderate. Therefore, they cannot excuse it 
from being a sin. 
4. Furthermore, there is no shame 
(verecundia) except from a disgraceful (turpi) 
act, according to Damascene. But the goods of 
marriage do not remove embarrassment 
(erubescentia) from that act. Therefore they 
cannot excuse it. 
But on the contrary, conjugal lying 
together does not differ from fornication except 
by the goods of marriage. If therefore, they did 
not suffice to excuse it, then marriage would 
have remained always illicit; which is against 
what is found above, in Distinction 26, 
Question 1, Article 3. 
Moreover, the goods of matrimony are 
ordered to its act like due circumstances, as 
was said. But such circumstances suffice to 
make an act not evil. Therefore, these goods 
can excuse marriage so that it is in no way a 
sin. 
I answer that a certain act is said to be 
excused in two ways. In one way on the part of 
the one doing it, so that however evil it may be, 
it is not imputed to the doer in guilt, or at least 
not in so much guilt, as ignorance is said to 
excuse sin in whole or in part. In another way, 
an act is said to be excused on the part of itself, 
so that it is not evil; and in this way the goods 
of marriage are said to excuse the matrimonial 
act. Now the same reason that accounts for a 
moral act not being evil is the reason that 
makes it good: for no particular act is 
indifferent, as was said in the Second Book, 
Distinction 40, Article 5. However any human 
act is called good in two ways. In one way, by 
the goodness of virtue, and thus an act is made 
good by those things which place it in the 
mean; and fidelity and the procreation of 
children do this in the marital act, as is clear 
from what has been said. In another way, by 
the goodness of sacrament, according to which 
the act is not only called good but also holy; 
and the marital act has this goodness from the 
indissolubility of the union, according to which 
it designates the union of Christ and his 
Church. And thus it is clear that the things said 
sufficiently excuse the marital act. 
1. By the marital act a man does not incur 
the loss of reason as a habit, but only as regards 
the act. Nor is it unfitting that sometimes a 
certain act, better according to its own genus, is 
interrupted by a certain act of lesser good. For 
this can be done without sin, as is evident in 
someone who ceases contemplation so that he 
may sometimes have time for action. 
2. That argument would hold if the evil 
that inseparably accompanies lying together, 
were the evil of guilt. In this case, however, it 
is not the evil of guilt, but only of punishment, 
which is the disobedience of concupiscence to 
reason. And therefore the argument does not 
follow. 
3. The overflow of passion which causes 
vice does not depend on its quantitative 
intensity, but upon its relation to reason. 
Wherefore passion is only considered 
immoderate when it exceeds the limits of 
reason. However, the delectation which occurs 
in the marital act, no matter how intense it may 
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be according to quantity, nonetheless does not 
exceed the limits fixed for it by reason before 
its beginning, regardless of how incapable 
reason may be to establish them during the 
delectation itself. 
4. That baseness (turpitudo) which is 
always in the marital act and causes 
embarrassment (erubescentia), is the baseness 
of punishment, not guilt. For man is naturally 
embarrassed (erubescit) by any defect. 
Article 2 
Whether the marital act may also be excused 
without the marital goods 
1. It seems that the marital act may also be 
excused without the goods of matrimony. For 
whoever is moved to the marital act by nature 
alone does not seem to intend any good, since 
the goods of matrimony pertain to grace or 
virtue. But when someone is moved to the 
aforementioned act by natural appetite alone, it 
does not seem to be a sin. For nothing natural is 
bad, since evil is contrary to nature and 
contrary to order, as Dionysius says. Therefore, 
the marital act can be excused even without the 
goods of marriage. 
2. Furthermore, the man who avails 
himself of his wife in order to avoid fornication 
does not seem to intend any good of marriage. 
But such a man does not sin, as it seems, since 
for this purpose marriage was conceded to 
human weakness, that fornication might be 
avoided, (1 Corinthians 7). Therefore also 
without the goods of marriage this act may be 
excused. 
3. Furthermore, the man who uses at will 
what is his does not do anything against justice, 
and thus, he does not sin, as it seems. But 
through matrimony the wife becomes the 
husband's, and vice versa. Therefore if they 
avail themselves of each other at will when 
sexual desire (libidine) moves them, it does not 
seem to be a sin. And thus, the same as was 
said before. 
4. Furthermore, that which is made good 
by its genus, is not made bad unless done with 
an evil intention. But the matrimonial act in 
which someone knows his own wife, is good 
by its genus. Therefore, it cannot be bad, unless 
done with a bad intention. But it can be done 
with a good intention even if one does not 
intend any of the goods of matrimony, for 
instance, when someone intends to preserve or 
pursue physical health by it. Therefore it seems 
that also without the goods of marriage, that act 
can be excused. 
But to the contrary, an effect is removed 
by its cause being removed. But the marital 
goods are the cause of the dignity of the marital 
act. Therefore, without them the marital act 
cannot be excused. 
Furthermore, the act in question does not 
differ from the act of fornication except by the 
aforementioned goods. But fornication is 
always evil. Therefore, if it is not excused by 
the goods mentioned, the marital act would also 
always be evil. 
I answer that as the goods of matrimony, 
according as they are habitual, make marriage 
dignified and holy. So also according as they 
are in actual intention, they make the marital 
act dignified as regards those two goods which 
have to do with the act itself. Whence, when 
spouses come together for the sake of the 
procreation of children, or so that they might 
render the debt to one another, which belongs 
to fidelity, they are totally excused from sin. 
But the third good does not pertain to the use of 
marriage, but to its very essence, as was said; 
whence it makes marriage itself dignified, but 
not its act such that through it the act may be 
made sinless because they come together for 
the sake of a certain signification. And 
therefore, only in these two ways do spouses 
come together without any sin whatsoever, 
namely: for the sake of the procreation of 
children, and for rendering the debt. Otherwise, 
however, it is always a sin, at least venially. 
1. Offspring, as a good of the sacrament, 
adds something beyond offspring as the 
intention of nature. For nature intends offspring 
according as the good of the species is 
preserved in them. But in offspring as a good of 
the sacrament of matrimony, it is understood 
that, beyond this, children received are 
ordained to God. Therefore it is necessary that 
nature's intention by which she intends 
children, be referred actually or habitually to 
the intention of children as a good of the 
sacrament; otherwise it would be stuck at the 
level of creation; which cannot happen without 
sin. Therefore, when nature alone moves 
someone to the marital act, he is not excused 
from all sin, unless to the extent that the 
movement of nature is further ordered actually 
or habitually to children as a good of the 
sacrament. Though, neither does it follow that 
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the impulse of nature is evil, but that it is 
imperfect, unless ordered further, to some good 
of matrimony. 
2. If someone intended by the marital act 
to avoid fornication in his spouse, this is not a 
sin; for this is a kind of rendering of the debt, 
which belongs to the good of fidelity. But if he 
intended to avoid fornication in himself, then 
there is here a certain superfluity; and 
according to this it is a venial sin: nor was 
marriage instituted for this, unless according to 
the forbearance (indulgentia) which exists 
about venial sins. 
3. One due circumstance does not suffice 
for an act to be good; and therefore it is not 
necessary that however one uses what is his 
own, that the use be good, but rather when he 
uses it as he should according to all the 
circumstances. 
4. Although to intend the conservation of 
health is not bad, still this intention becomes 
evil, if health is intended from something 
which is not of itself ordained to it, as if 
someone sought only bodily well-being from 
the sacrament of baptism; and it is the same 
way with the marital act in this argument. 
Article 3 
Whether someone sins mortally by knowing his wife 
if he does not intend any good of matrimony, but 
only delectation 
1. It seems that whenever someone knows 
his wife without intending any good of 
matrimony, but only delectation, he sins 
mortally. For Jerome says, as it has in the text: 
Pleasures which are taken in the embraces of 
prostitutes, are damnable in one's wife. But 
something is not said to be damnable unless it 
is a mortal sin. Therefore, to know one's wife 
because of pleasure alone, is always a mortal 
sin. 
2. Furthermore, consenting to delectation 
is a mortal sin, as was stated in Book 2, 
Distinctio 23, Question 2, Article 2 (corpus). 
But whoever knows his wife for the sake of 
delectation, consents to delectation. Therefore 
he sins mortally. 
3. Furthermore, whoever does not refer the 
use of creation to God, enjoys the creature, 
which is a mortal sin. But whoever avails 
himself of his wife because of delectation 
alone, does not refer this use to God. 
4. Furthermore, no one should be 
excommunicated except for mortal sin. But 
someone knowing his wife for the sake of 
sexual desire alone (libidine) is prevented from 
entering the Church as if he were 
excommunicated; as is said in the text. 
Therefore everyone of this kind sins mortally. 
But to the contrary, according to 
Augustine, this kind of sleeping together is 
counted among daily sins, for which one may 
say a Pater Noster, as the text has it. But sins 
like that are not mortal sins. Therefore, etc. 
Moreover, whoever uses food because of 
its delectation alone, does not sin mortally. 
Therefore, the same reasoning applies to 
someone who avails himself of his wife only 
for the sake of sensual desire (libidinis). 
I answer that certain people say that 
whenever sensual desire (libido) principally 
moves someone to the conjugal act, it is a 
mortal sin. But when it moves someone 
secondarily (ex latere), then it is a venial sin. 
However when someone refuses delectation 
altogether, and it displeases him, then it is 
without any venial sin at all. Thus, to seek 
delectation in this act would be mortal sin, to 
accept the delectation offered would be venial 
sin, but to hate it would be a thing of 
perfection. 
But this cannot be: for according to the 
Philosopher in Book 10 of the Ethics, the 
judgment of a delectation and an operation is 
the same: for the delectation of a good 
operation is good, and a bad operation carries 
bad delectation. Whence since the marital act is 
not evil per se, neither will seeking its 
delectation be always a mortal sin. And 
therefore it should be said that if delectation 
should be sought outside the dignity of 
marriage, such that, for example, someone 
should not turn to his wife because she is his 
wife, but only because she is a woman, 
prepared to do the same with her as if she were 
not his wife, that is a mortal sin. And such a 
man is called a too ardent lover of his wife, for 
in fact that ardor is borne outside the goods of 
marriage. If, on the other hand, delectation 
were sought within the limits of marriage, so 
that namely such delectation were not sought in 
any woman but one's wife, then it would be a 
venial sin. 
1. A man seeks a harlot's pleasures in his 
own wife whenever he sees nothing else in her 
than what he might look for in a prostitute. 
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2. Consenting to the delectation of that 
intercourse which is a mortal sin, is a mortal 
sin. However, the delectation of the marital act 
is not so. 
3. Although he does not refer this 
delectation to God in act, nevertheless, he does 
not place in it the final end of his will; 
otherwise he would seek it indifferently 
wherever he could find it. Therefore he does 
not necessarily rest in the enjoyment of a 
creature (fruatur), but he enjoys a creature 
(utitur) for itself. But this is for God's sake 
habitually, although not actually. 
4. This is not said because a man deserves 
excommunication for this sin, but because he 
renders himself unfit for spiritual things, by the 
fact that in this act a man is made to be entirely 
flesh. 
Expositio Textus 
It is usually asked, when a male and a 
female, neither one the spouse of the other, . . . 
come together for intercourse out of 
incontinence alone. Concerning this it was said 
in the preceding distinction, since a bad end 
does not remove the goodness of marriage. 
Indeed, those who procure the drugs of 
sterilization are not spouses, but fornicators. 
This sin, although it is grave, and to be counted 
among wicked deeds, and against nature, for 
even beasts desire offspring; nevertheless, it is 
less grave than murder, since a child conceived 
could still be impeded in another way. Nor is 
such a person to be judged irregular, unless he 
should now procure an abortion for the child 
about to be born. 
Seeds are gradually formed, etc . . . 
Concerning this it is discussed in Book 3, 
Distinction 3. And after the abdomen of the 
wife has swelled, may they not lose the 
children. For although the womb is closed after 
impregnation, yet from delectation, as 
Avicenna says, it is moved and opened, and 
because of this, the danger of miscarriage is 
imminent. Therefore, Jerome censures the 
approach of a man to his pregnant wife. Not, 
however, that such a thing would always be a 
mortal sin, unless perhaps when a probable 
danger of miscarriage is feared. Nor may it be 
changed into that use which is against nature. 
The use of one's wife against nature is when it 
neglects the right vessel, or the right mode 
instituted by nature as to the position. And in 
the first case it is always a mortal sin, for 
children cannot possibly follow, whence the 
intention of nature is totally thwarted; but in the 
second way it is not always a mortal sin, as 
certain men say, but it can be a sign of mortal 
concupiscence. Sometimes it can be without 
sin, when the disposition of the body does not 
permit another mode. Otherwise it becomes 
more serious, the more one recedes from the 
natural mode. 
185 
 
DISTINCTION 32 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered the goods 
of the union by which the marital act is 
excused, here he considers the act itself 
according as it receives further the character of 
something owed through the goods of the 
union; and this is divided into two parts: in the 
first he shows that both of the spouses are 
bound to render the debt to each other; and in 
the second he shows that requesting the debt is 
impeded because of the solemnity of the time, 
where he says: and the debt is always permitted 
to be fulfilled for the one requesting it, however 
it is not permitted to request it on any day 
whatsoever. The first part is divided into two: 
in the first part he shows that husband and wife 
are equals in the rendering of the debt; 
secondly he proves a certain thing which had 
been supposed: Because it is proved by 
witnesses. 
And it is permitted for the debt always to 
be paid to the one requesting it, but it is not 
permitted to request it on any day. Here he 
considers the times in which the marital act is 
forbidden; and about this he does two things: 
First, he shows that a certain time impedes the 
requesting of the debt; secondly, he shows that 
also something impedes the celebration of 
marriage: Nor are times to be observed only in 
fleshly work, but also in celebrating nuptials. 
About the first he does two things: first he 
shows the truth; secondly he excludes a certain 
objection: However, to the one who was told 
that to render the debt was not a sin, it seems to 
go against what Jerome says. 
Here five things are to be asked: 1) 
Whether both spouses are held to always render 
the debt to the other by the nececessity of a 
precept, 2)Whether at some time one should 
not render to the one asking; 3) Whether in 
rendering the debt husband and wife are equals; 
4) Whether one party without consent of the 
other could take a vow by which rendering of 
the debt would be impeded; 5) Whether time 
impedes the rendering of the debt. 
Article 1 
Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the 
other by the necessity of a precept 
1. Proceeding to the first, it seems that one 
spouse is not bound to pay the debt to the other 
spouse by the necessity of a precept. For no one 
is prohibited from partaking of the Eucharist on 
account of having fulfilled a precept. But he 
who pays the debt to his wife is not permitted 
to eat the flesh of the Lamb, as Jerome says in 
the text. Therefore to pay the debt is not of the 
necessity of precept. 
2. Furthermore, anyone can licitly abstain 
from those things which are harmful to his 
person. But sometimes, to render the debt to the 
one asking might be injurious to the person, 
either by reason of infirmity, or by reason of 
payment already made. Therefore, it seems that 
the debt may be denied to the one asking. 
3. Furthermore, whoever makes himself 
powerless to do what he is bound to do by a 
precept, sins. If therefore someone were bound 
to pay the debt by necessity of a precept, it 
seems that he would sin if, due to fasting or any 
other weakening of his body, he rendered 
himself powerless to perform the debt; which 
does not seem to be true. 
4. Furthermore, matrimony, according to 
the Philosopher, is ordained to the procreation 
and education of offspring, and again to the 
sharing of life. But leprosy is contrary to both 
ends of marriage, because, since it is a 
contagious disease, a woman is not bound to 
live together with a leper; and similarly, too, 
that disease is frequently transmitted to 
offspring. Therefore it seems that a wife is not 
bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband. 
But to the contrary, as a slave is in the 
power of his lord, so also is one spouse in the 
power of the other, as is clear from I 
Corinthians 7. But a slave is bound by the 
necessity of a precept to render any debt of 
servitude to his master, as is clear from 
Romans 13: 7: Render your debts to all men: to 
whom tribute is due, etc. . ., Therefore, also one 
spouse is bound of necessity of a precept to 
render the debt to the other. 
Moreover, marriage is ordained to the 
avoidance of fornication as is clear from I 
Corinthians 7. But this could not be done 
through marriage, if one spouse were not bound 
to render the debt to the other when the other is 
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attacked by concupiscence. Therefore, to 
render the debt is of the necessity of a precept. 
I answer that matrimony was principally 
instituted in the office of nature; and therefore 
in its act the movement of nature must be 
considered, by which the nutritive only gives to 
the generative what is not needed for the 
conservation of the individual. For this is the 
natural order, that first something should be 
perfected in itself, and afterward communicate 
this perfection to another. The order of charity 
also is characterized by this, that it perfects 
nature. Therefore since a wife does not have 
power over a husband except as to the faculty 
of generation, but not as to those things which 
are ordained to the conservation of the 
individual, the man is bound to render to his 
wife what he owes in those things which regard 
the generation of children, although preserving 
first the safety of his person. 
1. Someone fulfilling a certain precept can 
be rendered incapable of carrying out a certain 
sacred office, as a judge who condemns a man 
to death is made irregular by fulfilling a 
precept. Likewise also that man who fulfilling a 
precept, pays the debt, and is made unfit for 
executing the divine office; not because this act 
would be a sin, but by reason of the carnality of 
this act. Thus as the Master says, Jerome 
speaks only of the ministers of the Church, 
though not of others who are to be left to their 
own judgment: for they can either forgo out of 
devotion, or consume the body of Christ 
without sin. 
2. The wife's power over the body of the 
man does not extend to the endangerment of his 
person, as was said. Whence if she should 
make demands beyond this, it is not a 
requesting of the debt, but an unjust exaction 
from him, and for this reason, the man is not 
bound to satisfy her. 
3. If someone should be rendered 
incapable of paying the debt because of 
something following upon matrimony, for 
instance, when the debt is rendered beforehand, 
and he is incapable of paying it further, the 
woman does not have the right to ask for it 
again, and she shows herself to be more of a 
harlot than a wife in asking for it further. If, 
though, he is rendered incapable by another 
cause, if it is licit, then again he is not bound, 
nor can the woman demand it. If it is not licit, 
then he sins, and the sin of his wife, if she 
should lapse into sexual sin because of it, in 
some way would be imputed to him, and 
therefore he should take pains as much as he 
can so that his wife may remain in continence. 
4. Leprosy dissolves a betrothal, but not a 
marriage; whence, even the wife of a leprous 
man is bound to render the debt to her husband, 
though she is not bound to cohabit with him; 
for one is not so quickly infected by intercourse 
as by frequent cohabitation, and although a 
sickly child may be generated, nevertheless it is 
better for it to exist so diseased than not to be at 
all. 
Article 2 
Whether a man is bound to render the debt to a wife 
who is not asking 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that a man is not bound to 
render the debt to a wife who does not ask for 
it. For an affirmative precept does not oblige 
except for at a determined time. But the time 
determined for the payment of the debt can 
only be when it is asked for. Therefore, 
otherwise one is not bound to pay it. 
2. Furthermore, we should presume the 
best of anyone. But it is even better for spouses 
to restrain themselves than to make use of 
matrimony. Therefore, unless she should 
expressly request her due, the man should 
presume that she would rather be continent, and 
thus he is not bound to render the debt to her. 
3. Furthermore, the wife has power over 
the husband as a lord over his slave. But a slave 
is not bound to serve his lord except when the 
lord commands. Therefore, neither is the 
husband bound to render the debt to his wife 
except when required by her. 
4. Furthermore, a man can sometimes turn 
aside his demanding wife with entreaties, so 
that she does not demand. Therefore, much 
more should he not render if she does not 
demand. 
But to the contrary, through the rendering 
of the debt a medicine against the 
concupiscence of the wife is offered. But a 
doctor to whom someone sick has been 
committed, is bound to relieve his sickness, 
even if the invalid does not ask. Therefore the 
man is bound to render the debt to the wife who 
does not ask. 
Moreover, a prelate is bound to apply the 
remedy of correction against the sin of those 
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placed under him, even if they oppose it. But 
the rendering of a debt by a husband is 
ordained against the sins of his wife. Therefore, 
the man is bound to render the debt even if she 
does not request it. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. In addition. It seems that it would be 
licit for a menstruating woman to call in the 
debt. For under the Old Law, just as a 
menstruating woman was unclean, so also was 
a man suffering an outflowing of semen. But a 
man suffering in this way can request the debt. 
Therefore, by the same reasoning, a woman in 
menstruation can also. 
2. Likewise, leprosy is a greater infirmity 
than suffering a menstrual period. And it 
causes, so it seems, a greater corruption in 
children. But a leper may request the debt. 
Therefore, etc . . . 
3. Again, if a menstruating woman is not 
permitted to request the debt, this is only 
because of a defect which is feared in the 
children. But if the woman were barren, such a 
defect would not be feared. Therefore it seems 
that at least a barren woman may request the 
debt during menstruation. 
But to the contrary, Leviticus 18: 19: thou 
shalt not approach the woman who undergoes 
menstruation. To which Augustine adds, 
although he had sufficiently prohibited it, here 
again he repeats, so that it would not perhaps 
seem to be taken figuratively in higher things. 
Again, Isaiah 64:6 all of your justices are 
like the rags of a menstruous woman. About 
which Jerome says: At that time men must 
abstain from their wives, since those damaged 
in their members are conceivedâ€”blind, lame, 
leprous; so that if the parents were not 
ashamed to commingle in their chamber, their 
sins would be evident to all, and more openly 
are they rebuked in their little ones. And thus 
the same conclusion as above. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. In addition. It seems that a menstruating 
wife should not render the debt to a husband 
who asks. In Leviticus 20 it says that if 
someone approaches a menstruating woman, 
both are to be punished by death. Therefore, it 
seems that a woman rendering the debt sins 
mortally as much as the one demanding the 
debt. 
2. Again, Romans 1: 32 not only they that 
do them, but they also who consent to them that 
do them, are worthy of death. But someone 
who knowingly demands the debt of a 
menstruating woman sins mortally. Therefore 
also the woman consenting to him in the 
rendering of the debt. 
3. Again, a sword is not to be handed over 
to a furious man, lest he might kill himself or 
another. Therefore, by the same reasoning 
neither should a woman expose her body to her 
husband in the time of menstruation, lest he 
should die spiritually. 
But to the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7: 4: the 
woman does not have power over her body, but 
the man does. Therefore, the woman must 
render the debt to her husband requesting it 
even during the time of menstruation. 
And again, a menstruating woman must 
not be an occasion of sin for her husband. But 
if the husband should ask for his rights and she 
should not render the debt even in the time of 
her menstruation, she would be an occasion of 
sin to her husband: for perhaps he would fall 
into sexual sin. Therefore, etc. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that 
requesting the debt is twofold. In one way, 
expressly, as when in words the two ask each 
other. In another way, the requesting of the 
debt is understood, when for example the man 
perceives by certain signs that the wife wishes 
the debt to be rendered to her, but because of 
modesty she is silent. And thus also if she 
should so request the debt not expressly in 
words, nevertheless her husband is bound to 
render it to her, when express signs appear in 
his wife of her will to have the debt rendered. 
1. The time determined is not only when it 
is asked, but whenever there are signs that a 
danger is to be feared unless it is rendered then 
(for rendering the debt is ordered to the 
avoidance of this). 
2. A man can have such an assumption 
about his wife, when he does not see in her 
signs to the contrary. But when he does see 
them, it would be a stupid assumption. 
3. The lord is not so embarrassed to ask 
from a slave what is due from his servitude, as 
a wife is to ask her husband for the conjugal 
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debt. If however the lord did not ask because of 
ignorance, or another cause, nevertheless the 
servant is bound to fulfill it, if danger is 
imminent: for this is not to serve the eye, which 
the Apostle commands to slaves. 
4. A man should not turn aside his wife so 
that she does not request the debt, unless 
because of some reasonable cause; and then she 
should not be turned aside with much 
insistence on account of the imminent dangers. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that to approach a menstruating woman was 
prohibited under the Law for two reasons: both 
because of uncleanness as well as because of 
the harm which frequently resulted in the 
children from this kind of commingling. And 
so as to the first, this precept was ceremonial, 
but as to the second, it was moral: for since 
matrimony was principally ordered to the good 
of offspring, the use of matrimony was ordered 
by what is employed for the good of offspring; 
and therefore, this precept also obliges under 
the New Law because of the second reason, 
even if not for the first. However the menstrual 
flow can be natural and unnatural. It is natural 
namely when women suffer it at the determined 
times, when they are healthy. However it is 
unnatural when they suffer a flow of blood 
inordinately and almost incessantly because of 
some infirmity. Therefore, in an unnatural 
menstrual flow it is not prohibited to approach 
the menstruating woman under the New Law: 
both because of the infirmity, since a woman 
cannot conceive in such a state, and also since 
such an issue of blood is perpetual and long-
lasting, whence it would be necessary for her 
husband to abstain perpetually. But when the 
woman naturally undergoes the menstrual flow, 
she can conceive; and again such a period does 
not last but a little time. Whence it is prohibited 
to approach such a one, and likewise it is 
prohibited for the woman in such a period to 
request the debt. 
1. The flow of semen in a man proceeds 
from an infirmity, nor is semen flowing like 
that suitable for generation. Furthermore such a 
condition is long-lasting or perpetual, like 
leprosy. Whence there is no similar argument. 
2. And by this answer the second 
objection is also resolved. 
3. As long as a woman undergoes 
menstruation, one cannot be certain that she is 
barren. Certain women are barren in their 
youth, who become fertile by the process of 
time, and vice versa, as is stated in Book 10 of 
the History of Animals. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it should be said that 
on this matter certain men have said that the 
menstruating woman should not render the 
debt, just as she should not request it. For just 
as she is not bound to render it if she has an 
infirmity in her own person, from the fact that 
danger threatens her; so also she is not bound 
to render in order to avoid danger to the 
children. But this opinion detracts from 
matrimony, by which power is given entirely to 
the man over the body of his wife with respect 
to the marital act. Nor is the infirmity of the 
body of the offspring similar to danger to one's 
own body; for if the woman is unwell, it is 
most certain that in the carnal act danger would 
threaten her; but it is not so certain about the 
children, who perhaps will not even follow. 
And therefore, others say that the menstruating 
woman is never allowed to request the debt. If 
however, her husband should ask; either he 
asks knowingly, and then she should turn him 
aside by entreaties and warnings, yet not so 
categorically that it might be an occasion to 
him for other condemnable seductions, if he is 
believed to be prone to that; or else he asks 
ignorantly, and the woman can give some 
pretext, or say that she is unwell, so as not to 
render the debt, unless danger is feared for her 
husband. However, ultimately, if the man does 
not cease to request it, she should render the 
debt when he asks. Indeed, it is not safe for her 
to indicate her own situation lest perhaps the 
man should conceive a loathing for her because 
of it, unless he is presumed a man of prudence. 
1. This is to be understood when both 
consent voluntarily; not however if the woman 
should render the debt involuntarily as though 
compelled. 
2. Since consent only comes from the will, 
a woman is not understood to consent to the sin 
of her husband unless she renders the debt 
voluntarily: for when it is involuntary, she 
suffers it rather than consenting. 
3. A sword would be given to a furious 
man when greater danger would be feared if it 
189 
 
were not given; and it is likewise in the case at 
hand. 
Article 3 
Whether man and woman are equals in the marital 
act 
1. It seems that man and woman are not 
equals in the marital act. For what is active is 
nobler than what is acted upon, as Augustine 
says, in Book 12 of On the Literal Meaning of 
Genesis, Chapter 16. But in the conjugal act the 
man is related as the active party, and the 
woman as the passive. Therefore they are not 
equals in the conjugal act. 
2. Furthermore, the wife is not bound to 
render the debt to the husband unless he asks; 
the husband on the other hand is bound to 
render it to the wife, as was said. Therefore 
they are not equals in the marital act. 
3. Furthermore, in matrimony the woman 
was made for the sake of the man, as is evident 
from Gen. 2: 18: Let us make him a helper 
similar to himself. But when something is for 
the sake of something else, the latter is always 
more principal. Therefore, etc.. . 
4. Furthermore, marriage is principally 
ordained to the conjugal act. But in matrimony 
the man is the head of the woman, as is clear 
from 1 Corinthians 11. Therefore they are not 
equals in the act named. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7:4: the man does not have power 
over his own body, and the same thing is said 
of the wife. Therefore they are equals in the 
marital act. 
Moreover, marriage is an equal-sided 
relationship (aequiparentiae), since it is a 
conjoining, as was said. Therefore, husband 
and wife are equals in the marital act. 
I answer that equality is twofold: namely, 
of quantity, and of proportion. Equality of 
quantity is what is found between two 
quantities of the same measure, like two things 
that are each a bicubit long. But equality of 
proportion is what is found between two 
proportions of the same species, like a double 
and a double. Therefore, speaking of the first 
equality, a man and woman are not equals in 
matrimony, neither with respect to the conjugal 
act, in which what is nobler is due the man, nor 
as regards the management of the home, in 
which the woman is ruled and the man rules. 
But as regards the second kind of equality, they 
are equals in both things. For just as the man is 
bound to the woman in the conjugal act and in 
the management of the home in what pertains 
to a husband, so the wife is bound to the man in 
those things that pertain to a wife. And 
according to this it is said in the text that they 
are equals in rendering and requesting the debt. 
1. Although to act is more noble than to be 
acted upon, nevertheless the proportion of the 
passive to being acted upon is the same as the 
proportion of the agent to acting. And 
according to this there is an equality of 
proportion. 
2. This is accidental. For since the man 
has the nobler part in the conjugal act, naturally 
he is not so embarrassed to request the debt as 
his wife; and this is the reason that the wife is 
not so bound to render the debt to a husband 
who does not request it, as a husband is to his 
wife. 
3. By this fact it is clear that they are not 
absolute equals, though not that they are not 
equals according to proportion. 
4. Although the head is the chief among 
the members of the body, yet as the members 
are bound to the head in their functions, so is 
the head bound to the members in his own; and 
thus there is here an equality of proportion. 
Article 4 
Whether the man and woman may take a vow 
against the marital debt without mutual consent 
1. It seems that a husband and wife may 
take a vow against the marital debt without 
each other's consent. For the husband and wife 
are equally obligated to the payment of the 
debt, as was said. But it is permissible for the 
man, even with his wife forbidding it, to 
undertake a crusade in the defense of the Holy 
Land. Therefore this is also permitted to the 
wife, and thus since by this vow the rendering 
of the debt would be impeded, either spouse 
may take the vow mentioned without the 
consent of the other. 
2. Furthermore, no vow should depend 
upon the consent of someone who cannot 
dissent without sin. But one of the spouses 
cannot dissent without sin if the other should 
vow continence, either simply or for a time. For 
to impede spiritual progress is a sin against the 
Holy Spirit. Therefore, one can vow a vow of 
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continence simply or for a time without the 
consent of the other. 
3. Furthermore, just as in the marital act 
the rendering of the debt is required, so also the 
requesting of the debt. But one can without the 
consent of the other vow that he will not 
request the debt, since this is in his power. 
Therefore, by the same reasoning, he may not 
vow not to render the debt . 
4. Furthermore, no one can be forced by 
the comman of a superior to do what he would 
not be allowed to vow or to do for himself. For 
illicit things do not fall under obedience. But 
the superior prelate may command a man and a 
woman not to render the debt by imposing 
upon him some service. Therefore, he himself 
may vow something that may impede the 
rendering of the debt. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7:5: do not deprive each other, 
unless perhaps by common consent, that you 
may give yourselves to prayer. 
Moreover, no one can make a vow about 
what belongs to another. But the man does not 
have power over his own body, but the wife 
does. Therefore, without her consent he cannot 
make a vow of continence, either simply, or for 
a time. 
I answer that to vow is of the will, as even 
the word itself shows. Wherefore a vow can 
only be made about those goods which are 
subject to one's will, which are not those 
matters in which someone is bound to another. 
And therefore, in such things someone cannot 
profess a vow without the consent of the one to 
whom he is bound. For this reason, since 
spouses are bound to each other in the 
rendering of the debt, as was said, by this fact 
continence is impeded. One cannot without the 
consent of the other vow continence, and if he 
does vow it, he sins; nor should he keep this 
vow, but should do penance for having made a 
wicked vow. 
1. It is probable enough that a wife would 
will continence for a time to assist a need of the 
general Church. Therefore in consideration of 
the trouble that a crusade means, it was 
established that a man may undertake a crusade 
without the consent of his wife, just as also he 
may join the army without the consent of the 
earthly lord from whom he holds a fief. Nor 
however, is all the woman's right taken away 
from her in this: for the wife can follow him. 
Nor is it the same from a wife to her husband, 
for since the husband should rule the wife, and 
not vice versa, the wife is more bound to follow 
her husband than vice versa. Furthermore, the 
wife would travel across the lands with much 
greater danger to her chastity than the man, and 
with less benefit to the Church. And therefore, 
the wife cannot make a vow like this without 
the consent of the man. 
2. The spouse who dissents from the 
other's vow of continence, does not dissent in 
order to impede that person's good, but so that 
no disadvantage to himself might be 
engendered. 
3. About this matter there are two 
opinions. For certain men say that one person 
may vow not to request the debt without the 
consent of the other, though not that he will not 
render it, for in the first instance, both spouses 
are within their rights, but not in the second 
instance. But since if one spouse were never to 
request the debt, it would make the marriage 
onerous to the other, who would then always 
have to undergo the embarrassment of 
requesting the debt. For this reason, others say 
more probably that one person cannot vow 
either thing without the consent of the other. 
4. Just as the woman receives power over 
the body of the man, except in what the man 
owes to his own body, so also is excepted what 
he owes to another master. Therefore just as the 
wife cannot request the debt from her husband 
against the health of his own body, so neither 
can she impede what he owes to his lord. But 
beyond this a lord cannot prohibit someone 
from rendering a debt. 
Article 5 
Whether in sacred times someone should be 
impeded from requesting the debt 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that in sacred times no one 
should be impeded from requesting the debt. 
For a sick man is to be nursed at these times if 
he is ailing. But it is possible that on a holy day 
someone might be afflicted with 
concupiscence. Therefore, one should attend to 
him through the requesting of the debt. 
2. Furthermore, there is no other reason 
why the debt is not to be requested on holy 
days except that they are set aside for prayer. 
But on these days there are determined hours 
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for prayer. Therefore, at other hours it is 
permissible to request the debt. 
But to the contrary, just as some places are 
sacred, for they are set aside for sacred things, 
so also some times are sacred for the same 
reason. But in a sacred place it is not permitted 
to request the debt. Therefore, neither is it 
permissible at a sacred time. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
Whether someone who requests the debt 
during sacred times, sins mortally 
1. Again. It seems that someone who 
requests the debt during sacred times, sins 
mortally. For Gregory says in 1 Dial., that that 
woman who was known by her husband during 
the night, and in the morning joins the Church 
procession, has been seized by the devil. But 
this would not be, unless she had sinned 
mortally. Therefore, etc., 
2. Furthermore, whoever does something 
against a divine precept, sins mortally. But the 
Lord commanded in Exodus 19: 15â€”namely 
when they were about to receive the Law: do 
not approach your wives. Therefore, much 
more do they sin mortally, if at the time in 
which it is intended for the sacraments of the 
New Law, men should commingle with their 
wives. 
But to the contrary, no circumstance 
makes things worse ad infinitum. But an undue 
time is a certain circumstance. Therefore, it 
does not worsen a sin infinitely, making mortal 
what would otherwise be venial. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
Whether one is bound to render the debt 
during holy days 
1. Again. It seems that one is not bound to 
render the debt during holy days. For sinners 
and those who consent to their sins are 
punished equally, as is evident from Romans 2. 
But the one who renders the debt, consents to 
the one requesting, who sins. Therefore he too 
sins. 
2. Furthermore, we are obliged to pray by 
an affirmative precept, and also at certain 
determined times. But at that time in which 
someone is bound to pray, he should not render 
the debt, just as neither at that time in which he 
is bound to some special service for a temporal 
lord. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7:5: do not deprive each other, 
unless perhaps by consent for a time, that you 
may give yourselves to prayer. Therefore, when 
someone asks, it is to be rendered to him. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
Whether marriage is forbidden during 
periods determined in the text 
1. Again. It seems that weddings are not 
forbidden during certain periods determined in 
the text. For matrimony is a sacrament. But in 
those times the celebration of the other 
sacraments is not forbidden. Therefore, neither 
should be the celebration of matrimony. 
2. Furthermore, the requesting of the debt 
is more unfitting for holy days than wedding 
celebrations. But in those days the marital debt 
can be requested. Therefore, so can weddings 
be celebrated. 
3. Furthermore, marriages which happen 
against the statutes of the Church, should be 
dissolved. But they are not dissolved if the 
wedding happens during such periods. 
Therefore, nor should they be prohibited by the 
statutes of the Church. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Ecclesiastes 3:5: a time to embrace, and a time 
to be far from embraces. 
I answer the first question by saying that 
the marital act, while free from sin, 
nevertheless, since it brings down reason 
because of the carnal delectation, renders man 
unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, in the days 
in which one is particularly to give oneself to 
spiritual things, it is not permitted to request 
the marital debt. 
1. At a time like that, other things can be 
applied for the repression of concupiscence, 
like prayer, and many other things of this kind, 
which also apply to those who are bound to 
perpetual continence. 
2. Although one is not bound to pray at 
every hour, nonetheless one is bound to keep 
the whole day suitable for prayer. 
I answer the second question by saying 
that to seek the marital debt on a holy day is 
not a circumstance amounting to another 
species of sin; wherefore, it cannot become 
infinitely more grave. Therefore, neither the 
husband nor the wife sin mortally, if either 
requests the debt on a holy day. But 
nevertheless the sin is graver if it is sought only 
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for the sake of delectation, than if someone 
should seek the marital debt for himself 
because he fears for himself because of the 
fragility of the flesh. 
1. That woman was not punished because 
she rendered the debt; but because afterward 
she disgraced herself by approaching the divine 
things against her conscience. 
2. From that authority it cannot be proved 
that this would be a mortal sin, but only that it 
would be unfitting. For many more things 
pertaining to the cleanliness of the flesh were 
required by the necessity of a precept in the 
Old Law, which was given for carnal men, that 
are not required in the New Law, which is the 
law of the Spirit. 
To the third question it is to be said that 
since the woman has power over the body of 
her husband as far as concerns the act of 
generation, and vice versa, one is bound to 
render the debt to the other at any time 
whatsoever and at any hour whatsoever, 
preserving due decency, which is required in 
such things. For it is not fitting that it be 
rendered immediately in a public place. 
1. That person as he is in himself, does not 
consent, but what is required from him, he 
renders reluctantly and with sorrow. For this is 
divinely ordained because of the slipperiness of 
the flesh that always one may render the debt to 
the one asking, lest some occasion of sinning 
be given. 
2. There is no determined hour for praying 
which cannot be compensated in other hours; 
and therefore, this objection does not compel. 
To the fourth question it is to be said that 
when new brides are given to their husbands, 
the souls of the spouses are more greatly 
occupied by the concern for carnal things in 
this very newness and therefore in weddings 
many signs of wild rejoicing are wont to be 
shown; and because of this in those times in 
which men should particularly elevate 
themselves to spiritual things, it is prohibited 
for weddings to be celebrated. 
However this is from Advent until 
Epiphany because of communion, which 
according to the ancient canons is usually to be 
made appropriately during the period of the 
Nativity. And from Septuagesima until the 
octave of Easter, because of the Paschal 
communion; and from three days before the 
Ascension until the octave of Pentecost, 
because of preparation for consuming 
communion at that time. 
1. The celebration of matrimony has 
something of worldly and carnal rejoicing 
joined to it, which is not in the other 
sacraments. Therefore it is not similar. 
2. Such great distraction of souls does not 
occur in the rendering or requesting of the debt 
as in the celebration of a wedding, and 
therefore it is not similar. 
3. Since time is not of the essence of 
matrimony, if it is contracted at an improper 
time, nevertheless it is a valid sacrament; nor 
are the contractants separated simply, but for a 
time, that they may do penance for having 
transgressed the statutes of the Church; and in 
this way what the Master says is to be 
understood. 
Exposition 
If first he had promised, and afterward 
prohibited, etc... It seems from this that the 
man may call his wife back to himself, even if 
concerning his freedom, he vows chastity. And 
the word of Augustine is understood in the case 
when the man has dissembled before full 
deliberation, which dissimulation indeed seems 
to be a certain consent. If however, he had 
expressly consented, he may not revoke the 
vow. For which reason he speaks about the 
judgment of the Church, when the promise 
cannot be proved. Whence because of this 
danger, such secret vows are not approved. Nor 
to eat the flesh of the Lamb. On the 
impediment of consumption of the Eucharist 
because of carnal delectation in sleep, it was 
discussed above, Distinction 9. 
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DISTINCTION 33 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered the goods 
of matrimony, here he shows how these goods 
were in the marriage of the ancients; and this is 
divided into two parts: in the first part he shows 
in what way were in marriage of the fathers 
before the Law; in the second part, how there 
had been celebrated in marriage in the time of 
the Law, where he says: indeed, in the time of 
the Law Moses forbade carnal intimacy to 
happen with one's mother, etc... 
The first in two parts: in the first he shows 
that before the law the patriarchs licitly had 
several wives; in the second he inquires how 
with multiple wives the good of fidelity is 
preserved, where he says: If someone objected 
that the fathers did not preserve fidelity in their 
marriage bed, we say etc... concerning the first 
he does three things, first he raises the question, 
secondly he defines it: To this we say etc... And 
concerning the latter he does two things: first 
he brings in the authority for testing the 
principal proposition, that namely the unions of 
those people who had many wives, were licit: 
secondly he shows that they even merited as 
much as virginity does in our time, where he 
says: Because indeed, virginal chastity may not 
be placed before the conjugal chastity of 
Abraham in merit, Augustine shows. In fact, in 
the time of the law Moses forbade carnal 
intimacy to happen with the mother, with a 
step-mother, etc... 
Here he considers the marriage celebrated 
in the time of the Law; and concerning this he 
does three things: first he shows how marriage 
was determined by the Law of Moses and 
regarding the determination of eligible persons, 
and regarding separation: secondly, he inquires 
whether in the time of the Law it was licit to 
have several wives, where he says: But was 
anyone under the Law allowed to have multiple 
wives? ; thirdly he considers virginity from 
what follows: however virginity of the mind is 
better than virginity of the flesh. 
Here is a threefold question. First, about 
the plurality of wives. Secondly, about the writ 
of divorce. Thirdly, about virginity. 
Concerning the first, three things are to be 
asked: 1) whether to have multiple wives 
would be against the Law of Nature 2) whether 
it was licit 3) whether to have a concubine is 
against the Law of Nature. 
Article 1 
Whether to have several wives is against the Law of 
Nature 
1. It seems that to have several wives is 
not against the Law of Nature. For custom 
(consuetudo) does not prejudice natural right. 
But to have several wives was not a sin when it 
was a custom (mos), as is found in the text 
from Augustine. 
2. Furthermore, wheover acts against the 
natural law, acts against a precept. For just as 
the written law has its own precepts, so does 
the natural law. But Augustine says that to have 
several wives was not against a precept, for it 
had been prohibited by no law. Therefore, to 
have several wives is not against the natural 
law. 
3. Furthermore, marriage is principally 
ordered to the procreation of children. But one 
man can receive children through many 
women, by making more of them pregnant. 
Therefore it is not against natural law to have 
many wives. 
4. Furthermore, natural right is what 
nature has taught all animals, as is stated in the 
beginning of the Digests. But nature has not 
taught all animals this, that there should be one 
female to one male. For among many animals, 
one male mates with many females. Therefore, 
it is not against the law of nature to have many 
wives. 
5. Furthermore, according to the 
Philosopher in Book 1 of On the Generation of 
Animals, in the generation of offspring the 
male is ordered to the female as active to 
passive, and craftsman (artifex) to material. 
But it is not against the order of nature that one 
active principle should act upon several passive 
elements, or that one craftsman should work 
from diverse materials. Therefore, nor is it 
against the law of nature that one male should 
have several wives. 
6. But to the contrary, that seems 
particularly to be of natural right what has been 
put into man in the very institution of human 
nature. But that one woman should be one 
man's was instilled in the human being at the 
very institution of human nature, as is clear 
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from Genesis 2: 24: they shall be two in one 
flesh. Therefore, it is of natural law. 
7. Moreover, it is against the law of nature 
that man should oblige himself to the 
impossible, as, for example, that what was 
given to one might be given to another. But a 
man contracting with one wife hands over to 
her the power over his body, so that it would be 
necessary to render the debt to her when she 
requested it. Therefore, it is against the law of 
nature if afterward he should hand over to 
another the power over his body; for he could 
not render the debt at the same time to both, if 
they should request it at the same time. 
8. Moreover, it is of natural law that what 
you do not wish to be done to yourself, you 
will not do to another. But a man in no way 
wills that his wife should have other men. 
Therefore he would act against the law of 
nature, if he introduced an additional wife. 
9. Moreover, whatever is against natural 
desire (desiderium) is against natural law. But 
the zeal of the husband for his wife, and of the 
wife for her husband, is natural, for it is found 
among all people. Since this zeal, therefore, is a 
love that does not tolerate the sharing of the 
beloved, it seems that it would be against 
natural law that many wives should have one 
husband. 
I answer that there are naturally in all 
things certain principles by which they not only 
can bring about their proper operations, but 
also render those operations suitable for their 
end. These actions may either follow from a 
thing's generic nature, or they may follow from 
the nature of its species: as it belongs to a 
magnet to be borne downwards from the nature 
of its genus, and to attract iron from the nature 
of its species. Yet just as in things acting from 
natural necessity, the principles of their actions 
are their very forms, by which proper 
operations proceed fittingly toward their end; 
so also in those things which participate in 
reason, the principles of acting are cognition 
and appetite. For this reason, it is necessary that 
in the cognitive power there be a natural 
concept, and in the natural appetite a natural 
inclination, by which an operation arising from 
the genus or the species is rendered 
proportionate to the end. But since, among all 
the other animals, man knows the reason of his 
end, and the relation of his work to that end, 
therefore a natural concept was placed in him, 
by which he is directed to operating fittingly, 
which is called natural law or natural right; in 
the rest of the animals it is called natural 
instinct (aestimatio). For brutes are more 
impelled toward appropriate actions by the 
power of nature than regulated as if they were 
agents with proper judgment (arbitrio). 
Therefore the natural law is nothing other than 
a concept naturally bestowed on man, by which 
he is directed toward acting fittingly in his 
proper actions, either those appropriate to him 
by the nature of his genusâ€”as generation, 
eating, and other things of this kind; or by the 
nature of his species, as reasoning and the like. 
But anything that renders an action unfit for the 
end which nature intends from a certain work, 
is said to be against the natural law. 
Nonetheless, an action can be unsuited either to 
the principal end or to the secondary end; and 
whether the former or the latter, it happens in a 
two-fold manner. In one way, from something 
which impedes the end entirely: as excessive 
over-indulgence or failure to eat impedes the 
health of the body as the principal end of 
eating; and it impedes the ability to manage 
one's affairs well, which is a secondary end of 
eating. In the other way, from something that 
makes the attainment of the principal or 
secondary end difficult or less becoming, like 
inordinate eating at an inappropriate time. So if 
an action were unsuited to the end by entirely 
preventing the principal end, then natural law 
prohibits it directly in the first precepts of 
natural law, which are related to practical 
matters as general concepts are related to 
speculative matters. If, on the other hand, it 
should be insufficient for the secondary end in 
any way, or simply make the attainment of the 
principal end difficult or less complete, then it 
is prohibited not indeed by the first precepts of 
natural law, but by the secondary ones, which 
are derived from the first, just as conclusions in 
speculative matters have credibility from the 
principles known per se. And it is in this way 
that the action stated is said to be against the 
law of nature. For matrimony has as its 
principal end the procreation and education of 
children; which end, indeed, befits man 
according to the nature of his genus, whence 
also it is common to other animals, as is stated 
in Book 8 of the Ethics: and thus offspring is 
considered a good of matrimony. But as the 
Philosopher says, among humans alone 
marriage has as its secondary end the sharing of 
those works which are necessary in life, as was 
said above; and according to this the two owe 
fidelity to each other, which is one of the goods 
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of matrimony. It has beyond these another end, 
inasmuch as it occurs between two members of 
the faithful, namely, the signification of Christ 
and his Church. And thus sacrament is called a 
good of matrimony. Wherefore the first end 
corresponds to the marriage of man insofar as 
he is an animal; the second, insofar as he is 
man; the third, insofar as he is one of the 
faithful. Therefore, a plurality of wives neither 
totally removes nor otherwise impedes the first 
end, since one man suffices to make several 
wives fruitful and to educate the children born 
of them. But even if it does not totally destroy 
the second end, nevertheless it impedes it 
greatly, by the fact that it is not easy for peace 
to exist in a family where many wives are 
joined to one husband, since one man may not 
suffice to satisfy all the wishes of many wives. 
And since the sharing of many in one office 
causes contention, as potters brawl with each 
other, and it would be the same way among the 
many wives of one man. However, it 
completely destroys the third end of marriage, 
in which as Christ is one man, so is the Church 
one bride. And therefore it is clear from what 
has been said that a plurality of wives is in a 
certain way against the law of nature, and in 
another way, not. 
1. Custom (consuetudo) does not infringe 
upon the law of nature as far as its first 
precepts, which are like the general concepts of 
the mind in speculative things. But custom 
reinforces and likewise diminishes what is 
drawn from these precepts as conclusions; and 
the precept of natural law that there should be 
one wife is this kind of thing. 
2. As Cicero says, religion and the 
strength of laws have sanctioned those things 
perfected by nature and approved by custom. 
Wherefore it is clear that those things that 
natural law dictates, as if derived from the first 
principles of natural law, do not have 
compelling force in the mode of a precept 
absolutely, unless afterward they have been 
sanctioned by divine and human law. And this 
is how Augustine says that they were not acting 
against a precept, for it had been prohibited by 
no law. 
3. To the third objection the solution is 
evident from what has been said. 
4. Natural right is taken many ways. First, 
indeed, a certain right is called natural from its 
principle, since it is implanted by nature; and 
thus Cicero defines in Book II Of Rhetoric, 
saying: natural right is what was not born of 
opinion, but a certain innate power instilled. 
And since also in natural things certain 
movements are called natural, not because they 
were from an intrinsic principle, but because 
they are from a superior moving principle, as 
the motions which are in the elements because 
of the influence of heavenly bodies are called 
natural as the Commentator says in Book 3 of 
On Heaven and Earth; therefore, those things 
which are from divine right, are said to be from 
natural right, since they are from from the 
impression and infusion of a superior principle, 
namely, God. And this is how it is taken by 
Isidore, who says that natural right is what is 
contained in the Law and in the Gospel. 
Thirdly, natural right is called not only by its 
principle, but by its own nature, since it is 
about natural things. And since nature is 
divided against reason, by which man is man; 
then taking natural right in the strictest sense, 
those things which belong to men alone, even if 
they were the dictates of natural reason, are not 
said to be of natural right, but only those things 
which natural reason dictates about things 
which are common to man and others. And 
thus the definition stated is given, namely: 
natural right is what nature has taught all 
things. Therefore, plurality of wives although it 
may not be against natural right taken in the 
third way, is notwithstanding against natural 
right taken in the second way, since it is 
prohibited by divine right; and also against 
natural right taken in the first way, as is clear 
from what has been said, because nature 
dictates to any animal according to the mode 
befitting its species. Wherefore also certain 
animals, in which the concern of both male and 
female is required for the education of the 
young, preserve by natural instinct the union of 
one to another, as is evident in the case of the 
turtledove and the dove, and others of this kind. 
5. To the fifth objection the resolution is 
clear from what has been said. 
6. But since the reasons adduced to the 
contrary seem to show that multiple wives are 
against the first principles of the law of nature, 
they should therefore be answered. And so it 
should be said to the sixth objection, that 
human nature was established without any 
defect; therefore not only were implanted in it 
those things without which the principal end of 
marriage cannot be had without difficulty, but 
also those things without which the secondary 
end of marriage cannot be had without 
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difficulty; and in this way it is enough for man 
in his beginning to have one wife, as was said. 
7. By marriage a man does not give his 
wife power over his body in all things, but only 
concerning those things that marriage requires. 
However, marriage does not require that a man 
should render the debt to a wife who is asking 
at any moment whatsoever, unless as regards 
what marriage was chiefly instituted for, i.e., 
the good of offspring, and as much as is 
necessary for conception. However inasmuch 
as marriage was instituted as a remedy, which 
is its secondary end, it does require that one 
render the debt at whatever moment one's 
spouse asks for it. And thus it is clear that a 
man taking many wives does not obligate 
himself to the impossible when the principal 
end of marriage is considered; and therefore a 
plurality of wives is not against the first 
precepts of natural law. 
8. This precept of the law of nature, what 
you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to 
another, should be understood when the same 
relation is preserved. For if a prelate does not 
wish to be opposed by a subordinate, it is not 
that he himself must not oppose the 
subordinate. And therefore, it is not necessary 
from the strength of that precept that if a man 
does not wish that his own wife should have 
other husbands, he himself may not have other 
wives: since for one man to have several wives 
is not against the first precepts of the law of 
nature, as was said. But for one wife to have 
several husbands is against the first precepts of 
the law of nature, by the fact that by this in a 
certain respect the good of offspring, which is 
the principal end of marriage, is totally taken 
away, and in a certain respect it is impeded. In 
the good of offspring is understood not only 
procreation; but also education, as was said. 
For the procreation of children itself, even if it 
is not totally destroyed (since it happens 
sometimes after the first impregnation that the 
woman is again impregnated, as it says in Book 
7 of the History of Animals), is nevertheless 
much impeded, for it can scarcely happen 
without damage happening either to one fetus 
or to the both. But the education of offspring is 
completely destroyed, for by the fact that one 
wife has several husbands, would follow an 
incertitude of the children with respect to their 
father, whose care is necessary in their 
education. Therefore by no law or custom is it 
permitted for one wife to have many husbands, 
as it is with the reverse. 
9. Natural inclination in appetitive things 
follows the natural concept in cognition; and 
since it is not so much against the natural 
concept that a man have many wives as it is 
that a woman have many husbands, the feeling 
of a wife does not so shun the sharing of her 
husband as with the opposite. Therefore, as 
much among men as among animals a greater 
zeal is found in the male for the female than the 
reverse. 
Article 2 
Whether to have several wives could have been licit 
at one time 
1. It seems that to have several wives 
could not have been licit at one time. For, 
according to the Philosopher in Book 5 of the 
Ethics, natural right has the same power always 
and everywhere. But a plurality of wives is 
prohibited by natural right, as is clear from 
what has been said. Therefore, as it is not licit 
in this way, it was never licit. 
2. Furthermore, if it were allowed at one 
time, this would not be unless either it were 
licit per se, or allowed because of some 
dispensation. If in the first way, then it would 
also be licit now. But if in the second way, this 
cannot be: for according to Augustine, since 
God is the founder of nature, he does not do 
anything against the reasons which he 
implanted in nature. Since therefore, God 
established that one woman should be for one 
man, as was said, it seems that He Himself 
would never have given a dispensation from 
this. 
3. Furthermore, if something is permitted 
by a dispensation, it is not permitted except to 
those men who receive a dispensation. But no 
common dispensation is found in the Old Law 
along with all the other acts. Therefore, since 
everyone who wanted several wives in the Old 
Testament, took them indiscriminately; and 
neither were they reprimanded for this in the 
Law or in the Prophets; it seems that it was not 
permitted through a dispensation. 
4. Furthermore, where there is the same 
reason for dispensation, the same dispensation 
should be made. But the cause of the 
dispensation cannot be proposed as the 
multiplicatio of children for the worship of 
God, for that is also necessary now. Therefore, 
the dispensation mentioned should have 
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endured even until now, especially since it is 
not written that it has been revoked. 
5. Furthermore, in a dispensation a greater 
good should not be omitted for the sake of a 
lesser good. But fidelity and sacrament, which 
do not seem to be preserved in a marriage in 
which one man is joined to many wives, are 
greater things than the multiplication of 
children. Therefore, the dispensation mentioned 
could not have been in consideration of this 
multiplication. 
But to the contrary, in Galatians 3 it is said 
that the law was written because of wrong-
doers precisely so that it might prohibit them. 
But the Old Law made mention of the plurality 
of wives without anything about its prohibition, 
as is clear from Deuteronomy 21:15: if a man 
have two wives, etc. Therefore, by having two 
wives they were not wrong-doers, and thus it 
was allowed. 
Moreover, this is seen at the same time by 
the example of the holy patriarchs, who were 
written to have had many wives, although they 
were most acceptable to God, like Jacob, 
David, and many others. Therefore, it was 
permitted at one time. 
I answer that as is clear from what has 
been said, a plurality of wives is said to be 
against the natural law, not as to its first 
precepts, but as to its second precepts, which 
are derived like conclusions from the first ones. 
But since human acts must be varied according 
to diverse conditions of persons and times, as 
well as other circumstances, the aforesaid 
conditions do not proceed from the first 
precepts of natural law as always having 
efficacy, but only for the most part. For such is 
the whole matter of morals, as is evident from 
the Philosopher in his book of Ethics. And 
therefore, where they lack efficacy, these things 
can be licitly overlooked. But since it is not 
easy to determine when a variance is 
acceptable, therefore, it is reserved to Him 
from whose authority the law has efficacy, that 
He may offer the permission to set aside the 
law in those cases where the efficacy of the law 
does not extend; and this kind of permission is 
called a 'dispensation'. However the law of 
monogamy is not humanly ordained, but 
divinely instituted, neither by word or writing 
handed down, but impressed on the heart, like 
those things which belong in any way at all to 
the law of nature. Therefore, in this matter, a 
dispensation could only have been made by 
God through interior inspiration, which indeed 
happened chiefly to the holy patriarchs, and by 
their example it was concluded by others at that 
time that it was fitting for the aforesaid precept 
of nature to be overlooked, so that the 
multiplication of offspring to be raised for the 
worship of God might be greater. For always 
the more principal end is more to be preserved 
than the secondary one. Wherefore, since the 
good of offspring is the principal end of 
marriage, where the multiplication of offspring 
was necessary the impediment which might be 
caused to the secondary ends had to be ignored 
for a time. And in order to remove this 
impediment, the precept prohibiting a plurality 
of wives is ordained, as is clear from what has 
been said. 
1. Natural right, always and everywhere, 
when it is per se, has the same potency. But per 
accidens it can be departed from at certain 
times and places because of some impediment, 
as in the same place the Philosopher gives an 
example from other natural things. For always 
and everywhere the right hand is better than the 
left according to nature, but by something 
accidental it befits some men to be 
ambidextrous, since our nature is variable. And 
likewise also is the naturally just, as the 
Philosopher says. 
2. In the Decretals it says about divorce 
that never was it permitted to anyone to have 
several wives without a dispensation received 
by divine inspiration. Nor is such a 
dispensation given against the reasons that God 
instilled in nature, but as an exception to them. 
For those reasons are not ordained for always 
but rather to be in most cases, as was said: Just 
as also it is not against nature when something 
miraculous happens among natural things 
beyond those things which happen usually. 
3. However the law is, so should be the 
dispensation from the law. And since the 
natural law is not written in letters, but 
impressed in hearts, because of this it was not 
fitting for the dispensation of those things 
which belong to natural law to be given 
through a written law, but rather to be made 
through interior inspiration. 
4. With the coming of Christ came the 
time of the fullness of the grace of Christ, 
through which the worship of God was diffused 
in all nations by spiritual propagation; and 
therefore there was not the same reason for a 
dispensation that there was before the advent of 
Christ, when the worship of God was increased 
and preserved through carnal propagation. 
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5. Offspring, as a good of matrimony, 
includes remaining faithful to God. For 
children are only considered a good of 
marriage according as they are hoped for in 
order to be raised to the worship of God. 
However, remaining faithful to God is more 
important than than remaining faithful to one's 
wife, which is another good of matrimony, and 
more important than the signification that 
belongs to the sacrament, for this signification 
is ordered to the understanding of the faith. 
Therefore, it is not unfitting if, for the sake of 
the good of offspring, something is taken away 
from the other two goods. Nor indeed are they 
destroyed in every way, for fidelity also 
remains for many, and sacrament in a certain 
way, since although the union of Christ and his 
Church is not signified as far as there is one 
bride, still the distinction of levels of the 
Church is signified by the plurality of wives. 
Which distinction is indeed not only in the 
Church Militant, but also in the Church 
Triumphant. Therefore, the marriages of those 
men signified in a certain way the union of 
Christ and the Church, not only the Militant 
Church, as certain people say, but also the 
Triumphant Church, in which there are many 
mansions. 
Article 3 
Whether it be against the law of nature to have a 
concubine 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that to have a concubine is not 
against the law of nature. For ceremonial 
matters of law are not of natural law. But the 
prohibition of fornication is included with the 
other ceremonials of the law which were being 
imposed for a time on believers who had come 
from the Gentiles in Acts 15. Therefore, simple 
fornication, which is to approach a concubine, 
is not against the law of nature. 
2. Furthermore, positive law is a 
development from natural law, as Cicero states. 
But according to positive law, simple 
fornication is not prohibited, but rather to the 
contrary according to the ancient laws women 
were condemned to be handed over to brothels 
as a punishment. Therefore, to have a 
concubine is not against the law of nature. 
3. Furthermore, natural law does not 
prohibit that what is given simply, may be 
given for a time and under a certain respect. 
But an unbound woman could give an unbound 
man power over her body in perpetuum, so that 
he could avail himself of her licitly, if she 
wanted. Therefore it is not against the law of 
nature if she gave him power over her body for 
an hour. 
4. Furthermore, whoever makes use of his 
own things as he wishes, injures no one. But a 
slave-girl is the possession of her lord. 
Therefore, if the lord makes use of her at will, 
he does not injure anyone. And thus to have a 
concubine is not against the law of nature. 
5. Furthermore, anyone can give to 
another what is his own. But a wife has power 
over the body of her husband, as is clear from 1 
Corinthians 7. Therefore, if the wife wished, 
the man could be joined with other women 
without sin. 
But to the contrary, according to all laws, 
children who are born of concubines are looked 
down upon (vituperabiles). But this would not 
be the case unless the intercourse from which 
they spring were naturally shameful. Therefore, 
to have a concubine is against the law of 
nature. 
Moreover, as was said above in Distinctio 
26, marriage is natural. But this would not be 
true if without prejudice to natural law a man 
could be joined with a woman outside of 
marriage. Therefore it is against the law of 
nature to have concubine. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
Whether to approach a concubine is a 
mortal sin 
1. Moreover. It seems that to approach a 
concubine is not a mortal sin. For to tell a lie is 
a greater sin than simple fornication: which is 
evident from the fact that Judah, who was not 
loathe to fornicate with Tamar, balked at telling 
a lie, saying, He will certainly not be able to 
charge us with lying. But to lie is not always a 
mortal sin. Therefore, neither is simple 
fornication. 
2. Furthermore, mortal sin should be 
punished by death. But the Old Law did not 
punish lying with a concubine by death, unless 
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in a certain case, as is clear from Deuteronomy 
13.380 Therefore, it is not a mortal sin. 
3. Furthermore, according to Gregory, 
carnal sins are blamed less than spiritual sins. 
But not every instance of pride or avarice is a 
mortal sin; and these are spiritual sins. 
Therefore, neither is all fornication, which is a 
carnal sin. 
4. Furthermore, where there is greater 
incitement, there is less of a sin: for that man 
sins more gravely who is overcome by a lesser 
temptation, as was said in Distinction 10. But 
concupiscence most greatly incites one to 
sexual things. Therefore, just as an act of 
gluttony is not always a mortal sin, neither will 
simple fornication always be a mortal sin. 
But to the contrary, nothing is excluded 
from the kingdom of God except mortal sin. 
But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom 
of God, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 6. 
Therefore, simple fornication is a mortal sin. 
Furthermore, only mortal sins are crimes. 
But all fornication is a crime, as is evident in 
Tobit 4:13: Refrain from all fornication, and 
beside your wife never endure to know crime. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
Whether it was ever licit to have a 
concubine 
1. Moreover. It seems that at one time it 
was licit to have a concubine. For just as to 
have one wife is of the law of nature, so also to 
have no concubine. But at one time it was 
permitted to have many wives. Therefore, also 
to have a concubine. 
2. Furthermore, no woman can be at the 
same time wife and slave-girl. Wherefore, 
according to the law by the very fact that a 
slave-girl was taken in marriage, she was 
rendered free. But certain of God's most 
favored (amicissimi) are said to have 
approached their own slave-girls, like Abraham 
and Jacob. Therefore, these women were not 
wives, and so at one time it was permitted to 
have concubines. 
3. Furthermore, the woman who is taken 
in marriage, cannot be sent away, and her son 
should take part in the inheritance. But 
Abraham sent away Hagar, and her son was not 
an heir. Therefore, Hagar was not Abraham's 
wife. 
                                                 
380 Actually Deuteronomy 22:19. 
But to the contrary, those things which are 
against the precepts of the Decalogue were 
never allowed. But to have a concubine is 
against the precept of the Decalogue, namely: 
Thou shalt not commit adultery. Therefore, 
never was it permitted. 
Moreover, Ambrose says in the book on 
the patriarchs, What is not permitted to a wife is 
not permitted to a husband. But never was it 
permitted that a woman approach another man, 
having sent away her own husband. Therefore, 
neither was it ever allowed to have a 
concubine. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that, as is 
clear from what has been said above, that 
action is said to be against natural law which is 
not suitable to the due end, either because it is 
not ordered in itself by the action of the agent, 
or because it is per se disproportionate to that 
end. However, the end which nature intends 
from lying together, is the procreation and 
education of children. And so that this good 
might be sought, nature has built delectation 
into intercourse, as Augustine says. Therefore, 
whoever makes use of intercourse because of 
the delectation which is in it, without referring 
it to the end intended by nature acts against 
nature; and likewise also unless it be such 
intercourse that it could fittingly be ordered to 
that end. And since a thing is named for the 
most part from its end as well as from its 
excellence: just as the union of matrimony 
takes its name from the good of offspring, 
which principally is sought through marriage, 
so also the name of concubine expresses that 
union in which only sleeping together 
(concubitus) for its own sake is sought. And 
even if someone should seek children at some 
time from such sleeping together, it is still not 
appropriate to the good of children, which 
means not only procreation, in which a child is 
conceived, but also education and instruction, 
which includes nourishment and discipline 
from the parents. In these three things parents 
are bound to their children, according to the 
Philosopher in Book 8 of the Ethics. Since 
however, education and instruction are owed to 
the children by their parents for a long period 
of time, the law of nature requires that father 
and mother remain together for a long time for 
the shared care of the children. For which 
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reason also birds that nourish their chicks 
together are not separated from the shared 
association which began with their mating, 
until the nurturing of the children has been 
completed. But this obligation of the woman 
remaining together with her husband is what 
makes matrimony. And therefore it is evident 
that to approach a woman not joined to oneself 
in marriage, which is called concubinage, is 
against the law of nature. 
1. Among the gentiles, the law of nature 
was obscured about many things. For which 
reason, to approach a concubine was not 
considered evil. But they employed fornication 
far and wide like something licit, like other 
things that were against the ceremonies of the 
Jews, although they were not against the law of 
nature. And therefore the apostles included the 
prohibition of fornication with ceremonials, 
because of the different judgments that existed 
about both matters among Jews and gentiles. 
2. That law arose not from the instinct of 
the law of nature, but from the aforementioned 
darkness into which the Gentiles had fallen, not 
rendering the due glory to God, as it says in 
Romans 1. For which reason, when the 
Christian religion prevailed, that law was 
extirpated. 
3. In other matters, just as nothing 
unfitting follows if someone simply hands over 
to someone else a certain thing which is in his 
power, neither would it be unfitting if he 
handed it over for a time. So neither of these is 
against the law of nature. However, it is not 
like that in this matter. Therefore, the reasoning 
does not follow. 
4. Injury is opposed to justice. However, 
natural law does not only prohibit injustice, but 
also those things opposed to every virtue. Just 
as it is against natural law that someone eat 
immoderately, although such a person using his 
own things does injury to no one. And 
furthermore, although a slave-girl is the 
possession of her lord as far as service goes, 
she is not however his possession as far as 
sleeping together goes; and again, it is 
important how someone uses his own 
belongings. Such a person also does injury to 
the children to be conceived, to whose good 
such a union is not sufficiently ordered, as was 
said. 
5. A woman has power over the body of 
her husband not simply speaking concerning all 
things, but only concerning the use of 
matrimony; therefore she cannot provide the 
body of her husband to another woman against 
the good of matrimony. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question as was said in the 
body of Book 2, Distinction 42, Question 1, 
Article 4, those acts are mortal sins which, by 
their genus, violate the covenant (foedus) of 
friendship between man and God and man and 
man. For these things are against the two 
precepts of charity, which is the life of the soul; 
therefore, since the lying together of 
fornication destroys the due order of parent to 
child, which nature intends from lying together, 
there is no doubt that simple fornication is by 
its own nature a mortal sin, even if it is not a 
written law. 
1. Frequently a man who does not avoid 
mortal sin, avoids some venial sin, toward 
which he does not have so much incitement; 
and so also Judah avoided lying, without 
avoiding fornication. Although that lying 
would have been pernicious, having injury 
joined to it, if he had not fulfilled a promise. 
2. A sin is not called 'mortal' because it is 
punished by temporal death, but because it is 
punished by eternal death; For which reason 
also theft, which is a mortal sin, and many 
other things are sometimes not punished by 
temporal death under the laws; and fornication 
is the same kind of thing. 
3. Just as not every movement of pride is a 
mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust 
(luxuriae). For the first movements of lust are 
venial sins, both in and things of this kind and 
even in matrimonial lying together. Sometimes, 
however, certain acts of lust are mortal sins, 
while certain movements of pride are venial. 
For in the words cited from Gregory a 
comparison is understood between vices 
according to genus, and not as single acts. 
4. As was said above, in Dist 16., 
Question 3, Article 2, questiuncula 2, that 
circumstance makes a sin more serious which 
makes it closer to the species of sin. Whence 
although fornication may be mitigated by the 
greatness of the incitement, nonetheless, 
because of the matter that it deals with, it has a 
greater gravity than inordinate eating, since it 
deals with what pertains to fostering the bond 
(foedus) of human society, as was said. 
Therefore the argument does not follow. 
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Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it must be said that 
Rabbi Moses says that before the time of the 
law fornication was not a sin; which he proves 
from the fact that Judah lay together with 
Tamar. But this argument is not compelling. 
For it is not necessary to excuse the sons of 
Jacob from mortal sin, since they had been 
accused to their father of a most wicked crime 
(Gen. 37:2), and they had consented to the 
murder of Joseph and his sale into slavery. 
Thus it must be said that since it is against 
natural law to have a concubine not joined to 
one in marriage, as has been said, at no time 
was it permitted in itself, nor even by a 
dispensation. For as is evident from what has 
been said, to lie with someone to whom one is 
not married, is not an act suitable to the good of 
children, which is the principal end of 
matrimony. And thus it is against the first 
precepts of natural law, which cannot receive a 
dispensation. For this reason, wherever it is 
read in the Old Testament that someone who 
must be excused from mortal sin had 
concubines, we have to think of these women 
as joined in marriage, even though they are 
called concubines, for they have something of 
the account of wives, and something of the 
account of concubines. For as marriage is 
ordained to its own principal end, which is the 
good of offspring, a wife is joined to her 
husband with an indissoluble union, or at least 
a long-lasting one, as is clear from what has 
been said; and against this there is no 
dispensation. But according to the second end, 
which is the management of the family and the 
sharing of labor, the wife is joined as a partner 
(socia); and this would have been lacking in 
those who were called concubines, for in this 
there could have been a dispensation, since it is 
a secondary end of marriage; and in that regard 
they resembled concubines, by reason of which 
they were called concubines. 
1. To have several wives is not against the 
law of nature in its first precepts, as to have a 
concubine is, as is clear from what has been 
said; therefore the argument does not follow. 
2. By that dispensation through which the 
patriarchs had many wives, they approached 
their slave-girls (ancillae) with uxorious 
affection. For they were wives as far as the 
principal and primary end of matrimony was 
concerned, but not as concerns that union 
which has to do with the secondary end, to 
which the condition of servitude is opposed, 
since they could not be at the same time partner 
and slave-girl. 
3. As in the law of Moses it was permitted 
by a dispensation to give a writ of divorce in 
order to avoid killing one's wife, as will be 
said; so by the same dispensation Abraham was 
permitted to send away Hagar for the 
signification of that mystery which the Apostle 
explained in Galatians 4. And also the fact that 
that son was not an heir belongs to the mystery, 
as is evident in the same place; just as also it 
pertains to the mystery that Esau, a free son, 
was not heir, as is clear from Romans 9. In the 
same way because of the mystery it happened 
that the sons of Jacob born of his slave-girls 
and of free women were heirs, as Augustine 
says: For in baptism they are born in Christ, 
sons and heirs, both through good ministers, 
whom the free women signify, as well as 
through bad ministers, who are signified by the 
slave-girls. 
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QUESTION 2 
Prologue 
Next it is to be inquired about the writ of 
divorce; and concerning this there are three 
things to be sought: 1) whether the 
indissolubility of marriage is of natural law 2) 
whether to repudiate one's wife was permitted 
at any time 3) on the causes of the writ of 
divorce permitted by the law, and of its 
inscription. 
Article 1 
Whether inseparability from one's wife is from 
natural law 
1. It seems that inseparability from one's 
wife is not from natural law. For the law of 
nature is common to all. But no law apart from 
the law of Christ has prohibited sending away 
one's wife. Therefore, inseparability from one's 
wife is not of the law of nature. 
2. Furthermore, sacraments are not of the 
law of nature. But the indissolubility of 
matrimony belongs to the good of sacrament. 
Therefore, it is not of natural law. 
3. Furthermore, the union of man and 
woman in marriage is ordained principally to 
the generation, raising, and instruction of 
children, as was said. But all these things are 
completed at some certain time. Therefore, 
after that time it is permissible to send away 
one's wife without any prejudice to the law of 
nature. 
4. Through matrimony is sought 
principally the good of offspring. But the 
indissolubility of matrimony is against the good 
of children; since, as the philosophers tell us, a 
certain man cannot receive children through a 
certain woman, even though he may be able to 
conceive through another woman, and she also 
might be impregnated by another man. 
Therefore, the indissolubility of marriage is 
more against the law of nature than from it. 
But to the contrary, that thing is 
particularly of the law of nature which nature 
received well-embedded in its beginning. But 
the indissolubility of matrimony is this kind of 
thing, as is evident from Matt 19. Therefore, it 
is of the law of nature. 
Moreover, it is by natural law that man 
does not go against God. But man would go 
against God in a certain way, if he separated 
what God had joined. Since then, the 
indissolubility of matrimony arises from this, 
Matt 19, it seems that it would be from natural 
law. 
I answer that matrimony by the intention 
of nature is ordered to the education of 
children, not only for a certain time, but for the 
entire life of the children. For which reason it is 
from natural law that parents store up their 
treasure for their children, and children are the 
heirs of their parents. Therefore, since children 
are a shared good of the husband and the wife, 
it is necessary for their association to remain 
undivided forever according to the dictates of 
the law of nature. Thus the indissolubility of 
marriage is of the law of nature. 
1. Only the law of Christ brought the 
human genus to perfection, returning it to the 
state of newness of nature; for this reason, both 
in the law of Moses and in human laws what 
was against natural law could not entirely be 
erased: for this was reserved to the law of the 
Spirit and life alone. 
2. Indissolubility belongs to matrimony as 
it is a perpetual sign of the union of Christ and 
the Church, and as it is ordained in the office of 
nature for the good of offspring, as was said. 
But since the dissolution of a marriage is more 
directly repugnant to the signification of 
marriage than to the good of offspring, to 
which it is repugnant in its consequences, as 
was said, indissolubility of marriage is 
understood more in the good of the sacrament 
than in the good of children, although it could 
be understood in both. And as it belongs to the 
good of children it will be of the law of nature; 
but not as it pertains to the good of sacrament. 
3. And to the third objection the solution is 
evident from what has been said. 
4. Marriage is principally ordained to the 
common good under the ratio of the principal 
end, which is the the good of offspring; 
although under the ratio of the secondary end it 
is ordained to the good of those contracting 
marriage, as it is per se a remedy for 
concupiscence. Therefore, in the marriage laws 
more attention is paid to what will be 
serviceable to all than what may suit one 
person. Therefore, although the indissolubility 
of marriage may impede the good of offspring 
for a certain person, nevertheless, it is fitting to 
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the good of offspring simply speaking, and for 
this reason the argument does not follow. 
Article 2 
Whether it could be permitted for one to put away 
his wife through a dispensation 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that to put away one's wife 
could have never been allowed through a 
dispensation. For what is against the good of 
offspring in marriage, is against the first 
precepts of natural law, which do not permit of 
dispensation. But putting away a wife is this 
kind of thing, as is clear from what has been 
said. Therefore, etc. 
2. Furthermore, a concubine differs 
particularly from a wife in the fact that she is 
not inseparably joined to the man. But to have 
concubines was was not open to dispensation. 
Therefore, also to put away one's wife. 
3. Furthermore, men are now as capable of 
receiving dispensations as they were in former 
days. But nowadays a man cannot receive a 
dispensation in order to divorce his wife. 
Therefore, neither could he in ancient times. 
But to the contrary, Hagar was known by 
Abraham with husbandly affection, like a wife, 
as was said. But he himself sent her away by 
divine command, and he did not sin. Therefore, 
it could have been made licit through a 
dispensation that a man send away his wife. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
Whether under the Law of Moses it was 
permitted to send away one's wife 
1. Ulterius. It seems that under the law of 
Moses it was permitted to send away one's 
wife. For one mode of consenting is not to 
prohibit, when you can prohibit. But to consent 
to the illicit is illicit. Since, therefore, Moses 
did not prohibit the divorce of one's wife, nor 
did he sinâ€”for the law is holy, as is said in 
Romans 7â€”it seems that divorce was allowed 
at one time. 
2. Furthermore, the prophets spoke 
inspired by the Holy Spirit, as is clear in 2 
Peter 1. But Malach 2: 16 states: if you hate 
her, send her away. Therefore, since what the 
Holy Spirit inspires is not illicit, it seems that 
divorce of one's wife was not always illicit. 
3. Furthermore, Chrysostom says that as 
the Apostles permitted second marriages, so 
Moses permitted the writ of divorce. But 
second marriages are not a sin. Therefore, 
neither is the divorce of one's wife under the 
law of Moses. 
But to the contrary is what the Lord says, 
that the writ of divorce was given by Moses to 
the Jews because of the hardness of their 
hearts. But the hardness of their hearts did not 
excuse them from sin. Therefore neither did the 
law concerning the writ of divorce. 
Moreover, Chrysostom comments on 
Matthew that Moses did not show the 
righteousness of God in giving the writ of 
divorce, such that by the law sin did not seem 
to be sin to those who did it. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. It seems that it would be permissible for 
a divorced woman to have another husband. 
For in divorce the iniquity of the man divorcing 
her was greater than that of the woman 
divorced. But the man could take another 
woman as his wife without sin. Therefore the 
woman could take another husband without sin. 
2. Furthermore, Augustine says about two 
wives, that when it was the custom or mores, it 
was not a sin. But in the time of the Law, there 
was such a custom (consuetudo) that a 
divorced woman would take another husband, 
as is clear from Deut 24:2: and when, having 
departed, the woman has taken another 
husband, etc... Therefore the woman was not 
sinning by joining herself to another. 
3. Furthermore, in Matt 5, the Lord reveals 
the justice of the New Testament to be 
superabundant by comparison with the justice 
of the Old Testament. But he says this belongs 
to the justice of the New Testament through its 
superabundance: that the divorced woman does 
not take another husband. Therefore it was 
allowed in the Old Testament. 
But to the contrary is what is said in Matt 
19:9: whoever takes a divorced woman in 
marriage, commits adultery. But adultery was 
never permitted in the Old Testament. 
Therefore, neither was it permitted to a 
divorced woman to take another husband. 
Moreover, in Deuteronomy 24 it is said 
that a divorced woman who has taken another 
husband, has been defiled, made abominable 
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before the Lord. Therefore she sinned by taking 
another husband. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
1. It seems that it was permitted for a man 
to take back the wife he had divorced. For it is 
permitted to correct what was done wrong. But 
it was wrongly done that the man divorced his 
wife. Therefore, it was permitted to correct this, 
by taking her back. 
2. Furthermore, it was always permitted to 
forgive sinners, since it is a moral precept, 
which remains in every law. But the man who 
took back his repudiated wife was forgiving 
that sinner. Therefore it was allowed. 
3. Furthermore, Deuteronomy 24 gives as 
the reason that she cannot be taken again is that 
she is defiled. But a divorce woman is not 
defiled unless she takes another husband. 
Therefore, at least before she has taken another 
husband, it was permitted to take her back. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Deuteronomy 24:4: the first husband could not 
take her back. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer the first question by saying that a 
dispensation of precepts, especially those 
which come in some way from the law of 
nature, is like changing the course of a natural 
thing. Natural things can be changed in two 
ways. In one way, from some natural cause, by 
which another natural cause is impeded in its 
course, as it is in all those things which occur 
for the lesser part (casualiter) in nature. But 
this way does not vary the course of those 
natural things that always happen, but only of 
those things that usually happen. In another 
way, natural things can be changed by an 
entirely supernatural cause, as occurs in 
miracles; and in this way not only can the 
natural course that is ordained to happen 
usually be changed, but even what is ordained 
to happen always, as is seen in the immobility 
of the sun at the time of Joshua, and its back-
tracking at the time of Ezechiel, and of the 
miraculous eclipse at the time of the Passion of 
Christ. 
However, this reason for dispensation 
from the precepts of natural law is sometimes 
from lower causes. Thus the dispensation can 
deal with the second precepts of natural law, 
but not the first: for those are like things always 
existing, as was said about the plurality of 
wives and things like that. At other times, 
however, it is only from superior causes, and 
then the dispensation can be divinely given 
even from the first precepts of natural law, by 
reason of some divine mystery of signifying or 
of showing, as was the case in the dispensation 
in the command made to Abraham of slaying 
his innocent son. But such dispensations are not 
made universally for all men, but for certain 
particular persons, as also happens with 
miracles. 
If therefore the indissolubility of 
matrimony were contained among the first 
precepts of the law of nature, it would only fall 
under dispensation according to this second 
way. If however, it were among the second 
precepts of the law of nature, it could also fall 
under dispensation according to the first way. 
But it seems more to be contained among the 
second precepts of natural law. For the 
indissolubility of matrimony is not ordained to 
the good of offspring, which is the principal 
good of marriage, except as concerns what 
should be provided for the children by the 
parents through their entire lives by the due 
preparation of those things which are necessary 
in life. However, the acquisition of things like 
this is not nature's first intention, according to 
which all things are in common. And therefore 
sending away one's wife does not seem to be 
against the first intention of nature, and as a 
result, neither is it against the first precepts, but 
against the second precepts of nature. For 
which reason, it also seems possible for it to 
fall under the first kind of dispensation. 
1. According as it is the first intention of 
nature, the good of offspring means 
procreation, as well as nourishment and 
instruction until the children attain their 
majority. But what may be provided to them 
afterward through an inheritance and the 
discharge of other goods, seems to belong to 
the second intention of natural law. 
2. To have a concubine is against the good 
of offspring as concerns what nature intends for 
them by her first intention, namely, their 
rearing and instruction, which requires that 
their parents remain together for a long time; 
which does not occur with a concubine, who is 
taken up for a time, and therefore it is not the 
same. Nevertheless, as far as concerns the 
second dispensation, even to have a concubine 
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can fall under dispensation, as is clear in Hosea 
1. 
3. Indissolubility, although it be a 
secondary aim of matrimony as it exists in the 
office of nature, nevertheless, relates to its 
primary aim as it is a sacrament of the Church; 
and therefore by the fact that it was instituted 
as a sacrament of the Church, while it remains 
such an institution it cannot receive a 
dispensation, unless perhaps the second kind of 
dispensation. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it is to be said that 
about this there are two opinions. For certain 
people say that whoever sent away their wives 
under the Law by giving a writ of divorce were 
not excused from sin, although they might be 
excused from the punishment inflicted 
according to the laws. And because of this 
Moses is said to have allowed the writ of 
divorce; and thus they argue four ways of 
allowing it: First, through the lack of a precept, 
as when a greater good is not commanded, the 
lesser good is said to be permitted by God, just 
as the Apostle permitted matrimony by not 
commanding virginity in I Corinthians 7. 
Secondly, through the lack of a prohibition; as 
venial things are said to be permitted, since 
they were not prohibited. Thirdly, through the 
lack of restraints; and in this way common sins 
are said to be allowed by God, inasmuch as He 
does not prevent them, when He could. 
Fourthly, through the lack of punishment; and 
in this way the writ of divorce was permitted 
by the Law, not indeed because of any greater 
good to follow, as was the case with the 
dispensation for multiple wives, but because of 
the greater evil to be prevented, namely, the 
murder of the wife, to which the Jews were 
prone because of their corruption of irascibility, 
as also they were permitted to lend money to 
outsiders because of a certain corruption in 
concupiscibility, so that they would not commit 
usury against their own brethren. And in the 
same way because of the corruption of 
suspicion in their reason, a sacrifice of jealousy 
was permitted, so that not a single suspicion 
would corrupt their judgment. 
But since the Old Law, although not 
conferring grace, had in fact been given for the 
sake of revealing sin, as the saints commonly 
say; therefore it seems to other people that if in 
the divorcing of a wife they sinned, this at least 
should have been indicated to them by the Law 
or the Prophets; Isaiah 58:1: announce to my 
people their sins. Otherwise it might seem to be 
extreme neglect, if those things which are 
necessary to salvation, which they did not 
know, were never announced to them; and this 
cannot be said, since righteousness observed in 
the time of the law merited eternal life. And 
because of this they say that although to 
divorce one's wife is bad per se, still it was 
made licit by divine permission. And they 
confirm this by the authority of Chrysostom, 
who says that the (Divine) Legislator took 
away the blame from that sin when He 
permitted divorce. And although this may be 
said in probability, nevertheless the first 
opinion is more commonly held; therefore we 
must answer both arguments. 
1. Someone who is able to prohibit does 
not sin if he refrains from prohibiting because 
he does not hope for any correction but judges 
that he will occasion a greater evil by such a 
prohibition, and thus it happened with Moses, 
for which reason relying on divine authority he 
did not prohibit the writ of divorce. 
2. The prophets inspired by the Holy Spirit 
did not speak of sending away one's wife as if it 
were the command of the Holy Spirit; but as if 
permitted, so that greater evils would not 
happen. 
3. That similarity in permission is not to 
be understood except for having the same 
cause, since either permission was given in 
order to avoid baseness. 
4. Although hardness of heart would not 
not excuse sin, nonetheless, the permission 
given because of hardness of heart would 
excuse. For certain things are prohibited to the 
healthy which are not prohibited to the sick in 
body; nor do the sick sin by taking advantage 
of the permission granted to them. 
5. Something good can be neglected in 
two ways. In one way, because some greater 
good will result; and then the omission of that 
good receives its rectitude (honestatem) by its 
order to the greater good, as when Jacob justly 
(honeste) departed from monogamy for the 
sake of the good of offspring. In another way, 
something is omitted in order to avoid a greater 
evil. And then if it is done by the authority of 
him who has the ability to give a dispensation, 
the omission of such a good is not culpable 
(reatum non habet), but it also does not 
acquire rectitude (honestatem); and in this way 
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the indissolubility of marriage in the Law of 
Moses was overlooked in order to avoid a 
greater evil, namely, uxoricide: and therefore 
Chrysostom says, as quoted above, that from 
the sin he removed the guilt. Although 
something disordered might remain in divorce, 
for which it is called a sin; nevertheless, it was 
not culpable (habebat reatum) of penalty either 
temporal or perpetual, since it occurred by 
divine dispensation, and so guilt was removed 
from it. And therefore also Chrysostom says in 
the same place, because divorce was allowed, it 
was not indeed evil, but illicit; and indeed those 
who are of the first opinion refer to this only 
because it was culpable of temporal penalty. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it should be said that 
according to the first opinion the wife sinned 
when she joined herself with another man after 
her divorce, for her first marriage had still not 
been dissolved. For while the woman lives, she 
is bound by law to her husband, as is seen in 
Romans 7. Nor could she have had several 
husbands at the same time. But according to 
another opinion, as it was permitted by a divine 
dispensation for a man to divorce his wife, so 
also a woman could have taken another 
husband. For the indissolubility of marriage, by 
which the words of the Apostle are understood, 
was removed by reason of the divine 
dispensation. 
1. Therefore, so that we may respond to 
both arguments, it must be said to the first, that 
a man was permitted many wives at the same 
time according to a divine dispensation; and 
therefore, having sent away one wife, even if 
the marriage were not dissolved, he could take 
another. But never was a wife permitted to 
have multiple husbands, and therefore it is not 
the same. 
2. In these words of Augustine, mores are 
not taken as "customs," but rather as "just acts" 
(actu honesto), according as from mores one is 
said to be law-abiding or morigeratus, because 
he is of good morals, or as from mores moral 
philosophy is named. 
3. In Matthew 5 the Lord shows that the 
New Law supercedes the Old by its counsels, 
not only as concerns those things which the Old 
Law made licit, but also with respect to the 
things which were illicit in the Old Law, but 
were considered licit by many because of the 
incorrect exposition of the precepts, as for 
example, in the hatred of enemies; and thus it is 
also with divorce. 
4. These words of the Lord are understood 
as regards the time of the New Law in which 
the permission mentioned was taken away; and 
in this way also are understood the words of 
Chrysostom, who says that whoever sends 
away his wife according to the Law, commits 
four iniquities: for in this he appears as a killer 
before God, inasmuch as he has the object of 
killing his wife unless he sends her away; and 
since he sends away someone who is not a 
fornicator, which is the only case in which the 
law of the Gospel allows one to send away his 
wife; and similarly because he makes of her an 
adulterer, as well as the man with whom she 
has relations. 
5. A certain interlinear gloss on 
Deuteronomy 24 says: she has been defiled and 
is abominable: namely in the judgment of the 
one who first sent her away as though defiled. 
And thus it is not necessary that she be defiled 
simply speaking. Or she is called defiled in the 
way that someone was called unclean if he 
touched a corpse or a leper: not the 
uncleanliness of guilt, but of a certain legal 
irregularity; for which reason it was also not 
permitted for a priest to take a widow or a 
divorced woman as his wife. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
To the fourth question it should be said 
that in the law regarding the writ of divorce 
two things were allowed: namely, to send away 
one's wife and for the divorced wife to be 
joined with another; and two precepts: namely, 
the writing of writs of divorce, and that the 
divorcing husband could not take his wife back 
again, which, indeed, according to those who 
hold to the first opinion, was done to punish the 
woman who married another, and in this sin, 
she was defiled. But according to others, it was 
so that a man could not divorce his wife lightly, 
for afterward he was in no way able to recover 
her. 
1. In order to impede that evil which a 
man committed by divorcing his wife, it was 
ordained that a man could not remarry the wife 
he had divorced, as is clear from what has been 
said. And therefore this was divinely ordained. 
2. It was always permissible to forgive a 
sinner as far as concerns the bitterness of heart, 
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but not as concerns the penalty divinely 
exacted. 
3. In this there are two opinions. For 
certain people say that it was allowed for a man 
to be reconciled with the wife he had divorced, 
unless she had been joined in marriage with 
another: for then because of the adultery to 
which the woman had voluntarily subjected 
herself, she was given the penalty that she 
could not return to her first husband. But since 
the law universally prohibits it, therefore others 
say that even before she has married another, 
she cannot be taken back, because of the fact 
that she was divorced: for this defilement is not 
understood as guilt, but as was explained 
above. 
Article 3 
Whether hatred of one's wife would have been a 
reason for divorce 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that hatred of one's wife was a 
cause of divorce, according to what is said in 
Malachi 2:16: if you have hatred for her, send 
her away. 
2. In Deuteronomy 24:1 is said: Since she 
has not found grace in his eyes because of 
some foulness, he shall write a writ of divorce. 
Therefore, the same as before. 
3. But to the contrary, barrenness and 
fornication are more opposed to matrimony 
than hatred. Therefore, they should have been 
the cause of divorce rather than hatred. 
4. Moreover, hatred can be engendered 
because of the virtue of the one who is hated. If 
therefore, hatred is a sufficient cause, then the 
woman could be divorced because of her own 
virtue; which is absurd. 
5. Moreover, in Deuteronomy 22 it is said: 
if a man has taken his own wife, and afterward 
has hatred for her, and has charged her with 
unchastity or carnal union . . . if he fails to 
prove it, he will be flogged, and he will be fined 
a hundred shekels of silver, and he will not be 
able to send her away all the days of his life. 
Therefore, hatred is not a sufficient cause of 
divorce. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Ulterius. It seems that the causes of the 
divorce should have been recorded in the writ. 
For by the writ of divorce the husband was 
absolved from the penalty of the law by what 
was written. But this seems unjust in every 
way, unless sufficient causes for the divorce 
were specified. Therefore, it was necessary to 
write them in the writ. 
2. Furthermore, it seems that those things 
written availed to nothing but displaying the 
causes of the divorce. Therefore, if they were 
not written, that writ was served in vain. 
3. Furthermore, the Master says this in the 
text. 
But to the contrary, the causes written 
were either sufficient or not. If sufficient, they 
prevented the woman from seeking a second 
marriage, which was conceded to her according 
to the law. If, though, they were insufficient, 
the divorce was shown to be unjust. And thus 
the divorce could not happen. Therefore, in no 
way were the causes of the divorce to be 
detailed in the writ. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
To the first question I answer that the 
reason for the permission to divorce one's wife 
was the avoidance of uxoricide, as the saints 
have commonly said. However, the proximate 
cause of homicide is hatred; and therefore the 
proximate cause of divorce is hatred. But 
hatred is caused by a certain cause, just as love 
is; and therefore also it is necessary to state 
certain other remote causes, which were the 
reason for the hatred. However, Augustine says 
in the Gloss on Deuteronomy 24: many were 
the reasons in the Law for sending away one's 
wife: Christ excepted only fornication; he 
commands other troubles to be endured for the 
sake of the fidelity and chastity of the union. 
However these reasons are understood as 
foulness in the body, like infirmity or some 
observable stain; or in the soul, like fornication, 
or something of this kind, which makes 
dishonor in morals. But certain people restrict 
these reasons more, saying more probably that 
it was not permitted to divorce one's wife 
unless because of some reason arising after 
marriage; nor for any of these reasons 
whatsoever, but only on account of things that 
can impede the good of offspring, either in the 
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body, as sterility or leprosy or something like 
that, or in the soul, as if she were of bad 
morals, which her sons might imitate from 
spending time with her. But a certain gloss over 
that verse of Deuteronomy 24: when she has 
not found grace, etc., seems more strict, 
namely, for sin, when he says there, by foulness 
is understood sin. But the sin the gloss names is 
not only in the habits of the soul, but also in the 
nature of the body. 
1,2. Thus therefore we concede the first 
two points. 
3. Sterility and other things of this kind, 
are causes of hatred; and thus they are remote 
causes. 
4. No one is worthy of hatred because of 
his virture, speaking per se; for goodness is a 
cause of love; and thus the argument does not 
follow. 
5. This is given to the man as punishment, 
that he may not send away his wife forever in 
this case, as also in other cases when he had 
deflowered the girl. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it is to be said that 
the causes of divorce are not recorded in the 
writ in particular, but in general, so that the 
divorce might be shown to be just. But 
according to Josephus, it was so that a woman 
having a written writ of divorce may marry 
another: for otherwise, it would not have been 
given to her; wherefore, according to him, the 
writing was thus: I promise to you that I will 
never be together with you. But according to 
Augustine, the writ was written for this reason, 
that in the period of time intervening, and by 
the dissuading advice of the scribes, the man 
might desist from his plan of divorcing. 
And by this the solution to the objections 
is evident. 
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QUESTION 3 
Prologue 
Next we will inquire about virginity, and 
regarding this three things are to be sought: 1) 
What virginity is; 2) Whether it is a virtue; 3) 
Its comparison with the other virtues. 
Article 1 
Whether virginity is the perpetual meditation of 
incorruption in corruptible flesh 
1. It seems that virginity is not a perpetual 
meditation in corruptible flesh, as Augustine 
says in his book On marriage and 
concupiscence. For after the Resurrection the 
holy virgins will not lose their virginity. But at 
that time they will not be in corruptible flesh. 
Therefore the corruptibility of the flesh should 
not be placed in the definition of virginity. 
2. Furthermore, virginity is counted as a 
part of continence, which can be reduced to 
temperance. But meditation is not an act of 
temperance, but rather of intellectual virtue. 
Therefore, it should not be included in the 
genus of virginity. 
3. Furthermore, virginity is not a stronger 
good than charity or other virtues, but on the 
contrary, a more fragile one. But perpetuity is 
not in the ratio of charity: otherwise it would 
not happen that charity once possessed could 
be lost; which was disproved in Book 3, 
Distinction 31, Question 1, Article 1. Therefore 
neither should perpetuity be placed in the 
definition of virginity. 
4. Furthermore, the perpetual meditation 
of incorruption is destroyed by corruption of 
mind, about which it is said in Matthew 5:28: 
Whoever has looked upon a woman with lust 
(ad concupiscendam eam), has already 
committed adultery with her in his heart. But 
virginity is not removed by this, for such a 
corruption can be repaired, but virginity cannot, 
as it says in the text. Therefore, virginity is not 
the perpetual meditation of incorruption. 
5. Furthermore, the perpetual meditation 
of incorruption is lost without lying together, 
not only in the mind, but also in the flesh, as is 
seen in those sins which are against nature. But 
virginity is not lost without lying together, for 
as Augustine says in the book, On Virginity, 
virginity is abstinence from any lying together 
by a faithful continence. Therefore, the same as 
above. 
6. Furthermore, Ambrose states in his 
book On Virginity that virginity is an integrity 
that has no share in contagion. But the body is 
contaminated by nocturnal emissions. 
Therefore, virginity is lost by this. But the 
perpetual meditiation of incorruption is not 
lost: therefore, etc... 
7. Furthermore, virginity can be destroyed 
by violation: otherwise, the man who contracts 
marriage with someone who has been 
deflowered by another through violence, would 
not be made irregular. But such an event would 
not affect the perpetual meditation of 
incorruption. 
I answer that virginity, as is clear from the 
words of Ambrose, is a certain integrity; for 
which reason it is called from the absence of 
corruption which occurs in the act of 
generation, where there is a threefold 
corruption. First, a bodily corruption only, in 
the fact that the hymen (claustra pudoris) is 
broken. Another is the spiritual and physical at 
the same time, from the fact that through 
settlement and movement of semen, delectation 
in the senses is generated. Third is spiritual 
only, from the fact that reason subjects itself to 
this delectation, in which it loses integrity as 
far as act goes; since it is impossible to 
understand something in itself, as the 
Philosopher says in Book 7 of the Ethics. For 
this reason, the very absorption of reason is 
called a corruption. However, this third 
corruption is not an act of reason, but a certain 
passion, coming to it per accidens from the 
passion of the inferior parts, as through sleep or 
madness or other bodily passions it happens 
that the act of reason is impeded per accidens. 
Since therefore virtue and vice are brought 
about in reason's act of consenting and 
dissenting, sufficient reason for virtue or vice is 
not found in any of the corruptions mentioned 
above, but it is necessary to add the consent or 
dissent of reason. And since virginity in the 
genus of moral acts belongs to virtue, therefore 
St. Lucy said that the body is not defiled 
without consent of the mind, namely by that 
defilement which is opposed to the purity of 
virginity. Therefore the first corruption, which 
is only bodily, is not a matter of virtue or vice, 
unless per accidens by some mediating passion 
of the soul; for which reason, if by some 
incision the hymen were ruptured, there would 
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not be in this a greater detriment to virginity 
than if a foot or hand were cut off by a sword. 
But the second and third kinds of corruption are 
matters of virginity and its opposites, as also 
other passions of the soul are matters of moral 
virtue and the opposed vices. But finally in the 
act of reason choosing or rejecting the 
corruptions named is effected the defilement 
that deprives a person of his virginity, and as a 
result, the virginity itself; and therefore 
Augustine included in the definition mentioned 
above that it is ordered by reason: namely, 
meditation, as the genus of virginity, taking the 
act in place of the habit, as is often done; 
incorruption, however, he included as the 
object or matter, but he adds a determined 
subject by saying in corruptible flesh; for 
privation and possession are bound to happen 
about the same thing. 
1. Although after the Resurrection, the 
saints may not have corruption of the flesh, still 
they do have the nature of the flesh, which was 
corruptible. Therefore, in them virginity will be 
able to be as in a subject; but not in the angels, 
in whom the corruption which virginity is a 
lack of, was not ever intended to be. And this 
especially suffices for the ratio of virginity, 
that not only does it concern what is present, 
but what is past. For someone is not a virgin 
only by the fact that he is not corrupted, but 
also by the fact that he never was corrupted. 
2. Although a moral act of virtue is 
perfected in the will, yet reason puts in it the 
form of virtue, as is said in Book 6 of the 
Ethics; indeed, for this reason the Socratics 
called all the virtues â€˜knowledge.' And 
Augustine uses this way of speaking here by 
setting down â€˜meditation' in place of choice. 
3. In the act of virtue not only is discretion 
required on the part of reason, but also a certain 
firmness from a habit tending toward the act 
through the mode of nature. And just as natural 
causes, as far as they are de se, are immoveably 
ordained to their proper effects, by reason of 
which we can say, â€˜a stone always descends 
downward' although this can sometimes be 
impeded; so also the habit of virtue, as much as 
it is de se, is immoveably ordained to its proper 
act, although sometimes the one having it 
performs a contrary act; and by reason of this 
lasting immoveability, permanence is usually 
included in the definitions of virtues, as is 
stated in Princ. Digestorum, that justice is a 
constant and perpetual will; and thus also 
Augustine includes perpetuity also in the the 
definition of virginity, although sometimes 
those possessing virginity lose it; as thus in the 
aforementioned definition the discretion of 
choice, which the act of virginity has as far as it 
belongs to the genus of morals, is understood 
by â€˜meditation,' but immobility is understood 
from â€˜perpetuity.' 
4. Corruption of the mind, as can be taken 
from the things we have said, is twofold. One 
corruption is like a passion of the mind, when 
the mind is subject to the delectation which 
usually occurs in intercourse. And since this 
delectation is compeleted in the release of 
semen, such a corruption of mind cannot 
happen without a corruption of the flesh, which 
is said to occur by the settling of semen. 
However, there is another corruption of mind, 
which is its act: namely, the consent to or the 
choice of the corruption described above. But 
since the inferior powers follow the movement 
of the superior ones, it sometimes happens that 
by the act of the mind thinking about the 
corruption of the flesh, and intending to 
experience its delectation, heat is excited in the 
body, and semen is released and delectation is 
caused in which the mind is suffocated just as 
in intercourse. And then without a doubt 
virginity is lost. If though, the corruption 
remains in the mind's act of consenting, 
virginity is indeed lost according to what is 
formally held in the mind, but not by reason of 
what is materially in it. For which reason such 
a person cannot be called a virgin except 
materially. And therefore, this loss of virginity 
can be restored, but not that loss of virginity in 
which also what is material is taken away. For 
virginity on the part of its act has to do only 
with present or future, as it is in any other 
virtue. For choice has to do with present or 
future, but not past. But on the part of the 
matter, it does not just have to do with the 
present, but also the past. For someone is called 
a virgin who has chosen incorruption, which is 
the matter in virginity, which he has never lost 
and does possess and intends to preserve. But it 
is not required that he had never made the 
opposite choice, but never the opposite 
corruption. For this reason though, lost 
virginity can never be restored, since what 
transpired in the past cannot be recovered. 
5. As for those who corrupt themselves 
without lying together, there is no doubt that 
they lose their virginity, even as concerns what 
is material in it. For also if lying together does 
not take place, still delectation does take place, 
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which causes the corruption of virginity in 
lying together. If though lust against nature 
occurs before adulthood is reached, since there 
is no settlement of semen, and as a result 
neither does complete delectation suffocate the 
mind, virginity is not lost as to what is material 
in it. 
6. The passions of the sensitive part 
cannot be the matter of virtue unless according 
as they are ordered by reason establishing a 
mean in them, just as the concupiscible appetite 
and the irascible appetite obey reason; and 
therefore the delectation which occurs during 
sleep with the settlement of semen is not a 
matter of virtue; and because of this neither 
does such corruption destroy the incorruption 
which is the matter of virginity; and therefore 
by this reason virginity is not lost by such 
pollution. And the same reasoning holds true of 
women who, while sleeping and drunk or 
senseless, are known by men, unless perhaps 
they went to sleep with this intention, that they 
should be known by a man. 
7. Something whose principle is 
completely outside it is not orderable by 
reason; and thus by the same token, neither do 
those women lose their virginity who are 
corrupted through violence either by a man, or 
by a demon (incubo), if as much as they can 
they resist, so that they keep their bodies free 
from corruption, or at least their minds opposed 
to consenting. For still it is more intended in 
the signification of the sacraments that 
something external is carried out than that 
something internal is done; that irregularity 
which is caused by a defect in the signification 
of the sacrament nevertheless was brought 
upon that man who took a violently deflowered 
virgin as his wife. And particularly since reason 
is suffocated because of the extreme delectation 
of that act, it is most difficult to dissent to such 
delectation in that state; and therefore the 
presumption seems to be that she consented. 
Article 2 
Whether virginity is a virtue 
1. It seems that virginity is not a virtue. 
For all virtue consists in a mean. But virginity 
does not consist in a mean, but precisely in an 
extreme. For it consists in abstaining from 
everything delectable, which is what chastity is 
about. Therefore, it is not a virtue. 
2. Furthermore, the use of a virtue, since it 
is from natural right, was allowed in all times. 
But in the state of created nature it was not 
permitted to keep one's virginity, for that was 
against the precept, as Genesis 1:28 has it: 
increase and multiply; likewise, neither in the 
time of the Law of Moses, when whoever did 
not leave behind on the earth any of his 
progeny, were subject to the malediction of the 
law. Therefore, virginity is not a virtue. 
3. Furthermore, there is no virtue which 
can be lost without sin, and which cannot be 
recovered by repentance. But virginity is lost 
without sin in the marital act, nor can it be 
restored by repentence. Therefore it is not a 
virtue. 
4. Furthermore, every virtue is an acquired 
or infused habit. But virginity is in those who 
have no acquired or infused habit, as in 
unbaptized children. Therefore, it is not a 
virtue. 
5. Furthermore, every virtue is ordained to 
some act. But not virginity; but it imports more 
the privation of an act. Therefore it is not a 
virtue. 
6. Furthermore, whoever has one virtue, 
has all virtues. But someone who lacks 
virginity sometimes has other virtues. 
Therefore, virginity is not a virtue. 
7. Furthermore, no one uses virtue badly. 
But some people use virginity badly, as is the 
case with the foolish virgins in Matthew 25. 
Therefore it is not a virtue. 
8. Furthermore, virginal continence is 
divided against marital continence and that of 
widows. But marriage is not considered a 
virtue, nor is widow-hood. Therefore, neither is 
virginity a virtue. 
But against this is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7:7: each one has his proper gift 
from God, and he speaks of virginity. But the 
spiritual gifts of God are virtues. Therefore 
virginity is a virtue. 
Moreover, Ambrose states in his book On 
Virginity: the love of virginity invites us to tell 
something of virginity, lest as if by a certain 
omission, we should seem to pass by what is the 
chief virtue. 
Moreover, nothing merits a reward except 
virtue. But a reward is owed to virginity, 
namely the hundredth fruit, as the saints say, 
and the golden crown. Therefore it is a virtue. 
I answer that just as giving and receiving 
are the matter of liberality, so are sexual 
delectations the matter of chastity and 
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continence. However, within its genus, an 
abundance of giving and receiving requires a 
special virtue, which is called magnificence, 
because of its difficulty. And since temperance 
or chastity involves great difficulty in 
restraining delectations, therefore especially 
that which has the most difficulty in these 
matters, namely fortification against every 
corruption of carnal delectation, requires a 
special virtue, which is called virginity. 
Wherefore if virginity is taken for its complete 
notion, as was said, then virginity is a special 
virtue. For thus it imports nothing else but the 
choice of preserving incorruption; and this 
choice, if it is carried out, must proceed from 
some habit of virtue. Nonetheless, virginity 
adds beyond this the status of virtue, in which 
the habit may result in the act. But it cannot 
result in the act of choosing to preserve one's 
incorruption, unless one be incorrupt; for there 
is no choice of an impossible thing; but it is 
impossible to recover incorruption once lost. 
But it is possible to recover the matter of 
magnificence once lost, and in this lies the 
dissimilarity between magnificence and 
virginity. Others say, though, that virginity is 
not named a virtue, but a perfect state of virtue; 
and by this understanding the saints sometimes 
call it a virtue; and according to this opinion it 
is easy to answer the objections. However, the 
objections should be answered by supporting 
the first opinion. 
1. Among theologians, certain people say 
that virtue is not always a mean. But those 
saying this do not know what the mean of 
virtue is. For when the mean of virtue is taken 
according to right reason then if something is 
not in the mean, it is not according to right 
reason. And thus it can be neither praiseworthy 
nor virtuous. And therefore it is to be said that 
virginity is in the mean of right reason, because 
indeed the mean is not always taken according 
to the quantity of whatever the virtue deals 
with, which quantity is between too much and 
too little. For certain virtues exist which attain 
the maximum quantity in their proper matter, 
as, for example, no one dignifies himself in 
greater ways than the magnanimous man, nor 
does anyone make greater expenditures than 
the magnificent man, as is evident from Book 4 
of the Ethics. But it is taken according to the 
proportion of all circumstances attending the 
act. And thus that man who gives the most 
gifts, attains the mean by preserving 
moderation in giving to whom he should and 
what he should and for the correct reason; and 
there is excess in what is given where it should 
not be or for a reason that it should not be, even 
if great things are given. It is the same way also 
with virginity, although it lies at the extreme as 
far as what it deals with, since it abstains from 
every corrupting delectation; yet it is in the 
middle inasmuch as it observes the other due 
circumstances in a moderate way; and it would 
be excess if someone wanted virginity when he 
should not, as in the time of the Law of Moses, 
or for a reason that he should not, as with the 
vestal virgins; and likewise according to the 
other circumstances. 
2. As was said, the mean of virtue is taken 
according to the relation of circumstances to 
right reason. And since time is one of the 
circumstances, it is not unfitting that something 
be not allowed at one time, which is permitted 
or virtuous if it were done at another time. And 
therefore, if at the time in which God willed to 
pursue the multiplication of the human race or 
men for the conjugal work of divine worship, 
someone who preserved incorruption by his 
own idea would have been at the extreme of 
diminution, for he would have abstained from 
pleasurable things when he should not have; 
but afterward, once the multiplication of the 
human race or of those worshiping God was 
sufficiently completed, he would not have 
sinned by keeping his virginity also under the 
Law of Moses, or in the state of unfallen 
nature, if man had not sinned. Nor would he 
have acted against a precept, but above a 
precept, since multiplication could have 
occurred though others. 
3. That state of virtue in which virtue may 
result in its own act, can be lost just as easily 
with or without sin. However it is recovered by 
penance, as the richest, most generous person 
can give all his belongings to the poor, and thus 
without any sin of his own, it happens to him 
that he will not be able to continue in an 
external act of this virtue. If however, he 
consumes his own resources in base uses, this 
will be like a sin; nor will he recover the first 
state by penance. And so virginity which he 
calls that state of virtue in which virtue can 
result in an act; and it is lost by sin in 
fornication, and without sin in the marital act; 
nor is it ever recovered by penance. 
4. That which is the matter of virginity can 
be in those people who have not habit of virtue, 
as in children before baptism, in whom there is 
the first level of virginity which nature has 
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given. And just as in those who wish to 
preserve the aforesaid incorruption for a time, 
but with the design of marrying in its own time, 
who have the second level of virginity, though 
they are not called virgins unless materially. 
But the complete ratio of virginity, as it is a 
virtue, does not exist except in those who have 
made a choice of preserving the integrity 
guarded thus far, until the end, either with a 
vow, or without a vow. And this choice cannot 
be carried out without a habit informing it. If it 
be unformed, the act of virtue will be as if 
preceding virtue, just as also happens with 
other acts of virtues. 
5. Temperance as was stated in Book 3, 
Dist. 33, Question 3, Article 2, questiuncula 1, 
consists chiefly in controlling delectations; for 
which reason it has as its principal intention a 
certain interior act, namely the choice of 
restraining concupiscence. But it does not have 
an external act as concerns what is principal in 
it, unless per accidens and as a result, namely 
in the fact that it employs certain external acts 
to control delectations, like turning away from 
sight of concupiscible things, which acts it 
commands more than it elicits. For to enjoy 
delectations according to the measure of 
reason, is of the secondary intention of 
temperance. And since virginity is the chief 
virtue in temperance, therefore it does not have 
an external act unless as a consequence, but it 
restrains any use whatsoever of concupiscence. 
6. That man who has one virtue, has all of 
them in a certain way, but not according to 
everything which is in a virtue; as (for 
example) whoever has liberality, sometimes 
does not have magnificence as far as concerns 
that state which could result in an external act. 
And likewise, not everyone who has 
temperance has the state which he calls 
virginity because of its imperfection. Although 
he may have what constitutes the ratio of virtue 
in virginity; as on the other hand, because of 
his perfection Christ has charity, but not faith, 
because of the state of imperfection that faith 
carries with it; and so he may have whatever is 
of perfection and virtuousness in faith. 
7. Someone can employ badly the matter 
of virginity, which the foolish virgins can 
possess. But not if virginity is considered under 
its full account. 
8. Widowhood and matrimony do not 
carry with them any other level of material 
temperance like virginity; wherefore the 
account is not similar. 
Article 3 
Whether virginity is greater than all other virtues 
1. It seems that virginity is greater than all 
virtues. For beauty (decor) is of the ratio of 
virtue. But the beauty of virginity is the 
greatest. Therefore, it is the greatest of the 
virtues. Proof of the mean. Ambrose says in his 
book On Virginity: who can deem a greater 
comeliness than this beauty, namely that of a 
virgin who is loved by the king, is tried by the 
judge, is dedicated to her lord, is consecrated 
to God, always a bride, always untouched, so 
that neither will her love come to an end, nor 
her chastity to loss. However, there is nothing 
lacking from this true comeliness, which alone 
deserves to hear from the king: you are 
completely lovely, etc. 
2. Furthermore, Cyprian states: now the 
word is from us to the virgins; for there is 
greater care of those in whom there is a more 
sublime glory. Their flower is that of the 
ecclesiastical seed, their splendor and 
adornment that of spiritual grace, their portion 
the more illustrious of the flock of Christ. 
Therefore, the same as above. 
3. Furthermore, the greater prize is owed 
to the greater virtue. But to virginity is owed 
the greatest prize, namely the hundredfold fruit 
and the golden crown. Therefore, etc. 
4. Furthermore, the greatest dignity of the 
virtues is that by them we are joined to God. 
But virginity joins one to God most closely; for 
incorruption brings one close to God, as is said 
in Wisdom 5; and in the Book of Revelation it 
is said that virgins follow the Lamb 
wheresoever He may go. Therefore it is the 
greatest of the virtues. 
5. But to the contrary is what is said in the 
text, that the celibacy of John is not preferred to 
the marriage of Abraham. 
6. Moreover, Bernard says it was written 
about the Gospel, that the humility of Mary 
pleased (God, that is) more than her virginity. 
Therefore virginity is not the greatest of 
virtues. 
I answer that one virtue, both as concerns 
its act and as concerns its habit, can be said to 
be more excellent than another in two ways: 
namely, per se and per accidens. Indeed, an act 
of virtue is measured per se by reason of its 
object, from which it has its species. But per 
accidens on the part of its subject, as an act is 
called better even in small things, if it is done 
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with a more prompt will, or at a more 
opportune time, and so on infinitely in other 
ways, for per accidens causes are infinite. And 
because of this they are left out on purpose. 
Whence, having omitted this comparison, it 
must be known that although spiritual good is 
nobler and better than the good of the body, 
those virtues which have as their object a 
spiritual good are simply speaking better than 
those which have something bodily or related 
to the body as their object; and thus intellectual 
and theological virtues are nobler than moral 
virtues, which in a certain way deal with 
physical acts and passions; and among moral 
virtues, that one is better, speaking per se, 
which approaches most closely to the other 
ones mentioned, which closeness indeed can be 
noticed in two ways. In one way, as to the 
suitability of the subject, and thus justice, 
which is in the will, is the highest and most 
noble; and after this, fortitude, which is in the 
irascible appetite, which is like a certain border 
between reason and sensuality, as was said in 
Book 3, Dist 26, Question 1, Article 1; and 
lastly temperance, which is in the concupiscible 
appetite. In another way the closeness of moral 
virtue to intellectual virtue can be seen in the 
degree to which it is disposed to it. And thus 
among the other moral virtues, the closest is 
temperance, because through delectations, 
which are its matter, reason is bound to be 
weakened the most. And among the parts of 
temperance, particularly chastity, because in 
the delectations that it deals with, reason is 
completely overcome. For which reason the 
Commentator says in Book 7 on the Physics, 
that chastity is worth the most to the 
speculative sciences; and in the genus of 
chastity, especially virginity. Thus therefore it 
must be said that virginity is not nobler than the 
other virtues, but it is nobler in a certain way 
than all the other moral virtues, and per se and 
simply speaking, than all the other species of 
temperance. 
1. Those delectations which temperance is 
concerned with are the basest by the fact that 
they are shared by us and animals, as is evident 
from Book 7 of the Ethics. Wherefore 
temperance, which controls them, particularly 
assumes that beauty which is common to all the 
virtues, as fortitude assumes difficulty, and 
justice rectitude. And because of this, virginity, 
which is the highest level of temperance, earns 
for itself the highest beauty; though it does not 
follow that it is the noblest virtue. 
2. All the words of Cyprian cited above, 
which display the excellence of virginity, 
pertain to its beauty; wherefore they must be 
answered in the same way as the first objection. 
Or by saying that virgins have with virginity 
other virtues: but others do not have virginity 
with other virtues; and therefore there is no 
basis for comparison between virginity and 
other virtues, and virgins and other people. 
3. The golden crown is an accidental prize, 
and so is the fruit. But an essential prize is 
nobler than an accidental one; therefore, simply 
speaking, those virtues are more powerful in 
which a greater prize is due more essentially. 
Yet the accidental prize does not have as much 
to do with the root of virtue as the state of 
virtue. And furthermore, the golden crown is 
not only due to virgins, but also to martyrs and 
doctors; but the fruit is only due to continence, 
in which virginity holds the highest place. And 
because through continence those delectations 
are repressed which most greatly impede the 
taste of spiritual sweetness, which the fruit 
signifies by its name. 
4. Incorruption makes something close to 
God in whom there is no corruption, by a 
certain resemblance of imitation. And since we 
are more able to be like God in our minds than 
in our flesh; therefore incorruption of the mind, 
which is opposed to all sin, and exists through 
every virtue, makes something to be like God. 
But virginity has both kinds of incorruption; 
and therefore with regard to many things, it 
makes us like God, namely in body and soul, 
by which reason it is said that it follows the 
Lamb wherever He may go; and Ambrose says 
that nothing is lacking from it. But it does not 
follow that virginity makes someone more like 
God than other virtues do, but according to 
more things. 
5. In the text the marriage of Abraham is 
equated with the celibacy of John as far as the 
merit of the persons is concerned; since 
Abraham merited as much in marital union as 
John did in virginity. For he served God with 
the same promptness according to the state of 
his time; and this comparison is through things 
accidental to virtue. 
6. Humility seems to be most closely 
related to the virtues, since by it man subjects 
himself to God out of reverence, and as a 
result, to others because of God. Therefore, 
simply speaking, humility surpasses virginity. 
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Exposition 
The unfruitful woman was cursed, who did 
not leave behind of her seed upon the earth. 
This curse is not of guilt, but of punishment; 
though not concerning the defect of nature 
which virginity has in the lack of children; but 
concerning disrepute, since it was held to be a 
reproach. The immoderate use of marriage in 
our time almost resembles the baseness of 
fornication of that time. This is said concerning 
the intention of those nowadays who contract 
marriage mostly because of the affliction of 
sensual desire, which is the same reason the 
ancients used to fornicate. Therefore, he adds 
â€˜almost,' since all fornication was a mortal 
sin, but not every immoderate use of marriage 
is. 
They may have been able to be continent 
more easily even than we ourselves can be, 
because of the greatness of virtue which was in 
them; either they could be joined in marriage, 
having considered the force of decency 
(honestatis), which attracts the just; so that it 
would be difficult to them to sin, or to decline 
from the perfect state of virtue in something. 
The grace of public office masks private 
guilt. It should be known that although Lot is 
believed to have been protected from mortal 
sin, yet his daughters are not in any way 
excused from mortal sin, but they sinned less 
because of the piety of their intention. For they 
decided based upon a lightly-taken judgment. 
And furthermore, if they believed for certain 
that the entire human race had perished, they 
should have sought divine counsel and that of 
their father in such a horrible deed, which was 
against the first institution of matrimony, where 
father and mother are prohibited: because of 
this a man shall leave his father and mother 
(Genesis 2). Nevertheless when these things are 
regulated and restrained by temperance to the 
natural use, sexual appetite cannot exist. This 
regulating is not found as to the quantity of 
delectation in the act, but as to the due limiting 
of circumstances. 
John . . . had continence in his works. 
Continence is taken here as the cessation from 
every carnal act whatsoever. 
Scripture sometimes calls these women 
wives, sometimes concubines. Certain people 
say that they were not truly wives; but because 
they were joined to them by uxorious affection 
and the intention of children, sometimes they 
are called wives. Others say that they were 
truly wives, but they are called concubines 
since they remained slave-girls, and their sons 
were born not in their name but in those of their 
mistresses; and this seems more true. 
To have many wives, not too many. They 
are said to be 'too many' with whom carnal 
activity cannot happen enough for conceiving 
without a weakening of his mind: for such great 
frequency of the act altogether weakens the 
mind. 
Flesh cannot be corrupted without the 
mind having been first corrupted. This is 
understood in the sense of the corruption 
belonging to the genus of moral acts, which 
excludes virginity. 
It is better to die of hunger than to feed on 
what has been sacrificed to idols. Against this 
see 1 Timothy 4:4: nothing is to be rejected 
which is received with thanksgiving. And it 
must be said that it should be understood before 
one eats in veneration of idols, or with a certain 
external profession of idolatry, whether it were 
demanded by a persecutor as a sign of having 
crushed one's Christian faith. 
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DISTINCTION 34 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered marriage 
and determined its causes, here he considers 
those persons contracting matrimony. And this 
is divided into two parts: in the first he 
determines the impediments to matrimony that 
do not make the persons entirely ineligible to 
contract it; in the second, those by which the 
persons are rendered entirely ineligible for 
marriage, (Dist. 37), where he says: Therefore 
there are certain orders in which a marital 
union can in nowise be contracted. The first is 
divided into two: in the first he considers a 
certain impediment to marriage which makes a 
person ineligible, not simply but in a certain 
respect. It consists in a defect of nature, 
namely, impotence; secondly, of the 
impediment of condition according to the 
customs (mores) and statutes of men, namely, 
servitude (Dist. 36), where he says: Now let us 
see about condition, whether it be strong 
enough to divide a marital union. The first is 
divided into two: In the first part he considers 
the impediment of impotence, which impedes 
the contracting of marriage; in the second of 
the impediment by which the act of a marriage 
already contracted is impeded, namely 
fornication, as it is a cause of separation (Dist 
35): where he says: This also must be noted, 
etc... The first is divided into two parts, in the 
first he pursues the impediments of the persons 
contracting marriage in general; in the second 
he descends specifically to the impediment 
which he intended first to address, where he 
says: For concerning those who cannot render 
the debt by reason of impotence, Gregory 
counseled that they remain. And this is divided 
into two: in the first he shows that impotence 
preceding the marriage impedes it from being 
contracted; in the second he shows that 
impotence occurring unexpectedly in the 
marriage itself may not dissolve it, where he 
says: Also this must be known, etc... The first in 
two parts: In the first, he considers the effect of 
nature impeding matrimony, by which a man is 
rendered incapable of carnal intimacy; in the 
second he considers the effect of sin, by which 
man is rendered unfit for the same, which also 
impedes marriage, namely, incest, where he 
states: Also it must be seen concerning those 
men who sleep with two sisters, or those 
women who sleep with two brothers. The first 
in two: in the first he considers the impediment 
in which a man is rendered by nature incapable 
of the carnal act; in the second, the impediment 
in which he is rendered incapable of consenting 
to conjugal intimacy, where it says: Also the 
mad, while they are in senselessness, are not 
able to contract matrimony. The first in two 
parts: In the first he considers inability to have 
intercourse from natural causes, which is 
impotence; in the second, the inability that 
results from a curse, where he states: But it is 
declared that this must be held to be the 
impediment of a curse. 
Here five things are to be asked: 1) 
Concerning the impediments of marriage in 
general; 2) Whether impotence impedes 
matrimony; 3) Whether a curse does; 4) 
Whether madness or mental handicap; 5) 
Whether incest does. 
Article 1 
Whether the impediments to marriage are fittingly 
enumerated 
1. It seems that the impediments to 
matrimony are not fittingly assigned. For 
marriage is a certain sacrament distinct from 
the others. But to the others no impediments 
are ascribed. Therefore, neither should any be 
ascribed to matrimony. 
2. Furthermore, whenever something is 
less perfect, it can be impeded in that many 
fewer ways. But marriage is the least perfect 
among the sacraments. Therefore, either no 
impediments or few impediments should be 
assigned to it. 
3. Furthermore, wherever there is a sick 
person, it is necessary for there to be a remedy 
for the sickness. But concupiscence, for whose 
remedy marriage was granted, is in everyone. 
Therefore, there should not be any impediment 
that would make someone intrinsically 
ineligible for contracting it. 
4. Furthermore, something is called 
ineligible which is against the law. But 
impediments of this kind which are assigned to 
marriage are not against the law of nature, 
since they are not found in the same way in 
every condition of the human race; for more 
degrees of consanguinity are found to be 
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prohibited at one time than at another. But 
human law cannot, it seems, lay down 
impediments to matrimony, for matrimony is 
not of human institution, but of divine, as also 
are the other sacraments. Therefore, certain 
impediments to marriage should not be 
assigned making persons ineligible for 
contracting it. 
5. Furthermore, ineligible and eligible 
differ according to what is against the law or 
not against the law, between which there falls a 
mean, since they are opposed according to 
affirmation and negation. Therefore there can 
be certain impediments to marriage, by which 
persons in the mean between eligible and 
ineligible are constituted. 
6. Furthermore, no impediment can 
remove from something what is included in its 
own definition. But indissolubility is included 
in the definition of marriage, as was evident 
above in Dist 27, Question 1, Article 1, 
questiuncula 3. Therefore there cannot be 
certain impediments which nullify the marriage 
contract. 
7. Furthermore, the union of man and 
woman is not licit except in matrimony. But 
every illicit union can be nullified. Therefore, if 
something should impede marriage from being 
contracted, this would invalidate the contract 
by that very fact: and thus there should not be 
some impediments listed which prevent 
marriage from being contracted and but which 
do not invalidate the marriage contract. 
8. But to the contrary, it seems that there 
should be infinite impediments to matrimony. 
For matrimony is a certain good. But there are 
infinite ways of falling away from the good, as 
Dionysius says. Therefore the impediments to 
marriage are infinite. 
9. Furthermore, the impediments to 
matrimony are taken according to the 
conditions of particular persons. But conditions 
of this kind are infinite. Therefore, so are the 
impediments to marriage. 
I answer that in marriage there are certain 
things which are of the essence of matrimony, 
and certain things which belong to its 
solemnity, as is the case also with the other 
sacraments. And since when those things are 
removed which are not of necessity for the 
sacrament, the validity of the sacrament 
remains, therefore, impediments which oppose 
those things that are of the solemnity of the 
sacrament, do not obstruct it from being a valid 
sacrament; and such things are said to impede 
the contracting of marriage, but they do not 
invalidate the contract; for example, the 
prohibition of the Church, and period of holy 
days. And this is where we get the verse: 
Though the forbidding of the Church as well as 
the holy days impede it from happening, they 
permit those who have been joined together to 
remain bound. However, impediments which 
go against those things that are essential to 
matrimony, prevent it from being a valid 
marriage. Therefore they are said not only to 
impede the marriage from being contracted but 
to invalidate the contract; and these 
impediments are contained in the following 
verse: error, condition, vow, relation, crime, 
disparity of cult, force, holy orders, previous 
bond, decency, if you are related by affinity, if 
perhaps you will be unable to have intercourse: 
these things taken together forbid marriage, or, 
when already done, annul it. However the 
number of these can be taken in this way. For 
marriage can be impeded on the part of the 
contract of matrimony, or on the part of the 
ones contracting. If in the first way, since the 
contract of marriage is made by voluntary 
consent, which is removed by ignorance or 
violence, there are two impediments to 
marriage, namely force, which is compulsion, 
and error arising from ignorance. Therefore the 
Master considered these two impediments 
above, where the causes of marriage were 
treated. But now he treats the impediments that 
are taken on the part of the persons contracting, 
which are distinguished thus. For someone can 
be impeded from contracting marriage either 
simply, or with respect to some certain person. 
Simply, as when a marriage can be contracted 
with no one; and this only happens because one 
is impeded from the marital act; which indeed, 
may occur in one of two ways. First, if de facto 
one cannot; either because one cannot at all in 
any way, and thus is established the 
impediment of impotence in intercourse; or 
because one cannot freely, and thus is 
established the condition of servitude. 
Secondly, if one cannot licitly, because one is 
obligated to continence: which may happen in 
two ways, since one is either obligated by the 
office one has received, and thus it is the 
impediment of holy orders; or because of a 
vow taken, and in this way, the vow impedes 
marriage. If however, someone is impeded 
from marriage not simply, but with respect to 
some particular person, then it is either because 
of an obligation to another person, as someone 
218 
 
who is joined to one person in marriage cannot 
be joined to another, and thus is a previous 
bond, namely, of marriage; or because the 
proper relation is lacking to the other person: 
and this happens three ways. First, because the 
person is extremely distant from one, and thus 
is disparity of cult. Secondly, because the 
person is extremely closely related, and thus a 
threefold impediment is included: namely, 
family relation, which consists in a close 
relation of two persons by reason of a third 
person having been joined in marriage to one of 
them; and the justice of public decency, in 
which there is a close relation of two persons 
by reason of a third person having been joined 
by betrothal to one of them. Thirdly, because of 
an undue union already formed with that 
person; and thus the crime of adultery 
previously committed with the same woman 
impedes marriage with her. 
1. Other sacraments can also be impeded, 
if something which is of the essence or of the 
solemnity of the sacrament is taken away, as 
was said. But still more impediments are 
assigned to marriage than to the other 
sacraments, for three reasons. First, because 
marriage consists in two persons: and therefore 
it can be impeded in more ways than other 
sacraments, which only involve one person 
individually. Secondly, because marriage has 
its cause in us, but the other sacraments only in 
God; for which reason the Master also assigned 
to penance, which has its cause in us in a 
certain way, certain impediments, like 
hypocrisy, playing, and things of this kind 
(Distinction 16). Thirdly, because there are 
precepts or counsels about the other 
sacraments, as about more perfect goods; but 
about marriage there is indulgence, as if about 
a less perfect good; and therefore, that an 
occasion might be given for progressing in 
better things, more impediments are assigned to 
marriage than to the other sacraments. 
2. More perfect things can be impeded in 
many ways, inasmuch as many things are 
required for them. If however, there were 
something imperfect for which many things 
were required, that thing would also have many 
impediments, and this is the way with 
marriage. 
3. That argument would hold if there were 
not other remedies, by which also the sickness 
of concupiscence could be relieved effectively; 
which is false. 
4. Those persons ineligible for contracting 
marriage are named from the fact that they are 
against the law by which marriage is 
constituted. But marriage, inasmuch as it is an 
office of nature, is founded on natural law; 
inasmuch as it is a sacrament, it is founded on 
divine law; inasmuch as it is an office of the 
community, it is founded on civil law; and 
therefore, by any one of the laws named a 
certain person can be made ineligible for 
marriage. Nor is it similar with the other 
sacraments, which are sacraments alone. And 
because natural law received diverse 
determinations according to diverse states, and 
positive law is also varied according to the 
diverse conditions of men in diverse times, 
therefore the Master counts different persons to 
have been ineligible in different times. 
5. Law can prohibit something either 
universally or in part according to certain 
cases; and therefore, between being completely 
legal, and being completely against the law, 
which are opposed as contraries and not 
according to negation and affirmation, being in 
a certain way according to the law and in a 
certain way against it lies as a middle. And for 
this reason, certain persons are counted a mean 
between simply eligible and simply ineligible. 
6. The aforementioned impediments are 
not said to destroy the marriage contract as 
though dissolving a valid marriage which has 
been contracted properly; but because they 
dissolve that marriage which has been 
contracted de facto and not de jure. Wherefore 
if the impediment appears in some marriage 
properly contracted, it does not suffice to 
dissolve it. 
7. Those impediments which prevent the 
marriage contract sometimes impede the 
contracting of the marriage, not so that it does 
not happen, but so that a valid marriage is not 
made licitly. And nonetheless, if it is made, the 
marriage is a valid contract, although those 
contracting it sin; just as if someone 
consecrated the Host without fasting, he would 
sin, acting against the statutes of the Church. 
Nevertheless, he would perform a valid 
sacrament; since the fast of the consecrator is 
not of necessity to the sacrament. 
8. There are infinite impediments by 
which a certain good is impeded per accidens, 
as is the case with all incidental causes. But the 
causes that corrupt a certain good per se are 
determinate, as is the case with constituent 
causes; for causes of construction and 
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destruction are from some opposed things, or 
from the same thing taken in opposite modes. 
9. The conditions of particular persons in 
the singular are infinite; but in general they can 
be reduced to a certain number; as is evident in 
medicine, and in all the practical arts, which 
consider conditions of the particulars, for 
actions are about particulars. 
Article 2 
Whether impotence impedes the marriage from 
being contracted 
1. It seems that impotence does not 
impede marriage from being contracted. For 
carnal intimacy is not of the essence of 
marriage; since those marriages are more 
perfect which are accompanied by a vow of 
continence, as was said above in Distinction 
26. But impotence takes away nothing from 
marriage except carnal intimacy. Therefore, it 
is not a diriment impediment to contracting 
marriage. 
2. For, just as extreme impotence impedes 
carnal intimacy, so also does extreme heat 
(caliditas), which dries a man out. But heat is 
not counted among the impediments to 
marriage. Therefore, neither should impotence 
be counted. 
3. Furthermore, all old men are impotent. 
But old men can contract marriage. Therefore, 
impotence does not impede marriage. 
4. Furthermore, if a woman knows a man 
to be impotent when she contracts marriage 
with him, it is a valid marriage. Therefore, 
impotence, in itself, does not impede marriage. 
5. Furthermore, it happens in a certain 
instance that a man can have a healthy dryness 
sufficiently moving him to carnal intimacy with 
an experienced woman, but not with a virgin; 
for immediately the heat (calidum) evaporates 
because of its own weakness, so that it is not 
sufficient for penetrating a virgin. And 
likewise, in a certain man there may be 
sufficient heat to move him with respect to a 
pretty girl, who inflames more his 
concupiscence, but not sufficient to move him 
toward an ugly girl. Therefore it seems that 
impotence also may impede with respect to one 
person, but not simply speaking. 
6. Furthermore, a woman is universally 
more frigid than a man. But women are not 
impeded from marriage by this fact. Therefore, 
neither should impotent men be impeded. 
But to the contrary is what is said [in the 
Decretal] Extra, concerning the impotent and 
those under a spell: just as a child, who cannot 
render the debt, is not suited to this union, so 
also those who are incapable are considered 
least suited to contracting marriage. But the 
impotent are among these. Therefore, etc. 
Furthermore, no one can oblige himself to 
the impossible. But in marriage man obliges 
himself to carnal intimacy, since he thereby 
gives another power over his own body. 
Therefore, the impotent, who cannot engage in 
sexual intercourse, cannot contract marriage. 
I answer that in marriage there is a certain 
contract, by which one person is obliged to the 
other to discharge the carnal debt. Whence just 
as in other contracts there is no obligation 
agreed upon if someone obliges himself to 
something which he cannot give or do, so it 
does not befit the contract of marriage, if it is 
made by someone who cannot discharge the 
marital obligation. And this impediment is 
called inability to have intercourse by the 
general name, which indeed can occur by either 
intrinsic and natural causes, or from extrinsic 
accidental causes, such as by witchcraft 
(maleficium), of which we will speak later. If 
however, it is from natural causes, this can be 
in two ways: since either it is temporary, which 
can be remedied by the benefits of medicine or 
the progress of time; and then it does not 
dissolve the marriage. Or it can be perpetual, 
and then it does dissolve the marriage; so that 
that man of whom the impediment is alleged 
may remain perpetually without hope of 
marrying; another may marry whom he wills in 
the Lord. However, in order to know whether 
the impediment is perpetual or not perpetual, 
the Church has employed a determined time, in 
which this matter can be tested; namely three 
years. So that if after three years in which both 
parties have faithfully applied themselves to the 
accomplishment of carnal intimacy, the 
marriage is found not to have been 
consummated, it is dissolved by the judgment 
of the Church. However, in this the Church 
sometimes errs; since sometimes three years is 
not enough to prove perpetual impotence. 
Wherefore, if the Church finds itself deceived 
by the fact that a certain man in whom there 
was formerly this impediment, is found to have 
accomplished carnal intimacy with the same 
woman or another woman, it may restore the 
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preceding marriage and annul the second, 
however much may have occurred from 
allowing it. 
1. Although the act of carnal intimacy may 
not be of the essence of matrimony, still the 
power for it is of this essence; for through 
marriage the power over the body of the other 
is given to both of the spouses with respect to 
carnal intimacy. 
2. An excessive heat can scarcely be a 
perpetual impediment. Yet if it were found that 
for three years it impeded carnal intimacy, it 
would be judged perpetual. Still since 
impotence impedes in a greater way and more 
frequently (for it takes away not only the 
commingling of seeds but also the rigidity of 
the member, by which the union of bodies 
occurs); therefore impotence is considered 
more of an impediment than excessive heat, 
since every natural defect may be reduced to 
impotence. 
3. Sometimes the elderly although they 
may not have sufficient heat for generation, 
nevertheless they have sufficient heat for carnal 
intimacy; and therefore, marriage is granted to 
them, according as it is a remedy; although it is 
not their duty as an office of nature. 
4. In any contract whatsoever, this is 
universally binding, that the person who is 
unable to fulfill something, is not considered fit 
for the contract by which he obliges himself to 
its fulfillment. Yet incapacity can be in three 
ways. In one way, if it cannot be fulfilled de 
jure. And in this way such an incapacity makes 
the contract null in every way, whether the one 
with whom the contract is made knows about 
this incapacity or not. In another way, when it 
may not be fulfilled de facto; and then if the 
one with whom the contract is made should 
know about this incapability, and nevertheless 
agree to the contract, it reveals that in this 
contract he is seeking another end, and 
therefore the contract stands. If however he 
does not know, then the contract is null. 
Therefore, impotence, which causes such an 
incapacity that a man cannot acquit his 
obligation de facto, and the condition of 
slavery, by which a man cannot render freely 
concerning the deed, both impede marriage 
when one spouse is ignorant that the other 
cannot render the debt. Yet the impediment by 
which someone cannot render the debt de jure, 
such as consanguinity, annuls the marital 
contract whether the other party knows or not; 
and because of this the Master counts these two 
as impediments which make persons entirely 
ineligible. 
5. There cannot be a perpetual natural 
impediment in the man with respect to one 
person and not to another; but if he were unable 
to complete the carnal act with a virgin, but he 
could with one who is not, then the hymen 
could be broken medically by some instrument, 
and they could be united. Nor would this be 
against matrimony, since it would not be done 
for the purpose of delectation, but for a medical 
reason. However loathing the woman is not a 
natural cause, but an extrinsic, accidental 
cause, and therefore it is adjudged the same as 
a curse, about which it will be discussed later. 
6. The male is the active principle in 
generation, but the female is the passive 
principle; and therefore, greater heat is required 
in the man than in the woman for the work of 
generation; whence impotence makes a man 
incapable, but frigidity would not make a 
woman incapable. But in the woman there can 
be a natural impediment from another cause, 
namely, arctatation (extreme tightness); and 
then the judgment of arctatation in the woman 
is the same as that of impotence in the man. 
Article 3 
Whether a curse (maleficium) can impede marriage 
1. It seems that a curse cannot impede 
marriage. For evil spells of this kind are the 
work of the demons. But demons do not have 
the power of impeding the marital act any more 
than other bodily acts, which they cannot 
impede. For if this were so, the whole world 
could be disturbed--if eating and walking and 
other things like this were impeded. Therefore, 
marriage cannot be impeded by evil spells. 
2. Furthermore, the work of God is 
stronger than the work of the devil. But an evil 
spell is a work of the devil. Therefore it cannot 
impede marriage, which is a work of God. 
3. Furthermore, no impediment voids the 
marriage contract unless it is a perpetual 
impediment. But an evil spell cannot be a 
perpetual impediment: for since the devil does 
not have power except over sinners, when the 
sin was driven out it would remove the spell, 
either through another spell, or through the 
exorcisms of the Church, which are ordained to 
repressing the force of the demons. Therefore, 
an evil spell cannot impede marriage. 
221 
 
4. Furthermore, carnal intimacy cannot be 
impeded unless the power of generation, which 
is its principle, is also impeded. But the 
reproductive power of one man has the same 
capacity toward all women. Therefore, by an 
evil spell there cannot be an impediment in a 
man with respect to one woman, unless it were 
with respect to all women. 
But against this is what is said in the 
Decretals, 33, Question 1: if through sorcery or 
evil spells ; and further: if they were not able to 
be cured, it is worthwhile that they be 
separated. 
Moreover, the power of the demons is 
greater than that of man: There is no power 
upon the earth which compares to it (Job 
40:24)381. But by a human deed some man 
might be made incapable of carnal intimacy 
because of a certain power or through 
castration; and by this marriage is impeded. 
Therefore much more can this be done by the 
power of the demons. 
I answer that certain people have said that 
witchcraft was nothing in the world, except in 
the impressions of men, who attribute natural 
effects whose causes are hidden to evil spells. 
But this is against the authorities of the saints, 
who say that demons have power over bodies, 
and over the imagination of men, when they are 
permitted by God. Thus sorcerers can work 
certain works of magic through them. 
However, the opinion mentioned above 
proceeds from a root of lack of faith, or 
disbelief, for they do not believe that the 
demons exist except in the imagination of the 
common people alone, such that the terrors that 
a man makes for himself out of his own mind, 
he imputes to a demon. And since also from a 
vigorous imagination certain figures may 
appear to the senses just as a man thinks them, 
and then he believes that he sees demons. But 
these notions are repudiated by the true faith, 
by which we believe the angels to have fallen 
from heaven, and the demons to exist, and to be 
capable from the subtlety of their nature of 
many things which we cannot do. Therefore, 
those men who summon them for doing these 
kinds of things, are called sorcerers. And 
therefore, others have said that through evil 
spells an impediment to carnal intimacy can be 
established, but nothing of this kind is 
perpetual, so that it does not void the marital 
contract, and they say that the laws that were 
                                                 
381 Actually Job 41:24. 
saying so, were revoked. But this is against 
experience, and against the new laws which 
agree with the old ones. And therefore a 
distinction must be drawn: for inability to have 
intercourse because of an evil spell is either 
perpetual, and then it invalidates the marriage, 
or it is not perpetual, and then it does not 
invalidate it. And to test this the Church has 
fixed a period of time in the same way, namely 
three years, just as was stated for impotence. 
Still, there are these differences between being 
under an evil spell and impotence: for someone 
who is incapacitated by impotence is just as 
incapable with one woman as with another. 
And therefore when the marriage is nullified, 
he is not granted permission to unite with 
another. But under a curse a man can be unable 
to unite with one woman and not with another; 
and therefore when by the judgment of the 
Church the marriage is nullified, both parties 
are granted permission to seek union with 
another. 
1. Since the first corruption of sin, by 
which man was made slave to the devil, is 
passed on to us by the generative act, therefore 
the power of sorcery is permitted to the devil 
by God in this act more than in others; just as 
the power of witchcraft is displayed more in 
serpents than in other animals, as is said, since 
through the serpent the devil tempted the 
woman. 
2. The work of God can be impeded by the 
work of the devil by divine permission; not that 
the devil could be stronger than God such that 
he could destroy His work through violence. 
3. Witchcraft is so enduring that it may not 
have a remedy in human action; although God 
may furnish the remedy by forcing out the 
demon or even the demon might stop. For it is 
not always the case that what was done by one 
spell could be destroyed by another spell, as 
sorcerers themselves admit. But if the remedy 
could be applied by witchcraft, nevertheless it 
would be considered perpetual, since in no way 
should someone invoke the help of a demon 
through witchcraft. Likewise, it is not 
necessary that if because of some sin power 
was given to the devil over someone, this 
power should end when the sin ends: for 
sometimes punishment remains once guilt has 
passed away. Likewise also the exorcisms of 
the Church are not strong enough for always 
repressing demons as concerns all corporeal 
troubles, when divine judgment requires this; 
but they are always strong enough against those 
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infestations of demons that they were instituted 
against. 
4. Sometimes witchcraft can establish an 
impediment with everyone, sometimes with 
just one person: since the devil is a voluntary 
cause, not acting from the necessity of nature. 
And furthermore the impediment of witchcraft 
can occur from the oppression of a demon on 
the imagination of a man, by which the 
concupiscence moving him toward a certain 
woman but not toward another is removed. 
Article 4 
Whether madness impedes marriage 
1. It seems that madness does not impede 
marriage. For spiritual marriage, which is 
contracted in baptism, is nobler than carnal 
marriage. But the insane can be baptized. 
Therefore, they can also marry. 
2. Furthermore, impotence impedes 
matrimony inasmuch as it impedes carnal 
intimacy, which is not impeded by madness. 
Therefore, neither is marriage. 
3. Furthermore, marriage is not invalidated 
unless by some perpetual impediment. But 
concerning madness it is impossible to know if 
the impediment be perpetual. Therefore it does 
not invalidate the marriage. 
4. Furthermore, the above-mentioned 
verses sufficiently contain the diriment 
impediments to matrimony. But no mention is 
made there of madness. Therefore, etc. 
But to the contrary, madness takes away 
the use of reason more than error. But error 
impedes marriage. Therefore, so does madness. 
Moreover, the insane are not fit for 
making any contract. But marriage is a certain 
contract. Therefore, etc. 
I answer that madness either precedes 
marriage or follows it. If it follows, it cannot 
invalidate the marriage in any way. But if it 
precedes, either the madman has lucid intervals 
or not. If he does, then although when he is in 
that interval it may not be safe for him to 
contract matrimony, since he doesn't know how 
to educate children; yet if he does contract 
marriage, it is a marriage. If however he does 
not have lucid intervals, or if he should contract 
marriage while he is not having one, then since 
there can be no consent where the use of reason 
is lacking, it will not be a valid marriage. 
1. The use of reason is not required for 
baptism as its cause, as it is required for 
matrimony. Therefore there is no similarity. 
But concerning baptism of the insane, see 
above, Distinction 6. 
2. Madness impedes marriage in its cause, 
which is consent, although not in its act, as is 
the case with impotence. But nevertheless the 
Master considers it at the same time as 
impotence because both arise from defects of 
nature. 
3. A temporary impediment that impedes 
the cause of marriage, namely, consent, 
completely voids matrimony. But an 
impediment that impedes the act must be 
perpetual in order to void matrimony. 
4. This impediment is reduced to that of 
error: for on both sides there is a defect of 
consent on the part of reason. 
Article 5 
Whether the incest by which someone knows the 
sister of his own wife, invalidates marriage 
1. It seems that incest by which someone 
knows the sister of his wife does not invalidate 
marriage. For the woman should not be 
punished for the sin of the man. But she would 
be punished if the marriage were dissolved. 
Therefore, etc. 
2. Furthermore, he sins more who knows 
his own relative than who knows the relative of 
his wife. But the first sin does not impede 
marriage. Therefore, neither does the second. 
3. Furthermore, if this is inflicted as 
punishment for sin, then it seems that also if, 
once his wife is dead, the incestuous husband 
should contract with someone else, they should 
be separated too, which is not the case. 
4. Furthermore, this impediment is also 
not enumerated among the others listed above. 
Therefore, it does not invalidate matrimony. 
But to the contrary, by the fact that he has 
known the sister of his wife, the man forms an 
affinity with his wife. But affinity does 
invalidate the marriage contracted. Therefore, 
so does the incest described. 
Moreover, whoever sins in something is 
punished in that thing. But such a person sins 
against matrimony. Therefore he should be 
punished by being deprived of his marriage. 
I answer that if someone knows the sister 
or another relative of his wife before the 
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marriage is contracted, even after the betrothal, 
it is necessary for the marriage to be dissolved 
by reason of the affinity contracted. But if it 
occurs after the marriage is contracted and 
consummated, the spouses cannot be 
completely separated; but the man loses his 
right of requesting the marital debt, nor can he 
ask for it without sin. But he should still render 
the debt to his wife if she asks, for she should 
not be punished for the sin of her husband. Yet 
after the death of his wife, he should remain 
entirely without hope of marriage, unless he 
receives a dispensation from this due to his 
own fragility, because of which illicit 
intercourse is feared. If however he should 
contract marriage without the dispensation, he 
sins against the statutes of the Church by so 
doing. Still, this is not enough reason that the 
marriage should be broken up. 
And through this the answers to the 
objections are evident. For incest is considered 
an impediment to marriage not just by reason 
of the fault, but by reason of the affinity which 
it causes, and therefore, also it is not 
enumerated among the other impediments, but 
is included in the impediment of affinity. 
Exposition 
Let both remain unmarried. This is 
understood when the impediment is alleged of 
both: otherwise that one only should remain 
unmarried on whose part the impediment is 
brought forth. 
Because if the wife should plead, and 
should say: I wish to be a mother, and to bring 
forth children, etc... It seems from this that by 
reason of sterility marriage could be dissolved. 
And to this it must be said, no. For in the sterile 
even if marriage does not attain its own aim, 
according as it is in the office of nature, yet it 
does act as a remedy through carnal intimacy; 
wherefore here the procreation of children is 
said for the sake of carnal intimacy, which 
women are too modest to ask for. 
By the hands of seven family members he 
may swear that they never came together 
carnally. In this way separation should take 
place. When impotence in intercourse is 
alleged, if both the husband and the wife 
should admit it; or if there is an evident 
impediment, as in the case of eunuchs, they can 
be separated immediately. But if it is not 
evident, it is to be commanded of them that 
they continue to live together, applying 
themselves to carnal intimacy in good faith. 
Because if it is unable to be done for three 
years, then both will swear that applying 
themselves in good faith, they were unable to 
be joined carnally; and so that separation may 
not be granted too easily, it is required that 
seven of the closest relations, who can better 
know the truth of the matter by probable signs, 
swear that they believe that the two spoke the 
truth. 
Let perjurers be bound by the crime of the 
matter; That is, let their testimony be so 
counted for nothing as if they were perjurers. 
Not though that they incur the guilt or disrepute 
of perjurers, if they believed them to speak the 
truth. 
But if a husband asserts that he has 
rendered the debt to his wife, and she denies, it 
is sought who is more trustworthy in merit. The 
same thing must be known that when the man 
asserts that carnal intimacy had occurred and 
the wife denies, it must be established by the 
oath of the man, unless by the state of her own 
body the woman wishes to prove the man has 
lied. But if the man swears falsely, and the wife 
cannot prove the contrary, she can protect 
herself by sleeping separately, lest by the attack 
of the man she should be provoked to sexual 
desire, and the danger of incontinence should 
threaten. If however, the man should deny that 
carnal intimacy had taken place, it is not to be 
established by his oath, although he is the head 
of his wife, if the wife affirms it: for in this 
way, it would be easy for many men to send 
away their wives. 
What is contained in the end of this 
chapter, must be understood as said more from 
strict interpretation than from equity of the 
canons. It must be known that if a curse 
rendering someone impotent were generally 
with respect to anyone, then if he married 
another, the impediment would be shown to 
have been not perpetual. Wherefore he should 
return to the prior union. If however the 
impediment was relative, that is, with respect to 
a particular person, since both were given 
permission to marry other people, then once 
this power to marry has been granted, they 
cannot return to the unconsummated marriage, 
since it was null, and the second is the valid 
marriage. 
But if it was contracted, they would not be 
separated. This is understood to mean that if it 
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was contracted when they were having lucid 
intervals. 
Nor is it permitted for him to render the 
debt to his own wife. This is no longer held. Or 
it should be said that he universally calls carnal 
intimacy rendering the debt, which the man 
was deprived of as to his own part, although his 
wife's right remains. For although marriage 
cannot stand on one leg, yet the right of 
requesting the marital debt can exist in one and 
not in the other. 
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DISTINCTION 35 
Prologue 
After he has considered inability to have 
intercourse, which impedes the marital act, here 
he considers a toro separation because of the 
sin of fornication, which similarly takes away 
the marital act although the marriage bond 
endures; and this is divided into two parts, in 
the first he shows how adultery following 
marriage removes the marital act although the 
marriage bond endures; in the second part he 
shows how adultery preceding the marriage 
removes also the marriage bond, where he 
states: it is also customary to ask whether it is 
valid for someone to be taken in marriage who 
has already been corrupted by adultery. The 
first has two parts: in the first part, he shows 
when it is permitted to put away one's wife 
because of fornication; in the second part he 
asks whether to put her away is of necessity or 
whether one may also keep her, where he 
states: However, John Chrysostom says . . . The 
first part is divided in two: first, he shows how 
it is permitted to the husband to send away his 
wife and vice versa, because of fornication 
committed; in the second he shows that neither 
may marry after the separation because the 
prior marital bond remains: But if someone 
completely free from fornication has sent away 
a fornicator, he cannot have intercourse with 
another. Concerning the first point he does two 
things: first he shows that either spouse may 
send away the other because of fornication, 
when the one who dismisses is innocent of 
fornication; secondly he shows that this cannot 
happen when he himself is guilty of the same 
crime, and there he says: If it is truly asked 
whether an adulterer can dismiss an adulterous 
wife because of fornication, we say etc... 
Here we will ask six things: 1) Whether it 
be permitted for the husband to send away his 
wife because of fornication; 2) Whether he is 
bound to do this; 3) Whether he may send her 
away by his own judgment or whether the 
judgment of the Church is required. 4) Whether 
husband and wife are of equal condition in this 
matter; 5) Whether after this separation they 
must remain unmarried; 6) Concerning 
reconciliation. 
Article 1 
Whether because of fornication it is permitted to a 
husband to put away his wife 
1. It seems that it is not permitted for a 
husband to put his wife away because of 
fornication. For evil is not to be rendered for 
evil. But a man putting away his wife because 
of fornication seems to render evil for evil. 
Therefore, this is not permitted. 
2. Furthermore, it is a greater sin if both 
should fornicate than if only one should. But if 
both should fornicate, they will not be able to 
be separated for this. Therefore neither should 
they if only one of them fornicates. 
3. Furthermore, spiritual fornication and 
certain other sins are more serious than carnal 
fornication. But a separation a toro cannot be 
made because of these. Therefore, neither 
should it occur because of carnal fornication. 
4. Furthermore, a vice against nature is 
more removed from the goods of matrimony 
than fornication, which is done in the mode of 
nature. Therefore it should have been counted 
as a cause of separation more than fornication. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Matthew 5. 
Moreover, one is not bound to keep faith 
with someone who breaks faith. But by 
fornicating a spouse breaks the faith that he 
owes to another. Therefore, one can send the 
other away because of fornication. 
I answer that the Lord allowed a husband 
to dismiss his wife because of fornication in 
penalty to the one who broke faith, and in favor 
of the one who kept faith, so that the faithful 
spouse would not be constrained to render the 
debt to the one who had broken faith. And 
because of this, seven instances are excepted in 
which the husband may not dismiss his wife for 
fornication, in which either the wife is free 
from guilt, or both are equally culpable. The 
first is if the husband himself was also a 
fornicator. Second, if he had prostituted his 
wife. Third, if the wife married another, 
believing in all probability her husband to be 
dead because of his long absence. The fourth is 
if she was known by someone who secretly 
entered her bed in the guise of her husband. 
Fifth, if she was violated by force. Sixth, if her 
husband were reconciled to her after the 
adultery took place, and knew her carnally. 
Seventh, if the marriage had been contracted 
while both were unbelievers, the man had given 
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his wife a writ of divorce, and the wife had 
married another; for then if both are converted 
to the faith, the man is bound to take her back. 
1. The man sins if he dismisses his 
fornicating wife for revenge in spite; but if he 
does it to guard against disgrace falling upon 
himself, lest he seem a participant in the 
offence, or for the sake of correcting the vice of 
his wife, or for avoiding incertitude about his 
children, he does not sin. 
2. Separation because of fornication 
occurs by one party accusing the other; and 
since no one can accuse who is guilty of the 
same offence, when both are fornicators, 
separation cannot be enforced, regardless of 
whether the marriage was more sinned against 
by one party who fornicated than by the other. 
3. Fornication is directly against the goods 
of matrimony; for the certitude of the paternity 
of children is ruined by it, and faith is broken, 
and the signification is not preserved when one 
spouse divides his own flesh among many. But 
since unbelief, which is called spiritual 
fornication, is also against a good of 
matrimony, i.e. raising children to the worship 
of God; so this can also cause a separation; but 
nevertheless in another way than fornication 
does. For it is possible to move for a separation 
because of one act of carnal fornication, but not 
because of one act of unbelief, but only for a 
habit that is shown to be obstinate, in which 
unbelief is the result. 
4. Also because of a vice against nature a 
separation can be sought; but mention is not 
made of it in this way, both because it is an 
unnameable passion, and because it occurs 
more rarely, and because it does not cause 
incertitude about children like this. 
Article 2 
Whether a man is bound by precept to dismiss a 
wife who fornicates 
1. It seems that a man is bound by precept 
to send away a wife who fornicates. For the 
man, since he is the head of his wife, is bound 
to correct his wife. But separation a toro is 
introduced for the sake of correcting a 
fornicating wife. Therefore, he is bound to 
separate her from himself. 
2. Furthermore, whoever consents to 
someone sinning mortally, mortally sins 
himself. But someone who retains a fornicating 
wife, seems to consent to her, as it says in the 
text. Therefore, he sins unless he casts her 
away from himself. 
3. Furthermore, in 1 Corinthians 6: 16, it 
states: whoever cleaves to a harlot becomes 
one body with her. But someone cannot be at 
the same time a member of a prostitute and a 
member of Christ, as is said in the same place. 
Therefore, a husband cleaving to a fornicating 
wife ceases to be a member of Christ, for he 
sins mortally. 
4. Furthermore, just as blood relation 
voids the marriage bond, so also fornication 
causes separation a toro. But after a man has 
known the sister of his wife, he sins mortally 
by knowing his wife. Therefore, if he knows 
his wife after he finds that she is a fornicator, 
he sins mortally. 
But to the contrary is what the gloss on 1 
Corinthians 7 says, that the Lord permitted a 
man to send away his wife because of 
fornication. Therefore, it is not commanded. 
Moreover, anyone can forgive another 
what sin he has committed against him. But a 
wife sins against her husband by fornicating. 
Therefore the man can spare her, such that he 
does not send her away. 
I answer that the dismissal of a fornicating 
wife was introduced for the correction of the 
wife by such a penalty. However, a corrective 
penalty is not required where emendation has 
already taken place; and therefore if the wife 
repents of her sin, the husband is not bound to 
send her away; but if she does not repent, he is 
bound, lest he seem to consent to her sin while 
he does not employ the due correction. 
1. The sin of fornication in a wife can be 
corrected not only by such a penalty, but also 
by words and blows. And therefore, if she were 
otherwise provided with correction, the 
husband would not be bound to apply the 
aforesaid penalty for her correction. 
2. The man seems to consent to his wife 
when he does not hold her to refrain from her 
past sin; but if she has amended, he does not 
consent to her sin. 
3. By the fact that she has repented the sin 
of fornication, she can not be called a harlot; 
and therefore, the man uniting himself with her 
does not become the member of a harlot. Or it 
should be said that he is not joined to her as 
harlot, but as wife. 
4. It is not the same, for consanguinity 
makes it so that the marriage bond will not be 
between them, and for this reason carnal 
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intimacy would be illicit. But fornication does 
not remove the bond mentioned above; and for 
this reason the act remains licit in itself, unless 
it should become illicit by some added 
circumstance, if for example it should seem 
that the man consents to the disgrace of his 
wife. 
5. That permission is to be understood in 
the lack of a prohibition, and thus it is not 
divided against a precept; for also what falls 
under a precept is not prohibited. 
6. The wife does not only sin against her 
husband, but against herself, and against God; 
and for this reason the man cannot totally forgo 
a penalty unless amendment should follow. 
Article 3 
Whether the man can dismiss his fornicating wife by 
his own judgment 
1. It seems that a man can dismiss his 
fornicating wife by his own judgment. For an 
automatic sentence (latae sententiae) from the 
court may be carried out without a trial. But 
God, the Just Judge, gave this sentence, that 
because of fornication a man may dismiss his 
wife. Therefore another judgment is not 
required for this. 
2. Furthermore, in Matthew 1 it is said that 
Joseph, since he was a just man, thought about 
sending Mary away secretly. Therefore it 
seems that a man may seek a separation 
secretly without the judgment of the Church. 
3. Furthermore, if a man after having 
known about the fornication of his wife renders 
the debt to her, he loses the legal recourse that 
he had against the fornicator. Therefore, 
refusing the debt, which pertains to the 
separation, should precede the judgment of the 
Church. 
4. Furthermore, that which cannot be 
proved should not be brought before the 
judgment of the Church. But the offence of 
fornication cannot be proved, since the eye of 
the adulterer observes darkness, as Job 24: 15 
says. Therefore, the separation mentioned 
should not be made by the judgment of the 
Church. 
5. Furthermore, a formal charge should 
precede an accusation, by which someone may 
oblige himself to damages, if he should fail to 
prove his case. But this cannot happen in this 
matter, for then however the thing should go, 
the man would attain his own aim, either he 
would dismiss his wife or she would dismiss 
him. Therefore, it should not be brought before 
the judgment of the Church by an accusation. 
6. Furthermore, a man is more bound to 
his wife than to strangers. But a man should not 
defer to the Church the offence of another, 
even of a stranger, unless he has already 
admonished him in secret, as is evident from 
Matt 19. Therefore, much less can he defer the 
offence of his wife to the Church, if he has not 
already privately rebuked her. 
But to the contrary, no one should avenge 
himself. But if a husband dismisses his 
fornicating wife by his own decision (arbitrio), 
he avenges himself. Therefore, this should not 
be done. 
Moreover, no one is both a prosecutor and 
a judge in his own cause. But the man is 
prosecuting his wife for the offense she 
committed against him. Therefore he cannot be 
the judge; and thus he should not dismiss her 
by his own decision. 
I answer that the man can send away his 
wife in two ways. In one way, only from the 
bed; and in this way he can dismiss her by his 
own judgment as soon as he discovers the 
fornication of his wife; nor is he bound to 
render the debt to her when she requires it, 
unless he is compelled by the Church; and in 
that case rendering the debt prejudices none of 
his rights. In another way, both a mensa et 
toro; and in this way she cannot be sent away 
except by the Church's verdict. And if she had 
been dismissed in any other way, he ought to 
be forced to cohabit with her, unless her 
husband could prove the fornication of the 
incontinent one. Now this dismissal is called 
separation (divortium); and therefore it must be 
admitted that separation cannot be granted 
unless by the judgment of the Church. 
1. A sentence is the application of a 
general law to a particular fact; whence the 
Lord promulgated the law, according to which 
the sentence should be formed in the court. 
2. Joseph did not want to send away the 
Virgin as though he suspected her of 
fornication, but out of reverence for her 
holiness, fearing to cohabit with her, as was 
said above; nor is it similar, for at that time the 
crime of adultery did not lead simply to 
separation, but rather to stoning; although that 
is not what happens in the judgment of the 
Church today. 
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3. And to the third objection, the answer is 
evident from what has been said. 
4. Sometimes a man having suspicions 
about his wife may lie in wait for her, and he 
can apprehend her in the crime of fornication in 
front of witnesses, and in this way he can 
proceed to the accusation. And furthermore, if 
he cannot establish the fact, there can be 
forceful suspicions of fornication, which, when 
they are proved, it seems that fornication is 
proved, for example if a man and a woman are 
found alone together at suspect times and 
places, or naked. 
5. A husband can accuse his wife of 
adultery in two ways. In one way for a 
separation a toro before an ecclesiastical judge, 
and then charges should be brought without 
obligation to the law of damages. For the 
husband attains his aim, as the objection 
proves. In another way for the punishment of 
the crime in the secular court; and for this it is 
necessary that charges be brought first, by 
which the man obliges himself to the payment 
of damages if he should lose the trial. 
6. As a Decretal says, in criminal matters 
things proceed in three ways. First, by inquiry, 
which must be preceded by public infamy, 
which takes the place of accusation. Secondly, 
by accusation, which must be preceded by 
filing suit. Thirdly, by denunciation, which 
must be preceded by fraternal admonition. 
Thus the word of the Lord is understood as 
concerning the way of denunciation, not the 
way of accusation; for in that case, it is not 
only a question of correcting the delinquent, 
but of punishing him for the sake of preserving 
the common good, which perishes when justice 
is lacking. 
Article 4 
Whether a husband and a wife should be judged 
equals in the matter of separation 
1. It seems that a husband and wife should 
not be judged equals in the matter of 
separation. For separation is conceded in the 
New Law in place of divorce, which existed 
under the Old Law, as is evident from Matt 5. 
But in divorce the husband and wife were not 
judged equals: for the man could divorce his 
wife, but not the reverse. Therefore, neither 
should they be judged equals in separation. 
2. Furthermore, it is more against the law 
of nature that a wife should have several 
husbands than that a man should have several 
wives: for the latter was allowed at certain 
times, but the former never at all, as was said in 
Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 1, ad 7. 
Therefore, the wife sins more in adultery than 
the husband, and so they should not be 
adjudged equals. 
3. Furthermore, where there is greater 
harm to one's neighbor, there is a greater sin. 
But an adulterous wife harms her husband 
more than an adulterous husband harms his 
wife: for the adultery of the wife causes 
uncertainty about the children, but the adultery 
of the man does not. Therefore, the sin of the 
wife is greater, and they should not be judged 
equals. 
4. Furthermore, separation is sought for 
the correction of the crime of adultery. But it 
belongs more to the husband, who is the head 
of the wife (I Corinthians 11), to correct his 
wife than vice versa. Therefore they should not 
be judged equals in divorce, but the man should 
have a better standing. 
5. But to the contrary, it seems that the 
wife should have the better standing. For the 
greater the fragility of the sinner, the more the 
sin is worthy of forgiveness. But in women 
there is a greater fragility than in men, by 
reason of which Chrysostom says that the 
proper passion of a woman is lust (luxuria). 
And the Philosopher says in Book 7 of the 
Ethics that women are not said to be 
incontinent properly speaking, because of their 
easy inclination to concupiscence, for neither 
are brute animals able to be continent because 
of the fact that they have nothing which could 
stand against their desires. Therefore, in the 
punishment of separation,women should be 
spared more. 
6. Moreover, the man is considered the 
head of the woman, so that he might correct 
her. Therefore he sins more gravely than the 
woman, and thus he should be punished more. 
I answer that in cases of separation the 
husband and the wife are judged equals, such 
that the same things are licit and illicit to one as 
to the other. However they are not to be judged 
equally in these things: for the reason for a 
separation is greater in one party than in the 
other, although there may be sufficient cause in 
both for separation. For separation is the 
penalty for adultery, inasmuch as it is against 
the goods of matrimony. Yet, as concerns the 
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good of fidelity, to which both the spouses are 
equally bound, the adultery of one sins as much 
against marriage as the adultery of the other, 
and this reason in either is sufficient for a 
separation. But as concerns the good of 
children, the adultery of the wife is a greater sin 
than the adultery of the husband, and therefore 
it is a greater cause of separation in the wife 
than in the husband. And thus they are bound to 
equal things, but not for equal reasons: nor is 
this unjust, since in either one there is sufficient 
cause for this penalty: just as it is when two 
people are condemned to punishment for the 
same person's death, although one may have 
sinned more gravely than the other. 
1. Divorce was not permitted unless for 
the sake of avoiding homicide; and since there 
was greater danger of this in men than in 
women, for this reason it was permitted for a 
man to send away his wife, not vice versa. 
2,3. These arguments proceed from the 
fact that in comparison to the good of offspring 
there may be a greater reason for separation in 
an adulterous wife than in an adulterous 
husband. But it does not follow that they 
should not be judged as equals, as is clear from 
what was said above. 
4. Although the man is the head of his 
wife, he is head as governor, not as if he were 
the judge of her, just as neither is she the judge 
of him. Therefore, in those things which must 
be done by a judgment, the man can do no 
more than his wife, and vice versa. 
5. The same character of sin is found in 
adultery as in simple fornication, and even 
more, because it is made worse by the wound 
to marriage. If therefore what is common to 
adultery and fornication is considered, the sin 
of a man and the sin of a woman are related as 
things that go too far and things that have been 
pushed too far. For in women there is more of 
the humors, and therefore they are more able to 
be drawn by their desires; but in the man there 
is more fieriness (calore) which excites 
concupiscence. But even simply speaking, with 
all other things equal, the man sins more in 
simple fornication than the woman does, for he 
has more of the good of reason, which is 
stronger than any movements of bodily 
passions. But as concerns the wound to 
marriage which adultery adds to fornication, 
for which reason separation is sought, the 
woman sins more than the man, as is clear from 
what has been said. And since this is graver 
than simple fornication, therefore, simply 
speaking, the adulterous woman sins more than 
the adulterous man, with all other things being 
equal. 
6. Although the rule over the woman 
which the man receives may be an aggravating 
circumstance, nonetheless, by the circumstance 
of wounding marriage, which changes the 
species of the act, the sin is made much more 
serious, for it turns it into a species of injustice 
in which someone else's children may secretly 
be passed off as one's own. 
Article 5 
Whether after a separation the man may marry 
another 
1. It seems that after a separation a man 
may marry another. For no one is bound to 
perpetual continence. But the man in some 
cases is bound to separate himself from a 
fornicating wife, as is clear from what has been 
said. Therefore, it seems that at least in such a 
case he may marry another. 
2. Furthermore, a sinner must not be given 
a greater occasion of sinning. But if someone 
who has been sent away because of the fault of 
fornication is not allowed to seek another 
union, a greater occasion of sinning is given to 
him. For it is not probable that someone who 
could not be continent in marriage will be able 
to be continent afterward. Therefore it seems 
that he or she should be allowed to pass to 
another union. 
3. Furthermore, the wife is not bound to 
the man except in the rendering of the debt, and 
in cohabitation. But by separation she is 
absolved of both. Therefore she is free from the 
law of her husband; therefore she can marry 
another, and the reasoning runs the same for 
the man. 
4. Furthermore, Matt 19:9 states: whoever 
sends away his wife and marries another, 
except by reason of fornication, commits 
adultery. Therefore it seems that if the wife 
was dismissed by reason of fornication and he 
has married another, he does not commit 
adultery. And thus it would be a valid marriage. 
But to the contrary, I Corinthians 7:10: 
Not I command, but the Lord commands the 
wife not to leave her husband, but if she has 
left, to remain unmarried. 
Moreover, no one should reap advantage 
from sin. But he would, if it were allowed for 
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an adulterer to pass over to some other more 
desired marriage, and it would be an occasion 
of committing adultery to those wishing to seek 
another marriage. Therefore it is not permitted 
to the husband or to the wife to seek another 
union. 
I answer that nothing introduced into the 
marriage may dissolve it; and therefore 
adultery does not do this either, if it be a valid 
marriage: for the conjugal bond remains, as 
Augustine says, between them while they live, 
because neither separation nor union with 
another can remove it; and therefore it is not 
permitted to one, when the other is living, to 
pass over to another embrace. 
1. Although per se no one is obliged to 
continence, nevertheless per accidens it can 
happen that someone is obliged; as if one's wife 
should contract some incurable illness, which 
could not allow carnal intimacy. And likewise, 
too, if she should suffer incorrigibly from some 
spiritual infirmity, like fornication. 
2. The very embarrassment which is the 
result of separation, should restrain such a 
person from sin. For if it cannot restrain her, it 
is a lesser evil if she alone should sin, than if 
her husband should be a participant in her sin. 
3. Although after their separation the wife 
is not bound to render the debt to and to cohabit 
with an adulterous husband, nevertheless the 
matrimonial bond, by which she was bound to 
this, remains even after. Therefore she may not 
pass over to another union while her husband 
lives. Yet she can take a vow of continence 
against her husband's will, unless the Church 
seems to have been deceived by false witnesses 
when it was granting the separation: for in such 
a case, even if she had made a vow of religious 
profession, she would be restored to her 
husband, and bound to render him the debt. But 
she would not be allowed to demand it. 
4. That exception which is in the words of 
the Lord refers to the dismissal of the wife: and 
therefore the objection proceeds on a false 
understanding. 
Article 6 
Whether after the separation, the husband and wife 
may be reconciled 
1. It seems that after a separation, the 
husband and wife may be not be reconciled. 
For this is the rule in the law: what has once 
been well determined should be retracted by no 
appeal (iteratione). But it has been determined 
by the judgment of the Church that they should 
be separated. Therefore they cannot be 
reconciled afterward. 
2. Furthermore, if a reconciliation were 
possible, it seems particularly that after the 
repentance of the wife the man would be bound 
to take her back. But he is not bound to do this, 
for even in the trial a wife cannot cite her own 
repentance as a defence against a husband 
accusing her of fornication. Therefore in no 
way can they be reconciled. 
3. Furthermore, if a reconciliation were 
possible, it would seem that the adulterous wife 
would be bound to return to a husband who is 
inviting her back. But she is not bound to this; 
for they have already been separated by the 
judgment of the Church. Therefore, etc. 
4. Furthermore, if it is allowed to reconcile 
with an adulterous wife, it should especially 
happen when the husband is found to have 
commited adultery after the separation. But in 
that case the wife cannot force him to a 
reconciliation, since the separation was justly 
granted. And therefore there is no way for them 
to be reconciled. 
5. Furthermore, if a secretly adulterous 
husband sends away his wife, convicted of 
adultery by the judgment of the Church, the 
separation does not seem to be justly done. But 
nonetheless the man is not bound to be 
reconciled with his wife; for the wife cannot 
prove the adultery of the husband in court. 
Therefore, much less when the separation is 
justly granted, can a reconciliation take place. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7:2: if she has left, she must remain 
unmarried, or be reconciled to her own 
husband. 
Moreover, the husband need not have sent 
her away after the fornication. Therefore, by 
the same reasoning he can reconcile himself to 
her. 
I answer that if after the separation the 
wife has amended her life and done penance for 
her sin, her husband can reconcile with her. But 
if she remains incorrigible in sin, he should not 
take her back to himself, by the same reasoning 
by which he was not permitted to retain her 
when she did not wish to cease sinning. 
1. The sentence of the Church granting a 
separation did not compel a separation, but 
only granted permission. Therefore without 
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retraction of this sentence a reconciliation can 
take place. 
2. The repentance of the wife should 
induce the husband not to accuse or to send 
away the wife who fornicated. But 
nevertheless, he cannot be forced to this, nor 
can the wife through her repentance prevent 
him from making the accusation: for in the 
person who withdraws from sin as regards both 
the act of sin and the stain, something still 
remains of the culpability (reatu). And even 
someone having no more culpability (cessante 
reatu) before God, may remain culpable of 
penalty under human judgment. For man does 
not see the heart as God does. 
3. What is introduced in someone's favor 
does not prejudice any of his rights; wherefore, 
when separation is granted in the husband's 
favor, it does not take away from him the right 
of asking for the marital debt, or of taking back 
his wife. For which reason the wife is bound to 
render it to him, and to return to him if she is 
invited, unless with his permission she has 
taken a vow of continence. 
4. According to the strict interpretation of 
the law, a formerly innocent husband should 
not be forced to take back his adulterous wife 
because of the adultery which he committed 
after the separation. But in the interest of 
justice, the judge by reason of his office should 
urge him to be careful of the danger to his soul 
and the scandal to others, although the wife 
cannot request a reconciliation. 
5. If the adultery of the husband is hidden, 
it does not remove the adulterous wife's right of 
bringing it as a defense against the accusation 
of the husband, although the proof may be 
lacking to her. Therefore, the husband sins by 
requesting a separation; and if after the 
granting of separation the wife should request 
the debt or a reconciliation, the husband is 
bound to both. 
Exposition 
He is a patron of disgrace who conceals 
the crime of his wife. Against this, Proverbs 
11:13: Faithful is the one who conceals the 
crime of his friend. And it must be said that this 
is to be understood when the concealment is 
not in prejudice of correction; otherwise, the 
one who conceals offers his protection to the 
disgrace. 
It is often asked whether it is valid to take 
someone in marriage who has already been 
polluted by adultery. It should be known that 
there are many offences which because of their 
enormity prevent marriage from being 
contracted. The first is incest; the second, 
uxoricide; the third, kidnapping the bride of 
another; fourth, when someone conspires in 
marriage to receive his own godchild; fifth, 
killing a priest; sixth, when someone feigns 
(peragit) solemn repentance. But the crimes 
mentioned do not invalidate a marriage that has 
been contracted. Yet there are certain crimes 
which void a marriage that has been contracted. 
One of these is when someone lies with a 
certain married woman, and because of this 
plots the death of her husband and does it. For 
in this instance the two should not contract with 
each other; and if they have contracted, they 
are separated. The second is when someone 
keeps his word to his partner in adultery that he 
will take her as his wife. But this is to be 
understood when the adulterous man as well as 
the adulterous woman knew the impediment; 
otherwise the marriage is not voided after it 
was contracted. The third is when someone has 
already contracted with someone de facto, for 
the first marriage prevents the second one from 
being valid; wherefore if the first was not a 
valid marriage, the second would stand. For it 
must be known that in the second and third 
cases, that is, when a promise is given that a 
marriage will be contracted, and when a 
marriage has been contracted de facto by words 
of the present, unless carnal defilement took 
place, the marriage following from a new 
contract is not voided because of this, after the 
death of the husband. 
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DISTINCTION 36 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered impotence 
to have intercourse, which de facto impedes the 
marital act from taking place at all, here he 
addresses the impediment of servile condition, 
which impedes the marital act from taking 
place freely; and this is divided into two parts: 
in the first he considers the servile condition, in 
the second he gives an epilogue, continuing 
from what he has said before to consequences: 
We have accomplished these two things, etc... 
The first part is divided into two parts: in the 
first he considers the servile condition, in the 
second the impediment of insufficient age, 
since such a person is no different from a slave, 
as long as he is under his guardians (Galatians 
4): Here also it must be known that according 
to the laws, a boy before he is fourteen years of 
age, or a girl before she is twelve years of age 
are unable to enter marriage. The first is 
divided into two: first, he considers when 
servitude precedes the marriage; secondly, he 
addresses the slavery that is introduced to an 
existing marriage, where he states: It is also to 
be noted, etc... 
The first is divided into two: first he 
considers the pre-existing slavery which is the 
condition of only one party in the marriage; 
secondly, that servitude which is pre-existing in 
both parties, where he states: Also it is to be 
inquired if one person's slave receives the 
slave-girl of another, whether there may be a 
union between the two of them. 
Here five things will be sought: 1) 
Whether the condition of slavery impedes 
marriage; 2) Whether a slave can contract 
marriage without the consent of his master; 3) 
Concerning the servitude which is introduced 
during the marriage; 4) Whether the children 
follow the condition of their mother; 5) 
Whether a defect of age impedes marriage. 
Article 1 
Whether the condition of servitude impedes 
marriage 
1. It seems that the condition of servitude 
does not impede marriage. For nothing impedes 
marriage except what is contrary to it in itself. 
But slavery has nothing in it contrary to 
marriage; otherwise, there could not be 
marriages between slaves. Therefore, slavery 
does not impede marriage. 
2. Furthermore, what is against nature 
cannot impede something that is according to 
nature. But slavery is against nature; for as 
Gregory says, it is against nature for a man to 
want to dominate another man, which is also 
evident from what is said to man in Genesis 
1:26: let him be master of the fish of the sea, 
etc., but not that he should be master of a man. 
Therefore, it cannot impede marriage, which is 
natural. 
3. Furthermore, if marriage is impeded, 
either this occurs by natural law or by positive 
law. But this does not occur by natural law, for 
according to natural law, all men are equal, as 
Gregory states in the place quoted above; and 
in the beginning of the Digests it is stated that 
slavery is not of natural law; for positive law 
comes to us from natural law, as Cicero says. 
Therefore, according to no law can slavery 
impede marriage. 
4. Furthermore, what impedes marriage 
impedes it equally whether it be known or 
unknown, as is clear in the case of 
consanguinity. But the slavery of one person 
which is known by another, does not impede 
marriage. Therefore, slavery in itself, poses no 
impediment to marriage. Therefore, it should 
not be counted as an impediment to marriage, 
per se and distinct from all the others. 
5. Furthermore, just as it happens that 
there is error about the condition of servitude, 
so that someone may be believed a free man 
who is really a slave; so also there can be error 
about freedom, so that someone is believed to 
be a slave who is in fact free. But freedom is 
not considered an impediment to matrimony. 
Therefore, slavery should not be considered 
one either. 
6. Furthermore, the disease of leprosy 
endangers the partnership of marriage and 
impedes the good of offspring more than 
slavery does. But leprosy is not counted among 
the impediments to matrimony. Therefore, 
neither should slavery be. 
But to the contrary is what the Decretals 
say about the marriage of slaves, that an error 
about their condition impedes marriage from 
being contracted, and voids the contract. 
Moreover, marriage concerns goods 
desirable in themselves, and as such, it has 
dignity. But slavery is to be shunned in itself. 
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Therefore, marriage and slavery are contraries, 
and thus slavery impedes marriage. 
I answer that in the marriage contract one 
spouse is obligated to another in the rendering 
of the debt; and therefore, if the one who 
obliges himself is unable to acquit himself, the 
ignorance of this inability in the person to 
whom the obligation is made, destroys the 
contract. 
However, just as by impotence in 
intercourse someone becomes unable to pay the 
debt, so that it cannot be resolved in any way; 
likewise in slavery he becomes unable to 
render the debt freely; and therefore just as 
unknown impotence in intercourse impedes 
marriage, but not if it is known; so also the 
unknown condition of slavery impedes 
marriage, but not if the servitude is known. 
1. Slavery is contrary to marriage as 
concerns its act, for which someone is obliged 
to another in marriage, which act cannot be 
accomplished freely; and also as concerns the 
good of offspring, who are given a worse 
condition by the slavery of their parents. 
But since anyone is able of his own accord 
to submit to some loss in what is due to him, 
then if one spouse knows the other's condition 
of slavery, the marriage would hold 
nevertheless. Likewise, also, since in marriage 
there is an equal obligation on both parties for 
the rendering of the debt, someone cannot 
require a greater obligation on the part of 
another than he can fulfill himself; and because 
of this, even if a slave should contract with a 
slave-girl whom he believes to be free, the 
marriage is not impeded because of this. Thus 
it is clear that slavery does not impede marriage 
unless it is without the knowledge of one of the 
spouses, even if it be that party who is of a free 
condition; and therefore, nothing prohibits 
marriage between slaves, or between a free 
man and a slave-girl. 
2. Nothing prevents something from being 
against nature as concerns nature's primary 
intention, but not against nature as concerns its 
secondary intention; just as all corruption and 
defect and decay is against nature, as is stated 
in Book 2 of On the Heavens and the Earth, for 
nature intends being and perfection; but it is not 
against the second intention of nature, for by 
the fact that nature cannot preserve being in 
one, it preserves it in another, which generates 
the corruption of the first; and when nature 
cannot bring something to a greater perfection, 
it leads it to a lesser one; as when it cannot 
make a male, it makes a female, which is "a 
defective male," as it says in Book 2 of On the 
Generation of Animals. Likewise also I say that 
slavery is against the first intention of nature, 
but not against the second; for natural reason 
inclines to this, and nature seeks this: that 
anything may be good; but by the fact that 
someone sins, it is also nature's inclination that 
sin incurs punishment; and thus slavery was 
introduced as a punishment for sin. Nor is it 
unfitting for something natural to be impeded 
by something that is unnatural in this way; for 
in the same way marriage is impeded by 
impotence in intercourse, which is against 
nature in the way stated. 
3. Natural law dictates that punishment be 
inflicted for fault, and that nothing without 
fault should be punished. But to determine the 
punishment according to the condition of the 
person and the fault, is for positive law; and 
therefore, slavery, which is a certain 
determinate penalty, concerns positive law, and 
departs from natural law as the determined 
from the undetermined; and with the same 
positive law determining, it has happened that 
unknown slavery may impede marriage, lest 
someone without fault be penalized: for it is a 
certain penalty for a wife that her husband be a 
slave, and vice versa. 
4. There are some impediments which 
make marriage illicit. And since our wills do 
not make something to be illicit or licit, but 
rather the law to which our wills should be 
subject, therefore, such ignorance of the 
impediment that removes willing or 
knowledge, does nothing to the validity of the 
marriage. And such an impediment is affinity, 
or a vow, or others like these. However, there 
are some impediments which make marriage 
incapable of fulfilling what is owed; and since 
it is within the power of our wills to release a 
debt that is owed to us, therefore, this kind of 
impediment, if it be known, does not take away 
matrimony, but only when ignorance makes 
willingness impossible. And slavery is an 
impediment of this kind, as is impotence in 
intercourse. And since they also have in 
themselves a certain ratio of impediment, they 
are counted as specific impediments beyond the 
impediment of error. But a change in the 
person is not considered a specific impediment 
beyond error, for another person substituted 
does not have the ratio of impediment, unless 
from the intention of the one contracting 
marriage. 
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5. Liberty does not impede the marital act; 
wherefore, an unknown free condition does not 
impede marriage. 
6. Leprosy does not impede marriage as 
concerns its first act, by the fact that lepers can 
freely render the marital debt, although they 
impose certain difficulties on the marriage as 
concerns its second effects; and therefore, it 
does not impede matrimony in the same way 
that slavery does. 
Article 2 
Whether a slave can contract marriage without the 
consent of his master 
1. It seems that a slave cannot contract 
marriage without the consent of his master. For 
no one can give to someone else what belongs 
to another, without his consent. But a slave is 
the belonging of his master. Therefore he 
cannot give the power over his own body to his 
wife by contracting marriage without the 
consent of his master. 
2. Furthermore, a slave is bound to obey 
his master. But his master can command him 
not to consent in marriage. Therefore, without 
his consent, he cannot contract marriage. 
3. Furthermore, after having contracted 
marriage, a slave is bound to render the debt to 
his wife by command of divine law. But at the 
same time that the wife requests it, the master 
could impose some other service upon the 
slave, which he could not do if he wished to be 
free for carnal intimacy. Therefore, if without 
the consent of his master a slave could contract 
marriage, the master would be deprived of the 
service owed him through no fault of his; 
which should not happen. 
4. Furthermore, a master can sell his slave 
into foreign lands, where the wife could not 
follow him either because of physical 
weakness, or because of imminent danger to 
her faith, if he were sold to infidels, or even 
because her master did not permit it, if she 
were a slave; and thus the marriage would be 
dissolved, which is unfitting. Therefore, a slave 
cannot contract marriage without the consent of 
his master. 
5. Furthermore, an obligation in which a 
man binds himself to divine service is 
preferable to that in which a man subjects 
himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter 
religious life or be promoted to the priesthood 
without the consent of his master. Therefore 
much less can he be joined in marriage without 
his consent. 
But to the contrary, Galatians 3:28 says: In 
Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free. 
Therefore, in the faith of Christ Jesus the same 
freedom for contracting marriage belongs to 
slaves and free men. 
Moreover, slavery comes from positive 
law. But marriage comes from divine and 
natural law. Since therefore positive law does 
not prejudice natural or divine law, it seems 
that a slave can contract marriage without the 
consent of his master. 
I answer that since positive law, as was 
said, proceeds from natural law, for this reason 
slavery, which comes from positive law, cannot 
prejudice those things which are of natural law. 
Yet as the natural appetite is ordered to the 
conservation of the individual, so it is ordered 
to the conservation of the species through 
generation. Wherefore, as a slave is not 
subjected to his master without being free to eat 
and to sleep, and other things of this kind 
which belong to the necessity of the body 
without which nature cannot be preserved, so 
also he is not subject to him such that he cannot 
freely contract marriage, even if his master 
does not know or forbids it. 
1. A slave is his master's belonging as 
regards those things which are super-added to 
nature; but as to natural things they are equals. 
For this reason in those things which pertain to 
natural acts, a slave can furnish to another the 
power over his own body in marriage, against 
the will of his master. 
2. A slave is bound to obey his master in 
those things that the master can licitly 
command. But just as the master cannot licitly 
command his servant not to eat or sleep, neither 
can he command that the slave abstain from 
contracting marriage. For how someone uses 
what is his own does not concern the legislator; 
therefore if the master commands his slave not 
to contract marriage, the slave is not bound to 
obey. 
3. If a slave contracts marriage with his 
master's permission, then he should leave 
undone the service that his master commands, 
and render the debt to his wife: for by the fact 
that the master allowed the slave to contract 
matrimony, it is understood that he conceded 
all the things that marriage requires. But if the 
marriage was contracted without the master's 
knowledge or permission, the slave is not 
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bound to render the debt but rather to obey his 
master, if both cannot be done at the same time. 
But nevertheless, in these things many 
particulars should be considered, as also in all 
human acts; for example, the imminent danger 
to the chastity of the wife, and the impediment 
that it will generate to the service commanded 
if he renders the debt, and other things like this. 
By thinking through these things properly it 
could be decided whom the slave would be 
bound to obey, his master or his wife. 
4. In such cases it is said that the master 
should be compelled not to sell his slave such 
that he places rather heavy burdens on the 
marriage, especially when he doesn't lack the 
possibility of selling his slave at a just price 
somewhere else. 
5. Through religious life and holy orders 
someone is obliged to undertake divine service 
all the time; but a man is not bound to render 
the debt to his wife at all times, but at suitable 
times; and therefore it is not the same. 
Furthermore, someone who enters religious life 
and receives holy orders, obliges himself to 
works which exceed those natural things to 
which a master's power extends. But this is not 
the case in those natural things to which one 
obliges himself in marriage; for which reason 
one could vow continence without the consent 
of one's master. 
Article 3 
Whether slavery can be introduced during marriage 
1. It seems that slavery cannot be 
introduced into a marriage, such that the 
husband be sold as a slave. Since what is done 
in fraud and prejudice of another's rights should 
not be enforceable (ratum). But someone who 
sells himself as a slave, does this sometimes in 
fraud against matrimony, and to the detriment 
of his wife. Therefore, such a sale should not 
be able to bind someone in slavery. 
2. Furthermore, two favorable things 
outweigh one not favorable thing. But marriage 
and freedom enjoy the favor of the law, and are 
contrary to servitude, which is not favored by 
the law. Therefore, this kind of slavery should 
be thoroughly cancelled. 
3. Furthermore, in marriage the husband 
and the wife are judged equals, as was stated 
above in Distinction 31. But the wife cannot 
give her self as a slave against the will of the 
husband. Therefore, neither can the husband 
against the will of the wife. 
4. Furthermore, in nature, what impedes 
the generation of a thing, destroys also the 
thing generated. But the slavery of the man 
without the knowledge of his wife impedes the 
marriage contract made beforehand. Therefore, 
if it could be introduced into the marriage, it 
would destroy the marriage, which is unfitting. 
But to the contrary, anyone can give to 
another what is his own. But a man is sui juris, 
when he is free. Therefore, he can give to 
another the right to himself. 
Moreover, a slave can take a wife against 
the will of his master, as was stated. Therefore, 
by the same rationale, a man may subject 
himself to a master against the will of his wife. 
I answer that a man is subject to his wife 
only in those things which pertain to the act of 
nature, in which they are equals, to which the 
subjection of slavery does not extend; and 
therefore, a man can give himself as a slave 
even against the will of his wife: not that his 
marriage would be dissolved by this, though, 
for no impediment superimposed upon an 
existing marriage can dissolve it, as was stated 
above, Distinction 34, Question 1, Article 1, ad 
6. 
1. Fraud can easily injure the one who 
commits it, but it cannot generate prejudice of 
another's rights; and therefore, if a man 
defrauds his wife by giving himself as a slave, 
he himself will reap the blame, losing the 
inestimable good of freedom. But by this he 
can do nothing to prejudice the rights of his 
wife, since he is bound to render the debt to her 
when she asks, and to all those things which 
marriage requires: for he cannot withdraw from 
these things at his master's command. 
2. As far as slavery is contrary to 
matrimony, matrimony takes precedence over 
servitude: for then the slave is bound to render 
the debt to his wife, even against the will of his 
master. 
3. Although in the marital act and those 
things which have to do with nature, the 
husband and wife are judged equals, the 
condition of slavery does not extend to this. 
Nonetheless, as regards the management of the 
home, and other things like this superadded, the 
man is the head of the woman, and should 
correct her, but not the reverse; and therefore, 
the wife cannot give herself as a slave against 
the will of her husband. 
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4. This argument proceeds from 
corruptible things, in which many things also 
impede generation which are not enough to 
destroy the thing generated. But among things 
that endure perpetually, an impediment can 
have the effect that something perpetual will 
not begin to be, but not that it will stop being 
once it exists, as, for example, the rational soul; 
and it is also the same way with marriage, 
which is a bond remaining perpetually during 
the present life. 
Article 4 
Whether the children should follow the condition of 
their father 
1. It seems that the children should follow 
the condition of their father. For denomination 
happens from the more noble. But the father is 
nobler in generation that the mother. Therefore, 
etc. 
2. Furthermore, the being of a thing 
depends more on its form than on its matter. 
But in generation, the father gives the form, the 
mother the matter, as is stated in Book 2 of On 
the Generation of Animals. Therefore, the 
children should follow the father more than the 
mother. 
3. Something should especially follow 
what it resembles more. But a son is more like 
his father than his mother, as a daughter is 
more like her mother. Therefore, at least a son 
should follow his father's condition, and a 
daughter her mother's. 
4. Furthermore, in sacred Scripture 
geneology is not computed through the women, 
but through the men. Therefore, children 
should follow more their father than their 
mother. 
But to the contrary, if someone sows in the 
land of another, his fruit belongs to whoever 
owns the land. But the womb of the woman is 
related to the seed of the man as land is related 
to seed. 
Moreover, we see this among other 
animals that are born from animals of diverse 
species, that the young follow more the mother 
than the father; for which reason a mule that is 
born from crossing a mare and a male donkey 
resembles horses more than one which is born 
from crossing a she-donkey and a stallion. And 
it should be the same way among humans. 
I answer that according to civil laws, the 
young follow the womb. And this is 
reasonable, for children have from their fathers 
their formal complement, but from their 
mothers they have the substance of their 
bodies. Yet slavery is a corporeal condition, 
since a slave is as the instrument of his master 
in operating. Therefore, children follow their 
mother in their condition of freedom or 
servitude; but in those things which pertain to 
dignity, which is the form of a thing, they 
follow their father, as it is in honors and 
citizenship (municipiis) and inheritance and 
other things: and in this the canons and the law 
of Moses agree, as is clear from Exodus 21. 
However, in certain lands which are not ruled 
by civil law, the offspring follow the lower 
condition; so that if the father is a slave, even if 
the mother is a freewoman, the children will be 
slaves; but not if, after the marriage is 
officiated, the father should indenture himself 
as a slave against the will of his wife, and 
likewise if it be the other way around. 
However, if both are of a servile condition, and 
belong to different masters, then they divide the 
children, if there are many of them, or if there 
is only one, one master compensates the other 
for the price, and he receives the child born into 
his own possession. Yet it is not credible that 
such a custom could be as reasonable as the 
one that was determined by many wise men 
through long study. This is found also in 
natural things that something is received by the 
recipient in the mode of the recipient, and not 
in the mode of the giver; and therefore, it is 
reasonable that the seed received by the mother 
is endowed with her condition. 
1. Although the father is a nobler 
principle, the mother gives corporeal substance, 
on which the condition of slavery depends. 
2. In those things which belong to the 
ratio of the species, a son is more like his 
father than his mother; but in material 
conditions he should be more like his mother 
than his father, for a thing has specific being 
from its form, but material conditions from its 
material. 
3. A son resembles his father by reason of 
the form which he has in his own complement, 
as his father does too; and therefore this 
argument does not address the issue. 
4. Since the honor of the son is more from 
his father than from his mother, therefore in 
genealogies in Scripture and according to the 
common custom sons are named more from 
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their father than from their mother; 
nevertheless, in those things which regard 
slavery, they follow their mother more. 
Article 5 
Whether a defect in age impedes marriage 
1. It seems that a defect in age does not 
impede matrimony. For according to the laws 
children receive a guardian up until twenty-five 
years of age. Therefore, it seems that up to that 
time their reason is not sound enough for the 
consent, and so it seems that that should be the 
age established by law for entering marriage. 
But before that time marriage can be 
contracted. Therefore, a defect of the age 
established by law does not impede marriage. 
2. Furthermore, just as the bond of 
religious life is perpetual, so also is the bond of 
matrimony. But before eighteen years of age 
one cannot make the profession of religious 
life, according to the new statutes. Therefore, 
neither would it impede the contracting of 
marriage if there were a defect of age. 
3. Furthermore, just as consent on the part 
of the man is required for matrimony, so it is 
also required on the part of the woman. But the 
woman can contract marriage before the 
fourteenth year. Therefore, so can the man. 
4. Furthermore, impotence to have 
intercourse, unless it be perpetual and 
unknown, does not impede matrimony. But the 
defect of age is neither perpetual nor unknown. 
5. Furthermore, it is not contained in any 
of the aforementioned impediments. And so it 
does not seem to be an impediment to 
matrimony. 
But to the contrary is what the Decretals 
say, that a boy who cannot render the debt is 
not suited to marriage. But before fourteen 
years of age, for the most part, he cannot render 
the debt, as is evident from Book 9 of the 
History of Animals. Therefore, etc. 
Moreover, nature has fixed a limit to size 
and growth for all constant things: and thus it 
seems, since marriage is natural, that it should 
have a determined time, by the defect of which 
it would be impeded. 
I answer that because it is made in the 
mode of a certain contract, marriage is subject 
to the ordering of positive law, just as other 
contracts are. For this reason, according to law 
it is determined that before that time of 
discretion in which both parties can sufficiently 
deliberate about marriage, and render the debt 
to each other, marriage cannot be contracted; 
and if this has not happened, it would be 
invalidated. 
However, this time, for the most part, is at 
fourteen years for males, but twelve years for 
females, and the reason for this was given 
above in Distinctio 27, Quaestio 2, Article 3 
(Corpus). For although the precepts of positive 
law follow what happens for the most part, if 
someone should arrive at the required maturity 
before the time established, such that the 
strength of his nature and his reason should 
supply the defect of age, the marriage is not 
dissolved; and therefore, if the parties 
contracting before the age of puberty were 
joined carnally before the age established, 
nevertheless, the marriage would stand as 
indissoluble. 
1. In those things to which nature inclines, 
not as much strength of reason for deliberating 
is required, as in other things. And therefore, 
someone considering marriage can consent 
sufficiently before he would be able to manage 
his own affairs in other contracts. 
2. And the same thing must be said to the 
second objection: for the religious vow is for 
those who are above the inclination of nature, 
for it is more difficult than marriage. 
3. A woman arrives sooner at the age of 
puberty than a man, as is stated in Book 9 of 
the History of Animals, and as was said above, 
in Distinctio 37, Question 2, Article 2, ad 3. 
And therefore it is not the same for both. 
4. In this instance, there is not only an 
impediment because of the inability to have 
intercourse, but because of a defect of reason, 
which until then is not sufficient for properly 
making that consent which could endure 
perpetually. 
5. Just as the impediment of madness is 
reduced to the impediment of error, so also is 
the impediment of insufficient age, since a man 
does not have full use of his free will. 
Exposition 
Because if she were detained in servitude, 
if he can buy her back from servitude, let him 
do it. If he cannot, let him take another if he 
wishes. It should be known, that if before the 
slavery of his wife were discovered, if there 
was a doubt about it, let him request the debt. If 
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a man be moved by a light suspicion, he should 
request the debt: nor would any prejudice to his 
rights be generated by this. However, if he has 
probable grounds to wonder about it, or if he 
should strongly suspect it, or if he should know 
it for certain, he should not render the debt to 
her, by the command of the Church, since he 
would either prejudice his own rights, if he 
should know her with husbandly affection, or 
else he would be fornicating. 
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DISTINCTION 37 
Prologue 
After the Master has treated of 
impediments which make persons something 
in-between wholly eligible and wholly 
ineligible, here he considers the impediments 
which make persons wholly ineligible; and this 
is divided into two parts: in the first, he 
considers the impediments which make persons 
wholly ineligible with respect to any other 
person; in the second part he considers 
impediments which make persons ineligible 
with respect to certain persons, and not 
everyone (Distinction 39), where he states: 
after these things, the disparity of cult must be 
seen. The first is divided into two: first, he 
addresses the impediment of holy orders; 
secondly, he addresses the impediment of the 
religious vow (Distinction 38), where he states: 
Now let us look closely at religious vows. The 
first part is divided in two: In the first, he 
shows how marriage is impeded by holy 
orders; in the second, how it is impeded by the 
crime of uxoricide, where he says: To these 
things must be added, etc... 
Here is a twofold question: First, 
concerning the impediment of holy orders. 
Second, concerning uxoricide. 
Regarding the first question, two things 
are to be sought: 1) Whether pre-existing holy 
orders impedes marriage; 2) Whether marriage 
should be allowed to follow existing holy 
orders. 
Article 1 
Whether holy orders impedes matrimony 
1. It seems that holy orders does not 
impede matrimony. For nothing is impeded 
unless by its contrary. But orders is not the 
contrary of marriage, since both are 
sacraments. Therefore, it cannot impede it. 
2. Furthermore, we have the same holy 
orders as the Eastern church. But marriage is 
not impeded in the Eastern Church. Therefore, 
it should not be in the western church. 
3. Furthermore, marriage signifies the 
union of Christ and the Church. But it is fitting 
that precisely this be signified among those 
men who are ministers of Christ, namely, those 
ordained. Therefore, holy orders does not 
impede matrimony. 
4. Furthermore, every level of holy orders 
are ordained to something spiritual. But holy 
orders cannot impede marriage unless for a 
spiritual reason. Therefore, if any level of 
orders impede marriage, all levels should 
impede it. Which is false. 
5. Furthermore, all those ordained can 
have ecclesiastical benefits, and can enjoy the 
privilege of clerics, and do so equally. And if 
therefore, because of this holy orders impede 
matrimony, so that those bound to wives cannot 
have an ecclesiastical benefit, nor enjoy the 
privileges of clerics, as the jurists say, then any 
orders would impede marriage; which is false, 
as is apparent from the Decretals of Alexander, 
and thus no orders, as it seems, should impede 
marriage. 
But to the contrary is what the Decretals 
say in the same place: if in the subdiaconate 
and other superior orders, wives are known to 
have been taken, compel them to send away 
their wives. And this would not be the case, if it 
were a valid marriage. 
Moreover, no one vowing continence can 
contract matrimony. But there are certain 
orders which have a vow of continence 
attached, as is evident from the text. Therefore, 
such orders impede matrimony. 
I answer that the order of priesthood by its 
its very nature is characterized by a certain 
congruence that it should impede marriage; for 
in holy orders sacred vessels are constituted 
and they handle the sacraments; and therefore it 
is becoming that they should preserve a 
physical purity through continence. But what 
impedes matrimony does so by the decision of 
the Church, although differently in the Roman 
rite than in the Greek rite. For among the 
Byzantines, it impedes marriage from being 
contracted by virtue of orders alone; but among 
the Roman Catholics, it impedes by virtue of 
orders, and also by the vow of continence, 
which is attached to holy orders; because even 
if someone does not profess that in words, by 
the very fact that he receives orders, according 
to the western rite of the Church he is 
understood to have taken that vow. And 
therefore, among the Greeks and other Eastern 
churches, holy orders impedes marriage from 
being contracted, but not the use of a marriage 
already contracted; for they can avail 
themselves of a marriage contracted 
beforehand, although they cannot contract 
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marriage again. But in the Western church, it 
impedes marriage and the use of marriage; 
unless perhaps a man has received holy orders 
without his wife's knowledge and against her 
will. For by this no prejudice to her rights can 
be generated. However, on the fact that holy 
orders are distinguished from non-holy orders 
now, as in the early Church, see above, 
Distinction 24, Question 2, Article 1, 
questiuncula 3. 
1. Although holy orders may not be 
contrary to marriage as a sacrament, it does 
have a certain repugnance to it by reason of its 
act, which impedes spiritual acts. 
2. Now it is clear that this objection 
proceeds from false premises. For both orders 
impede marriage from being contracted, 
although both do not have the vow attached to 
them. 
3. Those who are established in holy 
orders, signify Christ by nobler acts than those 
who are joined in marriage, just as was evident 
in the treatise on orders (Distinction 23, 
Question 2, Article 1, Question 3). And 
therefore the argument does not follow. 
4. Those who have had minor orders 
conferred on them are not prohibited from 
contracting matrimony by virtue of orders, for 
although those orders are deputed with certain 
spiritual things, they do not however have 
immediate access to handling sacred things as 
those who are in the order of priesthood. But 
according to the statutes of the Western church, 
the use of matrimony does impede the exercise 
of lower orders for the sake of conserving a 
greater rectitude in the duties of the Church. 
And since someone is bound by his benefice to 
the exercise of orders, and by this very fact 
enjoys clerical privilege, therefore these things 
are taken away from married clerics in the 
Roman rite. 
5. And by this the solution to the last 
objection is clear. 
Article 2 
Whether holy orders can be received after marriage 
1. It seems that holy orders cannot 
supervene upon marriage. For the stronger 
prejudices the rights of the less strong. But the 
spiritual bond is stronger than the corporeal. 
Therefore if someone joined in marriage should 
receive orders, a prejudice would be generated 
to the wife, that she could not demand the debt; 
since orders is a spiritual bond, and marriage a 
corporeal one; and thus it seems that someone 
could not receive holy orders after having 
consummated his marriage. 
2. After the marriage has been 
consummated, one spouse cannot vow 
continence without the consent of the other 
spouse. But holy orders has a vow of 
continence attached to it. Therefore, if a man 
received holy orders against his wife's will, the 
unwilling wife would be forced to keep 
continence, for it would not be possible to 
marry another, while her husband is living. 
3. Furthermore, a man cannot even be free 
for prayer for a time without the consent of his 
wife, as is shown in 1 Corinthians 7. But 
among those of the Eastern rite, the men who 
are ordained in holy orders are bound to 
continence at the time in which they execute 
their office. Therefore, neither can they be 
ordained without the consent of their wives, 
and much less can Latin rite men. 
4. Furthermore, a husband and wife are 
judged equals. But a Greek priest whose wife 
has died cannot take another. Therefore, neither 
can the wife if her husband has died. But the 
ability to marry after the death of her husband 
cannot be taken away from her by the act of 
that husband. Therefore, a man cannot receive 
orders after matrimony. 
5. Furthermore, as much as marriage is 
opposed to orders, so much are orders opposed 
to marriage. But pre-existing holy orders 
impede marriage. Therefore, the reverse is also 
true. 
But to the contrary, religious are bound to 
continence just as those who are in holy orders. 
But after marriage someone can enter religious 
life if his wife permits or if she has died. 
Therefore, he may also receive orders. 
Furthermore, someone can become a slave 
to men after marriage. Therefore, he may also 
become a slave to God through the reception of 
holy orders. 
I answer that marriage does not impede 
the reception of holy orders, for if a married 
man undertakes holy orders, even if his wife 
contradicts it, nevertheless he receives the 
character of orders, but he lacks the faculty of 
exercise of orders. If however, with the 
permission of his wife, or after her death, he 
receives holy orders, he receives orders and 
their exercise. 
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1. The bond of orders overrules the bond 
of matrimony as regards the rendering of the 
debt, by reason of which it creates a certain 
tension with marriage on the part of the one 
who receives orders. For he cannot request the 
debt, nor is his wife bound to render it to him. 
But nevertheless the marriage is not dissolved 
on the part of the other spouse, for the husband 
is bound to render the debt to his wife, if he 
cannot induce her to remain continent. 
2. If the wife should know, and the man 
should receive holy orders with her consent, 
she is bound to vow perpetual continence. But 
she is not bound to enter religious life, if she 
does not fear for her own chastity because of 
the fact that her husband has taken a solemn 
vow. But not so if he has taken a simple vow. 
If, however, he has received holy orders 
without her consent, she is not bound; for by 
this fact none of her rights are prejudiced. 
3. It seems more probable (although 
certain people have said the contrary), that even 
the Greeks do not undertake holy orders 
without the consent of their wives, since at 
least at the time of their ministry, their wives 
would be cheated of the rendering of the debt, 
and they are not able to be cheated of this 
according to the order of the law, if their 
husbands received orders against their will or 
knowledge. 
4. As is said, by the very fact that, among 
the Greeks, the woman consents that her 
husband receives orders, she obliges herself to 
never marry another for the rest of her life; for 
the signification of marriage is not preserved, 
which is particularly required in the marriage 
of a priest. If however, he is ordained without 
her consent, she does not seem to be held to 
this. 
5. Marriage has our consent as its cause; 
however, orders does not, but rather has a 
sacramental ordination from God; and therefore 
marriage can be impeded by pre-existing 
orders, such that it is not a valid marriage; but 
orders cannot be impeded by marriage such 
that it is not a true ordination; for the strength 
of the sacraments is immutable, but the act of a 
man may be impeded. 
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QUESTION 2 
Prologue 
Here uxoricide is to be considered. 
Concerning it two things are to be asked: 1) 
whether in any case it could be licit to kill one's 
wife; 2) whether uxoricide impedes matrimony. 
Article 1 
Whether it may be permitted for a man to kill his 
wife if he has apprehended her in the act of adultery 
1. It seems that it would be licit for a man, 
apprehending his wife in the act of adultery, to 
kill her. For divine law commanded that 
adulterous women be stoned. But that person 
who executes divine law does not sin. 
Therefore, neither does someone sin by killing 
his own wife, if she be an adulterer. 
2. Furthermore, that which is permitted to 
the law, is permitted to the one to whom the 
law entrusts it. But it is permitted for the law to 
kill an adulterous woman, or any person who is 
condemned to death. Since, therefore, the law 
has committed to man the killing of a wife 
apprehended in the act of adultery, it seems that 
it permits him to do this. 
3. Furthermore, a man has greater power 
over an adulterous wife than he has over the 
one who committed adultery with her. But if a 
man struck a cleric whom he found with his 
wife, he is not excommunicated. Therefore, it 
seems that also it is permitted to kill one's own 
wife when one catches her in adultery. 
4. Furthermore, it is for the man to correct 
his own wife. But correction is made by the 
infliction of just penalties. Therefore, since the 
just penalty for adultery is death, which is a 
capital crime, it seems that it is permitted for a 
man to kill an adulterous wife. 
But to the contrary is said in the text that 
the Church of God, which is never constrained 
by secular laws, has no sword except the 
spiritual one. Therefore, it seems that for 
someone who wants to be in the Church, it 
would not be a licit use of its law which would 
permit uxoricide. 
Furthermore, a husband and wife are 
judged equals. But it is not permitted for a wife 
to kill her husband when she has caught him in 
adultery. Therefore, no more is it permitted to 
the husband to kill his wife. 
I answer that for a man to kill his wife 
happens it two ways. In one way through civil 
judgment; and thus there is no doubt that 
without sinning, from a zeal for justice, not 
motivated by the desire for revenge or hatred, a 
man is able to accuse an adulterous wife 
criminally in a secular court, and request the 
death penalty established by law; just as also he 
can accuse someone of homicide, or of another 
crime. Nevertheless, such an accusation cannot 
be made in ecclesiastical courts; for the Church 
does not have a physical sword, as it says in the 
text. In another way, he can slay her himself, 
without her having been convicted in court. 
And to kill her this way, outside the act of 
adultery, no matter how much he may know 
her to be adulterous, is not allowed either by 
civil laws or according to the law of 
conscience. But civil law counts it almost licit 
to kill her if she was caught in the very act--not 
as though commanding it, but by not inflicting 
the penalty for homicide,382 because of the 
extreme provocation which a man has to kill 
his wife in such a situation. But in this the 
Church is not bound by human laws, so it may 
judge him liable to eternal punishment, or to 
punishment to be applied by ecclesiastical 
judgment, from the fact that he is not liable to a 
penalty through the secular courts. And 
therefore, in no case is it permitted for a man to 
kill his wife by his own authority. 
1. The law has not committed that penalty 
to be inflicted by private persons, but by public 
persons, who hold the office deputed for this; 
however, a husband is not the judge of his wife; 
and therefore, he cannot kill her, but only 
accuse her before the judge. 
2. Civil law has not committed the 
execution of a wife to her husband as though 
commanding it (for if it were so, he would not 
be sinning, as neither does the minister of the 
court sin by executing a thief condemned to 
death), but it has permitted it, by not applying 
the penalty; for which reason it has also set 
forth certain obstacles, by which men might be 
prevented from uxoricide. 
3. From this fact it is not proved that it is 
simply allowed, but only as regards immunity 
                                                 
382 Parma edition has quasi poenam homicidii 
inferens; we have translated according to the Piana 
edition: quasi poenam homicidii non infligens. 
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from some penalty; for excommunication is 
also a certain penalty. 
4. Community can be in two ways: certain 
communities are domestic, like any family; and 
certain are political, like a city or kingdom. 
Therefore, the man who is rules the second 
kind of community, such as a king or judge, 
can inflict a penalty both in order to correct a 
person, and to expell for the purification of the 
community that he cares for. But that man who 
rules in the first kind of community, like a 
paterfamilias, cannot inflict punishment unless 
it is a corrective punishment, which does not 
extend beyond the boundaries of reform, but 
the death penalty does cross these limits. And 
therefore, a husband, who is set over his wife in 
this way, cannot kill her, but only reprove her 
in other ways. 
Article 2 
Whether uxoricide impedes matrimony 
1. It seems that uxoricide does not impede 
matrimony. For adultery is more directly 
opposed to marriage than homicide. But 
adultery does not impede marriage. Therefore, 
neither does the homicide of one's wife. 
2. Furthermore, it is a graver sin to kill 
one's mother than to kill one's wife, for it is 
never permitted to strike one's mother, but it is 
permitted to strike one's wife. But killing one's 
mother does not impede marriage. Therefore, 
neither does killing one's wife. 
3. Furthermore, someone who kills the 
wife of another because of adultery sins more 
than someone who kills his own wife; 
inasmuch as he has less motive, and her 
correction is less his business. But whoever 
kills the wife of another is not impeded from 
marriage. Therefore, neither is someone who 
kills his own wife. 
4. Furthermore, an effect is removed by 
the removal of its cause. But the sin of 
homicide can be removed by penance. 
Therefore, so can the impediment to marriage 
which is caused by it; and thus it seems that 
after the completion of penance it is not 
prohibited to contract marriage. 
But against this is what the canon states: 
Someone who kills his own spouse is to be 
directed to the sacrament of penance, and 
marriage is completely denied to him. 
Moreover, in that matter in which 
someone sins, he should also be punished. But 
the man who slays his wife sins against 
marriage. Therefore, he should be punished by 
being deprived of marriage. 
I answer that uxoricide impedes marriage 
by the statute of the Church. But although it 
impedes marriage from being contracted, it 
does not annul the contract; for example, when 
a man kills his wife because of adultery or 
because of hatred; nevertheless, if his 
continence is feared for, he can be granted a 
dispensation by the Church, so that he may 
contract marriage licitly. Sometimes it also 
voids the contract, as when someone kills his 
wife so that he may marry the one with whom 
he committed adultery: for then a person 
becomes simply ineligible for contracting 
marriage with that woman; so that if he does in 
fact contract marriage with her, it is 
invalidated. 
But the person is not made simply 
ineligible with respect to other women; 
wherefore, if he has contracted with another 
woman, although he sins against the statutes of 
the Church by doing it, nonetheless the 
marriage contracted is not invalidated because 
of this. 
1. Homicide and adultery in certain cases 
impede marriage from being contracted and 
void the contract, as is here said of uxoricide, 
and of adultery, as was treated above in 
Distinction 35. Or it may be said that uxoricide 
is against the substance of the union, but 
adultery is against the good of fidelity owed it. 
And thus adultery is not more against marriage 
than uxoricide; and so the argument proceeds 
from false premises. 
2. Simply speaking, it is a graver sin to kill 
one's mother than one's wife, and more against 
nature; for a man naturally reveres his mother; 
and therefore, he is less inclined to kill her, and 
more prone to killing his wife; and for the 
repression of this proneness the marriage of a 
wife-killer is forbidden by the Church. 
3. Such a person does not sin against 
marriage as the man does who kills his wife; 
therefore, it is not the same. 
4. It is not necessary that when guilt is 
blotted out, all penalty is blotted out as well; as 
is evident from the case of irregularity. For 
penance has not restored original dignity, 
although it may restore one to a pristine state of 
grace, as was said above in Distinction 14. 
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Exposition 
A virgin wife, etc..â€¦ This is understood 
under a hypothesis; that is, if a man about to 
advance to the priesthood desires to return to 
the clerical state. 
The Holy Church of God does not have a 
sword etc. . . Against this is what Bernard says 
to Eugene, that the Church has both swords. 
And it should be said that it has only a spiritual 
one with regard to execution to be imposed by 
its own hand; but it also has a temporal one as 
concerns its bidding: for someone is released 
by its command, as Bernard says. 
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DISTINCTION 38 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered the 
impediment of orders, here he considers the 
impediment of religious vows; and this is 
divided into two parts: in the first, he shows 
how someone is impeded from contracting 
marriage through a vow by which he obliges 
himself to God; in the second, how a marriage 
is impeded by another marriage already 
contracted, by which a man has obliged himself 
to a wife, where he states: When a man and a 
woman etc. . . The first part is divided in three: 
first he shows what a vow is; in the second he 
distinguishes many kinds of vows, where he 
states: It must be known truly that something is 
common to all vows, but something else is 
particular; in the third he shows that a vow 
also in a certain way impedes marriage, where 
he says: those who make a private vow of 
continence, should not contract marriage. And 
this part is divided into two parts: in the first he 
shows that a vow of continence impedes 
marriage; in the second he shows what is to be 
done with those who marry after such a vow: 
concerning virgins you do not veil if they have 
strayed . . .We have such a decree. And 
concerning this he does three things: first he 
shows that they should do penance; second, he 
objects to the contrary: here what Pope 
Innocent decreed regarding widows and young 
girls is not to be omitted. 
When a man and woman etc..â€¦ Here he 
addresses the other impediment to marriage, 
which was called above â€˜previous ties'. And 
this is divided into two parts: in the first he 
shows that while a preceding marriage stands, 
it impedes another marriage from being 
contracted; in the second, he shows how even 
with a marriage standing until now, the union 
of a second marriage can exist without sin, 
although it is not a valid marriage: here it is 
asked about those women who, believing their 
husbands to be murdered, or in captivity, or 
never to be freed from some evil domination, 
have passed on into other unions. And he sets 
forth these things in two parts according to two 
cases. The second part begins thus: But if 
someone, having left his wife behind in his own 
homeland, and going away to a distant region, 
should take another wife, etc. 
Here is a two-fold question. First, 
concerning the vow. Second, concerning 
scandal, which is connected with some vows, 
as it states in the text. Concerning the 
impediment of previous ties, the same thing 
should be asked as about multiple wives, and 
about the indissolubility of matrimony, which 
was discussed in Distinction 33. 
Concerning the first question, five things 
are to be asked: 1) On the vow in itself; 2) On 
the division of the vow; 3) On the obligation of 
the vow; 4) On the dispensation of the vow; 5) 
On the veiling of virgins, which is done as a 
certain sign of the vow. 
Article 1 
Whether the vow is fittingly defined in the text 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that the vow is unfittingly 
defined in the text. For a vow, by reason of its 
own name, conveys a certain fixed purpose of 
will without any promising. For vows are said 
to be made which are done voluntarily: which 
is also clear from a certain definition given for 
a vow: a vow is the conception of a good 
intended with confirmed deliberation, by which 
someone obliges himself before God to doing 
something or not doing something. Therefore, it 
should not include a promise in the definition 
of a vow. 
2. Furthermore, to promise proceeds from 
the mind, just as to believe does. But there can 
be no belief but willing belief. Therefore, 
neither can there be a promise that is unwilling. 
And thus it is added unnecessarily, spontaneae. 
3. Furthermore, a promise is not the same 
thing as bearing witness to a promise. But a 
vow is a certain promise, as is evident from the 
definition of Hugh of St. Victor, who says that 
a vow is a voluntary pledge of the mind. 
Therefore, the Master says incorrectly that a 
vow is bearing witness to a promise. 
4. Furthermore, that which is included in 
the definition, should be universally fitting to 
the thing defined. But not every vow is made to 
God, for vows are also made to the saints. 
Therefore, it is unfittingly included in the 
definition of the vow that it should be made to 
God. 
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5. Furthermore, jurists define a vow thus: 
a vow is the promise of a certain good, made 
with deliberation. But not every good concerns 
those things which pertain to God; rather some 
pertain to one's neighbor. Therefore, it should 
not be included in the definition of a vow, that 
it concerns those things which pertain to God. 
6. Furthermore, deliberation of mind is 
required for a vow, as is evident through a 
certain definition of the vow given by the 
teachers, which is thus: a vow is the promise of 
a better good, confirmed by deliberation. 
When, therefore, in the definition which is set 
forth in the text, no mention is made of 
deliberation, it seems insufficient. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Moreover. It seems that a vow does not 
only concern a better good. For that which is of 
necessity, is not considered a better good, but a 
common good. But a vow can be made about 
what is of necessity, as Jacob vowed that the 
Lord would be his God. Therefore, it is not 
necessary that it concern a better good. 
2. Furthermore, certain vows are made 
about indifferent matters, as women are 
especially wont to vow that they will not comb 
their hair on such or such a day. But indifferent 
matters are not included among better goods. 
Therefore, a vow does not always have to do 
with a better good. 
3. Furthermore, what is illicit is not good, 
so neither may it be better. But a vow can be 
about something illicit, as is clear in the case of 
Jephte, who because of his vow killed his 
innocent daughter, who, as Jerome says, is 
counted in the canon of the saints; for his soul 
pleased God by making the vow. Therefore, a 
vow does not always have to do with a better 
good. 
4. Furthermore, better goods seem to be 
those which are counseled. But those things 
that can turn to the danger of the person, are 
not counseled. Nevertheless, certain men vow 
these things, like those who abstain from food 
for two or three days, which cannot be endured 
without danger to one's person. Therefore, a 
vow does not always concern a better good. 
But to the contrary is the definition of a 
vow set forth above, namely: a vow is a 
promise of a better good, strengthened by 
deliberation. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Ulterius. It seems also that he who is 
not sui juris would be able to vow something. 
For an obligation which is made to someone 
inferior, cannot impede the service owed to a 
superior master. But by a vow someone 
obligates himself to the service of God. 
Therefore, the obligation by which a slave is 
bound to his master, who is nevertheless a man, 
cannot prevent him from fulfilling a vow. 
2. Furthermore, the son of a family is in 
the power of his father. But he can make a vow 
even against his father's wishes; for it occurs 
daily that young men enter religious life against 
their parents' will. Therefore, someone who is 
not sui juris can take a vow. 
3. Furthermore, no one is more under the 
power of another than a monk who has vowed 
obedience. But a monk can vow, as it seems, 
since in certain things he is arbiter of his own 
will. For he is not bound to obey his superior in 
all things, as Bernard says, but only in those 
things which pertain to religious life. 
Therefore, etc... 
4. Furthermore, a wife is also under the 
power of her husband, as is evident in Genesis 
3. But a wife can vow certain things without 
the consent of her husband. Therefore, etc. 
But to the contrary is the fact that it is not 
permitted to offer a sacrifice to God out of the 
possessions of another. But the person who 
makes a vow, offers a certain sacrifice to God. 
Therefore, if he is in the power of another, he 
cannot make a vow. 
Moreover, a vow, since it is characterized 
as a freely-given promise (spontaneam 
promissionem), requires liberty. But he who is 
in the power of another, does not have liberty. 
Therefore, he cannot make a vow. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that a vow, 
by its very name, expresses a certain obligation 
assumed by one's own will; and since someone 
cannot be bound in his will unless to Him who 
is the guarantor (cognitor) of the will, who is 
God alone; therefore, it consequently brings 
with it an obligation made to God, and by 
consequence, it concerns those things that are 
related to God (spectant ad deum), since an 
obligation made to someone about things which 
are not related to God, would be nothing. 
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However an obligation is made to a man 
through words expressed externally; whence it 
is said in Proverbs 6, 2: you are entrapped by 
the words of your mouth. And therefore, to Him 
who looks into the heart, it is fitting that a 
voluntary obligation be made by an interior 
word; and therefore it is fitting that it be made 
by an act of that power to which it belongs to 
enuntiate, which is reason; and therefore, the 
promise, which is the very act of reason, is the 
essence of the vow. For, since a promise is an 
act of reason, it is clear that, on the one hand, it 
is a certain enunciation and, on the other, the 
one promising directs his promise to someone 
else. However, every directing comes from 
reason. Yet a promise made outwardly is 
sometimes called "a naked promise," when it 
does not have something added that confirms 
the obligation; and then it does not have the full 
force of binding. Likewise, in order that an 
inward promise made to God have full binding 
force, it is necessary that it not be "a naked 
promise," but should have something by which 
it is confirmed; and indeed, this confirmation 
occurs through three steps. First, by the simple 
deliberation; second, by the intention of 
binding oneself under a certain penalty; third, 
by the fact that the witness of men is 
summoned for the inner promise. And thus 
many definitions are given for a vow, 
according to the various different things which 
are required for a vow included in those 
definitions; and many more could be given still. 
However, the definition, as the Master 
establishes it, seems to be the most complete; 
since he includes both the promise, which is the 
essence of the vow; and he touches the will, 
which is the cause of the obligation, in the fact 
that he says, spontaneae; and the final 
confirmation of the promise, which he includes 
elsewhere, by the fact that he says, a bearing-
witness; as well as the end of the vow, since it 
is an act toward another, in the fact that he 
says, which must be done for God; as well as 
the matter, in the fact that he says that it 
concerns things which are of God. 
1. To will something is not to vow; and 
therefore, an intention (propositum) is not a 
vow, but only the announcement of that 
intention in the mode of a promise; and since 
an interior announcement is called the 
conception of the heart, for this reason in that 
definition is included that a vow is the 
conception of a good intended (propositum). If 
a vow were said to be an intention simply 
speaking though, the predication would be 
from the cause, since the intention is the 
principle of the vow; just as also sometimes a 
desire (desiderium) itself is called a prayer 
(oratio), as was said above in Distinction 15. 
2. A promise is sometimes made by the 
mouth and not by the heart; and such a thing is 
not a vow to God; and for this reason, it is 
fitting to add spontaneae. 
And furthermore, although man cannot be 
sufficiently compelled to make a true promise, 
he can nevertheless be compelled to make the 
external promise by a certain subtle pressure, 
just as with other external works of the will; 
but not in the interior promise, just as no one 
can be forced to faith. However, the Master is 
defining the vow that is pronounced externally, 
because it can impede marriage. For this is the 
vow he means here; and this vow is the 
evidence of an interior promise, not the interior 
promise itself. 
3. And by this, the answer to the third is 
clear. 
4. A vow is not made to saints, unless 
according as by their intercession they are the 
mediators between us and God; just as also 
prayer is made to the saints; and therefore 
every vow is ultimately directed to God, just as 
with prayer too. 
5. That definition of the jurists is to be 
understood not as referring to any good 
whatsoever, but to that good which belongs to 
the religious life of piety; and this is of God, 
whether it be done toward one's neighbor, as 
the closest matter, or toward oneself, or toward 
God. 
6. Deliberation is included in bearing 
witness, as was said. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it must be said 
that, as was already mentioned, a vow cannot 
exist unless it concerns some good pertaining 
to the worship of God in some way or another; 
and therefore, on the part of Him to whom the 
obligation is made, every evil goes against a 
vow; but on the part of the will, from which 
such an obligation proceeds, any necessity in 
some way goes against a vow. However, 
necessity can be of two kinds. One is absolute 
necessity; and such necessity prevents vowing 
entirely; as if, for example, someone were to 
vow never to die, or things which were not at 
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all in his power, the vow would be worthless. 
The other kind of necessity is conditional for 
the attainment of an end; and thus we have a 
necessity of doing those things without which 
we cannot attain salvation; just as there are 
commands that we are otherwise bound to 
follow. And the second necessity does not 
prevent every kind of vow; for sometimes it is 
found, taking vow in a broad sense, to be about 
those things which are under such necessity; 
but such necessity does exclude a vow, 
properly so called; and therefore if 'vow' were 
taken according to its own ratio, it is properly 
concerning those goods to which all men are 
not bound, which are supererogatory; and 
therefore they are called "better goods," since 
they are super-added to those goods without 
which there is no salvation; and therefore, a 
vow, taken properly, is said to be about a better 
good. 
1. That promise of Jacob was more a 
certain recognition of an obligation rather than 
the cause of the obligation; and therefore it 
cannot be called a vow properly, but only in the 
larger sense. Or it could be said that the vow of 
Jacob was not concerning something that was 
of necessity but rather it concerned worship in 
a special way by the construction of an altar; 
and therefore, it had to do with a better good. 
2. These kinds of promises of women are 
more superstitions than vows; for they are a 
certain relic of idolatry, in the way that days 
and months were observed; and therefore they 
are not to be taken for vows, and the people 
vowing such things sin by doing so; since, as 
Jerome says, we should not even have a word 
in common with infidels. 
3. A vow, if it be about something that is 
simply evil, is not a vow unless by 
equivocation; and thus in no way does it bind. 
If, however, it concerns something which could 
be good in one contingent case and evil in 
another, if the vow were in any event, it is 
imprudent (indiscretum); if though, the 
outcome were good through the intention of the 
one vowing, it is prudent, and it would not 
oblige if there were an evil outcome. Thus, the 
vow of Jephtha was about something that in a 
certain case could have turned out well, namely 
if an animal were encountered for the sacrifice; 
and in another case it would not have been 
good, namely if no animal were encountered 
for the sacrifice. And since he vowed to do it in 
any event, the vow lacked discretion. 
Therefore, in his vow, as far as the taking of the 
vow goes, there is something praiseworthy, 
namely devotion, and faith by which he hoped 
for victory from God; and in this way it is said 
to be motivated by the Holy Spirit; but the 
determination of the vow was imprudent; and 
as for its execution, that deed was cruel, though 
it was a figure of something laudable. And 
thus, although the vow was in one way 
praiseworthy, the man himself is not excused 
from sin, since he was stupid in vowing it, and 
wicked in fulfilling it, as Jerome says. 
Nevertheless, he is counted in the canon of 
saints because of the victory that he obtained 
from God, as also with other saints. 
4. A vow which endangers the person is 
not a vow to be kept, since no one can vow 
something that endangers his own person; and 
therefore it is safer that in such matters the 
dispensation of the superior is sought; and if he 
should not give it, and the danger is imminent, 
he should break the vow without compunction. 
However, a danger could be imminent either 
from infirmity or from poverty, as when 
someone does not have enough to eat except 
what he has vowed to abstain from. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it must be answered 
that it is clear from what has already been said 
that a vow cannot be made by anyone except 
about those things that are subject to his will; 
and therefore, that man who is constituted 
under the power of someone else, cannot make 
a vow about the matters in which he is subject, 
since they are not subject to his own will. And 
likewise, those who do not have the use of their 
free will, just as with those who are not of 
sound mind, cannot make a vow, as neither can 
children before the age of puberty. 
1. By the very fact that man serves God in 
his flesh, he serves him in his spirit; for which 
reason the Apostle teaches them to continue to 
serve because of their conscience. And since 
this is of necessity, it cannot be impeded by 
what is not of necessity; just as neither can 
what falls under a command be removed by 
what falls under counsel. 
2. By the fact that a man attains the age of 
puberty, he is not under the power of another as 
concerns what regards his own person, if he be 
of free condition; and therefore, just as such a 
person can contract marriage against his 
parents' will, so also can he make a religious 
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profession against their wishes; but as concerns 
domestic matters he cannot vow anything 
without the consent of his father. 
3. Although a religious is not bound in 
obedience in all things that may be commanded 
of him, nevertheless he is bound in obedience 
all the time concerning those things that can be 
commanded of him, just as a slave is not 
exempt at any time from the service of his 
master; and therefore, they have no free time in 
which they may do whatever they like. And 
since every vow is to be completed by a certain 
time, therefore just as a slave cannot take any 
vow, so neither may a religious take a vow 
without the consent of his own superior. 
4. In those matters in which a wife is 
bound to her husband, and vice versa, neither 
can make a vow without mutual consent, as is 
evident with the vow of continence. But since 
in the management of the household and in the 
management of daily life the wife is subject to 
the husband and not vice versa, the man can 
vow certain things without the consent of the 
wife, but not the reverse. 
Article 2 
Whether vows are fittingly divided into common and 
singular 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that vows are unfittingly 
divided into common and singular. For division 
should be predicated according to the same 
account of dividing factors. But "vow" is not 
said in the same way of common and singular 
vows; for a vow is properly speaking singular, 
and not common, as is clear from what has 
been said. Therefore, this is an inadequate 
division. 
2. Furthermore, singular is not divided 
against common, but more properly against 
universal. Therefore a vow should also be 
divided here into singular and universal. 
3. Furthermore, every vow incurs a 
particular sin by its transgression. But a 
common vow does not incur any particular sin 
when it is broken, for thus a man would sin 
twice by any sin after baptism. Therefore, a 
vow is not anything common. 
4. Furthermore, that man who does not 
have the use of his free will cannot take a vow. 
But baptism may be received by someone who 
does not have the use of his free will. 
Therefore, in baptism no vow is made that 
should be called common. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Ulterius. It seems that vows are not 
fittingly divided into private and solemn. For 
there is a certain kind of public vow which is 
neither solemn nor private. Therefore, the 
division is not sufficiently named. 
2. Furthermore, things should be divided 
by what is essential to them. But â€˜private' 
and â€˜solemn' do not divide vows according to 
something essential to them; since a vow is 
essentially a certain obligation made to God; 
and as far as God is concerned, the obligation 
does not differ whether it be made in secret or 
before many. Therefore, the stated division is 
inadequate. 
3. Furthermore, when something is 
divided by a common essential division, it is 
necessary that the species divided differ from 
each other. But private vows and solemn vows 
do not differ in species; since thus no private 
vow could be solemnized, since species cannot 
cross over into each other. Therefore, the 
division stated is inadequately given for a vow. 
4. Furthermore, just as a vow has certain 
things that pertain to its solemnity, so also has 
marriage, and the other sacraments. But in 
marriage simple marriage is not distinguished 
from solemn marriage. Therefore, neither 
should this distinction be made in vows. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Ulterius. It seems that a vow is not 
solemnized by the profession of an established 
rule, and by the reception of holy orders, as 
certain people say. For solemnity is set forth as 
a difference of vows commonly said. But some 
vows do not come under an established rule, 
nor are they joined to holy orders, like the vow 
of a pilgrimage. Therefore, those two things do 
not suffice for making the solemnity of a vow. 
2. Furthermore, it is also said by some that 
a vow is solemnized by the reception of the 
religious habit. But sometimes the religious 
habit is received without profession or 
reception of orders. Therefore, etc. 
3. Furthermore, before the constitution of 
approved rules, a vow could also be solemnized 
without the reception of holy orders. But men 
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cannot oblige themselves to God now less than 
before. Therefore, also now the solemnity of a 
vow can be without profession of an 
established rule. 
4. Furthermore, profession of an 
established rule can be done in private. But 
here solemn vows are divided against private 
ones. Therefore, profession of an established 
rule is not sufficient for the solemnization of a 
vow. 
But to the contrary, the effect of a solemn 
vow is properly to invalidate the marriage 
contract. But only the vow that is attached to 
holy orders and under an established rule 
invalidates the marriage contract. Therefore, 
only in these ways is a vow solemnized. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
To the first question I answer that the 
division by which vows are divided into 
singular and common, is an analogous division 
which is predicated by prior and posterior 
about the dividing factors, like being is 
predicated of substance and accidents. For 
since a vow is an obligation made of one's own 
volition, but necessity excludes the voluntary, 
that vow that contains nothing of necessity is 
called a vow per prius, as though possessing 
the complete notion of a vow; and this is the 
singular vow, because it concerns things to 
which we are not bound. Yet the vow that 
contains something of necessity has the account 
of vow incompletely, and therefore it is called a 
vow per posterius; and this is called a common 
vow, because it is about things to which all 
men are bound, whose necessity is conditioned, 
not absolute, as is evident from what has been 
said. 
1. That notion proceeds from a division of 
the univocal; and this is not such a division. 
2. A common vow is a certain singular act, 
and made by a singular person; whence it could 
not fittingly be called universal; but it is said by 
the common ratio of those things that it deals 
with, to which all men are bound. 
3. The transgression of a common vow 
does not incur a special sin, but it adds a 
special deformity to a sin: for a baptized person 
sins more greatly than a non-baptized in the 
same kind of sin, as is evident in Hebrews 10: 
29: How much do you think he deserves worse 
punishments, who has trampled underfoot the 
Son of God, and considered the blood of the 
testament unclean? And therefore, it is not 
taken without reason, since it adds a certain 
obligation, as the written law adds a certain 
obligation above that of the natural law; and 
thus it does not constitute another sin, but it 
adds a new deformity. 
4. That reasoning proceeds from vows 
about things that not all men are bound to. But 
by the fact that on behalf of the child the 
godfather takes a common vow, nothing is lost 
by the child, since he would be obliged to the 
same thing otherwise: nor is it a problem 
[obstat] that it is a major obligation, since for 
him it is outweighed by the magnitude of 
benefits that it brings with it. For a child is 
caused no injury by someone accepting a 
benefit for him from another, to whom the 
child is afterward bound in service or in thanks 
when he himself arrives at years of discretion. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question I answer that the 
division of vows into private and solemn is a 
division of the whole potentiality into its parts, 
of which (its) perfect virtue is in one of its 
parts; however, in other things, a certain 
participation of that, as the soul is divided into 
rational, sensible, and vegetative. 
Yet the virtue of a vow is the obligation: 
which virtue, indeed, exists completely in the 
solemn vow, whose obligation can in no case 
be voided (irritari); but it exists incompletely 
in the private vow, whose obligation can be 
cancelled in certain cases, as will be said. 
1. A vow can be said to be public in two 
ways. In one way, per se, if it involves 
something which should come into public, as 
for example when someone receives holy 
orders, through which he is constituted a 
minister of the Church for the public service of 
God. In another way, a vow can be public per 
accidens, as for example when it comes to the 
attention of many people. And since the 
judgment of a thing does not vary according to 
what is accidental to it, but according to what is 
per se, a vow that is public in the second way is 
considered the same as a private vow.  
But a vow that is public in the first way is 
distinguished from private vows; and this is a 
solemn vow. 
2. The stated division is given through 
those things which are essential to a vow. For 
that which gives a vow the power of obligating 
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is essential to it. Wherefore, it is not true that 
they oblige equally in every way, neither before 
God, nor before men; but they do oblige 
equally in a certain way, as will be said. 
3. The progress from imperfect to perfect 
is the natural order; for which reason a progress 
is also made from one part to another in the 
whole potentiality; as an embryo has a 
vegetative soul in a certain way before the 
sensible soul, and a sensible soul before a 
rational one; and likewise also it is not unfitting 
that the same vow should be first private, and 
public afterwards. 
4. Marriage and the other sacraments have 
their full effect even when those things that 
pertain to the solemnity of the sacrament are 
omitted, because they have efficacy from 
divine power, not human institution. But 
because a vow obligates through the fact that it 
is from man, it does not have the perfect force 
of obligating unless the due solemnity is 
employed. Therefore, a vow is distinguished as 
solemn and not solemn; but this is not true of 
marriage or any other sacrament. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question I answer that a vow, 
as was said, is called solemn by the fact that it 
has the complete force of obligating. For those 
things are said to pertain to the solemnity of a 
thing which confer on it its complete existence. 
However, a vow, since it is essentially a 
promise, receives the full complement of its 
own power in the same way that a promise 
does; and the obligation of a promise is only 
complete at the moment when the one 
promising something, actually gives it, in some 
way placing it in the physical possession of the 
one to whom it was promised, so that he can 
have it. For example, if someone promised the 
fruit of a field, and by promising the field, he 
gave the fruit; and it is the same, if he promised 
some service, and gave himself as a slave. And 
therefore, a vow is only said to be solemnized 
when someone gives himself to God by making 
himself a slave in the divine service in His 
presence. And indeed, this is what is done by 
the reception of holy orders, and by the 
profession of an established rule made in the 
due manner: namely, given into the hand of the 
one who should receive this profession; and 
observing all the other circumstances that are 
determined by law. Otherwise it would not be a 
solemn vow, no matter who should profess it, 
since by such a profession he would not place 
himself under the power of those who are the 
heads of the religious order. 
1. Since the solemnity of the vow comes 
from the fact that the thing itself is given, by 
which the promise is fulfilled, when something 
temporally accomplishable is promised it 
cannot be a solemn vow, like the vow to make 
a pilgrimage or something like this. Nor is it a 
problem that solemnity is considered a 
difference of vows taken commonly: for also 
the rational soul, in which the ratio of life 
exists perfectly, is not in every living thing, 
although rational may be considered a 
difference of animals simply speaking. 
2. A religious habit is two-fold: one kind 
which they give to unprofessed religious, and 
another which is given to professed religious. 
And if in certain religious orders the same habit 
is given to both nevertheless it is customary for 
the habit to be blessed in formal profession; 
and a habit blessed in this way is considered as 
if it were a different thing altogether. Therefore 
the first habit does not suffice for solemnizing 
the vow, even a vow already taken; but the 
reception of the second habit solemnizes the 
vow, since there is a certain profession 
anticipated; against which presumption no trial-
period is required, if the due circumstances are 
observed (e.g., the habit is given by someone 
who may give it, and before a multitude of 
brethren). For if someone in his own house 
received such a habit, he would not because of 
that be presumed to have solemnized his vow; 
and therefore, the reception of the habit should 
not be considered another cause of solemnity, 
since it does not solemnize a vow unless 
insofar as his profession is presumed with 
certainty. 
3. Before those recent rules existed there 
was some mode of living approved by the 
Church, by which some people obligated 
themselves to those things which are 
supererogatory; and in those days the 
obligation of living in another way for a certain 
time was made in the same way that now the 
obligation is made to a certain rule. 
4. That vow is not called private because it 
comes under the notice of few people, but since 
it does not have what would be necessary to be 
established in public. But that person who 
makes his profession in secret, for example if 
in his own house he vowed to the one who 
could receive his profession, makes a vow that 
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should be established in public, since he must 
leave his secular life, and be converted in the 
cloister with the others of his order. 
Article 3 
Whether a vow obliges such that it would always be 
necessary to observe it 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that a vow does not oblige in 
such a way that it should always be observed. 
For nothing can oblige one to the impossible. 
But it is sometimes impossible to fulfill a vow, 
as is clear in the case of the woman who vows 
her virginity and is deflowered. Therefore it is 
not of necessity to keep a vow. 
2. Furthermore, an effect cannot be 
stronger than its cause. But the cause giving 
strength to a vow is deliberation, as is evident 
from the definition posited above in Question 
1, Article 1. Therefore, since human 
deliberation does not have the necessary 
firmness, for the thoughts of men are timid and 
our providence uncertain, as is seen in Wisdom 
9, it seems that a vow does not oblige its 
fulfillment as a matter of necessity. 
3. Furthermore, an oath obliges more 
strictly than a vow: for divine truth, from which 
an oath gets its obligation, is more efficacious 
than human deliberation, from which a vow's 
obligation comes. But an oath does not oblige 
such that it must be observed of necessity; for 
sometimes an oath can be broken without sin, 
as when it would lead to a worse result. 
Therefore neither does a vow oblige in such a 
way that it is always necessary to be fulfilled. 
4. Furthermore, when a vow is made under 
certain conditions, like Jacob's vow in Genesis 
28:20: if my God is with me . . . the Lord will be 
my God. But such a vow does not oblige if the 
condition does not stand. Therefore, not every 
vow obliges of necessity. 
5. Furthermore, someone who remains in 
the religious life beyond the trial-period 
determined, and also does not enter then, is said 
to have made an implicit vow. But this vow, it 
seems, is not necessary to fulfill, since the 
person has promised nothing: nor does he 
always seem to be held to those things which 
are contained in the vow of profession; since 
sometimes in the trial period the statutes of the 
rule do not seem to be observed, and he himself 
does not intend to enter the monastery, unless it 
be in order to live as the others live. Therefore, 
it seems that not every vow obliges such that it 
must necessarily be kept. 
6. Furthermore, no one is obliged to that 
which depends upon the will of another person, 
as when someone vows to enter a certain 
religious cloister; for it is in the power of others 
to accept him or not. Therefore, if those others 
do not wish it, it does not seem that he is 
obliged to fulfill his vow. 
7. Furthermore, whoever is bound to 
something without a determined time in which 
to accomplish it, is bound to do it immediately. 
Therefore, if a vow possessed a power of 
obligating, whoever made the vow would be 
obliged to fulfill it right away. Which does not 
seem to be true. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Deuteronomy 23:21: When you have vowed a 
vow to the Lord your God, do not delay to 
render it. 
Moreover, Augustine says that to vow is 
voluntary, but to render is of necessity. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Ulterius. It seems that by the obligation 
of a simple vow the matrimonial contract 
should be invalidated. For a stronger bond 
prejudices a weaker one. But the bond of a vow 
is stronger than the bond of marriage; since the 
latter is made by men, and the former by God. 
Therefore, the bond of a vow prejudices the 
bond of matrimony. 
2. Furthermore, God's command is not less 
than the Church's command. But the command 
of the Church obliges someone to this, that if 
marriage is contracted against it, it is nullified, 
just as is evident with those who contract in 
some degree of consanguinity prohibited by the 
Church. Therefore, since to keep a vow is a 
divine precept, it seems that when someone 
contracts marriage against a divine vow, the 
marriage would be nullified by this fact. 
3. Furthermore, in marriage a man may 
enjoy carnal intimacy without sin. But that man 
who makes a simple vow can never commingle 
carnally with his wife without sin. Therefore a 
simple vow invalidates matrimony. Here is the 
proof. Suppose that this man who contracts 
marriage after a simple vow of continence sins 
mortally; for according to Jerome, for those 
vowing continence, not only marriage but the 
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wish to marry, is blameable. But the marriage 
contract is not opposed to a vow of continence 
except in carnal intimacy. Therefore, when he 
first commingles carnally with his wife, he sins 
mortally, and by the same reasoning in all the 
other vices, for a sin committed first cannot 
excuse from subsequent sins. 
4. Furthermore, a man and a woman 
should be equals in marriage, particularly with 
regard to carnal intimacy. But that man who 
makes a simple vow of continence can never 
request the marriage debt without sin; since it is 
expressly against the will for continence, to 
which he is bound by his vow. Therefore, nor 
can he render the debt without sin. 
But to the contrary is what Pope Clement 
says, that a simple vow impedes marriage from 
being contracted, but it does not invalidate a 
marriage once contracted. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Ulterius. It seems that a solemn vow 
would also not annul a marriage contract. For 
as the Decretals state, in the sight of God a 
simple vow does not obligate less than a 
solemn vow. But marriage stands or is annulled 
by divine recognition. Therefore, since a simple 
vow does not annul a marriage, neither could a 
solemn vow annul it. 
2. Furthermore, a solemn vow does not 
add such powerful strength above a simple vow 
as an oath does. But a simple vow, even with 
an oath added to it, does not nullify the 
marriage contract. Therefore, nor does a 
solemn vow. 
3. Furthermore, a solemn vow does not 
possess anything that a simple vow could not 
have: for a simple vow might create scandal, 
which could exist in public, as also with a 
solemn vow. Likewise, the Church could and 
should legislate that a simple vow annuls a 
marriage contract in order that many sins might 
be avoided. Therefore, by the same reasoning 
that a simple vow does not annul marriage, 
neither should a solemn vow. 
But to the contrary is that the man who 
makes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual 
marriage with God, which is much nobler than 
material marriage. But a material marriage 
contracted first invalidates a marriage 
contracted afterward. Therefore, so does a 
solemn vow. 
Moreover, this can also be proved by 
many authorities who are set forth in the text. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer the first question that a vow, as is 
clear from what has been said, is a certain 
contract of a promise between God and man. 
Whence, since a contract made between men in 
good faith obliges someone to necessary 
observance, more strongly does a vow in which 
a man promises something to God, in those 
matters to which the vow is extended. In those 
things, however, to which the vow is not 
extended, the obligation of the vow does not 
have any place: and therefore, whoever breaks 
a vow properly made sins mortally since he has 
broken the trust that he entered upon with God. 
1. The same thing that, if it were present, 
would impede a vow from being made, also 
removes the obligation from a vow that has 
been made; wherefore when it concerns the 
impossible, there can be no vow, as was said; if 
after taking the vow something becomes 
impossible which had previously been possible, 
the obligation of the vow is removed as far as it 
is concerned; as if someone rich should vow to 
build a church, which afterward he should be 
unable to complete because of falling into 
poverty, he would not be obliged to fulfill this 
vow. But nonetheless, in this matter we must 
make a two-fold distinction. In one way, since 
either he has become unable to fulfill the vow 
at all, and then he is simply not bound to what 
he vowed; or else he has become unable to 
complete it in its entirety, but not unable to 
complete a part of it; and then he remains 
obliged to do what he can. In another way it 
must be distinguished whether he incurred this 
incapacity by his own fault; for then it would 
be necessary for him to make up for it by 
penance; or if not by his own fault, and then he 
is not bound to any reparation. Therefore, if a 
woman who vows virginity is not a virgin, 
although she cannot offer her virginity, yet she 
can offer continence; and she remains obliged 
to this, and beyond this, to grieving in penance, 
by which she atones to God for her lost 
virginity: because although indeed it would not 
be worth the same simply-speaking, it is 
nevertheless equivalent according to the 
consideration of God, who does not demand 
from man beyond what he can do. 
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2. Although deliberation may be a variable 
cause, nonetheless the rectitude of the natural 
law, which dictates that what is promised to 
God must be kept, is invariable; and this gives 
to the vow the necessary obligation. 
3. Just as an oath which tends toward a 
worse result is not to be kept, so neither is a 
vow. For which reason Isidore says: in a base 
vow change your resolution; for a vow does not 
extend to illicit things, or even to less good 
things, as has been said. Nor does it matter 
whether it was illicit when the vow was taken, 
or whether it became so afterward. 
4. What is vowed under a certain 
condition is not vowed simply; and therefore it 
does not oblige unless that condition stands. 
5. An implicit vow obliges just as also a 
vow taken orally: wherefore if someone 
remained in a monastery after a trial period, he 
is obliged by an implicit vow; unless perhaps 
because of some reason it was extended a year 
for him, or they were accustomed to extend it 
for others. Because then he does not make an 
implicit vow beyond the current year; and such 
a person who made an implicit vow is bound to 
the three principal vows of religious life in any 
case; but as to the other observances, whose 
transgression seems to be allowed by the 
dissembling of prelates, since they see but do 
not correct, so that they don't seem to be 
obliged, and particularly if it be a simple 
person, who does not know how to discern 
such things adequately. 
6. The obligation of a vow is caused by 
the proper will; wherefore if in vowing he has 
first thought about entering religious life, and 
afterward he has chosen such a religious order 
or such a place, he is obliged to religious life, 
simply. Wherefore if he is unable to be 
received into those things that he has chosen, 
he should seek another. If though, first and 
principally, he thought about such an order or 
such a place, then this condition is understood 
in his vow, if they want to receive him; 
otherwise it would be an imprudent vow; 
wherefore, since the condition isn't fulfilled, he 
is not obliged. If however, he is unsure of how 
he is related to the vow, then he should choose 
the safer way, lest he commit himself to his 
own peril. 
7. If when someone has vowed that he 
would enter religious life, for example, he 
intended to oblige himself to it immediately, or 
to the judgment of another, he cannot longer 
defer even because of debts outstanding; but 
the one who receives him is bound to settle 
them. However, if in vowing he was thinking 
about his debts, it can probably be presumed 
that he did not intend to oblige himself before 
he had disposed of his affairs. However, when 
he fears a perpetual impediment, he is not 
bound to defer further. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it must be said that 
something ceases to be in the power of 
someone by the fact that it passes into the 
dominion of another; but the promise of a 
certain thing does not transfer it into the 
dominion of the one to whom it is promised; 
and therefore not because of the fact itself that 
someone promises a certain thing, does that 
thing cease to be in his own power. Since 
therefore in the simple vow there is nothing but 
a simple promise made to God for preserving 
continence of one's own body, after the simple 
vow a man still remains the master of his own 
body; and therefore he can give it to another, 
namely a wife, in which giving the sacrament 
of marriage consists, which is indissoluble. 
And because of this, a simple vow, although it 
might impede a marriage from being 
contracted, since he sins who contracts 
marriage after a simple vow of continence, 
nevertheless, since it is a valid contract, the 
marriage cannot be rendered invalid by this. 
1. A vow is a stronger bond than marriage 
as concerns the one to whom it is made and that 
to which it binds, since by marriage a man is 
bound to his wife for the rendering of the debt, 
but by a vow he is bound to God in continence. 
However, as to the mode of binding, marriage 
is a stronger bond than a simple vow, since in 
marriage a man is actually handed over to the 
power of his wife, but not in a simple vow, as 
was said. For the claim of the one in possession 
is always stronger. But as far as this is 
concerned, a simple vow obligates in a similar 
way as a betrothal, wherefore a betrothal is 
invalidated by a simple vow. 
2. The impediment of consanguinity does 
not have the effect of invalidating marriage 
from the fact that it is a command of God or of 
the Church, but from the fact that the body of 
one blood relative cannot pass into the power 
of another. However, this fact does not make a 
command prohibiting marriage after a simple 
vow, as is clear from what has been said; and 
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therefore, the argument does not follow, for it 
cites as the cause what is not a cause. 
3. The person who contracts marriage by 
words of the present after taking a simple vow 
cannot know his wife carnally without mortal 
sin; for the possibility of fulfilling his vow of 
continence still remains to him before the 
consummation of the marriage, as is clear from 
what has been said above, Distinction 27, q. 2, 
art. 3, questiuncula 2. But after the marriage 
has already been consummated, it becomes 
illicit for him not to render the debt to his wife 
when she demands it, although by his own 
fault; and therefore the obligation of the vow 
does not extend to this, as is clear from what 
was said above; nevertheless, grieving in 
repentance should make up for the continence 
that was not preserved. 
4. When someone has not been rendered 
unable to preserve his vow of continence, he is 
obliged to observe it even after the marriage 
contract; because of which he is bound to be 
totally continent at the death of his wife; and 
since he is not obliged by the marriage bond to 
request the debt, therefore he cannot request the 
debt without sin, although he could render the 
debt to a spouse who demands it without sin, 
afterward he is obliged to this by the preceding 
carnal intimacy. However, it must be 
understood, either the wife requests expressly 
or implicitly, as when the woman is modest 
(verecunda), and the man senses her wish 
(voluntate) for the rendering of the debt, then 
he can render the debt without sin; and 
particularly if he fears a danger to her chastity. 
Nor is it a problem that they are not equals in 
the matrimonial act: for anyone can renounce 
what is his own. Though certain people say that 
he can both request and render, lest a marriage 
be made exceedingly burdensome for the wife 
who is always having to demand the debt. But 
if it is looked at correctly, this is to demand 
implicitly. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third it must be said that everyone 
says that just as a solemn vow impedes a 
marriage from being contracted, so also it 
renders a marriage contracted invalid. 
However, certain people assign scandal as the 
cause of this. But this is nothing; for also a 
simple vow sometimes carries scandal, 
whenever it is in some way public. And 
furthermore the indissolubility of marriage 
concerns the truth of life, which is not 
abandoned because of scandal. And therefore 
others say that it is because of a statute of the 
Church. But this also is insufficient, for 
according to this the Church could legislate the 
opposite; which does not seem true. 
And therefore it must be said with others 
that a solemn vow by its own nature contains 
what would render a marriage contract invalid, 
namely inasmuch as through it a man has lost 
power over his own body, by handing it over to 
God in perpetual continence, as is clear from 
what has been said; and therefore he cannot 
hand himself over into the power of a wife for 
contracting marriage; and since the marriage 
which follows such a vow is null, thus the 
aforementioned vow is said to render a 
marriage contract invalid. 
1. With respect to God a simple vow is 
said to obligate one not less than a solemn vow 
in those matters which regard God, as 
separation from God is mortal sin; for he sins 
mortally who breaks a simple vow, just as he 
who breaks a solemn one; although it may be a 
more serious sin to break a solemn one, so that 
in this way the comparison is taken generically, 
not determined by the quantity of the 
culpability (reatus). But as concerns marriage, 
through which a human is obliged to a human, 
it is not fitting that there be equal obligation 
also generically; for a solemn vow obliges one 
to certain things, not a simple one. 
2. An oath obliges more than a vow on the 
part of the one by whom the obligation is 
made; but a solemn vow obligates more as 
concerns the mode of obligating, inasmuchas it 
actually hands over what is promised, which is 
not done through an oath; and therefore the 
argument does not follow. 
A solemn vow carries the actual handing 
over of one's own body, which a simple vow 
does not carry, as is clear from what has been 
said; and therefore this argument proceeds on 
insufficient grounds. 
Article 4 
Whether a dispensation could be made from a vow 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that a dispensation could not be 
made for a vow. For a common vow possesses 
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less of the account of a vow. But in the case of 
a common vow, no one can give a dispensation. 
Therefore, neither in a singular vow. 
2. Furthermore, to fulfill a vow is a matter 
of natural law; since whoever does not fulfill it, 
lies; which is against natural law. But no one 
can give a dispensation permitting lying, or 
anything else which is of natural law. 
Therefore, no one can give a dispensation in 
the case of a vow. 
3. Furthermore, through a dispensation a 
greater good should not be neglected in favor 
of a lesser good. But nothing outweighs the 
worth of continence of the soul, as is said in 
Sirach 26:20; for the part of contemplatives, 
which is symbolized by Mary of Bethany, is 
the best, for she has chosen the best part, as it 
is said in Luke 10. Therefore, at least for the 
vow of continence, which belongs to the state 
of contemplation, a dispensation cannot be 
given. 
But to the contrary, no vow is licit which 
verges on danger to the person. But it could be 
the case that continence preserved might verge 
on danger to a person. Therefore at least in that 
case, a vow of continence can be dispensed. 
Moreover, just as monks are bound to 
continence, so also to poverty and obedience. 
But they can be dispensed from their vows of 
obedience and poverty, as is clear from the case 
of those who are taken up to the prelature. 
Therefore, it is also possible for the vow of 
continence. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Ulterius. It seems that any prelate can 
give a dispensation from a vow. For every 
prelate is established for the sake of providing 
for the benefit of his subjects. Therefore, if the 
benefit of his subjects should require it, he can 
give a dispensation. 
2. Furthermore, someone can give a 
dispensation from a vow by the fact that he has 
been constituted a steward (dispensator) of the 
mysteries of God. But this belongs to every 
prelate. Therefore, etc. . . . 
But to the contrary since in the human 
body there are certain actions which are only 
suited to the principal members, and also 
certain actions to the head alone. But in the 
Church the Pope holds the office of head, and 
the greater prelates hold the office of principal 
members, as bishops. Therefore, there are some 
dispensations which only the Pope can give. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Ulterius. It seems that no vow can be 
commuted: Levit., ult. 9,383 The animal which 
can be sacrificed to the lord, can be changed 
neither for a better nor for a worse. Therefore, 
if it be a licit vow, it cannot be changed. 
2. Furthermore, if it could be changed, it 
could especially be changed for the better. But 
this cannot be: for Bernard says of well-ordered 
monasteries: no one will depart from my 
counsel in the desire of a stricter life without 
permission of the superior. Therefore, etc. 
But to the contrary is that it is always 
permitted to make progress. Therefore, a vow 
can also be changed into something better. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
1. Ulterius. It seems that someone can 
commute a vow by his own authority. For if 
someone after a vow of the Holy Land should 
vow to enter religious life, he is freed if he 
fulfills the second, as the Decretals say. But he 
can by his own authority vow religious life. 
Therefore also by his own authority he can 
commute his vow. 
2. Furthermore, that man who makes a 
certain vow in secular life, does not seem to be 
bound to it after he has entered the cloister, as 
certain people say. But the cloister can be 
entered by one's own authority. 
3. Furthermore, a temporal vow is 
superceded by a perpetual vow in its duration 
alone. But by his own authority someone can 
commute the temporal vow of a pilgrimage into 
a perpetual vow of religious life, as was said. 
Therefore by the same reasoning, by his own 
authority he can change a vow of lesser 
duration into a vow of greater duration, like a 
lesser pilgrimage into a greater one. 
But to the contrary, a commuting is a 
certain dispensation. But no one can dispense 
himself from his own vow by his own 
authority. Therefore, neither can he commute 
it. 
                                                 
383 Actually Leviticus 27:10 
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Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that 
concerning this there are diverse opinions. 
For certain people say that any vow can 
have a dispensation from the prelates of the 
Church at the pleasure of the prelate: for, as 
they say, in any vow is conditionally 
understood the will of the superior prelate, 
namely the Pope, to whose dispensation the 
acts of all his subjects belong. And therefore, 
when he willed it, that highest prelate could 
relax the obligation of a vow, so that one was 
not bound to fulfill the vow, since this 
condition is not existing. But this does not 
seem to be well said: for there are certain 
things in which man is so free of in himself, 
that he can do them even against the precept of 
the Pope; as to be continent, and the other 
divine counsels; whence absolutely and without 
the condition of the will of any prelate he can 
vow other things. 
And therefore, others say that no vow 
receives a dispensation according as a 
dispensation is a relaxation of the law (jus), but 
rather according as it is a declaration of law: 
for the Pope can declare this law, that when 
recompense is made of a greater good, a lesser 
good to which someone obliged himself can be 
omitted. But this also does not seem true: for to 
declare a law (jus) is not to make a new law, 
but rather to manifest what was in the law. 
Wherefore according to this by the dispensation 
of a vow nothing was ever made not against the 
law that was formerly against the law, but only 
what seemed to be against the law, and was 
not. 
And therefore it should be said in another 
way that a vow can be dispensed, even 
according as a dispensation is a relaxation of 
the law, for some legitimate reason. For since a 
vow cannot be about something illicit, but it is 
not permitted to take away from someone what 
is owed him,therefore someone's vow cannot 
be made to the prejudice of his own prelate, 
rather he should submit to his commands, 
whenever it was appropriate; wherefore if the 
prelate saw that by some reasonable cause it 
was expedient, either because of the one who 
vowed, or because of others, that he not keep 
the vow, he can release anyone who otherwise 
was obliged by law from the observation of the 
vow. 
1. To those things which fall under a 
common vow, someone is not only obliged by 
the vow, but also by natural law, and by divine 
precept; and therefore by this reason it cannot 
have a dispensation like other vows. 
2. To observe a vow while the obligation 
of the vow endures, is of natural law; but when 
the obligation of the vow ceases, its observance 
is not of natural law. But this obligation ceases 
either on its own, as when keeping it tends 
toward a worse outcome; and then by the 
declaration of a superior, if he has the faculty 
of asking, the observance of the vow should be 
forgone. Or else the obligation ceases by the 
authority of a superior, who judges something 
else more necessary, and gives a dispensation 
of the vow. Nor in this is a man guilty of lying 
who does not keep a vow in such a case: for a 
man should have worthy conditions added 
concerning the future, either explicitly or 
implicitly, as is evident from James 5. 
3. Concerning the vow of continence there 
are two opinions. 
For certain people say that no one can give 
a dispensation from it; but different reasons for 
this are given by different people. For some say 
that this is the case because a vow of 
continence cannot be abandoned without 
someone sinking into the opposite of the vow, 
which is never allowed. But a vow of poverty 
can be overlooked in some way which is not 
directly against the vow, as when someone has 
money not of his own, but in the name of the 
Church. But this is no reason: for thus a vow of 
abstaining from meat on a certain day, or the 
vow of a pilgrimage, would not receive a 
dispensation; which is absurd. 
And so others assign another reason, 
saying that this is fitting, for a vow of 
continence cannot be replaced with something 
better, by the fact that nothing outweighs the 
value of continence for the soul: either because 
by continence a man wins triumph over an 
interior enemy, as certain people say: or 
because by the religious life a man is perfectly 
conformed to Christ. Wherefore, because the 
vow of continence is included in the vow of 
religious life, like the other vows essential to 
religious life, a dispensation cannot be given, 
as certain people say. But even this does not 
seem to be sufficiently said: for the common 
good is much better than a private good, and 
sometimes for its sake a man is even removed 
from the garden of holy contemplation, which 
is the best part, by the judgment of his lord, 
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Luke 10, so that he may be free for the 
common benefit of his neighbors. 
And therefore others say more probably 
that if the common benefit of the whole Church 
or of one kingdom or province requires it, both 
a vow of continence and a vow of religious life 
can be dispensed, however much it has been 
solemnized: for by a vow a man cannot 
disoblige himself from that in which he is 
bound to another, as was said; wherefore, a 
necessity could threaten such that it could be 
justly prohibited to someone either to vow 
continence or religious life; and if the same 
necessity remained, he could also be dispensed 
from a vow he had already made. 
4. But since the reasons given to the 
contrary do not proceed rightly, therefore it 
should be said to the fourth objection that the 
good of continence is much nobler than bodily 
health; and therefore the danger of bodily death 
is not a sufficient reason for giving a 
dispensation of a vow of continence; wherefore 
also he does not sin who finds himself in such a 
case that his continence endangers his person, 
if he has vowed continence, particularly when 
he could combat that danger by other remedies; 
just as he does not sin who because of some 
work of virtue exposes himself to the danger of 
death. 
5. With those who are promoted from the 
state of religious life to the state of the 
prelature a dispensation is not given from the 
principal vows of religious life: since those 
things which they are said to possess, they 
possess not in their own name but in the name 
of the Church; wherefore nothing in their vow 
of poverty is prejudiced by this; likewise 
neither in the vow of obedience, since 
obedience regards the state of the prelature in 
another whom one is bound to obey. And 
therefore, if the man who ceases to be under a 
prelate is not bound to obey anyone, it is not 
because the obligation of the vow is lacking on 
his part, but because there is no longer any 
episcopacy for him to obey. Wherefore a monk 
who promises obedience to an abbot, if he 
himself is made abbot, is not bound to obey 
other abbots since he no longer has an abbot. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that the fullness of power in granting 
dispensations resides in the possession of the 
Supreme Pontiff; however others participate in 
this power to the degree that it is delegated to 
them, so that, since all cannot have recourse to 
one man, they might receive a dispensation 
through those lower than him; wherefore for 
those vows which receive a dispensation 
neither easily nor frequently, but rarely, like the 
vow of religious life and other perpetual vows 
like it, only the Pope can give a dispensation; 
but for other temporal vows, like a vows of 
pilgrimage or fasting or other things of this 
kind, also bishops can give dispensations, 
unless the Pope has reserved something of 
these to himself, like the dispensation of the 
vow of the Holy Land. 
1. Not everything that is beneficial to the 
subject can be applied to him by any prelate, 
but the greater things are reserved to the greater 
ones; just as not every doctor can cure every 
sickness, but in the more dangerous illnesses, 
more experienced doctors are required. 
2. Although all are dispensers of the 
mysteries of God, yet they are not all equally 
so; and therefore it is not fitting that all should 
be able to give dispensations in all things. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it should be said that 
there is a distinction between the commutation 
of a vow and the dispensation: that when a vow 
is commuted, the one vowing is absolved from 
one thing and bound to another; but when a 
dispensation from a vow is given, he is simply 
absolved from the vow without being bound to 
something else; wherefore a commutation of a 
vow conveys less than a dispensation; and 
therefore when a vow can be dispensed for a 
reasonable cause, it can also be commuted, 
either because it is commuted into something 
better or because it is less dangerous. 
1. The animal of sacrifice was designated 
by this very vow for the worship of God; and 
therefore it was somehow already sacred, and 
because of this it could not be reduced to 
common uses. And likewise, also now if 
someone vowed to enter religious life, he 
cannot send another in place of himself, unless 
by the dispensation of his superior. However it 
is otherwise in other vows, in which a specific 
person is not designated for the special worship 
of God. 
2. Bernard speaks in counsel: since 
sometimes because of the lightness of their 
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souls certain people pass into another state 
under the appearance of a life of greater 
strictness; and therefore it is safer that it be 
done by counsel and permission of the superior 
prelate; particularly if he does not believe that 
his superior would unreasonably present an 
impediment. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
To the fourth question it should be said 
that in a commutation is a certain contract, 
which cannot be completed without the consent 
of both parties; whence when a man obliges 
himself to God by a vow, the immutation of the 
vow cannot be made, unless the consent of the 
one who wields God's power on earth should 
interveneâ€”namely, the prelates. Unless 
perhaps one vow should be included in another. 
And since a vow of religious life includes all 
other vows both by reason of its perpetuity, and 
by reason of obedience by which a man hands 
over to God his own will, through which he can 
be master of himself and all things. Therefore 
that man who has made some temporal vow, 
can enter religious life without a dispensation 
required of some prelate despite a previous 
vow that might impede his entrance into 
religious life, like the vow of a pilgrimage or 
something like this. If though he vows two 
temporal things, both of which are possible at 
the same time, he should keep both, unless 
perhaps by the authority of his superior an 
earlier lesser vow were commuted into a 
subsequent greater one. If however it were 
entirely impossible to accomplish both vows, 
he should keep the greater one and make 
satisfaction for the lesser according to the 
judgment of his prelate. 
1. The vow of the Holy Land obliges a 
man to the service of God temporally, and 
concerns a determined time; but the vow of 
religious life concerns all things, and according 
to every time; and therefore it is in a certain 
way more an enlargement of the vow rather 
than a commutation. 
2. Since by the entrance of religious life a 
man dies to his prior life, he is not bound to 
discharge those unfulfilled vows that he vowed 
in secular life, by the fact that he enters 
religion. Both particularly since singularity 
among religious is dangerous, and the burden 
of religious life is more difficult to the degree 
that the same ease in observing the vow does 
not remain that there was in secular life. 
However, certain people say that he should 
explain to his prelate, and the prelate could 
give a dispensation once he has considered the 
conditions of the person and of the vow. But 
according to others this is not required; since 
by the very force of the vow of religious life he 
was absolved from his prior vows, for reasons 
stated. 
3. A perpetual vow regards all time: and 
therefore there does not remain some time after 
its fulfillment in which another temporal vow 
could be completed; as time remains for 
fulfilling a vow of greater duration after a vow 
of lesser duration; and because of this, it is not 
similar. 
Article 5 
Whether for virgins vowing continence there should 
be a special veil by comparison with others who 
have vowed continence and have been corrupted 
1. It seems that there should not be a 
special veil for virgins who vow continence as 
compared with others who have vowed 
continence and have been corrupted. For both 
virginity and the vow of continence are 
common to men and women. But to men who 
vow continence in virginity nothing else is 
given than is given to others who have lost 
their virginity. Therefore neither should virgins 
receive a special veil by comparison with 
others. 
2. Furthermore, signs in the New Law are 
not empty, but fruitful, since the sacraments of 
the New Law confer grace. But the virginal veil 
does not seem to bear fruit, since grace is not 
conferred in it; otherwise it would be a 
sacrament, and should be given to the corrupted 
young girls who also need the help of grace for 
preserving their continence. Therefore it seems 
that there should not be a special veil for 
virgins as opposed to others. 
3. Furthermore, the consecration which is 
applied to men in the reception of holy orders 
is more than that which is applied to women in 
taking the veil. But the consecration of holy 
orders does not require virginity in the 
consecrated. Therefore neither should the 
veiling of a woman. 
4. Further more no one should be punished 
again for a pain that he has already undergone. 
But sometimes a woman suffers for the fact 
that she has been corrupted, as is evident in 
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those who have been corrupted by any kind of 
violence. Therefore such as these should not be 
denied the virginal veil for a lesser veil. 
5. Furthermore, if ever a virginal veil is 
denied to a woman who has been corrupted, 
scandal results for those in attendance, and 
danger of homicide, if she was secretly 
corrupted. Therefore it seems that at least in 
such a case a virginal veil should be given to 
others besides to virgins. 
But to the contrary, in an office of the 
church it is not seemly that there be any falsity. 
But in the whole office in which virgins are 
veiled, mention is made of bodily integrity, as 
is evident to anyone who pays attention. 
Therefore, the virginal veil should not be given 
to those who have been corrupted. 
Moreover, by taking the veil a woman is 
in a certain way espoused to Christ, who is 
worthier than any high priest (pontifex) of the 
Old Law. But in the Old Law the high priest 
was not allowed to marry anyone but a virgin. 
Therefore no one should be veiled unless she is 
a virgin. 
I answer that those things which act 
physically in the Church are spiritual signs. But 
since a physical sign cannot sufficiently 
represent a spiritual signified thing, it is 
sometimes necessary that several corporeal 
signs be used for signifying the same spiritual 
thing. Therefore the spiritual marriage of Christ 
and the church has both fecundity, by which we 
are regenerated as sons of God, and 
incorruption, since Christ chose for himself the 
Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or anything 
like this, as is stated in Ephesians 5; wherefore 
it is said in 2 Corinthians 11, 2: for I have 
espoused you to one husband that I may 
present a chaste virgin to Christ. But a bodily 
fecundity does not allow the integrity of the 
flesh; and thus it is necessary that the spiritual 
union of Christ and the Church be represented 
by diverse signs as to its fecundity and as to its 
integrity. Therefore as spiritual marriage is 
represented by fleshly marriage as to its 
fecundity, so it is necessary for there to be 
something that represents the spiritual marriage 
as to its integrity; and this is done in the veiling 
of virgins, as is shown by all the things which 
are brought forth and done there; and because 
of this only a bishop, to whom the care of the 
Church is commited, espouses the virgins, by 
veiling them not for himself but for Christ, like 
a friend and attendant of the bridegroom. 
And since the signification of integrity can 
be fully in virginal continence, but in the 
continence of widows it is partial, on this 
account another veil is given to widows, though 
not with that solemnity with which it is given 
to virgins. 
1. The Church stands in the spiritual 
marriage as a bride, but Christ as the 
Bridegroom; yet by the vow of continence the 
soul is espoused to Christ; wherefore it is not 
fitting that this espousal be signified in a man, 
but only in a woman. 
2. In the consecration of virgins, as in the 
consecration of kings, and in other benedictions 
of this kind, grace is given, unless there be an 
impediment on the part of the one receiving; 
but nevertheless things of this kind are not said 
to be sacraments, since they were not instituted 
for the cure of the disease of sin, like the other 
sacraments. 
3. In the reception of Holy Orders 
someone is not consecrated as a bridegroom, 
but as the minister of the bridegroom; 
wherefore virginity is not required for the 
integrity of the signification of spiritual 
matrimony, as it is required in the veiling of the 
woman who is consecrated as the bride. 
4. Those women who are corrupted 
through violence, if they do not consent in any 
way, do not lose the glory of virginity in the 
sight of God. But since it is extremely difficult 
that in such pleasure (delectatione) some 
impulse of enjoyment does not surge forth, 
therefore the Church which cannot judge 
interior matters, does not veil a woman among 
virgins when she has been externally corrupted. 
For which reason Pope Leo says: Those 
servants of God who have lost the integrity of 
their chastity by barbaric oppression will be 
more greatly praiseworthy in their humility and 
modesty, if they do not dare to unite themselves 
with uncontaminated virgins. 
5. Those women who have been corrupted 
secretly, whether by men, or in another way, 
are in no way to be veiled; for the sacraments 
or sacramentals of the Church should not be 
changed for the sake of avoiding scandal. But 
as some people say, some caution can be 
employed for avoiding scandal, that namely 
those things may be done which are not of the 
substance of virginal veiling (like the lighting 
of candles, and other things like this), for 
instance that the word virginity may be 
changed into chastity. 
261 
 
QUESTION 2 
Prologue 
Next we inquire about scandal; and 
concerning this four things are to be asked: 1) 
what it is; 2) whether it is a sin; 3) to whom it 
pertains; 4) what things should be forgiven for 
the sake of scandal. 
Article 1 
Whether the definition of scandal is fittingly 
assigned 
1. It seems that the definition of scandal is 
unfittingly assigned, which is taken from the 
interlineal gloss on Matthew 18: woe to the 
world from scandals, that is: scandal is 
something not quite proper that is said or done 
which presents the occasion of ruin to others. 
For scandal is divided into active and passive. 
But this definition cannot include passive 
scandal. Therefore, it is not convertible with 
the thing defined; and thus it is insufficient. 
2. Furthermore, it says about Numbers 31: 
Revenge first the children of Israel, etc., that 
scandal is when a deceit is put forth to someone 
walking rightly, for his ruin. But not everything 
said or done not quite rightly is a deceit. 
Therefore, the definition of scandal is 
insufficiently assigned. 
3. Furthermore, just as a sin of the mouth 
and of deed can present an occasion of ruin to 
another, so also can a sin of the heart, 
especially when, by its external signs, it comes 
to the notice of others. But in the definition 
given the sin of the mouth and the sin of deed 
are touched upon, but not the sin of the heart. 
Therefore, it is unfittingly assigned. 
4. Furthermore, an occasion signifies its 
cause per accidens. But even good things are 
sometimes cause of bad things per accidens. 
Therefore, not only saying or doing something 
not quite right may present to another the 
occasion of ruin, but even if it is right it should 
be called scandal. 
5. Furthermore, it is said of Christ in 
Isaiah 8:14: He shall be for a stone or a 
stumbling block. But in Christ there was not 
anything 'not quite right'. Therefore it is not of 
the definition of scandal that it is something not 
quite right. 
I answer that scandal is a Greek word and 
in Latin it means "a dashing against;" which is 
properly said indeed in corporeal matters, but 
by extension in spiritual ones. Wherefore it is 
fitting that spiritual scandal, which we are 
discussing, is taken for a likeness to corporeal 
impact; which indeed does not happen unless 
something is thrown into the path of someone 
walking that may be the occasion of his falling, 
even if he doesn't actually fall. But nothing 
done by another is bound to make someone fall 
if he is walking in the way of God, unless it is 
something not quite right, either in word or in 
deed, that comes into his notice. And therefore, 
saying or doing something not quite right is 
what becomes impact spiritually, and the 
occasion of ruin is given to another, in which 
the notion of scandal consists. 
1. Just as in a corporeal impact there are 
two things to consider--namely, the impact 
itself on the one falling or on the one who is 
disposed to the cause; and the thing with which 
the impact happens, which is called a 
stumbling-block; so it is also in spiritual 
matters. And both of these receive the name 
scandal, but not univocally, just as faith is also 
said of the very thing believed, and the act of 
believing. Therefore the spiritual impact by 
which someone is disposed to fall, is called 
passive scandal. But the spiritual stumbling-
block from which the impact comes is called 
active scandal. And this is the way scandal is 
defined here, for by saying or doing something 
not quite right, someone is disposed to ruin. 
2. Sometimes someone commits a certain 
sin, speaking per se, when he acts intentionally, 
and not when without his intention a sin 
happens, as is clear in accidental homicide; and 
therefore someone commits scandal properly 
speaking when he intends to bring about the 
ruin of his neighbor. But whoever is led into 
sinning, is deceived: for every wicked man is 
ignorant, as the Philosopher says in Book 3 of 
the Ethics. And therefore wherever there is 
scandal, speaking per se, saying or doing 
something not quite right is a certain deception, 
which is put before someone walking, for his 
ruin. Or it may be said that it is called 
deception inasmuch as it is the occasion or the 
cause of deception: for everyone sinning is 
deceived, as was said. 
3. A spiritual stumbling block, which is 
called scandal, must be thrown into the path of 
the one walking; that happens until it comes to 
his notice. However, the sin of the heart cannot 
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come to the notice of another unless by some 
sign, which is reducible to a sin of mouth or of 
deed; and thus in the definition of scandal is 
included only saying or doing something not 
quite right, and no mention is made of the sin 
of the heart. 
4. Occasion does not always mean cause, 
but whenever cause is insufficient in itself; and 
in this way the foregoing should be taken in the 
definition. For a sin cannot have any sufficient 
cause from outside in what is voluntary; but it 
can have some inducing cause: indeed 
whenever this cause is per se bound to incline 
to sin either by its own genus or by the 
intention of someone proposing it in order to 
induce someone to sin; and then it is said to 
give the occasion of ruin. But when someone is 
inclined to sin by something incidental, which 
in itself is not bound to incline to it, as also 
happens in corporeal things that someone 
stumbles on a flat road, and falls; then that 
person is said to have taken up an occasion of 
ruin, though no occasion was given to him 
from outside. But such a cause of ruin cannot 
be named scandal; for although the names of a 
cause are allotted by its essential effects, they 
are never customarily named from the things 
that result accidentally. 
5. Christ is not said to be a stumbling 
block as though the essential cause of scandal, 
for he himself did not give anyone the occasion 
of scandal; but he is said to be a stumbling 
block of scandal such that the proposition 
conveys not the order of cause but of 
consequence; for from the things that Christ 
did, the scandalizing of the Jews resulted. 
Article 2 
Whether scandal is always a sin 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that scandal is not always a sin. 
For nothing necessary is a sin. But it is 
necessary that scandals come, as it says in 
Matt. 18: 7. Therefore, scandal is not a sin. 
2. Furthermore, every sin is from the 
incitement of the Devil, not from the affection 
of piety. But in Matt. 16 where it is said to 
Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan; you are a 
scandal for me, the Gloss says: The error of the 
apostle comes rather from the emotion of piety 
than from the incitement of the Devil. 
Therefore, not every scandal is a sin. 
3. Furthermore, Jerome says: Being 
scandalized is not so distant in vice from 
scandalizing. But passive scandal, it seems, can 
be without sin, just as also a corporeal impact 
sometimes happens without a fall. Therefore, 
also active scandal can be without sin. 
But to the contrary, everything said or 
done not quite right is a sin. But scandal is that 
kind of thing. Therefore, etc. 
Furthermore, it is said in the Gloss on 
Numbers 31: it is a far more serious sin to give 
the cause of sin, than to sin. But whoever 
scandalizes, gives the cause of sinning. 
Therefore he sins. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Moreover. It seems that it is not a 
special sin. For according to the Philosopher in 
Book 5 of the Ethics, every special act of 
injustice is sometimes found separate from all 
other acts of injustice. But scandal is not found 
separate from other sins, for it is always 
something said or done not quite right. 
Therefore it is not a special sin. 
2. Furthermore, saying or doing something 
not quite right that offers an occasion of ruin 
can happen according to any kind of sin 
whatsoever. But that is the definition of 
scandal. Therefore, scandal is no particular sin. 
3. Furthermore, whoever sins in the 
presence of another, gives scandal. But to sin in 
the presence of another does not add any 
specific difference above sinning simply 
speaking, but rather it adds a certain 
circumstance, just like sinning in secret. 
Therefore, scandal is not a special sin. 
4. Furthermore, the one acting is 
proportionate to the one acted upon. But 
passive scandal is not a special sin: for 
whenever someone falls into sin by the 
example of another, he is said to suffer scandal. 
Therefore neither is active scandal a special sin. 
But to the contrary, sinning in itself has to 
do with God, and with one's neighbor. But 
scandal is sinning against one's neighbor. 
Therefore it is a special kind of sin. 
Furthermore, something is called evil 
because it harms, according to Augustine. But 
scandal has a special ratio of harming. 
Therefore it is a special sin. 
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Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Moreover. It seems that scandal is 
always a mortal sin. For the Gloss on Matthew 
18, woe to the world because of scandals! says: 
overflowing eternal damnation threatens 
because of scandal. But eternal damnation is 
not due except because of mortal sin. Therefore 
scandal is always a mortal sin. 
2. Furthermore, spiritual life is more noble 
than bodily life. But someone who takes away 
the bodily life of another, sins mortally. 
Therefore also someone who scandalizes, since 
he takes away the spiritual life, by leading 
another to his ruin. 
But to the contrary, scandal is saying or 
doing something not quite right which presents 
an occasion of ruin to another. But even venial 
sin is sometimes this kind of thing. Therefore, 
sometimes scandal is a venial sin. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer that scandal is twofold, namely 
active and passive, as is clear from what has 
been said. Passive scandal is always a sin; for 
that man suffers scandal who either is thrown 
off the way of God, or at least is hindered on 
the way, which cannot happen without mortal 
or venial sin. Also active scandal is always a 
sin, for active scandal is always something that 
in itself is bound to lead another to sin; and 
such a thing always contains some disordering 
either by the genus of the act, or at least from 
the circumstances of the person, place, or time; 
and thus it is always a sin. But sometimes 
active scandal can exist without anyone falling 
into sin--when, for example, someone of 
himself gives the occasion of ruin, but the other 
is not ruined. Also sometimes conversely there 
is passive scandal without the sin of the one 
scandalizing, as when someone takes to himself 
the occasion of ruin from something that is not 
done inordinately by another. 
1. Necessity is twofold. One necessity is 
absolute: either something is necessary in itself, 
like it is necessary for God to exist; or by the 
force of some external cause, like something 
violent is called necessary, and in this way it is 
not necessary that scandals happen. The other 
is conditional necessity, which is not opposed 
to the voluntary; and in this way it is necessary 
for scandals to come by conditional necessity 
for three reasons. First, by divine 
foreknowledge and predestination itself, as we 
say, "It is necessary for this to be, if God 
foresaw it." And such necessity is not opposed 
to the freedom of the will; wherefore 
Chrysostom says about that text, Although it is 
said, necessary, it does not destroy the 
spontaneity of the power, nor the freedom of 
choosing. His prediction does not therefore 
introduce scandals, nor does this happen 
because he predicted it; but since it was to be, 
for this reason he predicted it. Second, by the 
inclination of the fomes, as also we say that 
sinning venially is necessary, although it may 
be possible to avoid a certain particular venial 
sin. Third, by consequent usefulness, which 
God draws out of scandals, as all useful things 
are called necessary. 
2. According to that Gloss it seems that 
Peter did not sin in wanting to prevent the 
passion of Christ: for it was possible for the 
passion of Christ to please rightly and to 
displease according to different aspects; and 
there scandal is taken broadly for whatever 
impediment is presented to someone on any 
path that he intends to follow. 
3. Speaking per se, active scandal is a 
greater sin than passive, for in any genus, a 
cause is more powerful than its effect. 
Nevertheless, sometimes the passive thing can 
be greater than the active, when someone takes 
more occasion for ruin than is given to him; 
just as also sometimes there is passive sin 
without the sin of an agent. But what Jerome 
says is to be understood as to the genus of sin, 
and not as to the quantity of culpability. And 
yet the other proposition is false, that passive 
scandal is not a sin: for that spiritual impact 
itself is a certain sin, inasmuch as it is a certain 
hindering from the way of God; and although it 
may be called passive scandal, nevertheless it is 
not passive in every way, but somewhat active. 
For a sufficient cause for sinning cannot be 
given to another from outside, as though 
forcing him to sin; the one who is scandalized 
cooperates with the one acting, and thus he 
sins. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
A given act is determined to a species of 
morals in two ways. In one way, on the part of 
the object, like fornication from the fact that it 
is about pleasures of touch; and this 
determination is material, and regards the habit 
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eliciting the act. In another way, on the part of 
the end; and this is the formal specification, 
and regards the commanding habit. However, 
sometimes it happens that an act is determined 
to the same species on both counts, like when 
some act is commanded and elicited by the 
same habit, as when someone fornicates for the 
sake of pleasure. Sometimes though it is 
determined by either part but to diverse species, 
as when an act is elicited by one habit, and 
commanded by another, like when someone 
fornicates for the sake of money; for that is 
determined to a species of lust by its object, but 
to a species of avarice by its end. Nevertheless, 
there are not two sins there, but one two-sided 
sin, since it is one act. Sometimes it even 
happens that some act is not determined to a 
certain species on the part of the object, but on 
the part of the end, by the fact that it is 
commanded by a particular habit, but not 
elicited by one; like edifying one's neighbor, 
which act charity does not elicit, for it only 
elicits interior acts, and edification does not 
happen by those; but it commands it, and it is 
materially elicited by the other virtues, not 
determinately by any particular one, but by all, 
for charity can command all the others. And 
since active scandal is the sin opposed to the 
edification of one's neighbors, thus materially 
speaking, on the part of the matter and the 
habits eliciting, it is not a special sin; but only 
speaking formally, on the part of the end and 
habit commanding, which is the habit opposed 
to charity, that is, the vice of hatred. And 
therefore when someone says or does 
something not quite right intending to present 
an occasion of ruin to his neighbor, he commits 
a special sin of scandal. But if it happens 
outside his own intention, active scandal will 
not be a special sin; nevertheless, it will 
amount to certain circumstances of the sin, by 
the fact that, just as any act of virtue has an 
order to the end of charity, even if an act is not 
ordered to that end, it also has an aptitude to be 
commanded by charity; in the same way any 
sin, considered in itself, has an order to the 
contrary end, even if that end is not intended by 
the one acting. 
1. The sin of active scandal is found 
sometimes separate from every other species of 
sin, because it consists in an external act; as 
when an external act is not a sin in itself, unless 
inasmuch as it has a certain likeness to a sin, it 
is bound to give the occasion of ruin if it is 
done publicly, like eating the food of idols: and 
for this reason it does not also say in the 
definition of scandal, saying or doing 
something evil, but rather not quite right. And 
thus it is clear that the objection proceeds from 
false premises. 
2. That argument arises from the side of 
the habits eliciting, not the habit commanding. 
3. This circumstance "in the presence of 
another" does not add to a sin a new species by 
its own nature, but by the end to which it is 
ordered by such a circumstance. Wherefore 
also to sin in secret does not remove the sin 
from one species since by this it does not 
receive an order to another end. 
4. The one who is scandalized both acts 
and is acted upon; but his action does not 
pertain to the genus of scandal, but to whatever 
other genus; only his suffering scandal pertains 
to the genus of scandal. And since no one sins 
in what he suffers, but only in what he does, for 
this reason passive scandal is not counted as a 
special sin, like active scandal, which belongs 
to the genus of scandal by the action itself. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
Scandal is twofold, as was said: active and 
passive. And either of these is sometimes a 
venial, sometimes a mortal sin. Indeed, passive 
scandal is a mortal sin when someone tumbles 
into mortal sin by the sin of another, whether 
the deed of the one acting is good, or 
indifferent, or an evil deed of mortal or venial 
sin. But it is a venial sin when, no matter how, 
someone is not ruined by the deed of another, 
but is disposed to ruin; as whoever is struck is 
disposed to fall, even if he does not fall. For 
which reason the interlineal Gloss on Romans 
14 says, scandal is the name for afflicting. But 
active scandal can be taken two ways. In one 
way, formally: namely, when it is a special sin, 
by the fact that someone intends to scandalize 
another; and in this way if he intends to lead his 
neighbor into mortal sin, he sins mortally; but 
if he intends to lead him into something venial, 
he sins venially, as pertains to the ratio of 
scandal. For if he intended to lead someone 
into venial sin by an act of mortal sin, he would 
sin mortally; but this would be incidental to the 
scandal. In another way, materially: when it is a 
circumstance of the sin, since he did not intend 
to hurt his neighbor; and then the judgment is 
the same of the scandal and of the act that 
scandalizes another--it is sometimes venial, 
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sometimes a mortal sin. Unless perhaps it were 
venial or indifferent but having the likeness of 
a mortal sin, for then the active scandal would 
be a mortal sin since by some concurrent 
circumstances it could be probably guessed that 
the weak ones watching would sin mortally. 
1. The Lord speaks of active scandal, 
which is a mortal sin. 
2. The one who gives scandal does not 
always take away spiritual life, for sometimes 
his deed does not necessarily lead anyone into 
mortal sin, even if someone should tumble into 
mortal sin from it by his own fault. And 
furthermore whoever takes away bodily life 
gives sufficient cause of natural death; but 
someone who gives scandal does not give 
sufficient cause for spiritual death, as was said. 
Article 3 
Whether passive scandal is only of "little ones" 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that passive scandal is not only 
of "little ones." For Christ was not little, but 
most perfect. But Christ suffered scandal by 
Peter, as he said, you are a stumbling-block to 
me (Matt. 16:23). Therefore, etc. 
2. Furthermore, no one can love unless he 
loves someone. But no one can give scandal, 
unless he scandalizes someone. But the one 
who sins in the presence of perfect men, cannot 
scandalize anyone but those watching. 
Therefore, the perfect would be scandalized, 
and not only little ones. 
3. Furthermore, even the perfect 
sometimes sin venially. But sometimes a venial 
sin is a scandal. Therefore also the perfect are 
scandalized. 
But against this is that the Lord in 
Matthew 18, where he speaks of scandal, does 
not make mention of any scandal but the 
scandal of little ones. Therefore, they alone are 
scandalized. 
Furthermore, the Apostle says of those 
scandalized, that their conscience, since it is 
weak, is defiled (I Cor. 8). But the perfect do 
not have a weak conscience. Therefore, etc. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Moreover. It seems that active scandal 
also applies to the perfect. For Christ was the 
most perfect. But he himself gave scandal, for 
he was set forth for the ruin of many, as is said 
in Luke 2, and the Pharisees having heard his 
word were scandalized, as it says in Matt. 15. 
Therefore active scandal applies to the perfect. 
2. Furthermore, Peter was perfect after he 
was confirmed by the Holy Spirit. But he gave 
scandal, for by his own act he compelled the 
gentiles to become Jews. Therefore, etc. 
But to the contrary, the same thing doesn't 
set an example of good and give scandal. But 
the perfect do the first, as is clear from 
Matthew 5:16: so let your light shine before 
men that they may see your good works. 
Therefore, they don't give scandal. 
Questiuncula 3 
1. Moreover. It seems that only the perfect 
can give scandal. For contrary things must 
correspond to contraries. But passive scandal is 
divided against active. Since, therefore, passive 
scandal only applies to "little ones," active 
scandal can apply only to the perfect. 
2. Furthermore, only the man who 
provokes another to sin by his example 
scandalizes. But this only occurs with those 
whose life is set forth as an example to others--
namely, prelates and religious. Therefore, 
active scandal only has to do with them. 
But to the contrary, Peter before the 
Passion was not yet in the state of perfection; 
for they were not yet confirmed from heaven 
(that is, the apostles) by the Word of God and 
the Spirit of his mouth. But he, as he was, gave 
scandal, for it is said to him: You are a 
stumbling-block for me (Matt. 16: 23). 
Therefore active scandal does not only have to 
do with the perfect. 
Questiuncula 1 
I answer that someone suffers passive 
scandal in two ways. In one way, by his own 
choice, as when someone seeing another sin, 
chooses to follow him in sinning; and in this 
way passive scandal does not belong to the 
perfect, for they follow the example of Christ 
principally, and the precepts of God, and the 
good of reason. Wherefore, they follow no 
one's example contrary to these things. In 
another way, without choice, as when, by the 
deed of another, some emotion of 
concupiscence comes into being in someone, or 
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even of sadness, or anger, or something like 
that. And in this way passive scandal can affect 
the perfect whoever they may be according to 
their state of life. But since choice is the 
principal thing in a moral act, as the 
Philosopher says, it is commonly said that 
passive scandal doesn't happen to the perfect. 
1. Christ said to Peter: you are a 
stumbling-block to me, not because he had been 
scandalized by his deed, but because Peter, as 
he was, gave scandal to him in some way. 
2. Speaking grammatically, every active 
corresponds to a passive, for the grammarian 
does not consider the substance of the action, 
but its mode of signifying. However, every 
active verb signifies an action that crosses over 
into something else. But considering the 
substance of the action, sometimes the action 
goes out from the agent, and does not extend to 
a 'patient'--because it has the ability to receive 
the effect of the agent or not to receive it, or 
because of some impediment interfering. 
Therefore, speaking in reality, the active does 
not correspond to a passive in all actions that 
are terminated in something outside the agent, 
like it is with striking, killing, scandalizing, and 
suchlike things. But to love and to know are 
interior acts of the soul, which do not go out to 
an outside reality except as it exists somehow 
within the agent himself; and thus in such 
things, even speaking of realities, the active 
does always correspond to a passive. 
3. Although a perfect man sometimes may 
commit some venial sin even by choice, or 
deliberately; nevertheless, he does not choose 
to follow someone into even venial sin, for that 
is an extremely light reason for sinning. But 
sometimes moved by another cause, he 
commits a venial sin. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
Active scandal is sometimes venial, 
sometimes a mortal sin, as is clear from what 
has been said. Therefore, according as it is a 
mortal sin, it does not apply to the perfect in 
any way, just as neither does sinning mortally. 
But according as it is a venial sin, it does 
sometimes also affect the perfect, just as venial 
sin does too, inasmuch as some weakness does 
remain in them. 
1. Since some people took the occasion of 
ruin from the deeds or sayings of Christ, he is 
said to be for their ruin and scandal; not 
because he gave any even slight occasion of 
ruin; wherefore we do not read that Christ 
scandalized others, but that some people were 
scandalized by his deeds and words. 
2. According to Augustine, in the truth of 
the matter Peter was to be blamed for that deed, 
not because he acted wickedly, but unwisely; 
and thus according to that it is not unfitting to 
say that he sinned venially in scandalizing. But 
somehow Jerome excuses Peter even from 
venial sin, as was said above (Dist. 1, Question 
1, article 1, qc. 3). 
Questiuncula 3 
Even the imperfect can give others an 
occasion of ruin by their words or deeds, either 
indirectly by setting an example, or directly 
inciting to evil by persuading words or 
disturbing deeds; and thus there is no doubt that 
anyone imperfect can scandalize. 
1. In perfect men there is some disposition 
preventing passive scandal in themselves; but 
in imperfect men there is nothing to prevent 
active scandal. And therefore the argument 
does not follow. 
2. Active scandal does not consist in the 
fact alone that someone provokes another to sin 
by his own example, but in the fact that he 
gives the occasion of ruin to another in any 
way. But it is evident that any imperfect person 
can give the occasion of ruin to another either 
by persuading words or by provoking him to 
impatience for unjust persecutions. And thus 
there is no doubt that an imperfect man can 
scandalize. But it is also false, what is said, that 
an imperfect man does not scandalize by the 
mode of example: for God has committed to 
each man the care of his neighbor, as is clear 
from Sirach 17:12; and thus anyone is bound to 
edify his neighbor by his example. Also it is 
known by experience, that many are enticed to 
sin by the example of those who are not in the 
state of perfection: for not only the examples of 
the great, but even those of one's equals and 
lessers, can move one. 
Whether the truth should be set aside on account of 
scandal 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that truth should be set aside 
on account of scandal. In the parable of the 
weeds, the Gloss of Augustine says: when a 
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multitude is at stake, or their leader, strictness 
must be lessened. But not except because of 
scandal. Therefore the truth of justice is to be 
set aside because of scandal. 
2. Furthermore, the avoidance of any sin 
whatsoever pertains to the truth of life. But a 
man can commit a venial sin to avoid 
scandalizing his neighbor, for he should rather 
watch out for the eternal damnation of his 
neighbor, which he will suffer for the mortal 
sin in which he was scandalized, than his own 
temporal loss, which he will suffer for his 
venial sin. Therefore the truth of life is to be set 
aside because of scandal. 
3. Furthermore, sometimes preaching is 
taken away because of general scandal. But 
preaching pertains to the truth of doctrine. 
Therefore, also the truth of doctrine should be 
set aside for the sake of scandal. 
But to the contrary is what Gregory says, 
if scandal is taken about the truth, it is more 
useful to allow scandal to arise than to 
abandon truth. Therefore truth should not be 
set aside because of scandal. 
Furthermore, man should not sin in order 
to avert the sin of his neighbor. But the man 
who forgoes truth, sins. Therefore, someone 
should not forgo truth because of the scandal of 
another. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Moreover. It seems that the counsels 
should be set aside because of scandal. For the 
rule of Jerome is that everything that can be 
held or not held, save the Threefold Truth, is to 
be set aside because of scandal. But the 
counsels are among these. Therefore they are to 
be set aside because of scandal. 
2. Furthermore, the vow of religious life is 
a certain counsel. But Man can forgo his 
entrance into religious life because of the 
scandal of his parents, lest due honor be taken 
away from them: for the precept is honor your 
parents (Exodus 20). Therefore, counsels 
should be set aside because of scandal. 
3. Furthermore, the works of mercy are 
sometimes set aside because of scandal, lest 
they are believed to be done from an intention 
of vain praise. But the works of mercy are in 
counsel and in precept: nor are they to be set 
aside according as they are in the precept, for 
there they pertain to the truth of life. Therefore, 
they are to be set aside because of scandal 
according as they are in counsel. 
But to the the contrary, scandal is doing or 
saying something not quite right. But a counsel 
does not have to do with not quite right things, 
but with greater goods. Therefore, the 
observation of the counsels is not to be set 
aside because of scandal. 
Furthermore, Jerome says to Heliodorus: 
let your little grandson hang on your neck, let 
your mother show her breast with hair 
disheveled and garments rent, let your father 
lie across the threshhold: step over him and go 
ahead, rush forth with dry eyes to the banner of 
the cross. To be cruel is the only kind of piety 
there is in this matter. But he is speaking about 
taking up religious life. Therefore, the counsels 
are not to be set aside even for the sake of 
scandal to one's relatives, and so much less for 
the scandal of others. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Moreover. It seems that temporal things 
are to be set aside for the sake of scandal. For 
temporal things were owed to the Apostle, who 
was sowing spiritual things. But the Apostle 
did not make use of this power, lest he might 
give a cause of offense to the Gospel of Christ, 
as is clear from 1 Cor. 9. Therefore, also we 
should reject temporal things for the sake of 
avoiding scandal. 
2. Furthermore, someone is bound to give 
his own property to someone in dire need in 
order to avert his temporal death. But we 
should do more to avert the spiritual death of 
our neighbor than his spiritual death. Therefore, 
should rather abandon temporal goods than 
abandon him to fall into spiritual death by 
scandal. 
3. Furthermore, among all temporal goods 
food is the most necessary thing for the body. 
But food is to be set aside because of scandal, 
for it says in I Cor. 13:13384: if food scandalizes 
my brother, I will never eat meat. Therefore 
much more firmly are other temporal things to 
be set aside because of scandal. 
4. Furthermore, the Apostle says in I 
Corinthians 6:7 : already there is a fault among 
you that you have lawsuits one with another. 
Why do you not rather accept injury? But he 
does not say this except because of the scandal 
                                                 
384384 Actually I Cor 8:13. 
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that was resulting from it. Therefore because of 
scandal man should forgo temporal things, and 
should not claim them in a lawsuit. 
5. The tithes attached to temporal things 
are counted among spiritual things. But the 
Church does not require tithes if it might avoid 
a scandal. Therefore, much more should other 
temporal things be set aside because of scandal. 
6. In the order of charity we should set the 
spiritual good of our neighbor ahead of our 
own temporal good, just as we should prefer 
his soul to our own body. Therefore, we should 
forgo our temporal goods rather than let our 
neighbors suffer loss in spiritual things by 
scandal. 
7. Furthermore, a man can forgo temporal 
things or not, except for the Threefold Truth. 
Therefore, according to Jerome, temporal 
things should be abandoned because of scandal. 
But to the contrary, Blessed Thomas of 
Canterbury demanded back the Church's goods 
to the scandal of the king. Therefore it is also 
permitted to us to seek our temporal goods 
amid the scandal of others. 
Furthermore, no one should reap 
advantage from his own sin. But this would 
happen if the belongings of another were to be 
abandoned to someone who possessed them 
and who has fallen into scandal. Therefore, 
temporal things are not to be abandoned to 
someone possessing them unjustly for the sake 
of averting his scandal. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
Active scandal is never without the sin of 
the one doing it, as is clear from what has been 
said. But for no reason should someone be 
given an inclination to sin; wherefore he should 
overlook all things rather than commit active 
scandal, nor ever for the sake of avoiding 
active scandal can truth be set aside: for 
whoever follows the truth does not actively 
scandalize since active scandal is doing or 
saying something not quite right. Wherefore 
when it is asked whether truth should be set 
aside for the sake of scandal, the question is not 
to be understood as concerning active scandal, 
but passive, because sometimes, without sin, 
someone does something from which the 
occasion of scandal is taken, though it is never 
without scandal for him who is scandalized, as 
is clear from what has been said. And so since 
it is asked what should be set aside because of 
passive scandal, nothing else is to be sought 
than what man should set aside lest someone 
else should sin. But since, by the order of 
charity man is bound to love himself more than 
his neighbor in spiritual goods, in no way 
should someone sin so as to avert the sin of 
another. But anyone who abandons truth, sins. 
However the truth of which we are speaking 
consists in the fact that man conforms himself 
in his sayings and deeds to the rectitude of the 
divine rule or law, to which indeed man should 
be conformed both in those things that pertain 
to knowledge and what pertains to the truth of 
doctrine. And in those things that regard action, 
either someone should do them for their own 
sake, which pertains to the truth of life, or he 
should promulgate to others the things to be 
observed, which belongs to the truth of justice 
that consists in rectitude of judgment. But 
whoever does not set aside something when by 
doing so he can conform himself to divine law, 
is said to set aside the truth, for the truth can 
still remain with that thing removed. But 
someone who forgoes or does something is said 
to set aside the truth when, once it has been 
omitted or done, truth does not remain, which 
this cannot be without sin. And thus in no way 
is truth to be set aside because of passive 
scandal. 
1. The act of justice is to render to each 
one what is his. But rendering to each one what 
is his is in two ways. In one way when what is 
given to him is directly useful to him, like 
money or something like that, which cannot be 
denied to someone without sin. For which 
reason no matter how much scandal should 
follow, the judge must act so that his right is 
rendered to him. In another way when the work 
of justice, which is rendered to the asking of 
another, does not yield directly to the good of 
the one asking, but rather to the good of the 
state, as is clear in the imposition of fines, by 
which peace in the state is preserved through 
the repression of malefactors. For which reason 
if the judge who bears the care of the state sees 
that greater detriment to the state will come 
forth from the infliction of a penalty, he can 
either forgo the penalty or mitigate it. Nor does 
he do injury to anyone by this; for he bears the 
person of the state and he also must do this 
because he is bound by his office to provide for 
the public welfare. But this happens especially 
when a prince or some multitude is in the case, 
or someone of whose punishment it is feared a 
schism will follow, and then Augustine says 
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that with a multitude of sinners, warning is 
better than threatening; but severity should be 
exercised in the sin of the few. But this is to be 
understood when a greater danger is not feared 
in the dissembling of the sin of the prince or 
even of the multitude than would occur from 
their punishment. For which reason, if by the 
impunity of the leader or of the multitude, faith 
and the truth of doctrine and good morals are 
corrupted, neither the leader nor the multitude 
should be spared; for it happens particularly 
when the ones sinning strive to defend their sin 
by their authority or power. Wherefore Isidore 
says, those who neither are reformed from their 
vice of corruption, and even attempt to 
vindicate that very crime that they commit by a 
certain unreasoning authority, may receive 
neither the degree of honor nor the grace of 
communion. 
2. The man who commits some venial sin 
so that another does not sin mortally, is not 
bound to, nor does he do well by committing 
this. For in the first place we do not tend to 
avoid sin by our own loss, for this would be to 
stop sinning from fear of punishment; but we 
are inclined to avoid sin lest we should offend 
God, who is also offended by venial sin, 
although not as greatly as by mortal sin. But no 
one should offend God a little so that another 
will not offend him a lot; for man should love 
God infinitely more than his neighbor; and thus 
no one should do a venial sin to avoid scandal, 
provided that his own act done for this reason 
remains a venial sin. For there is an opposition 
in what is suggested, if it were said that 
someone ought to sin or does well by sinning. 
Nevertheless, it can make an act done for this 
reason not to be a venial sin, which otherwise 
would be venial, such as saying an idle word; 
for now it would not be idle, since it would not 
lack a reason of pious usefulness. 
3. In doctrine there are two things to 
consider: namely, the act of the one teaching, 
and the thing that is taught. But the act of the 
one teaching pertains to the truth of life, just as 
also any other act of mercy; for doctrine is 
spiritual alms, as was said above (Dist. 15, qu. 
2, art. 3, qc. 2, c). Wherefore, the judgment is 
the same about it as about the other acts of 
mercy, of which we will speak later, because 
sometimes because of scandal they can be 
deferred. But the thing itself that is taught, is 
what pertains to the truth of doctrine. Nor is the 
truth of doctrine passed over when some true 
thing goes unsaid, but when damage is produce 
to the truth of that thing either by a contrary 
teaching, or by other people keeping silent; and 
then for the sake of no scandal should the truth 
of doctrine be abandoned. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
All works of perfection which are not 
commanded by a precept are called counsels; 
wherefore they can be passed over except for 
the Threefold Truth. But sometimes they fall 
under a precept, either because of a vow, or by 
some other circumstance. And then they cannot 
be set aside without damage to the truth of life. 
And so we are not speaking about these things 
now, but only when it remains in our power to 
do them or not. Therefore, speaking in this 
way, we must distinguish what is passive 
scandal; for sometimes it arises from the malice 
of people who hate the truth, who are troubled 
and trouble others because of the works of 
light, like sons of darkness. And this is the 
scandal of the Pharisees, as Bernard says; and 
in no way are the counsels to be set aside for 
the sake of this passive scandal, for then the 
wicken would be given a chance to impede the 
works of perfection whenever they wanted. For 
which reason in Matthew 15:14 the Lord told 
the Pharisees, who were being scandalized by 
his deeds and sayings, leave them alone; they 
are blind and leaders of the blind. But 
sometimes it arises out of ignorance or 
weakness, and this is called, according to 
Bernard, the scandal of the little ones who do 
not know the truth, and because of this they are 
disturbed by the works of truth; and the Lord 
cautions about this scandal in Matthew 17:26, 
where he says to Peter: but that we may not 
scandalize them, go to the sea, etc., and he 
taught them to take precautions in Matthew 18. 
For which reason, because of this kind of 
passive scandal counsels are to be suspended 
for a time or done in secret, but not to be set 
aside entirely; for a man should provide for 
himself more than his neighbor in spiritual 
matters; and ignorance if it lasts a long time, 
changes into malice through obstinacy. Still, 
the quantity of scandal should be attended to, 
and the quantity of good that occurs by keeping 
the counsel; and according to this at some times 
counsels are to be overlooked because of the 
scandal of little ones, at other times one should 
be heedless of scandal for the sake of the 
counsels. 
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1. The truth of life includes not only those 
things that are of necessity for salvation, but 
also those that are of the perfection of 
salvation; wherefore, although in some way the 
truth of life can be saved even with counsels 
omitted, nevertheless the perfection of the truth 
of life cannot; wherefore the word of Jerome is 
to be referred to indifference by its own genus 
rather than to counsels. 
2. In someone who wishes to enter 
religious life, something must be distinguished. 
For either he fears an imminent threat his own 
salvation if he remains in the world, and then 
he should counteract the danger to his life by 
every means, regardless of scandal. But if, on 
the other hand, the danger was not threatening, 
and he is not obliged by a vow, he should in 
order to avoid the just scandal of his parents--
whom he is bound to take care of--suspend his 
plan of perfection for a time, so that he might 
fulfill the precept of honoring his parents at its 
own time, and afterward fulfill the counsel at a 
more suitable time. But if the scandal of 
relatives or of others is unreasonable, then it 
constitutes the scandal of the Pharisees; and 
then he should not put off his good intention 
because of scandal. But if he were obligated by 
a vow, then the doing of the counsel is 
commanded; and therefore in no way should it 
be set aside because of scandal, for this would 
be to do injury to the truth of life. 
3. The works of mercy, be they spiritual 
alms or corporal works of mercy, like the 
counsels too, should be suspended for a time 
because of the scandal of little ones; except in 
that case where they fall under a precept, for 
then they cannot be omitted save for the truth 
of life. 
4. That definition is given about active 
scandal; but even leaving that aside, even for 
the sake of passive scandal now and then a 
good work is to be set aside, or even 
suspended. 
5. Jerome is speaking of the unreasonable 
scandal of relatives. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To cast off temporal things or to set them 
aside happens in two ways. In one way when 
someone gives what he has in his own 
possession; in another way when he does not 
seek the things that are owed to him; and of 
these two things the judgment is pretty much 
the same. For one must know that sometimes 
someone who doesn't give his own belongings 
to another scandalizes actively, either because 
he is bound to give them, or because he refuses 
in a wicked manner; and in this situation no 
one is allowed to keep what he possesses amid 
active scandal. But sometimes passive scandal 
follows from the fact that someone does not 
give his temporal belongings; and in this 
situation a distinction must be made. For 
sometimes he cannot give without sin, for 
either he knows that the one to whom he gives 
would put the things to evil use; or because he 
cannot give temporal things to one person 
without prejudice to another, like if those who 
have care of the community gave by some 
means or another, the subtraction of which 
made the condition of that community worse. 
And in that case one should not give temporal 
belongings, in order to avoid scandal, for this 
would be to act against the truth of justice or of 
life. But sometimes one can give without sin; 
and then it is to be distinguished in passive 
scandal. For sometimes it proceeds from 
malice, and then a man is not bound to give his 
own belongings to someone maliciously 
asking; otherwise the chance to use his own 
things would not remain, and then the common 
good would perish. Nevertheless, he can give 
them as though by a counsel, not by a precept; 
unless perhaps it were believed that by that 
giving he made himself worse; for example, if 
he were incited by this to seek other things 
wickedly, and to harrass others by these kinds 
of requests; for then he would sin by giving. 
But sometimes passive scandal proceeds from 
ignorance; and then he can give as if by the 
counsel, but he is not bound to as though by a 
precept; for he can drive away the one asking 
by instructing him; and sometimes this benefits 
him more, for example when such ignorance 
verges on injuring the truth of doctrine, than if 
temporal things were given to him. For by this 
the man would be maintained in his error, as is 
clear from those heretics who say that everyone 
should give his own goods to the poor who ask, 
even outside the case of extreme necessity. It 
should also be said likewise about pursuing 
one's own things, for no one should commit 
active scandal by demanding back his own 
temporal goods, nor by seeking things that are 
not owed him, nor by pursuing them 
inordinately in a lawsuit, or outside of court. 
But as to relinquishing a just claim for temporal 
goods, a distinction must be made. For 
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sometimes one cannot licitly relinquish a claim 
without injury to another, as when someone has 
care of another's goods, whether of the 
community, or of some private person; and 
then he would sin by dropping his suit, unless 
by the consent of whoever he is responsible to, 
or unless he feared a greater danger than the 
loss of that person's goods. But sometimes, he 
can forgo his suit without injury to another, and 
in that case if passive scandal were to proceed 
from malice, he is not bound to abandon his 
claim on his own things for the sake of such 
scandal; otherwise an opportunity would be 
given to banditry, and it would destroy the 
good of justice. But he can licitly forgo his suit 
to avoid such scandal, unless by giving it up the 
one keeping his things unjustly is believed to 
become worse, or to go uncorrected in any way 
for such a sin. Wherefore, Gregory says in 
Book 31 of Morals, chapter 8: those who carry 
off only temporal goods, are to be tolerated, 
but but they are to be prevented while 
preserving charity, though not only from 
concern that they take away our things, but lest 
while plundering what is not theirs, they should 
lose their very selves. But if passive scandal 
proceeds from weakness or ignorance, one 
should defer his claim on his own goods, or 
introduce it so that he may not be scandalized. 
Because if he is scandalized by this, he will be 
made malicious by his obstinacy; and therefore 
the judgment is the same of this kind of scandal 
as of that which arises from malice. 
Nevertheless, certain people say that it is 
permitted to the imperfect to claim their own 
things in spite of scandal, but not to the perfect. 
But this is nothing; for if they speak of the 
perfect as being those in the state of perfection, 
then the same judgment is made of them as of 
others, unless to the extent that they are obliged 
by a vow to have no personal property; 
wherefore a monk can claim in court temporal 
things in the name of his chapter by the same 
right as a secular in his own name. But if they 
are speaking of the perfect according to the 
state of charity, then that perfection of charity 
will lead them to keep the counsels, not 
because they are bound to do it; nor would they 
sin if they didn't do it; but in that some damage 
might be done to their perfection, and in this 
way should be understood that Gloss on I Cor. 
6: why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be 
defrauded? It is permitted to the perfect to 
claim their own things simply, that is, without a 
lawsuit, without quarreling, without a trial, but 
it does not befit them to argue their suit before 
a judge. For this cannot be understood of the 
perfect according to state, like religious, since 
such as these do not have private property; 
wherefore it means nothing to say that they 
could claim their own things simply. But those 
things that are held in common, either belong 
to the chapter or to the poor; wherefore they 
could claim them in the lawcourts for in that 
case they are responsible for someone else's 
belongings. Therefore what is said in the Gloss 
is to be understood according to the levels of 
charity; for although they may not sin by 
seeking their own things in the lawcourt, 
nevertheless, it detracts from their perfection; 
wherefore the Gloss does not say that it is not 
permitted to such as these, but that it does not 
befit them. Know, though, that it is permitted 
also to the perfect in that manner to claim their 
own things and to contend in court, even 
without detriment to their perfection, in five 
instances. The first is when a question arises 
about a spiritual matter; wherefore in Acts 15, 
when the question has arisen of the observation 
of legal matters, Paul deferred to the judgment 
of the Apostles (Galatians 2), because of 
certain false brother, etc. Second, when a 
question arises concerning something that can 
tend to the detriment of a spiritual good; 
whence in Acts 25, Paul called upon Caesar for 
his liberation, since by his death the fruit of his 
preaching would be impeded; but he, as he was, 
desired to be destroyed and be with Christ 
(Philippians 1). Third, when it is a contention 
concerning something that affects the temporal 
loss of another, most especially the poor 
(Sirach 34:24): He that offereth sacrifice of the 
goods of the poor, is as one that sacrificeth the 
son in the presence of his father. Fourth, when 
the contention concerns what affects the 
spiritual loss of someone who unjustly seizes 
spiritual goods, concerning which the authority 
of Gregory is cited above, speaking on Job 
39:16: she has labored in vain, no fear 
constraining her. Fifth, when it tends to the 
corruption of many by the example of banditry, 
Ecclesiastes 8:11: For because sentence is not 
speedily pronounced against the evil, the 
children of men commit evils without any fear. 
1. The Apostle could licitly have accepted 
his expenses from those to whom he was 
preaching the Gospel; but he omitted out of his 
perfection in charity, so as to avoid the scandal 
of those who were greedy, and so that he could 
convict them more freely and so that he might 
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take away from false apostles the chance to 
plunder. 
2. That man who is in extreme necessity 
does not have it in his power to meet with 
bodily death or not; rather, he necessarily 
incurs it because of his lack of temporal goods; 
and thus the man who refused to give him his 
own things is directly the cause of his death. 
But the man who is scandalized is able to avoid 
his own scandal, and therefore it is not the 
same situation. 
3. The eating of certain foods has in itself 
a certain likeness to evil, for example, the 
eating of food sacrificed to idols; and therefore 
whoever eats this in the presence of the weak, 
actively scandalizes them, which is more evil 
than bodily death; for it is preferable to die of 
hunger than to eat food offered to idols, 
precisely because of scandal; because the first 
thing is the evil of punishment, but the second 
is the evil of guilt. Nevertheless, someone 
should not allow himself to die of hunger 
sooner than eat of food sacrificed to idols amid 
scandal; for he would throw himself into their 
hands, and then the evil of guilt would be 
joined with the evil of punishment. But when 
eating some food does not have any species of 
evil, then the judgment is the same of 
abstaining from such eating and of releasing 
the temporal belongings of another; wherefore 
the Apostle says, the counsels pertain to 
perfection, not to the necessity of a precept. 
4. The Apostle is speaking of suing amid 
active scandal. Because, however, the Lord 
says: of him that taketh away thy goods, ask 
them not again (Luke 6:30), the counsel is 
greater than the precept. 
5. Because of general scandal a man 
should refrain from demanding back his own 
things, when he can licitly, unless by doing so a 
greater damage will be done to the truth than 
the public scandal would be, which sometimes 
arises from the malice of certain people inciting 
others; and in this way Blessed Thomas of 
Canterbury endured the public scandal so that 
he could confront the greater danger, which 
was the loss of Church liberty. 
6. If a man loved his own temporal 
belongings more than the salvation of his 
neighbor, he would sin; but sometimes when 
we demand our own things, we are thinking 
more of the salvation of our neighbors than of 
our own salvation; wherefore Gregory says, in 
the text mentioned above: we should fear more 
from those bandits themselves than be so 
eagerly demanding our temporal belongings. 
7. Although saving the Threefold Trinity, 
in this particular case someone might 
sometimes not sue for his own things in order 
to avoid scandal, nevertheless he could be 
doing it not without damage to the public truth, 
if he did not allow to sue; for peace and justice 
would perish. 
Exposition 
For what is hidden cannot be proved. 
Here there is not sufficient reason why a 
marriage should not be impeded simply 
speaking; for a lack of proof does not excuse 
the conscience from sin; but rather this is why 
it is not impeded in the face of the Church. 
I believe you know from Saint Paul, that 
the widows who fall away from their purpose, 
about whom you consulted us, unless they 
convert, in the future they are condemned. He 
is speaking of a purpose confirmed by a vow. 
What, among all sins, is more grave than 
adultery? This is understood according to the 
gravity of the punishment which according to 
the Law is inflicted for adultery, namely, the 
stoning of both parties; no punishment is graver 
than this. This is said according to the place it 
holds in the penalties: for according to the Law, 
stoning is reserved only for blasphemers and 
adulterers, and disobedient children. But 
blasphemy here names those aberrant from 
God, and the disobedient are counted in the 
same genus, for it is like the crime of 
soothsaying to refuse to obey, as is clear from 1 
Kings 15. 
It is execrable when it happens with a 
prostitute, but more execrable still with a wife. 
Here the comparison is to be understood as 
dealing with the use against nature; but 
concerning the use according to nature, it is the 
reverse. 
Let us believe that the covenants of 
legitimate nuptials will be renewed. This is to 
be understood when both parties persevere in 
this life. But it seems that also if one should 
die, and afterward should be miraculously 
resuscitated, the marriage would be renewed, 
by the fact that Hebrews 11:35 says, the women 
received their dead raised to life again. 
Furthermore, a resuscitated man could 
seek out his former possessions. Therefore, also 
his wife. Furthermore, if it were necessary for 
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him to contract again with the same wife, he 
might be considered a bigamist because of the 
two-fold marriage that he contracted. 
And it must be said, according to 
Augustine, a wedding is a mortal good; and 
thus the matrimonial bond is finished with this 
life; and this is what is said in Romans 7:2, 
about a woman: if her husband is dead, she is 
released from the rule of her husband. And 
thus if he should be resuscitated, he could not 
seek his own wife again; but he could contract 
with her again, unless she has married another; 
for then the marriage contract could not be 
dissolved. 
To the first it must be said that this is 
understood of children, not of spouses. 
To the second, that possessions are subject 
to the power of their owner simply; wherefore 
even a dying man can make a will; but a wife is 
not subject to the power of her husband like a 
slave girl; rather there is a certain partnership 
between man and wife, which is terminated by 
death of one of them. Wherefore a dying man 
cannot leave his wife to another in his will. 
And thus it is clear that there is not the same 
ratio of possessions and wives. 
To the third it must be said that he would 
not be a bigamist by this, for neither spouse is 
dividing his flesh among many people. 
If they lack the reproach of a bad will. 
That indeed is when, not by a light 
presumption, but by some certain judgment of 
the death of the man, the woman has contracted 
with another. But if afterward some doubt 
should arise concerning the life of the first 
husband, she should neither render nor request 
the debt. But if it should be a light suspicion, 
she can do both licitly; for she should ignore 
that reason rather than form her conscience 
according to it. 
By the fact that he wants to return to his 
first wife but is not strong enough, the 
discipline of the Church is thought to bind this, 
he begins to be excused . . . 
Here the Master speaks falsely, since an 
excommunicated man should rather die than be 
joined to someone who is not his wife; for this 
would be against the truth of life, which is not 
to be covered up because of scandal. 
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DISTINCTION 39 
QUESTION 1 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered 
impediments to marriage that make a person 
ineligible for marriage simply speaking with 
respect to any other person, here he determines 
the impediment that makes someone ineligible 
for marriage with respect to certain persons, 
and not with respect to all. And this is divided 
into two parts: In the first he considers the 
impediment that makes a person ineligible in 
relation to some other person because of 
distance between them, namely, disparity of 
cult; in the second he considers the impediment 
that makes a person ineligible in relation to 
another person because of closeness between 
them, Distinction 40, where he says: now it 
remains to speak about blood relations. The 
first part is in two parts: in the first he considers 
the marriage that exists in disparity of cult, 
between a member of the faithful and an 
unbeliever; in the second, the marriage that is 
between two unbelievers, saying there: but 
there are several who claim that between 
unbelievers there is no union. The first part of 
this is divided into two parts: in the first he 
shows that disparity of cult preceding marriage 
impedes it from being contracted, and 
invalidates the contract; in the second he 
objects to the contrary, saying there: but this 
seems to go against what the Apostle says 
about unequal spouses. And this is divided into 
two parts: in the first he raises an objection 
from the words of the Apostle; in the second, 
he resolves it, saying there: but it clearly shows 
that this is one thing, and that is another. And 
concerning this he does three things: first he 
shows that the word of the Apostle, namely, 
that a believer has the power of remaining 
together or not remaining together with an 
unbeliever, is understood concerning the 
disparity of cult that follows matrimony; 
secondly he inquires whether a wife can be sent 
away on account of other sins, like unbelief, 
where he says: but if you ask whether she could 
be sent away because of some other crime, 
besides unbelief or idolatry, refer to what 
Augustine says; thirdly he inquires whether a 
member of the faithful who puts away his non-
believing wife, may marry another, here 
saying: this is asked, if a member of the 
faithful, sends away an unbeliever, or an 
unbeliever leaves a member of the faithful, 
whether the believer is allowed to marry 
another. And concerning this he does three 
things: first he cites the authority for the 
negative side; secondly, for the affirmative, 
where he says: but Ambrose testifies to the 
contrary; thirdly he resolves it, saying: notice 
that these things seem to be contrary to what 
has been said. 
Here there are six things to be asked: 1) 
whether a member of the faithful may contract 
marriage with an unbeliever; 2) whether 
marriage exists between unbelievers; 3) if one 
of two unbelieving spouses should convert to 
the faith without the other, whether he may 
remain in the same marriage; 4) whether one 
may leave an unbelieving wife; 5) whether, 
having put her away, one may marry another; 
6) whether because of other sins, like unbelief, 
a man may put away his wife. 
Article 1 
Whether a member of the faithful may contract 
marriage with an unbeliever. 
1. It seems that a member of the faithful 
may contract marriage with an unbeliever. For 
Joseph contracted with an Egyptian woman, 
and Esther with Assuerus. But in both 
marriages there was disparity of cult: for one 
was a believer, the other an unbeliever. 
Therefore, disparity of cult preceding marriage 
does not impede it. 
2. Furthermore, the same faith is taught by 
the Old Law and the New Law. But according 
to the Old Law, a marriage could exist between 
a believer and an unbeliever, as is clear from 
Deuteronomy 21:10: if, having gone out to fight 
. . . you see a beautiful woman among the 
captives, and you fall in love with her . . . you 
may go into her and sleep with her, and she 
will be your wife. Therefore, it is also allowed 
in the New Law. 
3. Furthermore, a betrothal is ordered to a 
marriage. But in some cases between a believer 
and an unbeliever there can be a betrothal with 
the condition of future conversion. Therefore, 
under the same condition a marriage can be 
contracted between them. 
4. Furthermore, every impediment of 
marriage is in some way contrary to marriage. 
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But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, for 
marriage is in the office of nature, whose 
dictates extend beyond faith. Therefore, a 
disparity of faith does not impede marriage. 
5. Furthermore, sometimes disparity of 
faith also exists between two baptised people, 
as when one has lapsed into heresy after 
baptism; and if such a person contracts with 
some member of the faithful, nevertheless it is 
a valid marriage. Therefore, disparity of cult 
does not impede marriage. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 2 
Corinthians 6:14: what concord has light with 
darkness? But there is the greatest concord 
between husband and wife. Therefore, someone 
who is in the light of faith cannot contract 
marriage with someone who is in the darkness 
of unbelief. 
Moreover, it is said in Malachi 2:2 (trans. 
note: Malachi 2:11), Judah has contaminated 
the sanctification of the Lord, which he loved, 
and has had the daughter of an alien god. But 
this would not be, if between them a valid 
marriage could be contracted. Therefore 
disparity of cult impedes marriage. 
I answer that the more principal good of 
marriage is offspring to be educated to the 
worship of God. But since education is done by 
the father and mother together, either one 
intends to educate the children to the worship 
of God according to his own faith. And thus if 
they are of diverse faiths, the intention of one 
will be contrary to the intention of the other. 
And so between them there can be no fitting 
marriage. And because of this, disparity of cult 
preceding marriage impedes it from being 
contracted. 
1. In the Old Law it was permitted to enter 
into marriage with certain unbelievers, and 
with others it was prohibited. In particular it 
was prohibited with the unbelievers living in 
the land of Canaan: both since the Lord 
commanded them to be killed for their 
obstinacy, and because the greatest danger 
remained that they would pervert their spouses 
or children to idolatry, for the children of Israel 
were more prone to their rites and customs 
because of their interaction with them. But it 
was permitted with other nations, especially 
when there could not be the fear of being 
drawn away into idolatry; and in this way 
Joseph and Moses and Esther contracted 
marriages with unbelievers. But in the New 
Law, which is diffused throughout the world, 
there is a similar reason for prohibiting 
marriage with all unbelievers; and thus 
disparity of cult preceding marriage impedes it 
from being contracted, and invalidates the 
contract. 
2. That law either speaks of other nations 
with whom they could licitly enter into 
marriages; or it speaks about when the captive 
woman was willing to be converted to the faith 
and worship of God. 
3. The relation of the present to the present 
is the same as the relation of the future to the 
future; wherefore just as when marriage is 
contracted in the present, unity of cult is 
required in both of the contractants, so also in 
the betrothal, in which a pledge of future 
marriage is made, a condition applied to future 
unity suffices. 
4. Now it is clear from what has been said 
that disparity of cult is contrary to marriage by 
reason of its more principal good, which is the 
good of offspring. 
5. Marriage is a sacrament; and thus as 
much as pertains to the necessity of the 
sacrament, it requires parity in the sacrament of 
the faith, namely baptism, more than in interior 
faith; for which reason this impediment is not 
called â€˜disparity of faith' but disparity of cult, 
which regards external service, as was said in 
the corpus of Book 3, Dist. 9, Question 1, 
Article 1, questiuncula 1. And because of this, 
if some member of the faithful contracts 
marriage with a baptized heretic, it is a valid 
marriage, although he would sin in contracting 
it, if he knows his spouse to be a heretic; just as 
he would sin if he contracted with someone 
excommunicated; nevertheless this marriage 
would not be rendered invalid because of this; 
and by the same token, if some catechumen 
having right faith, but not yet baptized, should 
contract with some baptized member of the 
faithful, it would not be a valid marriage. 
Article 2 
Whether a marriage can exist between unbelievers. 
1. It seems that between unbelievers there 
can be no marriage. For marriage is a 
sacrament of the Church. But baptism is the 
door to the sacraments. Therefore, unbelievers, 
who have not been baptized, cannot contract 
marriage, as neither can they receive the other 
sacraments. 
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2. Furthermore, two evils are more 
impeding to the good than one. But unbelief in 
only one party impedes the good of marriage. 
Therefore, the unbelief of both is even stronger; 
and thus there can be no marriage among 
unbelievers. 
3. Furthermore, just as there is disparity of 
cult between a believer and an unbeliever, so 
there can be between two unbelievers; for 
example, when one is a gentile and the other a 
Jew. But disparity of cult impedes marriage, as 
was said. Therefore, at least between 
unbelievers who have disparate religions there 
cannot be valid marriage. 
4. Furthermore, in marriage there is true 
chastity (pudicitia). But as Augustine says, and 
as is found in Distinction 28, Question 1, the 
chastity of an unbeliever with his wife is no 
true chastity. Therefore, it is not a true 
marriage. 
5. Furthermore, valid marriage excuses 
carnal intimacy from sin. But marriage 
contracted between unbelievers cannot do this: 
for the whole life of an unbeliever is a sin, as 
the Gloss on Romans 14 states. Therefore, 
there is no valid marriage between unbelievers. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 1 
Corinthians 7: 12: if some brother has an 
unbeliever for a wife, and she consents to live 
with him, he may not send her away. But "wife" 
is not said, except because of marriage. 
Therefore, between unbelievers there is true 
marriage. 
Moreover, what is first is not removed by 
what comes after. But marriage pertains to the 
office of nature, which precedes the state of 
grace, whose principle is faith. Therefore, 
unbelief does not prevent marriage from 
existing among unbelievers. 
I answer that marriage was chiefly 
instituted for the good of offspring, not only 
their generation, since this can happen without 
marriage, but also their upbringing to the 
perfect state: since everything naturally intends 
its effect to arrive at its perfect state. But in 
children a two-fold perfection must be 
considered: first, the perfection of nature not 
only as to the body, but also the soul, through 
those things which are of natural law; second, 
the perfection of grace. And the first perfection 
is material, and imperfect as compared with the 
second. 
And therefore, since things that are for the 
sake of an end are proportionate to that end, a 
marriage which tends to the first perfection is 
imperfect and material as compared with the 
marriage that tends to the second perfection. 
And since the first perfection can be common 
to both members of the faithful and 
unbelievers, but the second only exists among 
the faithful, in this way there is a certain 
marriage among unbelievers, but not completed 
by the last perfection, as it is among the 
faithful. 
1. Marriage was not only instituted as a 
sacrament, but also as a duty of nature; and 
thus, although marriage is not complete among 
unbelievers as a sacrament in the dispensation 
of the ministers of the Church, still it is 
sufficient among them insofar as it is a duty of 
nature. And nevertheless, this kind of marriage 
is also a sacrament in a certain way habitually, 
although not actually, in the fact that they do 
not in actuality contract in the faith of the 
Church. 
2. Disparity of cult does not impede 
marriage by reason of unbelief, but by reason 
of disparity in belief. For disparity of cult is not 
only an impediment according to the second 
perfection of children, but also the first, as long 
as parents intend to draw their children to 
different things; which does not happen when 
both are unbelievers. 
3. Between unbelievers there is marriage, 
as was said, as marriage exists in the office of 
nature. But those things that belong to the law 
of nature are determined by positive law; and 
thus if some infidels are prohibited by a certain 
positive law of their own from contracting 
marriage with infidels of another rite, disparity 
of cult impedes marriage between them. For 
they are not prohibited by divine law, for 
before God it does not matter how someone 
strays from the faith as much as that he is 
estranged from grace: likewise, neither by any 
statute of the Church, which does not have to 
judge those who are outside it. 
4. Purity and other virtues of unbelievers 
are said to be not true, for they cannot attain the 
end of true virtue, which is true happiness; just 
as something is said to be not true wine which 
does not have the effect of wine. 
5. An unbeliever who knows his wife does 
not sin, if because of the good of children, or of 
the fidelity by which he is bound to his wife, he 
renders her the debt, since this would be an act 
of justice and temperance, which preserves the 
due circumstances in sensual delights. 
Likewise, he does not sin in doing other acts of 
political virtue. Nor is the whole life of 
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unbelievers a sin because they sin by every act 
they commit, but because they cannot be freed 
from slavery to sin by anything that they do. 
Article 3 
Whether a husband converted to the faith can 
remain with an unbelieving wife who does not wish 
to convert 
1. It seems that a husband who has 
converted to the faith cannot remain with an 
unbelieving wife who does not wish to convert, 
with whom he contracted during his unbelief. 
For where there is the same danger, the same 
precautions should be applied. But because of 
the danger of subversion of the faith, it is 
forbidden that a member of the faithful should 
contract with an unbeliever. Therefore, since 
there is the same danger if a member of the 
faithful remains with an unbeliever with whom 
he contracted before, and even more so, since 
neophytes are more easily subverted than those 
who are nourished in the faith; it seems that a 
member of the faithful cannot remain with an 
unbelieving wife after his conversion. 
2. Furthermore in Case 28, Question 1, 
(trans. note: Council of Toletano IV) it is said, 
an unbeliever cannot remain in a union with a 
woman who has already converted to the 
Christian faith. Therefore, a member of the 
faithful must necessarily send away an 
unbelieving wife. 
3. Furthermore, a marriage that is 
contracted between members of the faithful is 
more perfect than one that is contracted 
between unbelievers. But if the faithful contract 
marriage in a degree [of consanguinity] 
prohibited by the Church, their marriage is 
dissolved. Therefore, also among unbelievers; 
and so a believing man cannot remain with an 
unbelieving wife, at least when he has 
contracted with her in a prohibited degree of 
consanguinity. 
4. Furthermore, sometimes a certain 
unbeliever has multiple wives according to the 
rite of his own law. Therefore, if he can remain 
with the woman with whom he contracted in 
his unbelief, it seems that after his conversion 
he could also retain several wives. 
5. Furthermore, it can happen that having 
divorced one wife, a man takes another, and 
while he remains in that marriage, he is 
converted. Therefore, it seems that at least in 
this case he cannot remain with his new wife. 
But to the contrary is that in I Corinthians 
7 the Apostle counsels that they remain 
together. 
Moreover, no impediment arising after 
marriage can destroy it. But the marriage was 
valid when both were unbelievers. Therefore, 
when one or the other is converted, the 
marriage is not invalidated by that fact; and so 
it seems that they can licitly remain together. 
I answer that the faith of the one who is in 
the marriage does not dissolve, but rather 
perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is 
a valid marriage among unbelievers, as is clear 
from what has been said, by the fact that one 
converts to the faith, the marriage bond is not 
thereby dissolved; but sometimes, although the 
marriage bond endures, the marriage is 
dissolved as concerns living together and 
rendering the debt; for unbelief and adultery 
parallel each other, for either one is against the 
good of children. Whence, just as one has the 
power to put away an adulterous wife or to 
remain with her, so also one has the power of 
sending away an unbelieving wife or remaining 
with her. For an innocent man can freely 
remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of 
correction, but not if she was obstinate in the 
sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve her 
baseness, as was said above in Distinction 35, 
Question 1, Article 2, although also with the 
hope of correction he is free to put her away. In 
the same way, a believer who has converted 
can remain with an unbeliever in the hope of 
conversion, if he has not seen her obstinate in 
her unbelief, and he does well to remain. 
However, he is not bound to, and from this 
comes the counsel of the Apostle. 
1. It is easier to prevent something from 
being done than to destroy what was done 
correctly; and therefore there are many things 
that impede marriage from being contracted, if 
they precede it, which nevertheless are not able 
to dissolve it, if they follow it, as is clear in the 
case of affinity; and the same thing is to be said 
of disparity of cult. 
2. In the primitive church at the time of 
the apostles, both Jews and Gentiles were 
everywhere converted to the faith; and thus at 
that time a believing man could have probable 
hope of his wife's conversion, even if she did 
not promise to convert. Afterward, however, as 
time went on, the Jews became more obstinate, 
and gentiles still entered the faith, as in the time 
of the martyrs, and the time of Emperor 
Constantine, and those times around then. And 
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so at that time it was not safe for a believer to 
live together with an unbelieving Jewish wife; 
nor was there the same hope for her conversion 
as there was hope for the conversion of a 
gentile wife. And therefore, at that time a 
converted believer could live together with a 
gentile, but not with a Jewish wife, unless she 
promised to convert; and it is according to this 
that the decree speaks. But now both Jews and 
gentiles walk by the same step, for both are 
obstinate; and therefore unless an unbelieving 
wife wants to convert, it is not permitted to live 
together with her, whether she be gentile or 
Jewish. 
3. Unbaptized non-believers are not bound 
by the statutes of the Church, but they are 
bound by the statutes of divine law; and so if 
certain unbelievers had contracted in degrees 
prohibited by divine law in Leviticus 18, and 
either one or both had converted to the faith, 
they could not remain in such a marriage. If, 
however, they had contracted in degrees 
prohibited by the statute of the Church, they 
could remain together, if both converted, or if 
one converted and there was hope of the other's 
conversion. 
4. As was said above in Distinction 33, 
Question 1, article 1, to have many wives is 
against the law of nature, by which unbelievers 
are also bound. And therefore, the only valid 
marriage that an unbeliever has is with the 
woman with whom he first contracted. 
Wherefore, if he is converted with all of his 
wives, he can live together with the first, and 
he must abjure the others. But if the first 
refused to be converted, and some one of the 
others did convert, he has the same right to 
contract with her anew that he had of 
contracting with the other; and we will speak of 
this further on. 
5. Divorcing one's wife is against the law 
of nature, as was said above in Distinction 33. 
And therefore it is not permitted to an 
unbeliever to divorce his wife. And so, if he is 
converted after he has divorced one wife and 
married another, the same judgment is made of 
him and of someone who had several wives. 
For he is bound to take back the first wife 
whom he divorced, if she wishes to convert, 
and to abjure the other. 
Article 4 
Whether a believer who has converted may send 
away an unbelieving wife who wishes to live 
together without offense to the Creator 
1. It seems that a believer who has 
converted may not send away an unbelieving 
wife who wishes to live together without 
offense to the Creator. For the bond of a man to 
his wife is greater than that of a slave to his 
master. But a slave who has converted is not 
absolved of the bond of his servitude, as is 
clear from 1 Corinthians 7, and 1 Timothy 6. 
Therefore, neither can a believing man send 
away his unbelieving wife. 
2. Furthermore, no one can prejudice the 
good of another without his consent. But an 
unbelieving wife had the right to the body of 
her unbelieving husband. Therefore, if by the 
fact that her husband converted to the faith, the 
wife could suffer detriment (prejudicium), such 
that she might freely be sent away, then a man 
could not convert to the faith without consent 
of his wife, as neither can he be ordained, or 
vow continence, without the consent of his 
wife. 
3. Furthermore, if someone knowingly 
contracts with a slave-girl, whether he be a 
slave or a free man himself, he cannot put her 
away because of that condition itself. 
Therefore, since the man knew the woman to 
be an unbeliever when he contracted with her, 
it seems that by the same token he may not 
send her away because of her unbelief. 
4. Furthermore, a father is bound in duty 
to attend to the salvation of his children. But if 
he left his unbelieving wife, their sons would 
remain with their mother, for "birth follows the 
womb." And thus they would be in danger of 
their salvation. Therefore, he cannot licitly send 
away an unbelieving wife. 
5. Furthermore, an adulterous man cannot 
put away an adulterous woman, even after he 
has done penance for the adultery. Therefore, if 
the same judgment be made of the adulterer 
and the unbeliever, then neither may an 
unbeliever send away an unbeliever, even after 
he has converted to the faith. 
But to the contrary is what the Apostle 
says in 1 Corinthians 7. 
Moreover, spiritual adultery is graver than 
carnal adultery. But because of carnal adultery, 
a man can cease to live with his wife. 
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Therefore, even more so because of unbelief, 
which is spiritual adultery. 
I answer that different things are fitting 
and expedient for a man according to one life 
than according to another. And so one who dies 
to the first life is not bound to those things that 
he was bound to in the first life; and so it 
happens that a man who vows certain things 
while living a secular life, is not bound to fulfill 
those things when he dies to the world by 
assuming religious life. But someone who 
receives baptism is regenerated in Christ and 
dies to the previous life, since the generation of 
one is the corruption of the other. And thus he 
is freed from the obligation by which he is 
bound to render the debt to his wife, and he is 
not bound to live with her if he does not wish, 
once he has converted, although in some cases 
he might freely do so, as was said; just as a 
religious might freely fulfill vows he made 
while in the world, if they are not against his 
religious life, although he is not bound to fulfill 
them, as was said in the preceding distinction. 
1. To be a slave is not something 
incompatible with the fulness of the Christian 
religion, which professes the greatest humility. 
But the obligation of marriage detracts 
something from Christian perfection, the 
highest state of which life is possessed by those 
who are continent. And thus the two things are 
not similar. And furthermore one spouse is not 
obliged to the other like his possession, as a 
slave is to his master, but in the mode of a 
partner of sorts, which is not suitably between a 
believer and an unbeliever, as is clear from 1 
Corinthians 7; and therefore what concerns a 
slave and a spouse are not the same. 
2. The wife did not have the right to the 
body of her husband except for as long as he 
remained in that life in which he had contracted 
with her; for also when a husband dies, the wife 
is freed from the rule of her husband, as is clear 
from Romans 7. And therefore, if after a man 
changes life, dying to his previous life, he 
should go away from her, no detriment is done 
to her. But by entering religious life, he dies 
only a spiritual death, but not a bodily one. And 
so, if the marriage has been consummated, a 
man cannot enter religious life without the 
consent of his wife. But he can before the 
fleshly union, when there is only a spiritual 
union. But someone who receives baptism is 
buried in death with Christ, also bodily; and 
thus he is also absolved from rendering the debt 
after the consummated marriage. Or it can be 
said that the wife who holds the convert in 
contempt suffers detriment by her own fault. 
3. Disparity of cult makes a person 
incapable of marriage simply speaking; but the 
condition of servitude does not, except when it 
is unknown; and so the argument about an 
unbeliever and a slave-girl is not the same. 
4. The children have either arrived at the 
age of maturity, and then are able to freely 
follow either their believing father or their 
unbelieving mother; or else they are considered 
to be in the age of minority, and then they 
should be given to the believing parent, 
notwithstanding that their mother's submission 
is necessary for their education. 
5. An adulterer does not embark upon 
another life by penance, as an unbeliever does 
by baptism; and thus the argument is not 
similar. 
Article 5 
Whether a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife 
may marry another 
1. It seems that a believer who leaves his 
unbelieving wife may not take another wife. 
For the indissolubility of marriage comes from 
its very nature, since the divorce of one's wife 
is against the law of nature, as was said above 
in Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 1. But 
between unbelievers there was a valid 
marriage. Therefore, in no way can that 
marriage be dissolved. But as long as the bond 
of marriage to one person remains, a person 
cannot contract with another. 
2. Furthermore, crime happening during 
the marriage does not dissolve marriage. But if 
the wife wishes to live together without affront 
to the Creator, the bond of marriage is not 
dissolved; for the man cannot take another 
wife. Therefore, the sin of the wife who does 
not wish to live together without affront to the 
Creator does not dissolve marriage such that a 
man might take another wife. 
3. Furthermore, man and wife are equals 
in the marriage bond. Therefore, since it is not 
permitted to an unbelieving wife to take 
another husband while her own husband is still 
alive, it seems that neither should it be 
permitted to a believer. 
4. Furthermore, a vow of continence is 
more favorable than a contract of marriage. But 
as it seems, it is not permitted for the believing 
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husband of an unbelieving wife to take a vow 
of continence: for then the wife is defrauded of 
her marriage, if afterward she should be 
converted. Therefore, much less is it permitted 
for him to contract marriage with another. 
5. Furthermore, a son who remains in 
unbelief once his father has converted, loses the 
right of paternal inheritance; and nevertheless, 
if afterward he converts, his inheritance is 
restored to him, even if another person has 
come into possession of it. Therefore, it seems 
that similiarly, if the wife of a believer converts 
afterward, her own husband is to be restored to 
her, even if he has since contracted with 
another; which could not be, if the second 
marriage were valid. Therefore he cannot 
contract with another. 
But to the contrary, marriage is not ratified 
without the sacrament of baptism. But what is 
not ratified can be dissolved. Therefore, 
marriage contracted in infidelity can be 
dissolved; thus once the marriage bond is 
dissolved, it is permitted for a man to take 
another wife. 
Moreover, a man should not live together 
with an unbelieving wife who does not wish to 
live together without affront to the Creator. If 
therefore it were not permitted to him to take 
another wife, he would be forced to keep 
continence, which seems unfitting, for it would 
mean that his conversion worked to his own 
disadvantage. 
I answer that when one spouse is 
converted to the faith, while the other remains 
in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if 
the unbeliever wishes to live together without 
affront to the Creator, or without provoking the 
other to unbelief, the believer can freely leave; 
but he cannot marry another. But if the 
unbeliever, breaking forth in words of 
blasphemy and refusing to hear the name of 
Christ, does not wish to live together without 
affront to the Creator; then if she should 
endeavor to bring him back to unbelief, the 
believing husband can leave and be united with 
another in marriage. 
1. The marriage of unbelievers is 
incomplete, as was said in Article 2 of this 
question. But the marriage of believers is 
complete, and as such it is firmer. But the 
stronger bond always dissolves the less strong, 
if it be at odds with it. And thus the marriage 
that is contracted afterward in the faith of 
Christ dissolves the marriage that had been 
contracted first in unbelief. For which reason, 
marriage of unbelievers is not absolutely firm 
and ratified. But it is ratified afterward by faith 
in Christ. 
2. The crime of a wife who refuses to live 
together without affront to the Creator absolves 
the man of the servitude by which he was 
bound to his wife which prevented his 
marrying another while she lived. But it still 
does not dissolve the marriage: for if the 
blasphemous one were converted before he had 
contracted another marriage, her husband 
would be restored to her: but it is dissolved by 
the subsequent marriage, which the believing 
man could not enter upon if he were not freed 
from servitude to his wife by her own fault. 
3. After the believer contracted, the bond 
of marriage was cut loose from both sides: for 
marriage cannot limp on one foot with regard 
to the bond, but sometimes it does limp as 
regards the effect. Wherefore it is appointed 
that the unbelieving wife may not contract with 
another, more in penalty to her than from the 
strength of the preceding marriage. But if 
afterward she should convert, it can be granted 
to her as a dispensation that she marry another, 
if her husband has taken another wife. 
4. If after the conversion of the man there 
should be some probable hope of the 
conversion of his wife, the man cannot take a 
vow of continence, nor may he enter upon 
another marriage: for it would be more difficult 
for the wife to be converted if she knew that 
she had lost her husband. But if there were no 
hope of her conversion, he could enter religious 
life or holy orders, after having asked his wife 
to convert; and then after the man has received 
holy orders, if the wife should convert, her 
husband would not be restored to her; but it 
should be imputed to her as a penalty for her 
late conversion that she has been deprived of 
her husband. 
5. The bond of paternity is not dissolved 
by disparity of cult, as the bond of marriage is; 
and therefore it is not the same concerning 
one's inheritance and one's wife. 
Article 6 
Whether other vices dissolve marriage, besides 
unbelief 
1. It seems that other vices dissolve 
marriage, just as unbelief does. For adultery 
seems to be more directly opposed to marriage 
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than unbelief. But unbelief in some cases 
dissolves the marriage, such that one is 
permitted to enter upon another marriage. 
Therefore, adultery also does the same thing. 
2. Furthermore, just as unbelief is a 
spiritual fornication, so is any other kind of sin. 
Therefore, if unbelief, which is a spiritual 
fornication, dissolves marriage because of this, 
any other sin would dissolve marriage by the 
same reasoning. 
3. Furthermore, it is said in Matthew 5:30, 
if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off 
and throw it from you; and it says in the Gloss 
that in hand and in right eye can be taken 
brothers, wife, neighbors, and children. But by 
any sin they are made an impediment to us. 
Therefore, because of any sin marriage can be 
dissolved. 
4. Furthermore, avarice is an idolatry, as it 
says in Ephesians 5. But because of idolatry a 
woman can be put away. Therefore, by the 
same reasoning on account of avarice, and in 
the same way because of other sins, which are 
greater than avarice. 
5. Furthermore, the Master expressly says 
this in the text. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Matthew 5:31: whoever puts away his wife, 
except because of fornication, commits 
adultery. 
Moreover, according to this, separations 
would be happening every day, for a marriage 
is rare in which one of the spouses or the other 
has not fallen into sin. 
I answer that bodily fornication and 
unbelief have special contrariety to the goods 
of marriage, as can be seen from what has been 
said, wherefore they especially have the force 
of separating marriages. But nevertheless it 
must be understood that a marriage is dissolved 
in one of two ways. In one way, on the part of 
the bond, and in this way it cannot be dissolved 
after the marriage has been ratified, neither by 
unbelief nor by adultery; but if it is not ratified, 
the bond is permanently dissolved by unbelief 
in either spouse, if the other, having converted 
to the faith, should enter upon another union. 
But the bond is not dissolved by adultery; 
otherwise an unbeliever could easily give a writ 
of divorce to an adulterous wife, and once she 
is put away he could marry another; which is 
false. In another way, marriage is dissolved as 
to its act; and in this way it can be dissolved 
just as well by unbelief as by fleshly 
fornication, as was said above in Distinction 
35. But marriage cannot be dissolved on 
account of other sins, even as to its act, unless 
perhaps the man wishes to remove himself 
from the company of his wife for her reproof, 
by removing the comfort of his presence from 
her for a time. 
1. Although adultery is more directly 
opposed to marriage than unbelief is, insofar as 
marriage is an office of nature, yet the reverse 
is true insofar as marriage is a sacrament of the 
Church, by which fact it has complete firmness, 
insofar as it signifies the indivisible union of 
Christ and the Church. And thus a marriage 
that is not ratified can be dissolved more easily 
by unbelief than by adultery, as to its bond. 
2. The first union of the soul to God is by 
faith; and thus the soul is espoused, as it were, 
to God, as is clear from Hosea 2:20: I will 
espouse you to me in faith. For which reason, in 
Sacred Scripture idolatry and unbelief are 
particularly designated by â€˜fornication;' but 
other sins are called spiritual fornications by 
more remote signification. 
3. This is to be understood when a woman 
presents a great occasion of sin to her husband, 
so that he has a probable fear of danger to 
himself. For then a man can remove himself 
from interaction with her, as was said. 
4. Avarice is called idolatry by a certain 
similarity of slavery, for both the greedy man 
and the idolater would rather serve a creature 
than the creator; but not by the likeness of 
unbelief; for the corruption of unbelief is in the 
intellect, but avarice happens in the affections. 
5. The words of the master are to be taken 
as concerning betrothed couples, for a betrothal 
can be broken because of sins committed 
afterward. Or if we should speak of marriage, it 
is to be understood about a separation for a 
time from shared interaction, as was said, or 
when the wife does not wish to live together 
unless under a sinful condition, as when she 
says, "I will not be your wife unless you 
acquire wealth for me by stealing," etc. for then 
he should rather put her away than engage in 
theft. 
Exposition 
And foreign nations, that is, heretical. The 
sin of heresy always impedes marriage from 
being contracted, but it does not invalidate the 
contract, unless she were such a heretic that she 
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did not accept the sacrament of baptism, or 
were not baptized in the form of the Church. 
If both believed, their union was 
strengthened by the recognition of God. But to 
the contrary. If a woman had fornicated before 
her conversion, her husband is bound to take 
her back, if he also wanted to convert, as it 
seems. And it must be said that if a woman 
who has converted seeks out her own husband, 
who has converted, the man cannot hold it 
against her that she had formerly committed 
fornication, if he himself gave her the occasion 
for fornicating; for example, if he refused to 
live together with her, and she wanted to live 
together without affront to the Creator; 
otherwise he could take exception; and 
nevertheless the marriage is ratified, so that it 
may no longer be dissolved on the part of the 
bond, such that the man would be allowed to 
take another wife, although it might be 
dissolved as to the act. 
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DISTINCTION 40 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered the 
impediment by which a person is made legally 
incapable of marriage with respect to some 
other person because of distance between them, 
here he begins to determine the impediments 
by which a person is rendered legally incapable 
of marriage with respect to another person 
because of close relationship between them; 
and this is divided into two parts: in the first 
part he determines the impediment of a 
physically close relationship; in the second 
part, the impediment of a spiritually close 
relationship, in Distinction 42, where he says: 
now we bring in spiritual family ties. 
The first is in two parts: in the first he 
determines about consanguinity; in the second, 
about affinity, Distinction 41, where he says, 
now affinity must be examined. The first is in 
two parts: in the first he shows which degrees 
of consanguinity impede marriage; in the 
second he objects to the contrary, and resolves 
it, where he says, but what Gregory [wrote] to 
Augustine, bishop of England is opposed to 
these things . . . 
He writes in reply. The first is in two 
parts; in the first he shows in what degrees 
consanguinity impedes marriage; in the second 
he shows the reason for this distinction, where 
he says, indeed, the reason that Isidore counts 
six degrees, he himself discloses. The first is in 
two parts: in the first he shows up to which 
degree consanguinity impedes marriage; and in 
the second he shows how these degrees are 
calculated, where he says, but how the degrees 
of consanguinity may be calculated, Isidore 
shows in this way. 
Here there are four things to be asked: 1) 
what is consanguinity; 2) about distinguishing 
it; 3) whether according to some degrees, it 
impedes marriage by natural law; 4) whether 
the degrees that impede marriage could be 
determined by the statutes of the Church. 
Article 1 
Whether the definition of consanguinity that certain 
people put forth is adequate 
1. It seems that the definition of 
consanguinity that certain people put forth is 
inadequate, namely: consanguinity is the bond 
contracted between those descended from a 
common root by carnal propagation. For all 
men are descended by carnal propagation from 
the same root, namely from Adam. Therefore, 
if the definition above were right, all men 
would be consanguineous with each other, 
which is false. 
2. Furthermore, a bond can only be of two 
things that go together, for a bond unites. But 
for those who are descended from one root, 
there is no greater matching with each other 
than with other people, since they are identical 
in species, and differ in number, just as any 
other people. Therefore, consanguinity is not a 
particular bond. 
3. Furthermore, carnal propagation, 
according to the Philosopher, occurs from an 
excess of food. But such an excess has more to 
do with matters of eating, with which it agrees 
in substance, than with the one who eats. 
Therefore, since no bond of consanguinity 
arises between the one born of semen and the 
things he eats, neither does any bond of close 
relationship arise by carnal propagation in the 
one generating. 
4. Furthermore, in Genesis 19:14 (trans. 
note: Gen 29:14), Laban said to Jacob, You are 
my bone and my flesh, by reason of the family 
relation between them. Therefore, a close 
relationship like this should be called carnality 
rather than consanguinity. 
5. Furthermore, carnal propagation is 
common to men and animals. But among 
animals no bond of consanguinity is contracted 
in carnal propagation. Therefore, neither does it 
happen in men. 
I answer that according to the Philosopher 
in Book 8 of the Ethics, all friendship consists 
in some kind of sharing, and since friendship is 
a certain tie or union, the sharing that is the 
cause of the friendship is called a bond. And 
for this reason, some people are named by 
whatever they share as though they were tied to 
each other, like those are called 'compatriots' 
who share with each other a political 
community, and 'comrades-in-arms' who share 
in military pursuits. And in the same way, those 
who share something in common at the level of 
nature are called 'consanguineous. And so in 
the definition above the genus of consanguinity 
is given as bond; as its subject, persons 
descending from one root, who have this kind 
of bond, of which the principle is carnal 
propagation. 
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1. The active force is not found according 
to the same perfection in the instrument as it is 
in the principal agent. And since every moved 
thing that moves is an instrument, it is for this 
reason that the strength of the first mover in 
any genus runs out in the end, diffused through 
the many intermediaries, and ends in something 
that is only moved, not a mover. But the power 
of the one generating moves not only what has 
to do with the species, but also what has to do 
with the individual, for which reason a son 
resembles his father not only in the nature of 
the species, but even in accidental things. But 
nevertheless the character of the father is never 
so completely in the son as it was in the father, 
and in the grandson even less, and it is 
weakened from that point on. And so it is that 
that character sometimes runs out, so that it 
cannot proceed any further. And since 
consanguinity exists inasmuch as many share in 
such a character diffused from one throughout 
many by propagation, over time consanguinity 
cancels itself out, as Isidore says; and so it is 
not necessary to include the remote root in the 
definition of consanguinity, but the near one, 
whose strength still remains in those who are 
propagated by it. 
2. Now it is clear from what has been said 
that the consanguineous do not only share in 
the nature of the species, but also in the proper 
virtue of the individual himself, passed on from 
one to many, by which it sometimes happens 
that a son not only resembles his father, but 
also his grandfather, or remote forebears, as is 
said in Book 4 of On the Generation of 
Animals. 
3. Convergence is more attendant on form, 
according to which something is in act, than 
upon matter, according to which something is 
in potency; which is clear in the fact that 
charcoal has more in common with fire than 
with the tree from which the wood was cut. 
And likewise, food, which has already been 
transformed into the nourished species by the 
nutritive power, has more to do with the 
nourished thing itself than that thing from 
which nourishment was taken. However, the 
argument might proceed according to the 
opinion of those who said that the entire nature 
of a thing is its matter, and that all forms are 
accidents; which is false. 
4. That which is more immediately 
converted into semen, is blood, as is proved in 
Book 1 of On the Generation of Animals. And 
because of this, the bond that is contracted by 
carnal propagation is more fittingly called 
consanguinity than carnality. And when 
someone consanguineous is said to be the 
"flesh" of another, this is because blood, which 
is converted into semen in the man or into the 
menstrual flow, is potentially flesh or bone. 
5. Certain people say that the bond of 
consanguinity is contracted between men by 
carnal propagation, and not among other 
animals, because whatever concerns the truth 
of human nature in all men, was in our first 
parents, which is not in other animals. But 
according to this, consanguinity would never 
be cancelled out. 
But this position was disproved in the 
corpus of Book II, Distinction 30, Question 1, 
Article 2; wherefore it must be said that this is 
fitting, for animals are not joined together for 
the unity of friendship for the sake of the 
propagation of many from one close forebear, 
as is the case with men, as was said in the body 
of this article. 
Article 2 
Whether consanguinity is suitably distinguished by 
lines and degrees 
1. It seems that consanguinity is 
unsuitably distinguished by lines and degrees. 
For the line of consanguinity is said to be the 
ordered series, containing diverse degrees, of 
persons related by blood, having descended 
from the same root. But consanguinity is 
nothing other than the series of such persons. 
Therefore, the line of consanguinity is the same 
as consanguinity. But nothing should be 
distinguished by itself. Therefore, 
consanguinity is not fittingly distinguished by 
lines. 
2. Furthermore, that according to which 
some common thing is divided, cannot be 
included in the definition of the common thing. 
But descent is included in the definition given 
for consanguinity. Therefore, consanguinity 
cannot be divided by lines of ascending and 
descending and transversals. 
3. Furthermore, the definition of a line is 
that which is between two points. But two 
points only make one degree. Therefore, one 
line has only one degree; and so the division of 
consanguinity by lines and by degrees seems 
the same. 
285 
 
4. Furthermore, degree is defined as the 
relationship of distant persons by which it is 
known by how much distance the persons are 
separated from each other. But since 
consanguinity is a certain close relationship, 
the distance of persons is more opposed to 
consanguinity than it is a part of it. Therefore, 
consanguinity cannot be distinguished by 
degrees. 
5. Furthermore, if consanguinity is 
distinguished and known by degrees, it is 
necessary that those persons who are in the 
same degree, are equally consanguineous. But 
this is false; for a great-grand-uncle and his 
great-grand-nephew are in the same degree, but 
they are not equally consanguineous, as the 
decree states. Therefore, consanguinity is not 
rightly distinguished between degrees. 
6. Furthermore, in ordered things, 
anything added to another makes another 
degree; just as a certain unit added makes 
another species of number. But a person added 
to a person does not always make another 
degree of consanguinity: for a father and a 
paternal uncle who is related to him, are in the 
same degree of consanguinity. Therefore, 
consanguinity is not correctly distinguished by 
degrees. 
7. Furthermore, between two relatives, 
there is always the same relation of 
consanguinity: for one of two extremes is 
equally distant from the other and vice versa. 
But the degree of consanguinity is not always 
found to be the same on both sides, since 
sometimes one relative is in the third degree 
and the other is in the fourth. Therefore, the 
closeness of consanguinity cannot sufficiently 
be known by degrees. 
I answer that consanguinity, as was said, is 
a certain close relationship, founded on a 
sharing at the natural level resulting from the 
act of generation, by which nature is 
propagated. Wherefore, according to the 
Philosopher in Book 8 of the Ethics, this 
sharing is three-fold. One is according to the 
relation of the principle to its effect 
(principiatum), and this is the consanguinity of 
the father to the son; wherefore he says that 
parents love their children as being some part 
of their own selves. 
Another way is according to the relation of 
the effect to its principle, and this is the relation 
of son to father; wherefore he says that children 
love their parents, because they exist from 
them. Thirdly is according to the mutual 
relation of those who share one principle, as 
brothers are said to be born from the same 
people, as he himself says in the same place. 
And since a point moved makes a line, and 
by propagation in a certain way the father 
descends into the son, for this reason three lines 
of consanguinity are taken according to the 
three relationships mentioned, namely, the line 
of descent according to the first relationship, 
the line of ascent according to the second 
relationship, and the collateral line according to 
the third relationship. But since the movement 
of propagation does not come to rest in one 
terminus, but progresses further, for this reason 
we find that every father has his own father and 
a son, his own son, and so on in succession; 
and according to these different steps, different 
degrees are found in one line. 
And since the degree of anything is some 
part of that thing, the degree of close 
relationship cannot be where there is no close 
relationship; and thus, either identity or 
extreme distance remove the degree of 
consanguinity, for nothing is closely related to 
itself, as neither is it like itself. And because of 
this no person makes any degree by himself, 
but only when compared to another person. 
But nevertheless, there are different 
formulae of calculating degrees in different 
lines. For a degree of consanguinity in the line 
of ascent is contracted by the fact that one 
person whose consanguinity is being 
considered, is descended from someone else: 
and thus, according to canonical and legal 
calculation, the person who comes first in the 
process of propagation whether by ascending or 
descending, is removed from the other, let's say 
from Peter, in the first degree, like a father and 
a son. But the ones who come second, are 
removed in the second degree, like a 
grandfather and grandson, and so on in 
succession. But the consanguinity of those who 
are in the collateral line is contracted not from 
the fact that one of them is propagated by the 
other, but because both are propagated by one 
person; and thus the degree in this line of 
consanguinity is calculated by comparison to 
the one principle from which both are 
propagated. But according to this there is a 
different canonical calculation from the legal 
calculation: for the legal calculation counts 
descent from a common root on both sides; but 
the canonical calculation only counts it on the 
side where the greater number of degrees is 
found; where, according to the legal 
286 
 
computation a brother and a sister, or two 
brothers, are related to each other in the second 
degree, for they both are removed from the 
common root by one degree; and likewise, the 
sons of two brothers are removed from each 
other in the fourth degree. But according to the 
canonical calculation, two brothers are related 
to each other in the first degree, for neither of 
them are removed from the common root 
except by one degree; but the son of one of the 
brothers is removed from the other brother in 
the second degree, for that is how distant he is 
from the common root. And thus according to 
the canonical calculation, by the same degree 
that someone is removed from someone higher, 
he is removed from anyone descended from 
him, and never less: for whatever is the cause 
of a thing being the way it is, is yet more so; 
wherefore if other descendents from the 
common ancestor are connected with someone 
by reason of a common ancestor they cannot be 
as close relatives to the him, as the ancestor 
himself is. But sometimes someone is more 
removed from someone descended from his 
common ancestor than he is from the ancestor, 
for the other may be more removed from the 
common ancestor than he is; and consanguinity 
has to be computed according to the more 
remote distance. 
1. That objection proceeds on false 
grounds. For consanguinity is not a series, but a 
certain relation of some persons to each other; 
their series makes the line of consanguinity. 
2. Descent, taken generally, is considered 
according to any line of consanguinity: for 
carnal propagation, by which the bond of 
consanguinity is contracted, is a certain 
descent; but only one kind of descent, i.e., from 
a person whose consanguinity is in question, 
makes the line of descendents. 
3. A line can be taken in two ways. 
Sometimes, properly, for that dimension which 
is the first species of continuous quantity; and 
in this way, a line contains only two points in 
act, which terminate it, but it has infinite points 
in potency, of which, if any are marked, the 
line is divided in act, and two lines are made. 
At other times, though, line is taken to mean 
those things that are disposed linearly; and 
according to this meaning line and figure are 
assigned in numbers, just as a unit is included 
in any number after "one", and thus any unit 
added makes a degree in this kind of line; and it 
is the same way with the line of consanguinity; 
and for this reason one line contains several 
degrees. 
4. Just as similitude cannot be where there 
is no diversity, so also close relationship cannot 
be where there is no distance; and therefore 
every kind of distance is not opposed to 
consanguinity, but only that distance that 
excludes the closeness of consanguinity. 
5. Just as whiteness can be called "greater" 
in two ways, in one way from the intensity of 
its quality, and in another way from the 
quantity of its surface: so also consanguinity is 
called "greater" or "lesser" in two ways. In one 
way, intensively, from the nature of 
consanguinity itself; in another way, almost 
dimensively; and in this way the quantity of 
consanguinity is measured from the persons 
between whom the propagation of 
consanguinity proceeds; and in this second way 
the degrees in consanguinity are distinguished; 
and thus it happens that of two people who are 
in the same degree of consanguinity with 
respect to a third person, one is more 
consanguineous to him than the other by 
considering the first quantity of consanguinity: 
just as father and son are related to someone in 
the first degree of consanguinity, for on neither 
part does some other person come in the 
middle; but nevertheless, intensively speaking, 
someone's father is connected to him more than 
his brother, for a brother is not connected to 
someone except inasmuch as they have the 
same father. And therefore, the closer someone 
is to the common principle, from which 
consanguinity descends, the more 
consanguineous he is, although he may not be 
in a closer degree, and according to this a great-
uncle is closer to someone than his great-
nephew, although they are in the same degree. 
6. Although a father and a paternal uncle 
are in the same degree with respect to the root 
of consanguinity, for both are removed one 
degree from the grandfather; but with respect to 
the person whose consanguinity is in question, 
they are not in the same degree; for the father is 
in the first degree, but the paternal uncle cannot 
be closer than the second degree, in which the 
grandfather is. 
7. Two persons are always removed in an 
equal number of degrees from each other; 
however, they are sometimes not removed in an 
equal number of degrees from the common 
forebear, as is clear from what has been said. 
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Article 3 
Whether consanguinity impedes marriage by 
natural law 
1. It seems that consanguinity does not 
impede marriage by natural law. For no woman 
can be closer to a man than Eve was to Adam, 
about whom Genesis 2:23 says, here now is 
bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. But 
Eve was joined in marriage to Adam. 
Therefore, no consanguinity impedes marriage, 
as far as the law of nature goes. 
2. Furthermore, natural law is the same 
among all men. But in barbarous nations no 
persons joined by blood ties are excluded from 
marriage. Therefore, consanguinity, does not 
impede marriage, as far as the law of nature 
goes. 
3. Furthermore, natural law is what the 
nature of all animals teaches us, as is said in the 
beginning of the Digests. But brute animals 
also copulate with their mothers. Therefore it is 
not of the law of nature that some person be 
barred from marriage because of consanguinity. 
4. Furthermore, nothing impedes marriage 
that is not contrary to some good of marriage. 
But consanguinity is not contrary to any good 
of marriage. Therefore, it does not impede it. 
5. Furthermore, those things that are more 
closely related and similar have a better and 
stronger union. But marriage is a certain kind 
of union. Therefore, since consanguinity is a 
certain kind of closeness, it does not impede 
marriage, but rather helps it. 
But to the contrary, that which impedes 
the good of offspring also impedes marriage, 
according to the law of nature. But 
consanguinity impedes the good of offspring; 
for as is reasoned in the text from the words of 
Gregory, we have learned by experience that 
from such a conjugal union progeny cannot 
grow up. Therefore, consanguinity impedes 
marriage according to the law of nature. 
Moreover, what human nature had in its 
first condition, is of natural law. But from its 
first condition nature held that father and 
mother were excluded from marriage; which is 
clear by what is said in Genesis 2:24, because 
of this a man leaves his father and mother; 
which cannot be understood with respect to 
living together, and thus it is necessary to 
understand it with respect to the union of 
marriage. Therefore consanguinity impedes 
marriage according to the law of nature. 
I answer that, as was said above in the 
corpus of Distinction 33, Question 1, article 1, 
what is said to be against the law of nature in 
marriage is what renders marriage inadequate 
to the end for which it was ordained. But the 
end of marriage, first and per se, is the good of 
offspring; which indeed is impeded by a certain 
consanguinity, namely between father and 
daughter or between son and mother. Not 
indeed that this end would be totally destroyed, 
for a daughter can conceive children by the 
seed of her father, and likewise with her father 
she may nurture and instruct them, and this is 
what the good of offspring consists in. But 
rather it would not be done in an appropriate 
manner. For it is disordered that a daughter 
should be joined to her father in marriage as a 
partner for the sake of generating and educating 
children, when it is necessary for her to be 
subject to her father in all things as to the one 
from whom she proceeds; and therefore it is of 
natural law that the father and mother are 
barred from marriage, and even more the 
mother than the father; for more of the 
reverence that is owed to parents is diminished 
if the son takes his mother to wife than if the 
father takes his daughter, for a wife should be 
in a certain way subject to her husband. But the 
secondary essential end of marriage is as much 
the repression of concupiscence; which is lost 
if any consanguineous woman can be taken in 
marriage; for a great opportunity is presented to 
concupiscence unless carnal intimacy is 
forbidden between those persons who have to 
keep company in the same house. 
And therefore divine law does not only 
exclude father and mother from marriage, but 
also other related persons with whom it is 
necessary to live at the same time, and who 
have to guard each other's purity. And divine 
law ascribes this reason, saying in Leviticus 18: 
nor shall you reveal the nakedness of such or of 
such, for it is your nakedness. But per accidens 
the end of marriage is the confederation of 
men, and the multiplication of friendship, when 
a man takes his wife's relatives as his own; and 
thus it would be detrimental to this 
multiplication of friendship if someone could 
take as his wife a woman joined to him by 
blood; for by this no new friendship would be 
built up by the marriage; and thus according to 
human laws and statutes of the Church many 
degrees of consanguinity are barred from 
marriage. So therefore, it is clear from what has 
been said that consanguinity impedes marriage 
288 
 
for certain persons by natural law; for others it 
is by divine law; and for others it is by the law 
instituted by men. 
1. Although Eve proceeded from Adam, 
she was nevertheless not the daughter of Adam; 
for she did not proceed from him by the mode 
in which a man is able to generate someone 
like himself in species, but by a divine 
operation; for so one who was an equal could 
be made from the rib of Adam, in this way Eve 
was made. And thus there is not merely a 
natural congruence between Eve and Adam like 
a daughter to a father, nor is Adam the natural 
principle of Eve, like a father to a daughter. 
2. It does not come from natural law that 
certain barbarians commingle carnally with 
their blood relations, but from the ardor of 
concupiscence, which eclipses the law of 
nature in them. 
3. The union of a husband and wife is said 
to be of natural law because nature teaches all 
animals this; but it teaches this union to 
different animals in different ways, according 
to their different conditions. However, carnal 
commingling diminishes the reverence that is 
owed to parents. For just as nature endows 
parents with concern for providing for their 
children, so it endows children with reverence 
for their parents. But it endows no genus with 
concern for their children or reverence for 
parents at all times, except for man; but with 
other animals, less or more, according to how 
necessary the children are to their parents or the 
parents to their children; wherefore also among 
certain animals the sons abhor knowing their 
mothers carnally, as long as recognition of their 
mothers remain in them, there is also a certain 
reverence for them, as the Philosopher notes of 
the camel and the horse in Book 9 of the 
History of Animals. And since all the decent 
habits of animals are naturally brought together 
in men, and more perfectly in them than in 
others, for this reason man naturally abhors 
knowing carnally not only the mother, but also 
the daughter, which is still less contrary to 
nature, as was said; and again, among other 
animals consanguinity is not contracted by 
propagation of the flesh, as among men, as was 
said; and therefore it is not a similar 
understanding. 
4. From what has been said, it is now clear 
how consanguinity of the spouses is contrary to 
the good of marriage; wherefore the argument 
proceeds on false grounds. 
5. It is not unfitting for one of two unions 
to be impeded by the other; for just as where 
there is identity there is not 'likeness,' so also 
the bond of consanguinity can impede the 
union of marriage. 
Article 4 
Whether the degrees of consanguinity that impede 
marriage could be fixed by the Church up to the 
fourth degree 
1. It seems that the degrees of 
consanguinity that impede marriage could be 
fixed by the Church up to the fourth degree. 
For in Matthew 19:6 it says, what God has 
joined, let man not separate. But those who are 
joined within the fourth degree of 
consanguinity, God has joined; for their union 
is not prohibited by divine law. Therefore, they 
should not be separated by human statute. 
2. Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament, 
just as baptism is. But it cannot happen by 
Church statute that the one who approaches 
baptism would not receive the baptismal 
character, if the person is capable of it. 
Therefore, neither can the statute of the Church 
make it so that marriage would not exist 
between those who are not prohibited by divine 
law from being joined matrimonially. 
3. Furthermore, positive law cannot 
remove or increase those things that are natural. 
But consanguinity is a natural bond, which in 
itself does not necessarily impede marriage. 
Therefore, the Church cannnot make it by a 
certain statute that some people can be joined 
or not joined matrimonially, just as it cannot 
make them consanguineous or not 
consanguineous. 
4. Furthermore, the statute of positive law 
must have some reasonable cause; for it is 
according to its reasonable cause that it 
proceeds from natural law. But the causes that 
are assigned for the number of degrees seem to 
be entirely unreasonable, for they have no 
relation to what is caused. For example, that 
consanguinity is prohibited up to the fourth 
degree because of the four elements, up to the 
sixth degree because of the six ages of man, up 
to the seventh degree because of the seven days 
in which all time is measured. Therefore, it 
seems that such a prohibition as this has no 
strength. 
5. Furthermore, where there is the same 
cause, there must be the same effect. But the 
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cause for which consanguinity impedes 
marriage is the good of offspring, the 
repression of concupiscence, and the 
multiplication of friendship, as is clear from 
what has been said, which at all times are 
equally necessary. Thereore at all times 
marriage should have been impeded by equal 
degrees of consanguinity, which is not the case; 
for currently consanguinity impedes marriage 
up to the fourth degree, while formerly, up to 
the seventh. 
6. Furthermore, one and the same union 
cannot be in the genus of sacrament and in the 
genus of illicit sexual intercourse (stuprum). 
But this would happen if the Church had the 
power of establishing a different number of 
degrees that would impede marriage. For if 
some couple were related in the fifth degree, 
when it was prohibited, such a union would be 
illicit sexual intercourse. But afterward when 
the Church revoked the prohibition, the same 
union would be a marriage; and by the 
converse, it could happen if some degrees were 
allowed by the Church, and afterward were 
forbidden. Therefore it seems that the power of 
the Church does not extend to this. 
7. Furthermore, human law should imitate 
divine law. But according to divine law, which 
is contained in the Old Law, the prohibition of 
degrees does not run equally above and below; 
for in the Old Law someone was prohibited 
from taking the sister of his father to wife, but 
not the daughter of his brother. Therefore, 
neither should any prohibition remain just now 
regarding uncles and aunts and nieces and 
nephews. 
But to the contrary is what the Lord said to 
his disciples in Luke 10:16: who hears you, 
hears me. Therefore, the precept of the Church 
has the same strength (firmitatem) as the 
precept of God. But the Church has sometimes 
prohibited and sometimes allowed certain 
degrees that the Old Law did not prohibit. 
Therefore these degrees impede marriage. 
Moreover, just as at one time the 
marriages of the Gentiles were dispensed by 
civil laws, so now they are by the statutes of 
the Church. But formerly the civil law 
determined the degrees of consanguinity that 
impede marriage and which ones don't. 
Therefore, now also this can be done by the 
statutes of the Church. 
I answer that according to different times, 
consanguinity has impeded marriage at 
different degrees. For in the beginning of the 
human race only the father and mother were 
barred from marriage to their children, for at 
that time there was a scarcity of men, and it 
was necessary to expend the greatest care for 
the propagation of the human race; wherefore 
no one was to be excluded except those persons 
who were inadmissible to marriage according 
to the chief end of marriage, which is the good 
of offspring, as was said. But after the human 
race had increased, many persons were ruled 
out by the law of Moses, which already began 
to restrain concupiscence; for which reason, as 
Rabbi Moses says, all those persons were 
barred from marriage who were accustomed to 
live together in one family; for if among them 
carnal intimacy could legally take place, it 
would have presented a great incentive to 
sensual desire. But the Old Law permitted other 
degrees of consanguinity; indeed, in a certain 
way, it even commanded them; as, for example, 
each man took his wife from among his blood 
relations, so that there would be no confusion 
about the succession; for in those days the 
divine worship was propagated by the 
succession of the race. But afterward, in the 
New Law, which is a law of spirit and love, 
many degrees of consanguinity were 
prohibited; for now by spiritual grace, not by 
carnal origin, is worship handed on and 
increased; for which reason it was necessary 
that men withdraw more from carnal things to 
be free for the spiritual things, and so that love 
would be diffused more widely; and thus, 
formerly, it was impeded up to more remote 
degrees of consanguinity, so that for many, a 
natural friendship would endure because of 
consanguinity and affinity; and reasonably up 
to the seventh degree, both because at that time 
the memory of the common root did not remain 
so easily beyond the seventh degree; and 
because it corresponded to the seven-fold grace 
of the Holy Spirit. But afterward, in recent 
times, the prohibition of the Church was 
restricted to the first four degrees; for it was 
useless and dangerous to prohibit the degrees 
of consanguinity beyond that. Useless indeed, 
for to more remote blood relatives there is 
hardly any bond of greater friendship than to 
strangers, with charity growing cold in many 
hearts. But it was dangerous, because while 
concupiscence and negligence were prevailing 
all the same, men did not keep track of the 
great number of their blood relations. And in 
this way a snare was hurled into the path of 
many by the prohibition of the more remote 
290 
 
degrees of consanguinity resulting in 
damnation. And the prohibition mentioned, 
reaching to the fourth degree, is appropriately 
strict enough; both because people are 
accustomed to living together up to the fourth 
generation, and so the memory of 
consanguinity cannot be effaced, for which 
reason the Lord threatens that the sins of the 
parents will be visited upon the sons up to the 
third and fourth generation; and because in any 
generation the mixture of blood, which causes 
consanguinity when it is the same, is newly 
combined with the blood of others; and when it 
is mixed with others, it is removed that much 
from the first ones. And since there are four 
elements, of which any one is more easily 
mixable to the degree that it is finer, so that in 
the first commingling, the identity of the blood 
is diluted as concerns the first element, which 
is the most subtle; in the second commingling, 
as to the second element; in the third, as to the 
third element; in the fourth as to the fourth 
element; and thus carnal union can decently 
happen again after the fourth generation. 
1. Just as God does not join those who are 
joined against the divine precept, so he does 
not join those who are joined against the 
precept of the Church, which has the same 
power of obliging as divine precept. 
2. Marriage is not only a sacrament, but 
also an office; and thus it is more subject to the 
ordering of the ministers of the Church than 
baptism, which is only a sacrament; for 
spiritual contracts and duties are determined by 
the laws of the Church just as human contracts 
and duties are determined by human laws. 
3. Although the bond of consanguinity is 
natural, nevertheless it is not natural that 
consanguinity impede carnal intimacy, unless 
according to a certain degree, as was said; and 
thus the Church does not make its own decree 
that certain people are or are not 
consanguineous, for in every age they remain 
equally consanguineous; but it decrees that 
carnal intimacy is licit or illicit in different 
degrees of consanguinity according to different 
times. 
4. Arguments such as those ascribed are 
given more in the mode of fittingness and 
proportion (adaptationis et congruentiae) than 
in the mode of cause and necessity. 
5. Now, from what has been said, it is 
clear that there is not the same reason for 
prohibiting degrees of consanguinity at 
different times; for which reason what is 
conceded as practical at a certain time, may be 
more wholesome to prohibit at another. 
6. A statute does not have to do with what 
is past, but with the future; for which reason, if 
at one time the fifth degree was prohibited, 
which is now allowed, those who are now 
joined in the fifth degree need not be separated; 
for no subsequent impediment to marriage can 
invalidate it; and in the same way, the union 
that was a marriage before would not become 
incestuous by the statute of the Church; and 
likewise, if a certain degree were permitted 
which is now prohibited, that union would not 
become matrimonial by the statute of the 
Church by reason of the first contract, for they 
could separate if they wished; but nevertheless 
they could contract again, and that would be 
another union. 
7. In prohibiting degrees of consanguinity, 
the Church particularly observes the reason of 
love; and since there is not less reason of love 
for a grandson than for a paternal uncle, but 
rather a greater one--as a father is said to be 
closer to his son than the son to his father in 
Book 8 of the Ethics--because of this it 
prohibits the degrees of consanguinity equally 
among uncles and grandsons. But in 
prohibiting persons the Old Law attempted to 
restrict concupiscence especially as regards 
cohabitation, by prohibiting those persons to 
whom the access was more easily open because 
of living together. But it is more customary for 
a grand-daughter to live together with an uncle 
than for an aunt to live with a grandson; for a 
daughter is almost the same with her father, 
since she is something of his; but a sister is not 
in this way the same as her brother, since she is 
not something of his, but rather born from the 
same; and thus there was not the same reason 
for prohibiting niece and an aunt. 
Exposition 
Since it does not calculate the trunk 
among the degrees. He calls the root of 
consanguinity the trunk, which is the father of 
sons. But the principle of a certain genus can be 
taken in two ways. In one way, the principle is 
what is in that genus, as if we say the first part 
of a line is the principle. In another way, the 
principle is what does not receive the 
predication of the genus, as the principle of a 
line is said to be a point; and in this way the 
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principle and root of consanguinity can be said 
in two ways. 
In one way the first person himself by 
whom consanguinity is said, which person is 
not consanguineous, but the principle of 
consanguinity; and according to this, a son who 
is removed from the person of his father, makes 
the first degree of distance, and the son of the 
son makes the second, and so on in succession. 
In another way, the first consanguinity is what 
is the cause of every other consanguinity; and 
thus the very consanguinity that is between 
father and son, is established as the root, and 
according to that the father and son are counted 
as one principle, from whom the son of the son 
is removed by the first consanguinity; and thus 
this distance makes the first degree and so on in 
succession; and according to this the 
calculation of degrees is made differently in the 
text. But the first way of calculating is more in 
common use. 
Just as in six ages the generation of the 
world and of the state of man is marked; so the 
closeness of the race is terminated at so many 
degrees. In the world, the ages are not assigned 
as to substance, for this will endure in 
perpetuity; but as to state, for thus the world 
will pass away, and thus it grows old and 
declines; and according to this the ages of the 
world are distinguished metaphorically by their 
likeness to the age of one man. For the ages in 
man are differentiated according to different 
notable changes in his states. For this reason, 
the first age is called infancy, up until the 
seventh year; the second, childhood, is up to 
the fourteenth year; the third, adolescence, to 
the twentieth year; which three ages are 
sometimes counted as one; the fourth is youth 
up to fifty years; but the fifth age is old age 
[senectus], to seventy years; the sixth is 
senium, until the end. And likewise, in the 
world, the first age is said to be from Adam 
until Noah, in which was the institution of the 
human race and the fall; the second from Noah 
to Abraham, in which was the destruction of 
the human race by the flood and its renewal; 
the third from Abraham to David, in which the 
institution of circumcision happened; the fourth 
from David until the exile in Babylon, in which 
the law flourished under the kings and 
prophets; the fifth from the exile in Babylon 
until Christ, in which the captivity and 
liberation of the people occurred; the sixth 
from Christ until the end, in which there is the 
redemption of the human race. But 
nevertheless, it is not necessary that the ages of 
the human race be completed by an equal 
number of years, since neither are the ages of 
one man; for the last age of man sometimes has 
as much as all the previous. 
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DISTINCTION 41 
Prologue 
After the Master has considered the 
impediment of consanguinity, here he considers 
the impediment to marriage that arises from 
affinity; and this is divided into two parts: in 
the first he shows how affinity impedes 
marriage; in the second he gives the names of 
affinity, where he says: that is also to be noted 
in Alexander, etc. The first is in three: in the 
first he shows how affinity impedes marriage, 
just as consanguinity does; in the second he 
shows how a marriage may be dissolved 
because of consanguinity and affinity, where he 
says: and it should be known that the Church 
separates those joined within the designated 
degrees of consanguinity; in the third, he 
considers incest, in which the bond of 
consanguinity and affinity is violated by carnal 
intimacy, by differentiating from other vices of 
the same genus, where he says: here it must be 
said that fornication is one thing, sexual 
defilement (stuprum) is another, etc. The first 
is in two parts: in the first he shows that affinity 
from a marriage already contracted impedes 
marriage; in the second he inquires whether 
affinity remains once the marriage that caused 
it is over, where he says: that is not to be 
overlooked what Gregory wrote to a revered 
bishop. 
The first is in two parts: in the first he 
shows up to which degree affinity impedes 
marriage, just as consanguinity does; in the 
second, he objects to the contrary, and resolves 
it, where he says: but others seem to grant in 
the fifth generation a conjugal union may be 
contracted between those related by marriage. 
Here five things are to be asked: 1) 
concerning the cause of affinity; 2) whether it 
impedes marriage, as consanguinity does; 3) 
concerning the illegitimate children who are the 
result of this impediment to marriage; 4) 
concerning incest, which someone incurs by 
the violation of consanguinity and affinity 5) 
concerning the separation of a marriage that 
happens because of consanguinity and affinity. 
Article 1 
Whether affinity is caused by the marriage of two 
consanguineous people 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that affinity is not caused in 
someone by the marriage of a blood relation. 
For whatever is the cause of a thing being such, 
is yet more so. But a woman taken in marriage 
is not related to her husband's family members, 
except by reason of her husband. Therefore 
since she does not have affinity to her husband, 
neither will she have an affinity with his 
relatives. 
2. Furthermore, of those who are separated 
from each other, if something is joined to one 
of them, it is not necessary on account of this 
that it be joined to the other. But the blood 
relations are already separated from each other. 
Therefore, it is not necessary that if a certain 
woman is joined to a certain man, because of 
this she is related to all his relations by affinity. 
3. Furthermore, relations arise from 
certain unions. But no uniting occurs among 
family members, by the fact that a man takes a 
wife. Therefore, a relation of affinity does not 
grow up between them. 
But to the contrary, a man and wife are 
made one flesh. If therefore a man is related 
according to the flesh to all those 
consanguineous to him, a woman will also be 
related in the same way to the same people. 
Moreover, this is clear from the authorities 
cited in the text. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Again. It seems that after the death of 
the husband, affinity does not remain between 
his wife and his relatives. For when the cause 
ceases, the effect ceases. But the cause of 
affinity was marriage, which ceased in the 
death of the man: for then the woman is freed 
from the rule of her husband, as is said in 
Romans 7. Therefore, the affinity mentioned 
does not remain either. 
2. Furthermore, consanguinity causes 
affinity. But consanguinity to the man's 
relatives ceases by the death of the man. 
Therefore, the affinity of his wife with them 
does as well. 
But to the contrary, affinity is caused by 
consanguinity. But consanguinity is a perpetual 
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bond as long as the persons live between whom 
there is consanguinity. Therefore, it is the same 
with affinity; and thus affinity is not dissolved 
when the marriage is dissolved by the death of 
the third person. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Again. It seems that illicit sleeping 
together does not cause affinity. For affinity is 
a certain decent (honesta) thing. But decent 
things are not caused by indecent things. 
Therefore, affinity cannot be caused by 
indecent sleeping together. 
2. Furthermore, where there is 
consanguinity, there cannot be affinity: for 
affinity is a closeness of persons arising from 
carnal intimacy, lacking any kinship. But 
sometimes it would happen to those who are 
consanguineous that they would have an 
affinity with each other, if illicit sleeping 
together caused affinity; as when a man 
carnally knows a woman who is 
consanguineous with him in an incestuous way. 
Therefore, affinity is not caused by illicit 
sleeping together. 
3. Furthermore, illicit sleeping together 
can be according to nature or against nature. 
But affinity is not caused by illicit sleeping 
together against nature, as the laws determine. 
Therefore, neither is it caused by only illicit 
sleeping together according to nature. 
But to the contrary is that someone 
cleaving to a prostitute is made one flesh with 
her, as is evident from 1 Corinthians 6. But 
because of this, marriage caused affinity. 
Therefore by the same reasoning, illicit 
sleeping together does. 
Moreover, fleshly intercourse is the cause 
of affinity, as is clear from the definition of 
affinity, which runs: affinity is the relationship 
of persons that arises from fleshly intercourse, 
lacking any kinship. But fleshly intercourse 
also happens in illicit sleeping together. 
Therefore, illicit sleeping together causes 
affinity. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
1. Again. It seems that no affinity can be 
caused by a betrothal. For affinity is a perpetual 
bond. But betrothals are sometimes broken. 
Therefore they cannot be the cause of affinity. 
2. Furthermore, if someone violated some 
woman and penetrated her, but did not succeed 
in bringing the act to consummation, affinity is 
not contracted by this. But that kind of act is 
closer to carnal intimacy than someone who 
contracts a betrothal. Therefore, affinity is not 
caused by a betrothal. 
3. Furthermore, in a betrothal, all that is 
done is a certain pledge of future nuptials. But 
sometimes a pledge is made of future nuptials, 
and no affinity is contracted by this; for 
example, if it were done before seven years of 
age, or if someone having a perpetual 
impediment depriving him of the power of 
sexual intercourse were pledged to marry a 
certain woman; or if such a betrothal were done 
between persons for whom marriage was 
rendered illicit because of a vow, or something 
else of that kind. Therefore a betrothal cannot 
be the cause of affinity. 
But to the contrary is that Pope Alexander 
III prohibited a certain woman from being 
united with a certain man in marriage, for she 
had been promised to his brother. But this 
would not be unless affinity were contracted by 
betrothals. Therefore, etc. 
Quaestiuncula 5 
1. Again. It seems that also affinity is the 
cause of affinity. For Pope Julius says in Cap. 
Contradicimus, 35, Question 3: no man may 
take to wife the abandoned relative of his own 
wife; and in the following chapter it says that 
two women related to each other are prohibited 
from marrying the same man, one after the 
other. But this would only be by reason of the 
affinity that is contracted by the union to 
someone with an affinity. Therefore, affinity is 
a cause of affinity. 
2. Furthermore, carnal commingling unites 
just as propagation of the flesh does: for the 
degrees of affinity and consanguinity are 
counted equally. But consanguinity is the cause 
of affinity. Therefore, also affinity is. 
3. Furthermore, two things that are equal 
to a third are equal to each other. But the wife 
of a certain man becomes related in the same 
way to all his family members. Therefore, all 
her husband's relatives become one with all 
those who are related to the wife by affinity; 
and thus affinity is the cause of affinity. 
But to the contrary, if affinity is caused by 
affinity, someone who knew two women would 
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be unable to marry either of them, for 
according to this one woman would have an 
affinity with the other. But this is false. 
Therefore, affinity does not cause affinity. 
Moreover, if affinity arose from affinity, 
someone contracting with the wife of a 
deceased man would have an affinity to all 
those consanguineous with the previous 
husband, to whom the woman had an affinity. 
But this cannot be, for he would have too many 
affinities through the dead man. Therefore... 
Moreover, consanguinity is a stronger 
bond than affinity. But those consanguineous to 
a wife do not have an affinity to those 
consanguineous with the husband. Therefore, 
much less would those who have an affinity 
with the wife acquire an affinity with his 
relatives; and thus the same as the first. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question, that a certain 
natural friendship is founded on a sharing at the 
level of nature, as was said above. But there are 
two ways of sharing something in common at 
the natural level, according to the Philosopher 
in Book 8 of the Ethics. 
In one way, by the propagation of the 
flesh; in another way, by the union that is 
ordered to the propagation of the flesh; for 
which reason he himself says in the same place 
that the friendship of a husband and wife is 
natural. Wherefore, just as a person connected 
to another through propagation of the flesh 
forms a certain bond of natural friendship, so 
also if they are joined by carnal intimacy. But 
the difference is this, that a person connected to 
another through propagation of the flesh, like 
the son to the father, becomes a sharer of the 
same root and blood; wherefore the son is tied 
with the same kind of bond to his father's 
relatives as the father was tied, namely, in 
consanguinity, although according to another 
degree, because of his greater distance from the 
root. But persons united by carnal intimacy do 
not become sharers of the same root, but joined 
almost extrinsically; and thus by this another 
kind of bond is made, which is called affinity; 
and this is what is stated in this verse: the bride 
changes the genus, but the daughter changes 
the degree: for in fact the person connected by 
generation falls into the same genus, but in a 
different degree. But by carnal intimacy, 
someone falls into another genus. 
1. Although the cause is more powerful 
than the effect, it is nevertheless not always 
necessary that the same name befits cause and 
effect: for sometimes what is in the effect is 
found in the cause not in the same way, but in 
another way: and thus the same name does not 
fit cause and effect, neither by the same ratio, 
as is evident in all causes acting equivocally; 
and in this way the union of a husband and wife 
is stronger than the union of a wife to the 
blood-relatives of her husband; but nonetheless, 
it should not be called affinity, but marriage, 
which is a certain unity, just as a man is the 
same thing as himself, not consanguineous with 
himself. 
2. Those who are consanguineous are 
separated in a certain way, and in a certain way 
connected; and by reason of this connection it 
happens that a person who is joined to one, in 
some way is joined to all; but because of the 
separation and distance it happens that the 
person who is joined to one in one way, is 
joined to the others in another way, either 
according to another genus, or according to 
another degree. 
3. Sometimes a relation arises from the 
motion of either of two extremes, like paternity 
and filiation; and such a relation is real in both 
parties. But sometimes it arises from the 
motion of only one of them; and this can 
happen in two ways. In one way when the 
relation arises from the movement of one 
without the movement of the other either 
preceding or concomitantly, as is seen in the 
creature and Creator, and in sensible things and 
the senses, and in knowing and the knowable 
thing; and then the relation is real in one party, 
and in the other, it is only rational. In another 
way, when it arises from the movement of one 
without any movement of the other at that time, 
but not without a movement beforehand; just as 
an equality can happen between two men by 
the growth of one, without the other growing or 
diminishing; but still the first arrives at this 
quantity which he has by a certain movement 
or change; and thus in both extremes the 
relation is real. And it is similar with 
consanguinity and affinity: for the relation of 
brotherhood, which arises when a certain child 
is born, to someone who is already older, is 
indeed caused without any movement of the 
one already existing, but by the motion (namely 
of his being generated) of the one coming forth: 
for here it happens that by the movement of 
another, a relation such as this arises in the first 
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person. Likewise, by the fact that someone is 
descended by his own generation from the 
same root as another man, an affinity with the 
man's wife comes into being in him without 
any new change of his own. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it must be said that 
any relation ceases to be in one of two ways. 
In one way, from the corruption of the 
subject; in another way, by taking away the 
cause; just as likeness ceases to be when one of 
two like things dies, or when the qualities that 
were the cause of the likeness are taken away. 
But there are certain relations which have for 
their cause an action or a passion, or a motion, 
as is said in Book 5 of the Metaphysics: of 
which certain things are caused by motion, as 
long as something is actually moving, like the 
very relation which is between mover and 
moved; but certain things inasmuch as they 
have an aptitude to motion, like the motion and 
the moveable thing, and the master and slave; 
but certain things, from the fact that something 
was moved before, in the way a father and son 
are related to each other, not from a being-
generated now, but from having been 
generated. But an aptitude to movement, and 
even being in motion itself, pass away; but to-
have-been-moved is perpetual; for what has 
been done can never cease to have been done; 
and thus paternity and filiation are never 
destroyed by the destruction of the cause, but 
only by the corruption of the subject at either of 
the two extremes. And likewise, it must be said 
about affinity, which is caused by the fact that 
certain people have been joined, not that they 
are joined; wherefore it is not dissolved in 
those persons remaining, between whom the 
affinity was contracted, even if the person by 
reason of whom it was contracted should die. 
1. The union of matrimony causes affinity 
not only according to what is actually joined, 
but also according to what was conjoined 
before. 
2. Consanguinity is not the proximate 
cause of affinity, but the union to someone 
consanguineousâ€”not only the union that is 
now, but the one that was; and because of this 
the argument does not follow. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third it should be said that 
according to the Philosopher in Book 8 of the 
Ethics, the union of a husband and wife is 
called natural principally because of the 
bringing forth of children, and secondarily 
because of the sharing of works. And of these 
two, the first pertains to marriage by reason of 
carnal intimacy; but the second inasmuch as it 
is a certain partnership in common life. But the 
first of these is found in any carnal intimacy 
where there is commingling of seeds, for from 
any union like this children can be produced, 
although the second kind of union may be 
lacking; and thus, since marriage causes 
affinity because of a certain carnal 
commingling, also fornication causes affinity, 
in so far as it possesses something of the 
natural union. 
1. In fornication there is something 
natural, which is common to fornication and 
matrimony, and it causes affinity from that 
aspect: but there is something else disordered 
here by which it is divided from marriage; and 
from that aspect affinity is not caused; 
wherefore affinity always remains decent, 
although its cause may be in some way 
indecent. 
2. It is not unfitting that opposite relations 
belong to the same person by reason of 
different things; and thus there can be affinity 
and consanguinity between some two persons 
not only by illicit sleeping together, but also by 
licit sleeping together; as when my relative on 
my father's side takes to wife my relative on 
my mother's side; wherefore what is said in the 
definition of affinity that was set forth, lacking 
any line of descent, is to be understood in this 
way. But neither does it follow that someone 
who knows his own relative forms an affinity 
with himself; for affinity, like consanguinity, 
requires diversity, just as likeness does. 
3. Intercourse against nature does not 
include the commingling of seed which could 
be a cause of generation; and thus, from such 
sleeping together no affinity is caused. 
Quaestiuncula 4 
To the fourth question it should be said 
that just as a betrothal does not contain the full 
notion of marriage, but it is a certain 
preparation for marriage, so affinity is not 
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caused by betrothal as it is caused by marriage, 
but rather something like affinity, which is 
called the justice of public propriety which 
impedes marriage, just as affinity and 
consanguinity do, and according to the same 
degrees; and it is defined in this way: the 
justice of public propriety is a close 
relationship arising between betrothed people, 
deriving strength from the institution of the 
Church because of its propriety. From this the 
reason for its name and its cause are clear; for, 
namely, such a close relationship was instituted 
by the Church for the sake of propriety. 
1. Betrothal, not by reason of itself, but by 
reason of that to which it is ordered, causes this 
kind of affinity, which is called the justice of 
public decency; and thus as marriage is a 
perpetual bond, so also is the mode of affinity 
mentioned. 
2. A man and a woman are made one flesh 
in carnal intimacy by the commingling of seed; 
wherefore, however much someone breaches 
and breaks the "gates of chastity" (the hymen), 
unless a commingling of seed results, affinity is 
not contracted from this. But marriage causes 
affinity not only by reason of carnal intimacy, 
but also by reason of the conjugal partnership, 
according to which marriage is also natural; for 
which reason affinity is also contracted by the 
contract of marriage itself, contracted in terms 
of the present, before carnal intimacy; and 
likewise, also by betrothal, in which a certain 
pact of conjugal partnership is made, 
something like affinity is contracted, namely 
the justice of public propriety. 
3. Any impediments that prevent 
betrothals from being betrothals, prevent 
affinity from happening from the pledge of 
marriage. For which reason, if a betrothal were 
contracted, while having a defect of age, or 
having a solemn vow of continence, or any 
impediment of this kind, no affinity results 
from this. Since the betrothal is nullified, 
neither is there any mode of affinity. But if 
someone younger, having a perpetual 
impediment, either impotent, or cursed, should 
contract a betrothal with an adult after the age 
of seven but before the years of puberty, the 
justice of public propriety is contracted by this 
contract; for up to that point there was nothing 
actually impeding, since at that age an impotent 
child and a non-impotent one are equally 
incapable with regard to the act. 
Quaestiuncula 5 
There are two modes in which something 
comes forth from something else. According to 
one, it comes forth in likeness of species, as a 
human is generated by a human; according to 
the other, it comes forth unlike in species, and 
this coming forth is always in an inferior 
species, as is evident in all equivocal agents. 
But no matter how often the first mode of 
procession is repeated, the same species always 
remains, for example when a human is 
generated by another human through an act of 
the generative power, this man will also 
generate a human, and so on in succession. But 
just as it makes another species in the first 
instance, the second mode will make a new 
species as often as it is repeated; for example, 
what comes from moving a point is not a point 
but a line, for the movement of a point makes a 
line; but from a line moved linearly, a line does 
not come forth, but a plane; and from a plane, a 
three-dimensional body; and beyond that there 
can be no further progress by a mode of 
proceeding like this. But we find two modes in 
the procession of relationships, by which a 
bond like this is caused. The one, by 
propagation of the flesh, and this always makes 
the same species of relationship; the other by 
marital union, and this makes another species 
in the beginning; as it is evident from the fact 
that a married woman does not become 
consanguineous with her husband's relatives, 
but establishes an affinity. 
Wherefore, even if this mode of 
proceeding is repeated, it will not be affinity, 
but another genus of relationship; for which 
reason the person who is joined maritally to 
someone with an affinity, does not have an 
affinity himself, but it is another kind of 
affinity, which is called the second kind. And 
vice versa, if someone is joined by marriage to 
someone with an affinity of the second kind, he 
will not have an affinity of the second kind, but 
of a third; as is shown in the verse cited above: 
the bride changes genus, the daughter changes 
degree. 
And these two kinds were formerly 
prohibited because of the justice of public 
propriety more than because of affinity, for 
they fall short of true affinity, just like that 
relationship which is contracted by betrothal; 
but now that prohibition has ceased, and only 
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the first genus of affinity, in which there is true 
affinity, remains under prohibition. 
1. The male relative of a certain man's 
wife has an affinity of the first kind with that 
man, and the relative's wife has an affinity of 
the second kind; wherefore, once the relative 
dies, who had an affinity, the man could not 
take her as his wife because of the second kind 
of affinity. Also, in the same way, if someone 
marries a widow, the relatives of the first 
husband, who have an affinity of the first kind 
with the wife, acquire an affinity of the second 
kind with the second husband, and the wife of 
that blood relative, who has an affinity of the 
second kind with the wife of this man, has an 
affinity of the third kind with the second 
husband. And since the third kind was 
prohibited for the sake of a certain propriety, 
more than because of affinity, for this reason 
the canon says, the justice of public propriety 
objects to two wives of consanguineous men 
marrying one husband, one after the other. But 
now that prohibition has ceased. 
2. Although carnal union does join, it does 
not join in the same kind of union. 
3. The wife of a man acquires the same 
relationship to his blood relatives as to degree, 
but not in the same genus of relationship. 
But since the arguments that are brought 
forth in opposition seem to show that no bond 
is caused by affinity, the other arguments must 
be answered, lest the old prohibition in the 
Church should seem unreasonable. 
4. To the fourth then, it must be said that a 
woman does not acquire an affinity of the first 
kind with the man to whom she is carnally 
united, as is clear from what has been said. 
Wherefore commonly two women who were 
known carnally by the same man have an 
affinity of the second kind with each other; 
wherefore, to the man taking one of them as his 
wife the other has an affinity of the third kind; 
and thus not even the old laws prohibited them 
from being linked successively with by the 
same man. 
5. Just as a man does not have an affinity 
of the first kind with his own wife, neither does 
he acquire an affinity of the second kind to the 
second husband of the same wife; and thus the 
argument does not proceed. 
6. One person cannot be connected to me 
by the mediation of another, unless both of 
them are connected with each other; wherefore, 
no person can be related to me through a 
woman who has an affinity to me, unless he or 
she is connected to that woman. But this cannot 
be except by propagation of the flesh from her; 
or because of marital union to her; and either 
way, according to the old laws, a certain 
relationship was established to me through the 
aforesaid woman; for even her son by another 
man has an affinity to me of the same kind, but 
in another degree, as is evident from the rules 
already given. And again, her second husband 
has an affinity to me of the second kind, but the 
other blood relatives of that woman are not 
connected to him; but she herself either is 
united with them as to a father and mother, 
inasmuch as she proceeds from them, or from 
the same principle, as to brothers; wherefore, 
the brother or father of someone with an 
affinity to me does not have an affinity to me of 
any kind. 
Article 2 
Whether affinity impedes marriage 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that affinity does not impede 
marriage. For nothing impedes marriage unless 
it is contrary to it. But affinity is not contrary to 
marriage, for it is its effect. Therefore, it does 
not impede marriage. 
2. By marriage a wife is made something 
of her husband's. But the blood relatives of a 
deceased man succeed him in his belongings. 
Therefore, they can succeed him with his wife, 
to whom an affinity still remains, as was 
shown. Therefore, affinity does not impede 
marriage. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Leviticus 18:8: thou shall not reveal the 
nakedness of your father's wife. But that 
woman only has an affinity with you. 
Therefore, affinity impedes marriage. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Again. It seems that affinity also has 
degrees of its own. For every close relationship 
has certain degrees of its own. But affinity is a 
certain close relationship. Therefore, it has 
degrees in itself apart from the degrees of 
consanguinity that cause it. 
2. Furthermore, in the text it says that the 
progeny of the second union cannot receive the 
inheritance of the first husband. But this would 
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not be unless the son of one person with an 
affinity also had an affinity himself. Therefore, 
affinity has degrees of its own, like 
consanguinity. 
But to the contrary, affinity is caused by 
consanguinity. Therefore, also all degrees of 
affinity are caused by degrees of consanguinity; 
and thus it does not have any degrees per se. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Again. It seems that the degrees of 
affinity do not extend like the degrees of 
consanguinity. For the bond of affinity is less 
strong than that of consanguinity, since affinity 
is caused by consanguinity in diversity of 
species, as by an equivocal cause. But the 
stronger the bond, the longer consanguinity 
lasts. Therefore, the bond of affinity does not 
last up to as many degrees as consanguinity. 
2. Furthermore, human law must imitate 
divine law. But according to divine law, some 
degrees of consanguinity were prohibited, in 
which degrees affinity did not impede 
marriage; just as is evident regarding the wife 
of one's brother, whom someone could marry if 
he were dead, but not his own sister. Therefore, 
also now there should not be an equal 
prohibition concerning affinity as concerning 
consanguinity. 
But to the contrary, it is from the very fact 
that someone is joined to my blood relative, 
that she has an affinity to me. Therefore, in 
whatever degree a man is consanguineous with 
me, to that degree will his wife have an affinity 
with me; and thus the degrees of affinity must 
be calculated in the same number as the 
degrees of consanguinity. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that affinity 
preceding marriage impedes it from being 
contracted, and nullifies the contract by the 
same reason that consanguinity does; for just as 
there is a certain necessity in blood relatives 
living together, so also with those who have an 
affinity; and just as there is a certain bond of 
friendship among blood relatives, so also 
among those with an affinity. But if the affinity 
should arise after the marriage, it does not 
nullify it, as was said above. 
1. Affinity is not opposed to the marriage 
by which it is caused, but it is opposed to the 
marriage that would be contracted with 
someone with whom one has an affinity, 
inasmuch as it impedes the multiplication of 
friendship, and the repression of 
concupiscence, which are sought through 
marriage. 
2. The things possessed by a man are not 
made into something one with him, as his wife 
becomes one flesh with him; wherefore just as 
consanguinity impedes a union with the man, 
so also with the wife of the man. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that a thing is not divided by an essential 
division, unless by reason of what belongs to it 
according to its own genus, as animal is 
divided by rational and irrational, but not by 
white or black. But the propagation of the flesh 
is related to consanguinity essentially, for the 
bond of consanguinity is contracted by it 
immediately; but to affinity it is not connected 
except by means of consanguinity, which is its 
cause. Wherefore, since the degrees of 
relationship are distinguished by the 
propagation of the flesh, the distinction of 
degrees has to do with consanguinity 
essentially and immediately, but with affinity 
only by means of consanguinity; and thus for 
finding the degrees of affinity there is the 
general rule that in whatever degree of 
consanguinity a man is related to me, his wife 
is related to me in that degree of affinity. 
1. Degrees in closeness of relationship 
cannot be taken except according to ascent and 
descent of propagation, for which affinity is not 
calculated, unless by means of consanguinity; 
and thus affinity does not have degrees of its 
own, but taken on a par with the degrees of 
consanguinity. 
2. The son of someone who has an affinity 
with me by another marriage, in former times 
was said to have an affinity, not speaking per 
se, but per accidens. For which reason he was 
prohibited from marriage more because of the 
justice of public honesty than because of an 
affinity, and because of this also that 
prohibition has been revoked. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
By the fact that the degree of affinity is 
taken according to the degree of consanguinity, 
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it is necessary that there be as many degrees of 
affinity as the degrees of consanguinity. But 
nevertheless, since affinity is less of a bond 
than consanguinity, both in former times and 
now a dispensation was given more easily in 
the remote degrees of affinity than in the 
remote degrees of consanguinity. 
1. That inferiority of the bond of affinity 
with respect to consanguinity makes a 
difference in the kind of relationship, not in its 
degree; and so that argument is not to the point. 
2. A brother could not take the wife of his 
own deceased brother, unless in the case that he 
had died without offspring, so that he might 
revive the seed of his brother: because then it 
was required, when religious worship was 
multiplied by the propagation of the flesh; 
which now does not take place; and thus it is 
clear that he was not taking her as his wife as 
though conducting his own person, but as it 
were, supplying the lack of his brother. 
Article 3 
Whether sons who are born outside of a valid 
marriage are illegitimate 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that sons who are born outside 
of a valid marriage are not illegitimate. For a 
legitimate son is said to be born according to 
the law of nature. But any son is born at least 
according to the law of nature, for it is the 
strongest. Therefore, any son is legitimate. 
2. Furthermore, it is commonly said that a 
legitimate son is someone who is born of a 
legitimate marriage, or one that is considered 
legitimate before the Church. But it sometimes 
happens that a certain marriage is considered 
legitimate in the eyes of the Church which has 
an impediment from being a valid marriage; 
and nevertheless it is known by those 
contracting before the Church, and if they 
marry secretly, and they don't know the 
impediment, it seems legitimate before the 
Church, by the fact that they are not prohibited 
by the Church. Therefore, the sons born outside 
valid marriage are not illegitimate. 
But to the contrary, something is said to be 
illegitimate which is against the law. But those 
who are born outside of marriage are against 
the law. Therefore they are illegitimate. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Again. It seems that the illegitimate 
sons should not suffer any disadvantage by it. 
For a son should not be punished for the sin of 
his father, as is clear from the sentence of the 
Lord in Ezekiel 18. But that someone is born 
from illicit intercourse is not his own sin, but 
the sin of his father. Therefore, he should not 
incur any damage from this. 
2. Furthermore, human justice has its 
exemplar in divine justice. But God deals out 
natural goods equally to legitimate and 
illegitimate sons. Therefore also according to 
human law, illegitimate sons should be made 
equal with legitimate ones. 
But to the contrary is what is said in 
Genesis 25, that Abraham gave all his goods to 
Isaac and to the sons of his concubines, gifts 
were given; and nevertheless, those were not 
born by illicit intercourse. Therefore, much 
more should those who are born by illicit 
intercourse suffer this disadvantage, that they 
don't succeed in their paternal goods. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Again. It seems that an illegitimate son 
cannot be legitimized. For the legitimate son is 
as far removed from the illegitimate, as the 
converse, the illegitimate removed from the 
legitimate. But a legitimate son is never made 
illegitimate. Therefore, neither is an 
illegitimate one made legitimate. 
2. Furthermore, illegitimate intercourse 
causes an illegitimate son. But illegitimate 
intercourse never becomes legitimate. 
Therefore, neither can an illegitimate son be 
made legitimate. 
But to the contrary, what is decreed by the 
law can be revoked by the law. But the 
illegitimacy of sons is appointed by positive 
law. Therefore an illegitimate son can be 
legitimized by whoever has the authority of 
law. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that the status 
of sons is four-fold. For certain ones are natural 
and legitimate, like those who are born from 
legitimate marriage. Certain are natural and 
illegitimate, as sons who are born from simple 
fornication. Certain are legitimate and not 
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natural, like adoptive sons. And some are 
neither legitimate nor natural, like bastards 
(spurii), born from adultery or rape: for such 
are born both against positive law and 
expressly against the law of nature. And in this 
way it must be granted that certain sons are 
illegitimate. 
1. Although those who are born from 
illicit intercourse are born according to the 
nature that is common to men and other 
animals, yet they are born against the law of 
nature that is proper to men: for fornication and 
adultery and things of this kind are against the 
law of nature; and thus according to no law are 
such as these legitimate. 
2. Ignorance excuses illicit intercourse 
from sin, unless it is feigned; wherefore, those 
who come together in good faith before the 
Church, although there may be an impediment, 
provided that they do not know of it, they do 
not sin, nor are their sons illegitimate. But if 
they know, although the Church, which does 
not know the impediment, supports them, they 
are not excused from sin, nor are their sons 
from illegitimacy. But if they do not know, and 
they contract secretly, they are not excused, for 
such ignorance seems pretended. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that someone is said to incur damages in two 
ways. In one way, by the fact that something is 
taken away from him that was owed to him; 
and thus an illegitimate son incurs no damage. 
In another way, certitude that something is not 
owed him, that otherwise would have been due 
him, and in this way, an illegitimate son incurs 
two kinds of damage. 
One, because he is not admitted to 
legitimate acts, like offices and dignities, which 
require a certain respectability in those who 
exercise them. They incur another damage 
when they do not succeed to the paternal 
inheritance. But nevertheless natural sons can 
succeed in the sixth part alone, but bastards in 
no part, although by natural law their parents 
are bound to provide for them in necessity; 
wherefore it belongs to the concern of the 
bishop to force each of the parents to provide 
for them. 
1. To incur damages in this second way is 
not a punishment: and thus we do not say that it 
is a punishment for someone who does not 
succeed to the throne of a certain kingdom 
because he is not the son of the king; and 
likewise, it is not a punishment that those 
things that are for legitimate sons are not owed 
to someone who is not legitimate. 
2. Illegitimate intercourse is not against 
the law as an act of the generative power, but 
as it proceeds from a depraved will; and thus 
the illegitimate son does not incur damage in 
those things that are acquired by natural origin, 
but in those things that are done or possessed 
by the will. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third it should be said that an 
illegitimate son can be legitimized, not that he 
can be made born from legitimate intercourse, 
for that intercourse has already passed by, and 
from the fact that it was once illegitimate, it can 
never be made legitimate. But rather he is said 
to be legitimized inasmuch as the damages that 
the illegitimate son incurs are taken away by 
the authority of law. And there are six ways of 
legitimizing: two according to the canons, one 
when someone takes as his wife a woman of 
whom he has borne illegitimate sons, if it was 
not adultery; and the other, by special 
indulgence and dispensation of his lordship the 
Pope. But four other means are according to the 
laws. The first is if the father presents a natural 
son to the court of the Emperor; for by this very 
fact he is legitimized on account of the honor 
(honestatis) of the court. Secondly, if the father 
names him a legitimate heir in his will and the 
son brings forth the will afterward. The third is 
if there is no legitimate son, and the son 
presents himself to the prince. The fourth is if 
the father, acting through a public document, or 
with the signature of three witness, names him 
legitimate, and doesn't add to that "natural". 
1. Favor can be granted to someone 
without injustice; but someone cannot be more 
condemned except because of some fault; and 
thus the illegitimate can be made legitimate 
rather than vice versa: for even if sometimes a 
legitimate son is deprived of his inheritance 
because of fault, he is still not called an 
illegitimate son, for he had a legitimate 
generation. 
2. An illegitimate act has a defect 
inseparable from itself, by which it is opposed 
to the law; and thus it cannot be made 
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legitimate. Nor is it the same with an illegimate 
son, who does not have this kind of defect. 
Article 4 
Whether incest differs in species from other species 
of lust (luxuriae). 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that incest does not differ in 
species from other species of lust which the 
Master touches upon in the text. For matter 
does not diversify species. But those things that 
the Master enumerates in the text do not differ 
except on account of matter. Therefore, they 
are not different species of sin. 
2. Furthermore, Colossians 3 says about 
this: fornication, uncleanness, etc. The 
interlinear gloss says that fornication is all 
lying together contrary to the law of wedlock. 
But incest is one of these. Therefore, it is 
fornication: and so it is not divided in species 
from fornication. 
But to the contrary virtues and vices are 
distinguished in species determined by their 
object. But those things that are here set forth 
are diversified by object. Therefore they differ 
in species. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Again. It seems that he divides the 
species of lust unfittingly. For the Apostle in 
Ephesians 5:3, seems to set forth only two 
species, where it says: Let not fornication and 
all uncleanness . . . be named among you. 
2. Furthermore, in Colossians 3, he sets 
forth four species, namely, fornication, 
uncleanness, concupiscence, and sexual desire 
(libido). 
3. Furthermore, in Galatians 5, another 
four species are set forth; namely fornication, 
uncleanness, impurity (impudicitia), lust 
(luxuria). Therefore, since [the Master] omits 
these species, it seems he divides insufficiently. 
4. Furthermore, the greatest sin in the 
genus of lust (luxuriae) is the sin against 
nature. But he makes no mention of that. 
Therefore, it seems insufficient. 
5. Furthermore, a widow is more removed 
from a prostitute than a virgin from a widow. 
But an act of lust that is commited with a virgin 
is distinguished from that which is committed 
with a widow. Therefore, also that which is 
committed with a widow should be 
distinguished from that which is committed 
with a prostitute. 
6. Furthermore, Isidore says that seduction 
(stuprum) is the illicit deflowering of a virgin, 
when of course the conjugal agreement has not 
preceded. But this is also the case in rape. 
Therefore, rape should not be distinguished 
against seduction. 
7. Furthermore among the species of lust, 
sacrilege is also named, which is committed 
when someone violates a woman consecrated 
to God, or with whom one has a spiritual 
relationship. Therefore, since he omits this, it 
seems insufficient. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Again. It seems that this vice is badly 
ordered. For virginal chastity (castitas) is more 
noble than conjugal chastity. But adultery is 
against conjugal chastity, but seduction is 
against virginal chastity. Therefore seduction is 
a graver sin; and thus it should be placed ahead 
of adultery. 
2. Furthermore, no dispensation can be 
made so that someone may licitly lie together 
with a woman with whom he is committing 
adultery; but it can happen through a certain 
dispensation that someone licitly lies together 
with someone with whom he commits incest; 
as, for example, by a dispensation, he can take 
as his wife a blood relative in the fourth degree, 
with whom it would formerly have been incest. 
Therefore, adultery is a graver sin than incest, 
and thus it should not be overlooked. 
3. Furthermore, for a girl who is carried 
off by force, there can be marriage, when 
violence is not done to her, but to her parents. 
But for that girl who is violated by incest, there 
cannot be marriage. Therefore, adultery is a 
graver sin than incest; and thus it should not be 
overlooked. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question, that as was 
said above, in Distinction 16, Question 3, 
Article 2, questiuncula 3, a sin changes to 
another genus by a circumstance, when it adds 
the deformity of another genus of sin. And 
according to this, these modes of lust that are 
here enumerated, differ in species; for 
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fornication does not carry in itself any other 
deformity but what pertains to the genus of 
lust, for it is a man who is free sleeping with a 
woman who is free; and fornication is named 
from fornix, for beside fornices, that is, 
triumphal arches, and in other places where 
men come together, prostitutes used to 
congregate, and there they were defiled. But 
seduction, which is the illicit deflowering of a 
virgin, adds another deformity, namely, the 
injuring of the woman violated, who is not so 
apt to be married as before; and this injury even 
has a special prohibition of law of its own. 
Likewise, adultery also, which is to violate 
the marital bed of another, adds a special 
deformity of another kind, which is the illicit 
use of what is someone else's, which pertains to 
the genus of injustice. Likewise, also incest, 
which is the abuse of consanguinity or affinity, 
has its name from incendium, fire, either from 
the privation of of chastity, as though by 
rhetorical substitution, for it violates chastity in 
those who are joined by the greatest of bonds, 
and adds this special deformity, namely, the 
violation of the natural bond. Likewise, also 
rape, which is committed when a girl is 
violently abducted from the home of her father, 
that so that the ruined maiden may be had in 
marriage. Whether the force is directed against 
the girl or her parents, it is clear that it adds 
another kind of deformity, namely violence, 
which the law prohibits in any thing 
whatsoever. And so it is clear what are the 
different species of sins; for which reason also 
the circumstances by which they are diversified 
are not to be omitted in confession. 
1. Material diversity in one's purpose 
results in formal diversity of the object; thus 
diversity in species follows. 
2. That species of lust that does not add 
some special deformity of another kind, retains 
the common name to itself, nor is it divided 
against the other species, unless according to 
what is taken with precision of those things that 
are added by other species. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that the species of lust are distinguished first by 
intercourse according to nature and against 
nature. 
But since lust against nature is 
unnameable, let it be left behind. But if the sin 
is intercourse according to nature, then either it 
does not add a certain deformity above the 
genus of lust, and so it is fornication; or it does 
add: and this in two ways; for either regarding 
the mode of acting, and then it is rape, which 
conveys violence; or by the condition of the 
one with whom lust is committed, and this 
condition either is hers absolutely, like 
virginity, and then it is seduction; or it is her 
ordering to something else; and this, either to 
the one lying with her, as the condition of 
consanguinity or affinity is, and thus it is 
incest; or to some other, like marriage; and then 
it is adultery. 
1. Uncleanness is set forth for every 
species of lust that adds a specific deformity 
above the genus of lust; and so it includes the 
other four species. 
2. Those four differences are distinguished 
in this way: for either it is according to nature, 
and so fornication is included as to the exterior 
act, and concupiscence as to the interior act; or 
it is against nature; and so uncleanness is 
according to the exterior act, sexual desire 
according to the interior act, which conveys the 
intensity of concupiscence. 
3. Among these four, fornication pertains 
to a man who is free sleeping with a woman 
who is free; impurity includes adultery and 
incest, just as uncleanness contains the species 
against nature; but lust refers to interior acts. 
4. The Master here considers those species 
according to which they have an order to 
affinity and consanguinity; and since affinity 
does not follow from intercourse against 
nature, for this reason the unnatural species are 
ommitted; and since such lust is not human, but 
bestial, as is said in Book 7 of the Ethics. 
5. By the fact that a virgin is deflowered, 
she incurs a certain damage beyond the damage 
to her chastity, for she is rendered less suitable 
for a subsequent marriage; but this is not the 
case with a widow, nor with a prostitute; and 
thus the argument is not the same. 
6. Rape adds a special deformity above 
seduction, namely violence, and being carried 
off from the father's home; and thus a species 
distinct from seduction is set down. 
7. That sacrilege is reducible to the species 
that was mentioned here; for the violation of 
someone who has taken a vow of continence is 
reducible to seduction, or rather to adultery, 
since the woman is espoused to God; but the 
act that is committed with a woman who is 
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joined to one by spiritual family relationship, is 
reducible to incest. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
To the third question it must be said that 
intercourse is more of a sin to the degree that it 
is removed from matrimonial lying together. 
But among the species here enumerated, a 
certain one is removed from marriage both 
regarding the essence of marriage, and 
regarding its cause; which is consent: and that 
one is rape; and thus it is the greatest sin among 
those which are here enumerated. But others 
are removed from marriage only as regards its 
essence; but this is two-fold; for the woman 
with whom one sleeps is either not joined to 
one in marriage, or she is not joined and cannot 
be joined; and the latter is more removed. 
However, if it is in the first way, either some 
impediment to subsequent marriage is 
established by this lying together, or not; and 
the first of these is more removed. 
However, if it is someone who cannot be 
joined in marriage: either he or she cannot from 
some existing condition, or he cannot simply 
speaking, in perpetuum; and the latter is more 
removed. 
And from this it is clear that simple 
fornication is the least sin among them; for no 
new impediment to subsequent marriage is 
created in the one who is slept with; and after 
this, it is seduction, by which an impediment 
arises in the woman, so that she may not easily 
get married afterward; and after this it is 
adultery, which is lying with a woman who 
cannot be taken as a wife, for her husband is 
alive; and after this it is incest, which is 
committed with a woman who simply speaking 
cannot be one's wife; and after this it is rape, 
which is opposed to marriage not only in its 
essence, but also in its cause. And this is the 
ordering of those according to their own kind 
of considerations. Still the order here can be 
varied according to diverse circumstances. 
Nevertheless, of all of these, the gravest sin is 
the sin against nature. 
1. Adultery is not only a sin because it is 
against chastity, but since it is against divine 
law, because that woman is some man's wife. 
2. Although someone cannot be given a 
dispensation to marry a woman with whom he 
has committed adultery while her husband is 
living: yet in a certain contingent case, he could 
take her as his wife without a 
dispensationâ€”namely, after the death of her 
husband: for the first adultery does not 
invalidate the marriage contracted except in a 
certain case, as was said earlier, in Distinction 
35, in the exposition of the text. 
3. Although afterward she may be taken in 
marriage, if the girl and her parents consent, yet 
as to what pertains to the present, it is most 
greatly removed from marriage, as is clear from 
what has been said. 
Article 5 
Whether a conjugal union that is contracted 
between those consanguineous or with an affinity 
may always be nullified through a separation 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that a conjugal union that is 
contracted between those who have an affinity 
or are consanguineous may not always be 
nullified through a separation. For those whom 
God has joined, man should not separate. 
Therefore since God is understood to do what 
the Church does, which sometimes joins such 
people in ignorance; it seems that if they should 
come into notice afterward, they may not be 
separated. 
2. Furthermore, the bond of marriage is 
more favored than ownership. But a man 
acquires ownership of things that he did not 
own, by court order after having them for a 
long time. Therefore, by enduring a long time, 
a marriage may be ratified, even if before it 
was not authorized. 
3. Furthermore, the same judgment is 
made of like things. But if the marriage were to 
be invalidated because of consanguinity, then 
in that case when two brothers have two sisters 
as their wives, if one is separated because of 
consanguinity, the other ought also to be 
separated for the same reason; which does not 
seem to happen. Therefore, marriage is not to 
be separated because of consanguinity or 
affinity. 
But to the contrary, consanguinity or 
affinity impede the marriage from being 
contracted, and invalidate the contract. 
Therefore, if consanguinity or affinity is 
proved, they must be separated, if they had 
contracted de facto. 
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Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Again. It seems that for the separation 
of a marriage that was contracted between 
people with an affinity or blood relationship, it 
must not proceed by the way of accusation. For 
inscription, by which someone obliges himself 
to damages if he should fail to prove his case, 
precedes accusation. But these things are not 
required when it is a question of the separation 
of a marriage. Therefore, accusation does not 
have a place here. 
2. Furthermore, in a case of marriage, only 
close relatives are heard, as was said. But in 
accusations, also strangers are heard. 
Therefore, in a case of separation of a marriage, 
it is not a matter for the way of accusation. 
3. Furthermore, if a marriage must be 
accused, then particularly this should be done 
when it is less difficult to divide. But this is 
when only a betrothal has been contracted: but 
then a marriage is not accused. Therefore, 
accusation should never be done concerning the 
rest. 
4. Furthermore, in accusation, the way is 
not closed to someone by the fact that he did 
not make his accusation immediately. But this 
does happen in marriage: for if first he was 
silent when the marriage was contracted, he 
cannot afterward accuse the marriage without 
being almost suspect himself. Therefore, etc. 
But to the contrary, everything illicit may 
be accused. But a marriage of people related by 
affinity or consanguinity is illicit. Therefore, an 
accusation can be made concerning it. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Again. It seems that in such a case, 
things should not proceed by witnesses as in 
other cases. For in other cases are brought in 
whoever is the greater in every exception. But 
here, no strangers are admitted, even if they are 
greater in every exception. Therefore, etc. 
2. Furthermore, witnesses suspected of 
private hate or love are barred from testifying. 
But close relatives can most greatly be 
suspected of love for one party, and hatred for 
the other. Therefore, their testimony should not 
be heard. 
3. Furthermore, marriage is more favored 
by the law than other cases, in which it is a 
matter of purely corporeal things. But in those 
things the same person cannot be plaintiff and 
witness. Therefore, also not in marriage, and so 
it seems that in this matter it is not fitting to 
proceed by means of witnesses. 
But to the contrary, witnesses are 
introduced in cases, so that concerning those 
things about which there is doubt, a trustworthy 
judgment may be made. But a trustworthy 
judgment must also be made in this kind of 
case, as in other cases, for it should not hand 
down a verdict on what has not been 
established. Therefore, things do proceed by 
means of witnesses, here as in other cases. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that since all 
lying together outside of legitimate marriage is 
a mortal sin, the Church endeavors to impede it 
in every way, which includes separating those 
between whom there cannot be a valid 
marriage, and particularly those who are 
consanguineous or who have an affinity, who 
cannot contract carnally without incest. 
1. Although the Church is buttressed by 
divine authority and gift, nevertheless insofar 
as it is a congregation of human beings, 
something of human defect enters into its acts, 
because it is not divine; and thus that union that 
happens in the eyes of the Church, when it is 
unaware of an impediment, does not have 
inseparability from divine authority, but it is 
introduced against divine authority by human 
error, which excuses it from sin, since it is an 
error of fact, as long as it lasts; and because of 
this, when the error comes into the notice of the 
Church, it must divide the union described. 
2. Those things that cannot be without sin, 
can be ratified by no court order. For, as 
Innocent says, length of time does not diminish 
sin, but increases it. Nor does the favor that 
marriage enjoys do anything that cannot be 
done between persons ineligible for marriage. 
3. A matter between two people in 
litigation does not prejudice the acts for another 
person; wherefore although one brother may be 
barred from marriage with one of two sisters by 
reason of consanguinity, the Church does not 
because of this divide another marriage which 
has not been called into question. But in the 
forum of conscience it is not always necessary 
that the other brother be obliged to separate 
from his wife, for often such accusations 
proceed from bad will, and are testified by false 
witnesses. 
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Wherefore it is not necessary that he 
inform his own conscience by the decision 
concerning the other marriage. But it seems the 
distinction lies in this. For either he has certain 
knowledge of the impediment to his marriage, 
or this is his opinion, or neither. If the first, he 
should neither demand nor render the debt. If 
the second, he should render it but not demand 
it. If the third, he can both render it and demand 
it. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it must be said that 
the accusation is instituted for this matter lest 
someone be sustained as innocent who has 
guilt. But just as it happens by ignorance that 
some man is considered innocent in whom 
there is guilt, so also out of ignorance of some 
circumstance it happens that a certain deed is 
believed licit which is illicit; and thus, as a man 
is accused sometimes, so also a deed itself can 
be accused; and thus marriage is excused when 
because of ignorance of an impediment, what is 
illegitimate is deemed legitimate. 
1. Obligation to the penalty of damages 
takes place when a person is accused of a 
crime, for then it is a question of his 
punishment. But when a deed is accused, then 
it is not a matter of punishing someone, but of 
impeding what is illicit. And thus in marriage, 
the accuser does not oblige himself to a certain 
penalty; but such an accusation can be made 
both in words or in writing, so that it expresses 
both the person accusing the marriage, and the 
impediment for which it is accused. 
2. Strangers cannot know consanguinity 
except through those who are consanguineous, 
and regarding them, it is more probable that 
they know. Wherefore when they themselves 
do not speak, suspicion falls on the stranger 
that he may be acting from a bad will, unless he 
wished to be accepted through those who are 
blood relatives; wherefore, he is barred from 
the accusation, when there are consanguineous 
people who keep silent, and by whom it cannot 
be verified. But the consanguineous, no matter 
how closely related they are, are not barred 
from the accusation, when a marriage is 
accused because of a certain perpetual 
impediment, which impedes contracting, and 
invalidates the contract. But when it is accused 
of not having been contracted, then even 
parents suspected are to be barred, unless on 
the side of the one who is inferior in status and 
wealth, concerning which it can be probably 
reckoned that they eagerly desire the marriage 
to stand. 
3. Since the marriage is not yet contracted, 
but only the betrothal, it cannot be accused; for 
what does not exist cannot be accused: but the 
impediment can be made public, so that the 
marriage is not contracted. 
4. That person who at first kept quiet, is 
sometimes heard afterward, if he wishes to call 
the marriage into question, and sometimes he is 
barred; which is clear from the decretal that 
says so: if after the marriage is contracted, 
someone appears as accuser, since he did not 
come forth in public when banns were 
published in the churches according to custom, 
whether the voice of his accusation should be 
admitted can rightly be inquired into. Upon 
which we respond that if at the time set aside 
for denunciation, the one who attacks those 
already united, was outside the diocese, or his 
denunciation could otherwise not come under 
notice, as, for example, if greatly oppressed in 
the heat of sickness, though of sound mind, 
suffering exile, or he was so young in years that 
his age was insufficient for understanding such 
things, or for another legitimate reason, he was 
hindered; then his accusation should be heard; 
otherwise he is beyond a doubt to be barred as 
suspect, unless he confirmed by oath what he 
had objected, and the fact that it did not 
proceed from malice. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
In this case it is necessary that by 
witnesses the truth should be made clear, just 
as in other cases. Nevertheless, as the jurists 
say, in this case many special conditions are 
found, namely that the same person can be 
plaintiff and witness; and that it is not sworn 
concerning calumny, since this is almost a 
spiritual cause; and that those consanguineous 
are admitted to testify; and that judicial order is 
not observed at all, for such a denunciation 
having been made, someone obstinate can be 
excommunicated by a lawsuit uncontested; and 
here the testimony is worth hearing, and after 
publication of the witnesses, the witnesses can 
be introduced. And all of this is so that the sin 
may be impeded, which can exist in such a 
union. 
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1. And by this is evident the answer to the 
objections. 
Exposition 
That which Gregory wrote to the 
venerable bishop is also not to be overlooked. 
Everything is abrogated by new laws; but even 
the degrees of consanguinity and affinity are 
restricted up to the fourth degree. And it must 
be known that the Church separates those 
joined within the aforesaid degrees of 
consanguinity. Be it known that since the 
church does not intend to deprive anyone of his 
right, if, deceived by false witnesses, she 
should separate a marriage when one of the 
persons has been ruined by force, restitution 
should justly be made to that person, even if the 
other has taken a vow of religious life, so that 
in any case it would not be permitted to her to 
request the debt, but only to render it. But when 
the woman presses for the renewal of the 
marriage, a distinction must be made. For if she 
presses a petitory suit that a certain man who 
has contracted with her, be given to her, before 
restitution happens it will be inquired whether 
there is any defense or exception on the part of 
the intended husband. But if she should press a 
possessory suit, first the man is to be restored 
to her as the aforementioned exception is 
treated; and the reasoning is the same if the 
man presses suit. But five cases are commonly 
excepted from either. The first is when the man 
in the case takes exception by bringing up the 
public fornication of his wife. Secondly, when 
he reveals the degree of consanguinity 
prohibited by divine law; nevertheless, if it is 
published, it is necessary that restitution be 
made by legal judgment; but that person is not 
bound to render the debt, if he is conscious of 
the consanguinity mentioned. Thirdly, if an 
objection is made to the exception of the matter 
judged, to which there is no appeal. Fourth, 
when there is so much cruelty in the man, that 
sufficient caution cannot be employed, for 
example, when the man takes revenge upon his 
wife with mortal hatred. The fifth is when the 
one who presses suit has despoiled another 
without cause. 
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DISTINCTION 42 
Prologue 
After the Master has examined the 
impediment of close fleshly relationship, here 
he examines the impediment of close spiritual 
relationship; and it is divided in two parts: in 
the first he shows how a spiritual family 
relationship impedes marriage; in the second he 
inquires whether the second wedding is licit, 
where he says: it must be known also, that not 
only the first, but the second wedding is licit, 
but also third and fourth are not to be 
condemned. The first is in two parts: in the first 
he distinguishes the close spiritual relationship 
from fleshly ones, which were treated above; in 
the second, he pursues close spiritual 
relationship, where he says: spiritual sons are 
those whom we raise from the sacred font. And 
this part is divided in two: in the first he shows 
where close spiritual relationship is contracted; 
in the second, he shows how it may impede 
marriage, where he says: because however 
godfather or godmother are unable to be joined 
to each other...it is taught by the council of 
Mainz. 
And this is in two parts: in the first he 
shows how the spiritual close relationship that 
some person contracts directly, impedes 
marriage,which is likened to consanguinity: in 
the second how that relationship which 
indirectly reflects on the husband from the 
wife, or vice versa, in the mode of a certain 
affinity, where he says: it is also wont to be 
asked if someone is able to marry the 
godmother of his wife, after her demise. The 
first is in two parts: in the first he shows when 
spiritual family relationship impedes marriage 
between the spiritual godfather and the natural 
mother, or vice versa; in the second he shows 
when it impedes marriage between spiritual and 
natural children, where he says: however, that 
spiritual or adoptive children cannot be united 
with natural ones, Pope Nicholas attests. 
The first is in two parts: in the first part he 
shows when spiritual family relationship 
preceding marriage impedes it from being 
contracted, and invalidates the contract 
between godfather and godmother; but not if it 
follows the marriage; in the second, he objects 
to the contrary, and resolves it, where he says: 
but what our God-given Pope says seems to 
address these things. However, that spiritual or 
adoptive children cannot be united with natural 
ones, Pope Nicholas attests. 
Here he shows when marriage is impeded 
between the spiritual and natural offspring of 
one man; and concerning this he does two 
things: first he tests the proposition; secondly, 
he inquires whether this proof extends to 
natural brothers of spiritual offspring, because 
namely they may be united with the natural 
children of a spiritual father, where he says: but 
certain people want to understand this only 
about those children to whom are made 
godfathers. It is also wont to be asked if anyone 
is able to marry the godmother of his wife, after 
her demise. 
About this, he does two things. First he 
shows that spiritual family relationship passes 
from a man to his wife. Secondly, he inquires 
whether they may spiritually be made parents 
of any offspring, where he says: it is wont to be 
asked, if a wife together with her husband 
should sponsor the child in baptism. 
Here there is a threefold question. First, 
concerning spiritual familial relationship. 
Second, concerning legal familial relationship. 
Thirdly, concerning second marriages. 
About the first three things are to be 
asked: 1) whether spiritual familial relationship 
impedes marriage; 2) by what cause it may be 
contracted; 3) among whom it is contracted. 
Article 1 
Whether spiritual familial relationship impedes 
marriage. 
1. It seems that spiritual familial 
relationship does not impede marriage. For 
nothing impedes marriage that is not opposed 
to some good of marriage. But a spiritual 
familial relationship is not opposed to any good 
of marriage. Therefore it does not impede 
marriage. 
2. Furthermore, a perpetual impediment to 
marriage cannot stand together with marriage. 
But spiritual family relationship stands together 
with marriage sometimes, as is stated in the 
text, as when someone baptises his own child 
in the case of necessity: for then he is joined to 
his own wife with a spiritual family 
relationship, nor is the marriage then separated. 
Therefore, spiritual family relationship does not 
impede marriage. 
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3. Furthermore, a union of spirit does not 
pass over into the flesh. But marriage is a 
fleshly conjoining. Therefore since spiritual 
familial relationship is a union of spirit, it 
cannot cross over to impede marriage. 
4. Furthermore, contraries do not have the 
same effects. But a spiritual family relationship 
seems to be contrary to disparity of cult; since 
spiritual familial relationship is a close 
relationship deriving from the bestowal of a 
sacrament, or the intention to the same; but 
disparity of cult consists in lacking the 
sacraments, as was said earlier, in Distinction 
39, Question 1, Article 1. Since therefore 
disparity of cult impedes marriage, it seems 
that spiritual familial relationship does not have 
this effect. 
But to the contrary, the holier a certain 
bond is, the more it is guarded. But the spiritual 
bond is holier than the bodily one. Therefore, 
since the bond of bodily close relationship 
impedes marriage, it seems that also a spiritual 
familial relationship does the same thing. 
Moreover, the conjoining of souls in 
marriage is more important [principalior] than 
the conjoining of bodies, for it precedes it. 
Therefore, much more strongly can a spiritual 
familial relationship impede marriage than a 
carnal one. 
I answer that just as by the propagation of 
the flesh a man receives the being of nature, so 
also by the sacrament he receives the being of 
spiritual grace. Wherefore, just as the bond that 
is contracted by the propagation of the flesh is 
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a thing of a 
certain nature; so also the bond that is 
contracted by the reception of a sacrament, is in 
some way natural to someone, inasmuch as he 
is a member of the Church; and thus, just as 
carnal family relationship impedes marriage, so 
also does a spiritual one by the statute of the 
Church. Nevertheless, a distinction should be 
made about spiritual familial relationship. For 
either it precedes marriage, or it follows it. If it 
preceded, it impedes it from being contracted, 
and invalidates the contract; if it follows, then 
it does not nullify the bond of marriage. But as 
to the act of marriage, a distinction must be 
made. For either a spiritual familial relationship 
is introduced in a case of necessity, as when a 
father baptises his child in danger of death; and 
then it does not impede the marital act on either 
side; or else, it is introduced outside of the case 
of necessity, yet out of ignorance; and then if 
that person by whose act it is introduced 
exercises diligence, the argument is the same as 
with the first; or else, by industry, outside the 
case of necessity; and then that person by 
whom it was introduced loses his right to seek 
the debt; but nevertheless, he should render it, 
for by his fault there should not be anything 
troublesome brought upon the other spouse. 
1. Although spiritual familial relationship 
does not impede any of the principal ends of 
marriage, nevertheless it impedes one of the 
secondary goods, which is the multiplication of 
friendship: for spiritual familial relationship is 
a sufficient reason for friendship in itself; 
wherefore it is fitting that familiarity and 
friendship with others be sought through 
marriage. 
2. Marriage is a perpetual bond; and thus 
no subsequent impediment can nullify it; and 
thus sometimes it happens that marriage and an 
impediment to marriage stand together; but not 
if the impediment precedes it. 
3. In marriage there is not only a bodily 
conjoining, but also a spiritual one; and thus 
the close relationship of the spirit poses an 
impediment to it without the spiritual close 
relationship having to cross over into a fleshly 
one. 
4. It is not unfitting that two contraries be 
opposed to the same thing, as the great and the 
small are to the equal; and thus disparity of cult 
and spiritual family relationship are both 
opposed to marriage: for in one there is a 
greater distance and in the other a greater 
closeness than what marriage requires; and thus 
it is impeded on both sides. 
Article 2 
Whether by baptism alone a close spiritual 
relationship is contracted 
1. It seems that by baptism alone a close 
spiritual relationship is contracted. For just as a 
bodily family connection is related to bodily 
generation, so spiritual family relationship is 
related to spiritual generation. But only baptism 
is called spiritual generation. Therefore, a 
spiritual family relationship is contracted by 
baptism alone, just as a fleshly family relation 
by carnal generation alone. 
2. Furthermore, just as in confirmation a 
character is imprinted, so also in holy orders. 
But a spiritual family relationship does not 
follow from the reception of holy orders. 
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Therefore, neither does one follow from 
confirmation, and so only from baptism. 
3. Furthermore, the sacraments are more 
noble than sacramentals. But from certain 
sacraments a spiritual family relationship does 
not follow, as is clear in extreme unction. 
Therefore, much less from catechism, as certain 
people say. 
4. Furthermore, among the sacramentals of 
baptism, many other are numbered besides 
catechism, as is clear above in Distinction 6. 
Therefore by catechism a spiritual family 
relationship is not contracted more than from 
the others. 
5. Furthermore, prayer is not less 
efficacious for leading someone to the good 
than instruction or catechising. But a spiritual 
family relationship is not contracted by prayer. 
Therefore, neither is it by catechism. 
6. Furthermore, instruction which is given 
to the baptised by preaching is not worth less 
than what is given to the not-yet baptised. But 
by preaching no spiritual family relationship is 
contracted. Therefore, neither by catechism. 
But to the contrary, 1 Corinthians 4:15: in 
Christ Jesus I have fathered you in the Gospel. 
But spiritual generation causes a spiritual 
family relationship. Therefore, by preaching 
the Gospel and by instruction a spiritual family 
relationship happens, and not only by baptism. 
Furthermore, just as by baptism original 
sin is taken away, so also by actual penance. 
Therefore just as baptism causes spiritual 
family relationship, so also does penance. 
Furthermore, father is the name of a 
family relationship. But by penance and 
teaching and pastoral care and many other 
things like this someone is called the spiritual 
father of another. Therefore, by many other 
things besides baptism and confirmation a 
spiritual family relationship is contracted. 
I answer that concerning this there is a 
threefold opinion. 
For certain people say that just as grace of 
the Holy Spirit is given in seven forms, so also 
spiritual regeneration happens by seven acts, 
beginning from the first feeding of salt of the 
sacrament up to the confirmation done by the 
bishop, and by anyone of these seven a spiritual 
family relationship is contracted. But that does 
not seem reasonable: for fleshly family 
relationship is not contracted except by the 
completion of the the act of generation; 
wherefore also affinity is not contracted unless 
the union of seeds has happened, by which 
fleshly generation can result. But spiritual 
generation is not complete unless by a certain 
sacrament. And thus it is unfitting that spiritual 
family relationship is contracted, except by a 
certain sacrament. 
And thus others say that by only three 
sacraments is spiritual family relationship 
contracted; namely by catechism, baptism, and 
confirmation. 
But those people seem to be unaware of 
their own voice: for catechism is not a 
sacrament, but a sacramental. And thus others 
say that only by two sacraments, namely by 
baptism and confirmation; and this opinion is 
more common. Nevertheless, certain of these 
people say concerning catechism, that it is a 
weak impediment that impedes the contracting 
of marriage, but does not invalidate the 
marriage contracted. 
1. The fleshly birth is two-fold. First in the 
uterus, in which what has come to be thus far is 
so fragile that it could not be exposed without 
danger; and the generation by baptism 
resembles this beginning, in which someone is 
regenerated, yet as though still being fostered 
in the womb of the Church. The second is the 
birth from the womb, when now what had 
come to be in the womb, is so strengthened that 
it can without danger be exposed to the outside, 
which is bound to corrupt it; and confirmation 
is compared to this, by which a strengthened 
man is exposed in public to confess the name 
of Christ. And thus fittingly by both of these 
sacraments a spiritual family relationship is 
contracted. 
2. By the sacrament of holy orders no 
regeneration happens, but a certain 
advancement of power; and therefore a woman 
does not receive holy orders; and thus no 
impediment can be erected to marriage by this, 
and thus such a family relationship is not 
considered. 
3. A certain profession of future baptism is 
made in catechism, as in a betrothal a certain 
pledge of future wedding is made; wherefore, 
just as in betrothal a certain kind of close 
relationship is contracted, so also in catechism, 
at least impeding the contracting as certain 
people say; but not in the other sacraments. 
4. Such a profession of faith is not made in 
other sacraments than baptism, as it is in 
catechism; and thus the reason is not the same. 
5,6. And the same thing should be said to 
the fifth, about prayer, and the sixth, about 
preaching. 
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7. The Apostle instructed those people in 
the faith by the mode of catechism, and so in a 
certain way such instruction had an order to 
spiritual family relationship. 
8. By the sacrament of penance is not 
contracted, properly speaking, a spiritual 
family relationship; wherefore the son of a 
priest can contract with someone whom the 
priest has heard in confession: otherwise the 
son of a priest would not find in the whole 
parish a woman with whom he might contract. 
Nor does it hinder that by penance actual sin is 
taken away: for this is not in the mode of 
generation, but more in the mode of healing. 
But nevertheless, by penance a certain bond is 
contracted between the priest and the woman 
confessing, like a spiritual family relationship, 
so that by knowing her carnally he would sin as 
if she were his own spiritual daughter, and this 
because the greatest familiarity is between a 
priest and the one who confesses to him and for 
this that prohibition was introduced, so that the 
occasion of sin might be removed. 
9. The spiritual father is called by his 
likeness to a fleshly father. But a bodily father, 
as the Philosopher states in Book 8 of the 
Ethics, gives three things: being, nourishment, 
and instruction; and thus someone is called 
spiritual father to someone else by reason of 
one of these three things. Nevertheless, the fact 
that someone is a spiritual father, does not 
necessarily mean he has a spiritual family 
relationship, unless he shares with a father what 
pertains to generation, by which there is being. 
And thus also the eight objections that 
preceded can be resolved. 
Article 3 
Whether spiritual familial relationship is contracted 
between the one receiving the sacrament of baptism, 
and the one lifting him from the holy font 
Quaestiuncula 1 
1. It seems that spiritual familial 
relationship is not contracted between the one 
receiving the sacrament of baptism, and the one 
raising him from the holy font. For in fleshly 
generation a close relationship is contracted 
only on the part of the one by whose seed 
offspring is generated, but not on the part of the 
one who receives the child when he is born. 
Therefore, niether is a spiritual family 
relationship contracted between the one who 
receives the child from the holy font, and the 
one who is received. 
2. Furthermore, that person who lifts the 
child from the holy font is called anadocus by 
Dionysius, and it falls to his duty to instruct the 
child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause 
of spiritual family relationship, as was said. 
Therefore, no family relationship is contracted 
between him and the one who is lifted from the 
holy font. 
3. Furthermore, it can happen that 
someone raises someone else from the holy 
font before that person is baptised. But by this, 
no spiritual family relationship is contracted: 
for the person who is not baptised is not 
capable of any spirituality. Therefore, to lift 
someone from the holy font does not suffice to 
contract a spiritual family relationship. 
But to the contrary, is the definition of 
spiritual family relationship introduced above, 
and the authorities who are set forth in the text. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
1. Again. It seems that spiritual family 
relationship does not pass from a man to his 
wife. For spiritual and bodily unions are 
disparate things, and of different genera. 
Therefore, by means of the fleshly union, 
which is between the man and his wife, a 
spiritual family relationship is not transferred. 
2. Furthermore, a spiritual father and 
mother share more in spiritual generation, 
which is the cause of spiritual family 
relationship, than the man who is a spiritual 
father shares with his wife. But a spiritual 
father and mother contract no spiritual family 
relationship from this. Therefore, neither does a 
wife contract any spiritual family relationship 
by the fact that her husband is a spiritual father 
to someone. 
3. Furthermore, it can happen that a man is 
baptised and his wife is not, as when one is 
converted from unbelief without the conversion 
of the other spouse. But spiritual family 
relationship cannot extend to the non-baptised. 
Therefore, it does not always pass from a man 
to his wife. 
4. Furthermore, a man and his wife can lift 
someone from the holy font together. 
Therefore, if a spiritual family relationship 
passes from a man to his wife, it follows that 
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both spouses would be twice father and mother 
to the same person, which is unfitting. 
But to the contrary, spiritual goods can be 
more multiplied than bodily goods. But the 
bodily consanguinity of a man passes to his 
wife by affinity. Therefore, much more does 
spiritual family relationship. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
1. Again. It seems that it does not pass to 
the carnal children of a spiritual father. For 
degrees are not assigned to spiritual family 
relationships, but there would be degrees, if it 
passed from a father to his son; for a person 
generated changes degrees, as was said above 
in Distinction 40, Article 2, Corpus. Therefore 
it does not pass to the carnal children of a 
spiritual father. 
2. Furthermore, a man is related to a son in 
the same degree, as also a brother is to a 
brother. If therefore spiritual family 
relationship passes from a father to a son, by 
the same reasoning it would pass from brother 
to brother, which is false. 
But to the contrary is the fact that it is 
proved in the text by equal authority. 
Quaestiuncula 1 
I answer to the first question that as in 
carnal generation someone is born of a father 
and a mother, so also in spiritual generation 
someone is reborn a son of God as his father, 
and of the Church as his mother. But just as the 
one who confers the sacrament bears the 
persona of God, whose instrument and minister 
he is, so the one who receives the baptised from 
the holy font, or who holds the one to be 
confirmed, bears the persona of the Church; 
wherefore a spiritual family relationship is 
contracted to both. 
1. Not only the father by whose seed 
offspring is generated has a carnal family 
relationship to the one born, but also the 
mother, who bestows the matter and in whose 
womb he is generated; and so also the 
anadocus who offers and receives the baptised 
in the place of the whole Church, and who 
holds the one to be confirmed contracts a 
spiritual family relationship. 
2. Not by reason of the instruction due, but 
by reason of the spiritual generation with which 
it works, he contracts a spiritual family 
relationship. 
3. A non-baptised person cannot raise 
anyone from the holy font, since he is not a 
member of the Church, whose type the one 
being baptised bears; although he may baptise, 
for he is a creature of God, whose type the 
baptiser bears. Nor, however, can he contract 
any spiritual family relationship; for he lacks 
experience in the spiritual life, into which a 
man is born first by baptism. 
Quaestiuncula 2 
To the second question it should be said 
that someone can become compater to another 
in two ways. In one way, by the act of the other 
person baptising, or receiving one's child in 
baptism; and in this way the spiritual family 
relationship does not pass from the husband to 
his wife, unless perhaps that child is the son of 
his wife; for then the wife directly contracts a 
spiritual family relationship, as well as her 
husband. In another way, by the proper act, as 
when he lifts the son of another from the holy 
font; and in this way the spiritual family 
relationship passes to the wife whom he has 
already known carnally; but not if the marriage 
has not yet been consummated, for then they 
have not yet been made one flesh; and this is by 
the mode of a certain affinity; wherefore, also 
by equal reasoning it seems to pass from the 
woman who has already been known carnally, 
although she is not a wife; for which reason the 
verse says: whoever lifted the baby to me from 
the font, or the one whom my wife raised from 
the font, this is my commater, she cannot 
become my wife. If anyone raised up from the 
font the child of my wife, not by me, I am not 
forbidden to have her after the death of my own 
wife. 
1. By the fact that spiritual union and 
bodily union are of different genera, it can be 
concluded that one is not the other; but not that 
one cannot be the cause of the other; for of 
those things that are in different genera, 
sometimes one is the cause of the other either 
per se or per accidens. 
2. A spiritual father and spiritual mother 
of the same person are not joined in spiritual 
generation, except per accidens; for one would 
suffice for this per se; wherefore it is not 
necessary that by this any spiritual family 
relationship should come about between them, 
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so that there could not be a marriage between 
them; wherefore the verse says: one of the 
compaters will always be spiritual, the other 
carnal: nor does such a rule fail. But by 
marriage, a husband and wife are made one 
flesh, speaking per se; and therefore, it is not 
the same. 
3. To the third I say that if the wife is not 
baptised, a spiritual family relationship does 
not extend to her because she does not have the 
capacity, not because a spiritual family 
relationship could not be transferred by 
marriage from the husband to the wife. 
4. By the fact that no spiritual family 
relationship is contracted between a spiritual 
father and mother, nothing prohibits that a 
husband and wife should lift someone from the 
holy font together; nor is it unfitting that the 
wife is made twice the spiritual mother of 
someone by different causes; just as it can also 
be that she has an affinity and is 
consanguineous to the same person by close 
fleshly relationship. 
Quaestiuncula 3 
A son is something of his father, and not 
vice versa, as is said in Book 8 of the Ethics; 
and thus a spiritual family relationship passes 
from the father to the son, but not vice versa, 
and so it is clear that there are three spiritual 
family relations. 
One which is called spiritual paternity, 
which is between a spiritual father and his 
spiritual child. Another, which is called 
compaternity, which is between the spiritual 
father and the carnal father of the same person. 
But the third is called spiritual fraternity, which 
is between the spiritual child and the carnal 
children of the same father. And any one of 
these impedes the contracting of marriage, and 
invalidates the contract. 
1. The person added by propagation of the 
flesh makes a degree with respect to that person 
who is related to him in the same genus, but not 
with respect to the one who is related in 
another genus; as a son is related in the same 
degree to the wife of his father as he is to his 
father, although in another genus of relating. 
But a spiritual family relationship is another 
genus than a fleshly one; and thus a spiritual 
child is not related in the same degree to a 
natural child of his spiritual father, by means of 
which spiritual family relationship passes; and 
so it is not necessary that spiritual family 
relationship have degrees. 
2. A brother is not something of his 
brother's, as a child is something of his father's; 
but a wife is something of her husband's, with 
whom she was made one flesh; And thus it 
does not pass from brother to brother, whether 
he was begotten before or after the spiritual 
brotherhood. 
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QUESTION 2 
Prologue 
Now we must examine legal family 
relationship, which is by adoption. And 
concerning this three things are to be asked: 1) 
about adoption; 2) whether by adoption any 
bond impeding marriage is contracted; 3) 
between which persons it may be contracted. 
Article 1 
Whether adoption is fittingly defined 
1. It seems that adoption is defined 
unfittingly: adoption is the legal assumption of 
a stranger as a son or grandson, and so forth. 
For a son should be subject to his father. But 
sometimes the one who is adopted does not 
pass into the power of his adoptive father. 
Therefore, someone is not always assumed as a 
son by adoption. 
2. Furthermore, parents ought to lay up 
treasure for their children; as said in II 
Corinthians 12. But it is not necessary that an 
adoptive father always save up for his adopted 
child; for sometimes the adopted one does not 
succeed in the goods of the one adopting. 
Therefore, adoption is not the assumption of 
someone as a child. 
3. Furthermore, adoption by which 
someone is assumed as a son, is likened to 
natural generation, by which a son is naturally 
produced. Therefore anyone who is suited for 
the natural generation of a son, is suited for the 
adoption of a son. But this is false; for a person 
who is not sui juris, and someone who is less 
than twenty-five years old, and a woman, 
cannot adopt, though they can generate 
children naturally. And therefore adoption is 
not properly called assumption of someone as a 
son. 
4. Furthermore, assumption of a stranger 
as a son seems to be necessary for supplying a 
lack of natural sons. But that person who 
cannot beget, for example, a eunuch or 
impotent man, suffers the most from the lack of 
natural children. Therefore, it would be most 
befitting to him to assume someone as his son. 
But it is not befitting to him to adopt. 
Therefore, adoption is not the assumption of 
someone as son. 
5. Furthermore, in spiritual family 
relationship, where someone is assumed as a 
son without propagation of the flesh, it does not 
matter if someone who has reached the age of 
majority is made father of a minor, or vice 
versa; for a young man can baptise an old man, 
and vice versa. If therefore by adoption 
someone is assumed as a son without 
propagation of the flesh, likewise it would not 
matter if an older man adopted a younger, or a 
younger adopts an older; which is not true; and 
thus the same as before. 
6. Furthermore, the one adopted does not 
differ according to the same degree from the 
one adopting. Therefore, whoever is adopted, is 
adopted as a son; and thus it is unfittingly said 
that someone is adopted as a grandson. 
7. Furthermore, adoption proceeds from 
love; wherefore also God is said to have 
adopted us as his sons by charity. But greater 
charity should be had for the one nearest than 
for strangers. Therefore, adoption should not be 
of strangers, but more of close relatives. 
I answer that art imitates nature, and 
supplies nature's lack of in those things in 
which nature fails; wherefore just as someone 
produces a child by natural generation, so also 
by positive law, which is the art of the equal 
and good, can someone assume to himself a 
son in likeness of a natural son, and to supply 
the aforementioned lack of sons, because of 
which adoption was particularly introduced. 
And since assumption conveys a terminus from 
which, because of the fact that the one 
assuming is not the one assumed, as was said in 
Book 3, Distinction 5, Question 1, Article 1, 
questiuncula 3, Corpus, it is necessary that the 
one who is assumed as a son be a stranger. 
Therefore, just as natural generation has a 
terminus to which, namely the form which is 
the end of generation, and a terminus from 
which, namely the contrary form; so legal 
generation has a terminus to which, a son or a 
grandson; and terminus from which, a stranger. 
And so it is clear that the designation 
given comprehends the genus of adoption, for 
legitimate assumption is said; and terminus 
from which, which is said stranger; and 
terminus to which, which is called as a son or 
grandson. 
1. The sonship of adoption is a certain 
imitation of natural sonship; and thus the 
species of adoption is two-fold. One which 
perfectly imitates natural sonship, and this is 
called adrogation, by which the adopted one is 
314 
 
reduced to the power of the one adopting, and 
thus the adopted one succeeds his adoptive 
father intestate, nor can the father deprive him 
of a quarter part of his inheritance without 
guilt. But to be adopted in this way cannot be 
unless the one adopted is sui juris, who indeed 
after he is adopted, does not have power, or if 
he has, he is emancipated; and this adoption is 
not done except by the authority of the prince. 
The other adoption, which imitates natural 
sonship imperfectly, is called simple adoption, 
by which the one adopted does not pass into the 
power of the one adopting; wherefore it is a 
certain disposition to perfect adoption, rather 
than a perfect adoption: and according to this, 
someone can also be adopted who is not sui 
juris; and without the authority of the prince, 
by the authority of the magistrate; and this kind 
of adopted child does not succeed in the goods 
of his adoptive parent, nor is the one adopting 
bound to leave him any of his goods in his will, 
unless he wishes. 
2. And by this, the answer to the second 
objection is apparent. 
3. Natural generation is ordered to the 
species resulting; and thus it befits everything 
to be able to generate naturally in which the 
nature of the species is not impeded: but 
adoption is ordered to the succession to an 
inheritance; and thus only those are suited to it 
who have the power of disposing of their 
inheritance; wherefore, someone who is not sui 
juris, or who is less than twenty-five, or who is 
a woman, cannot adopt anyone, unless by 
special concession of the prince. 
4. For someone who has a perpetual 
impediment to generating, his succession 
cannot pass into posterity; for which reason by 
this very fact already it is owed to those who 
must succeed him by right of being near 
relations; and for this reason he is not suited to 
adopt, just as neither is he to procreate. And 
moreover, the sorrow is greater over sons [who 
have been lost than over those] who were never 
had;385 and thus those having an impediment to 
generation do not need consolation for their 
lack of children, like those who have had, but 
have lost them; or even those who could have 
had them but do not because of some accidental 
impediment. 
                                                 
385 Words within brackets taken from the Piana 
edition which adds amissis quam de filiis to this 
sentence. 
5. Spiritual family relationship is 
contracted by the sacrament in which the 
faithful are reborn in Christ, in which male 
does not differ from female, slave from free 
man, young man from old; and thus it does not 
matter who is made the spiritual father of the 
other; but adoption happens by succession of 
heredity, and a certain subjection of the 
adopted to the one adopting. But it is not fitting 
that an older man is subjected to a young one in 
the care of familial things; and thus a minor 
cannot adopt his senior; but it is necessary 
according to the laws that the adopted be young 
enough that he could be the natural son of the 
one adopting. 
6. Just as it happens that children are lost, 
so also are grandchildren; and thus since 
adoption is brought about for consolation of the 
loss of children, just as someone can be 
introduced into the place of a son by adoption, 
so also in the place of a grandson, and so in 
succession. 
7. A near relative must succeed by the law 
of propinquity; and thus it does not befit him to 
be displaced in the succession by adoption; and 
if someone closely related who is not a 
candidate for the hereditary succession should 
be adopted, he is not adopted as a near relative, 
but as someone outside the right of succession 
in the goods of the one adopting. 
Article 2 
Whether by adoption any bond impeding marriage 
is contracted 
1. It seems that by adoption no bond 
impeding marriage is contracted. For spiritual 
care is more noble than bodily care. But by the 
fact that someone is subject to the spiritual care 
of another, no bond of close relation is 
contracted; otherwise, all those who live in a 
parish would be closely related to the priest, 
and could not contract with his son. Therefore, 
neither can adoption do this, which draws the 
adopted into the care of the one adopting. 
2. Furthermore, by the fact that someone 
becomes benefactor to another, no bond of 
close relationship is contracted. But adoption is 
nothing other than the tie of a certain 
benefactor. Therefore, by adoption, no bond of 
close relationship is made. 
3. Furthermore, a natural father principally 
provides for his son in three ways, as the 
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Philosopher says; for from him he has namely 
being, nourishment, and teaching; but the 
hereditary succession is later than these. But by 
the fact that someone provides for someone 
else in nourishment and teaching, no bond of 
close relation is contracted; otherwise, wet 
nurses and schoolmasters and teachers would 
be close relatives, which is false. Therefore, 
neither by adoption by which someone 
succeeds in the inheritance of another, is any 
close relation contracted. 
4. Furthermore, the sacraments of the 
Church are not subject to human laws. But 
marriage is a sacrament of the Church. 
Therefore, since adoption is devised by human 
law, it seems that marriage cannot be impeded 
by any bond contracted by adoption. 
But to the contrary, family relationship 
impedes marriage. But a certain family 
relationship, namely, a legal one, is caused by 
adoption, as is evident from its definition; for a 
legal family relationship is a certain closeness 
arising from adoption. Therefore, adoption 
causes a bond by which marriage is impeded. 
Moreover, this same thing is held by the 
authorities cited in the text. 
I answer that divine law excludes 
especially those persons from marriage who 
must live together, lest, as Rabbi Moses says, if 
carnal intimacy were permitted to them, an 
easy place would be open to concupiscence, to 
the repression of which marriage was ordained; 
and since an adopted son frequents the house of 
his adoptive father as a natural son would, thus 
by human laws it is prohibited for marriage to 
be contracted between such as these; and such a 
prohibition is approved by the Church; and for 
this reason it is held that legal family 
relationship impedes marriage. 
1,2,3. And by this the answer to the first 
three is evident; for by all those things such a 
cohabitation is not brought in which could 
present an incitement to concupiscence; and 
thus by these things no close relationship is 
caused that impedes marriage. 
4. The prohibition of human law would 
not suffice for an impediment to marriage, 
unless the authorities of the Church should 
intervene, which also forbids the same thing. 
Article 3 
Whether such a family relationship is not contracted 
except between the adoptive father and the adopted 
son 
1. It seems that such a family relationship 
is not contracted except between the adoptive 
father and the adopted son. For mostly it would 
seem that it should be contracted between the 
adoptive father and the natural mother of the 
adopted, just as happens in spiritual family 
relationship. But between people such as these 
there is a legal family relationship. Therefore, 
neither between persons beyond the adoptive 
person and the adopted. 
2. Furthermore, a family relationship 
impeding marriage is a perpetual impediment. 
But between the adopted son and the natural 
daughter of the one adopting there is not a 
perpetual impediment; for once the adoption is 
dissolved by the death of the one adopting, or 
the emancipation of the one adopted, he can 
contract with her. Therefore, with her he did 
not have any family relationship that would 
impede marriage. 
3. Furthermore, spiritual family 
relationship passes to no person who could not 
give the sacrament or receive it; wherefore, it 
does not pass to a non-baptised. But a woman 
cannot adopt, as is clear from what has been 
said. Therefore, a legal family relationship does 
not pass from a husband to his wife. 
4. Furthermore, spiritual family 
relationship is stronger than a legal one. But a 
spiritual family relationship does not pass to a 
grandson. Therefore, neither does a legal one. 
But to the contrary, a legal family 
relationship has more to do with the union or 
propagation of the flesh than the spiritual one 
does. But the spiritual family relationship 
passes to the other person in the way explained, 
as was said. Therefore, so does a legal one. 
I answer that legal family relationship is 
threefold. The first is that of descendants, 
which is contracted between an adoptive father 
and his adopted son, and the son of the 
adoptive son, and the grandson, and so on in 
succession. The second, which is between the 
adopted child and the natural child. The third 
by the mode of a certain affinity, which is 
between the adoptive father and the wife of the 
adopted son, or conversely between the 
adopted son and the wife of his adoptive father. 
Therefore, the first familial relationship and the 
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third impede marriage perpetually; but the 
second, not unless he remains for a long time in 
the power of his adoptive father; wherefore, 
when the father is dead, or the son is 
emancipated, marriage can be contracted 
between them. 
1. By spiritual generation, a son is not 
drawn outside the power of his father, as is 
done by adoption; and so the spiritual child 
remains the child of both at the same time, but 
the adoptive child does not; and thus no close 
relationship is contracted between the adoptive 
father and the natural mother and father, as was 
the case in spiritual familial relationship. 
2. Legal family relationship impedes 
marriage because of cohabitation; and thus 
when the necessity of living together is 
dissolved, it is not unfitting if the bond spoken 
of does not remain, as when he was beyond the 
power of the same father. But an adoptive 
father and his wife always retain a certain 
authority over the adopted son and his wife; 
and because of this, the bond remains between 
them. 
3. A woman can also adopt by concession 
of the prince; for which reason the legal family 
relationship can also pass into her. And 
furthermore, the reason that spiritual family 
relationship does not pass to the non-baptised is 
not because they cannot hold to the sacrament, 
but because they do not have the capacity for 
any spirituality. 
4. By a spiritual family relationship, a son 
is not established in the power and care of his 
spiritual father, as in legal family relationships. 
For it is necessary that whatever is in the power 
of the son should pass into the power of the 
adoptive father; wherefore, by the adoptive 
father are adopted the sons and the grandsons, 
who are in the power of the one adopted. 
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QUESTION 3 
Prologue 
Now it is to be examined concerning 
second weddings; and concerning this there are 
two things to be asked: 1) whether they are 
licit; 2)whether they are sacramental. 
Article 1 
Whether second marriages are licit 
1. It seems that second weddings are not 
licit. For the judgment of a thing should be 
according to the truth. For Chrysostom says 
that to take a second husband is, according to 
the truth, fornication: which is not licit. 
Therefore, neither is the second marriage. 
2. Furthermore, everything that is not 
good is not licit. But Ambrose says that a 
twofold marriage is not good. Therefore, it is 
not licit. 
3. Furthermore, no one should be barred 
from taking part in what is decent and licit. But 
priests are barred from taking part in second 
weddings, as is evident from the text. 
Therefore, they are not licit. 
4. Furthermore, no one incurs a penalty, 
except for guilt. But for a second wedding, a 
person incurs the penalty of irregularity. 
Therefore, they are not licit. 
But to the contrary is that Abraham is read 
to have contracted a second marriage in 
Genesis 25. 
Moreover, in 1 Timothy 5:14, the Apostle 
says: but I wish the younger ones, namely, 
widows, to wed, to procreate children. 
Therefore, second marriages are licit. 
I answer that the matrimonial bond only 
lasts up until death, as is clear from Romans 7; 
and thus when one spouse dies, the matrimonial 
bond ceases. Wherefore, because of a 
preceding marriage someone is not impeded 
from a second, once the spouse is dead, and so 
not only a second, but a third, and so forth, are 
licit marriages. 
1. Chrysostom is speaking about the cause 
that sometimes is wont to incite someone to a 
second marriage, namely concupiscence, which 
also incites to fornication. 
2. The second marriage is not said to be 
good, not because it is illicit, but because it 
lacks that honor of signification that is in the 
first marriage, that it might be one woman of 
one man, as it is in Christ and the Church. 
3. Men dedicated to divine things are not 
only barred from illicit things, but even from 
things which have some aspect of baseness; 
and thus also they are barred from second 
marriages, which lack the dignity that there was 
in the first one. 
4. Irregularity, as was said above in 
Distinction 29, Question 3, article 1, is not 
always introduced because of fault, but because 
of a defect of sacrament; and thus the argument 
is not to the point. 
Article 2 
Whether the second marriage is a sacrament. 
1. It seems that the second marriage is not 
a sacrament. For whoever repeats a sacrament, 
does harm to it. But injury is done to no 
sacrament. Therefore, if a second marriage 
were a sacrament, in no way could it be 
repeated. 
2. Furthermore, in every sacrament some 
blessing is applied. Yet in a second marriage it 
is not applied, as is said in the text. Therefore, 
no sacrament happens there. 
3. Furthermore, signification is of the 
essence of the sacrament. But in the second 
marriage, the signification of marriage is not 
preserved; for there is not one woman for one 
man, like Christ and the Church. Therefore, 
there is no sacrament. 
4. Furthermore, one sacrament does not 
impede the reception of another. But a second 
marriage impedes the reception of holy orders. 
Therefore, it is not a sacrament. 
But to the contrary, intercourse in the 
second marriage is excused from sin, as also in 
the first. But matrimonial intercourse is 
excused by three goods of the marital union, 
which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. 
Therefore, a second marriage is a sacrament. 
Furthermore, by the second non-
sacramental union of a man to a woman, 
irregularity is not contracted, as is evident 
concerning fornication. But in the second 
marriage irregularity is contracted. Therefore it 
is sacramental. 
I answer that wherever those things are 
found that are of the essence of a sacrament, 
there is a valid sacrament; wherefore, since in a 
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second marriage everything that is of the 
essence of the sacrament is found--for the due 
matter, which makes the eligibility of the 
persons, and the due form, namely the 
expression of interior consent through words 
establish that the second marriage is also a 
sacrament like the first. 
1. This is understood about a sacrament 
that brings about a perpetual effect; for then if 
the sacrament is repeated, it is given to 
understand that the first was not efficacious; 
and thus injury is done to the first, as is clear in 
all the sacraments that imprint characters. But 
those sacraments that do not have a perpetual 
effect can be repeated without injury to the 
sacrament, as is evident in the case of penance. 
And since a matrimonial bond is removed by 
death, no injury is done to the sacrament, if the 
woman marries again after the death of her 
husband. 
2. The second marriage, although 
considered in itself, it is a perfect sacrament, 
yet considered in order to the first, it has 
something of a defect of sacrament, for it does 
not have the full signification, since it is not 
one woman for one man, as it is in the marriage 
of Christ and the Church; and by reason of this 
defect, a blessing is taken away from the 
second marriage. But this is to be understood 
when the second marriage is second on the part 
of the man and on the part of the woman, or on 
the part of the woman alone. For if a virgin 
contracts with a man who has had another wife, 
nevertheless the marriage is blessed, for the 
signification is preserved in a certain mode also 
in its order to the first marriage; for Christ, 
even if he had one Church as his bride, still had 
many espoused in the one Church; but the soul 
cannot be the bride of anyone other than Christ, 
for with a demon it fornicates, nor is there a 
spiritual marriage; and because of this when a 
woman marries a second time, the marriage is 
not blessed because of the defect of the 
sacrament. 
3. The complete signification is found in 
the second marriage considered it itself, but not 
if it is considered in order to the preceding 
marriage; and in this way it has a defect of 
sacrament. 
4. The second marriage impedes the 
sacrament of holy orders as regards its defect of 
sacrament, not as regards its being a sacrament. 
Exposition 
All whom we receive in penance, are our 
sons just as those received in baptism: not by 
reason of some family relationship, but because 
of the danger to be avoided, as was said. 
Indeed, Paschal II prohibits the neophytes 
from being joined physically after 
compaternity. That prohibition is now not in 
force; for it was more because of a certain 
propriety than because of any bond. 
If someone accidentally married the 
daughter of his own spiritual commater, having 
kept the more mature counsel, let him have her. 
This is said therefore, because spiritual family 
relationship passes from a spiritual child to a 
natural child by the father; for all the natural 
children of a spiritual father are spiritual 
brothers to him; but not in respect of the father: 
for a father's spiritual sons do not become 
natural sons of the mother, or vice versa. 
But since someone who married two 
commaters or sisters, incurred expiative 
disgrace, a greater penance should be enjoined 
upon him. This is to be understood when one of 
these women was made commater of the other, 
afterwards is his wife in consummated 
marriage, and through the proper act: 
otherwise, it is prohibited, as was said. 
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